RealGM 50 Highest Peaks Project Thread

[thebottomline]

But what WERE the arguments against his '67 season? "-3 SRS from '67 to '69!" It began and ended there. And I've already rebutted that with the '93 Jordan point.

If you can point me to posts where people were actually able to find arguments against the '67 season ITSELF, please, by all means.

93 Jordan isn't a strong rebuttal though because context is important. The Bulls were an 8.6 and 10.1 SRS team in 91 and 92. In 93 we know they coasted as they went from a +4.9 ORtg / -1.9 DRtg team in the regular season back up to a +8.9 ORtg / -3.0 DRtg in the playoffs... So they were clearly a stronger team than they showed during the 93 RS. After all, their personnel barely changed throughout that threepeat.

Jordan leaves and the 94 Bulls fall to 2.9 SRS... and fall to -0.2 offensively (after being +6.7, +7.4 and +4.9 the previous 3 years). When Jordan came back in 1995, rusty and out of basketball shape, the offense jumped to +5.0 in the games with him. Then he gets back in shape and plays full seasons in 96 and 97 and they're back to +7.6 and +7.7 offensively (the addition of Rodman among other slight changes were important too).

So when you consider the greater context this is a really poor argument to use unless you're trying to argue FOR Jordan's impact.

As for Wilt, keep in mind that when I say "arguments against him" I am also lumping in the arguments in favor of Jordan, Shaq, and Russell which ended up being stronger than Wilt's case (because again, none of the Wilt supporters successfully addressed any of the arguments).

This is the post that had me reconsider how much credit Wilt deserves for the Sixers offense:

viewtopic.php?f=64&t=1198314&start=15#p32866734

The Sixers offense went from +0.4 in 1966 to +5.3 in 1967... As we know, Wilt stopped shooting so much and became a facilitator for his teammates, and the offense skyrocketed. And just how good were his teammates - good enough to post a +2.7 offense after he left!

So how much credit does Wilt deserve for that offense if he stops shooting and the offense skyrockets, and then his teammates prove they were a very good offensive supporting cast (+2.7) without him? Even if they were really a +1 or +2 supporting cast in 1967 and Wilt took them to +5.3, that's still nowhere close to GOAT offensive impact by Wilt... To use the scale that some have used in this project, if Magic, Bird, Jordan, Nash are in the +7 to +8 offensive impact range, and Shaq and Kareem are in the +5 to +6 range, then Wilt is clearly below them, around +4 IMO.

I used to look at Wilt's raw box score numbers (24/24/8 on 68 FG%!!) and think 1967 Wilt was arguably the best offensive season ever... but then I realize the faster pace and see his pace adjusted numbers (16/16/5 per 75 possessions), I acknowledge a critical coaching change in 1967, I see Wilt's FGA dropping drastically in 1967 and the offense concurrently exploding, I see evidence that his supporting cast was very good offensively... and I just can't give Wilt the same offensive credit I used to.

Now, his excellent defense is why his peak still ranks extremely high. But even there, his defense in 1967 wasn't quite as good as it was in 1964 or 1968 as others have argued. Taking all of that into account and not seeing any arguments that rebut any of these points that were made in the project's early threads, that's why I now view Wilt's peak a bit lower than before. It's not just because of "-3 SRS!"

[Doctor MJ]

The bottom line for me is that if you are achieving a basic statistical achievement without having the actual impact that stat is supposed to mean you're having, it means you've "hacked" the stat by a micro-optimization strategy which undoes the good a player typically does.

"Hacking"? Sounds like you're taking a reasonable, plausible explanation for something (see Dipper13's posts and my posts with tsherkin) and reducing it to a fuzzy, buzzword "intangible" or process that doesn't explain anything. And that's the downside of "impact" stats: they don't explain HOW that "impact" is taking place. "Impact" can be ascribed to a bunch of different factors that may or may not have anything to do with a player's ability to play team basketball better than another player. I'm interested in the HOW.

We both know you're better than that

Fuzzy buzzword? We've actually had historical quotes here talking about Wilt's choice in '68 to pass to jump shooters instead of drivers in order to maximize his chances of an assist. More generally, Wilt's obsession with his own stats, and at different times different stats, is well known. If it wasn't quantified, then Wilt just didn't focus on it as much.

I'm talking about stuff here I'm assuming is concrete to people. If it isn't to you, ask about it.

Re: downside of impact stats. Agree that that's a problem, and that very much shapes how I used them.

However in the case of Wilt, the most glaring issues which people refuse to knock him on involve massive amounts of contradiction. Well and good to say "Look at those stats and what most of the contemporaries said, how can you go agains that?" in a normal situation, but Alex Hannum clearly saw a massive problem, and Hannum was proven right on a level almost know coach in the history of sports has been while deviating from existing norms. To refuse to go against the norm, is to dare to go against Hannum, which should be a vastly more daunting prospect to people.

Why isn't it? Because most people have no freakin' idea who Alex Hannum even was.

[Dipper 13]

The Sixers offense went from +0.4 in 1966 to +5.3 in 1967... As we know, Wilt stopped shooting so much and became a facilitator for his teammates, and the offense skyrocketed. And just how good were his teammates - good enough to post a +2.7 offense after he left!

According to the RPOY project, the Sixers offense went from +0.7 in 1966 to +6.7 in 1967. And went down to +3.0 in 1969.

I would like to know exactly what changed in these calculations to make them more "accurate" (according to ElGee), or even what they are to begin with. Please share your insider knowledge with me.

good enough to post a +2.7 offense after he left!

The reason they were this effective is in large part due to Billy C's rapid improvement & their change to a finesse running team offensively with even more movement & passing to compensate for the size lost in the paint. Defensively they played a scrambling 3-1-1 zone defense with guards like Wali pressing full court. Jack Ramsay set a maximum weight for each player, threatening them with a fine of $100 for every pound "overweight" they were. Also don't forget Archie Clark, who was a part of the '68 Lakers & a nice fit for the new style Sixers of 1969.

[thebottomline]

The Sixers offense went from +0.4 in 1966 to +5.3 in 1967... As we know, Wilt stopped shooting so much and became a facilitator for his teammates, and the offense skyrocketed. And just how good were his teammates - good enough to post a +2.7 offense after he left!

According to the RPOY project, the Sixers offense went from +0.7 in 1966 to +6.7 in 1967. And went down to +3.0 in 1969.

I would like to know exactly what changed in these calculations to make them more "accurate" (according to ElGee), or even what they are to begin with. Please share your insider knowledge with me.

good enough to post a +2.7 offense after he left!

The reason they were this effective is in large part due to Billy C's rapid improvement & their change to a finesse running team offensively with even more movement & passing to compensate for the size lost in the paint. Defensively they played a scrambling 3-1-1 zone defense with guards like Wali pressing full court. Jack Ramsay set a maximum weight for each player, threatening them with a fine of $100 for every pound "overweight" they were. Also don't forget Archie Clark, who was a part of the '68 Lakers & a nice fit for the new style Sixers of 1969.

The updated numbers are based on a more accurate method of estimating pace from ElGee's blog. There's a link in there detailing the method.

http://www.backpicks.com/pre-1974-estimations/

I allowed for possible improvements that might have contributed to the 1969 Sixers +2.7 offense. While Cunningham improved, I don't think his improvement was very large. The biggest difference was more minutes played; his per-36 numbers didn't take some giant leap.

Your claim about the 1969 Sixers turning into a running team is unsupported by pace estimations which show the 1969 Sixers played 4 possessions slower than in 1968 and 2.4 possessions slower than in 1967. If you meant there was simply more player movement during offensive plays then point taken.

But as I said, even if Wilt's supporting cast in 1967 were closer to +1 offensively or something rather than closer to +2.7... I'm still not seeing GOAT or near-GOAT level offensive impact from Wilt.

Another issue I have with 1967 is that it's such an outlier that it's hard to be confident that Wilt even deserves the amount of credit I still give him for that offense. I mean, the best offense he led prior to 1967 was +1.7... his other offenses were either league average or poor. It wasn't until he paired up with Jerry West that he was on another great offense outside of 1967. Without any solid trends of great offensive impact that we see from players like Magic, Bird, Nash, Jordan, Shaq, Kareem, Oscar, etc... I just can't be quite as confident giving Wilt so much offensive credit for 1967.

Also to put some of Wilt's raw averages into perspective... His 7.8 APG translated to 21.7 AST%, which is not so far beyond what other elite big men have done. KG for example assisted on more of his team's FG five years in a row (24.3 AST% from 2001-2005). 00 Shaq's AST% was 19.3. 03 Duncan's AST% was 19.5, and 25.5 in the playoffs. Hakeem's AST% was 20+ in the playoffs from 1993-1995. Walton of course had some 20+ AST% seasons. Wilt's raw APG average of 7.8 makes his playmaking seem so incredibly outstanding compared to those guys, when in reality his averages are very inflated due to pace.

And Wilt scored at a rate of about 16 points per 75 possessions... Jordan literally averaged more than double the amount of points per 75 possessions during his peak on 60-61 TS%. Wilt's 64 TS% is of course amazing, but his FT shooting is still a weakness.

So yeah, I have some doubts about how great Wilt really was offensively, coupled with doubts about how good he was defensively in 1967 compared to his other seasons, and that's why he fell out of my top 5 peaks. Again, to say there are no arguments against Wilt except for -3 SRS is just silly.

[Dipper 13]

I just can't be quite as confident giving Wilt so much offensive credit for 1967.

So you agree with me the Sixers that year were the best team ever? This should be the next project on this forum. They certainly have the top frontcourt & overall balance of any team in the shot clock era.

Your claim about the 1969 Sixers turning into a running team is unsupported by pace estimations which show the 1969 Sixers played 4 possessions slower than in 1968 and 2.4 possessions slower than in 1967.

How can this be? It directly contradicts observer recaps as well as the game plan from Coach Ramsay himself. It was all they could do to make for the massive rebounding hit they took on both ends without Wilt (and Jackson after 25 games).




New York Times - Nov 20, 1968

Without Wilt Chamberlain, the 76ers are necessarily a faster, more fluid team.




Christian Science Monitor - Oct 15, 1968

Even without Wilt Chamberlain, the Philadelphia 76ers this year will be massive in size and talent. They will play a different game, built around more running, more passing, more defense, and more-diversified rebounding. But the overall results may be just as impressive. Chamberlain, who has worn out coaches than the Greyhound people, will be replaced by Luke Jackson, a natural center who has been playing the corner.

"Without Wilt, our approach will be different," said Coach Jack Ramsay, who has left his general manager's chair for a year on the bench. "We may not handle rival teams as easy as we have in the past, but we'll be tough. We're going to pressure people on defense. "We can't play a low post game any more," Ramsay continued. "When the clock begins to run out on us now we won't be able to funnel the ball into the pivot and let Chamberlain do the scoring. We're going to have to include more people in our offense and fastbreak whenever possible."




Christian Science Monitor - Mar 28, 1969

Ramsay teaches a disciplined defense and for the most part, a disciplined offense. While the 76ers run a lot, they almost always run with a purpose. Most of their free-lancing on offense comes only from their forwards. Philadelphia has been built to exploit other team's mistakes, while committing a minimum of their own. They seldom beat themselves. The 76ers probably would have won the Eastern Division title during the regular season if they hadn't lost their No. 1 pivot, Luke Jackson, after only 25 games. Jackson was board strength, plus scoring. While Darrall Imhoff, the man who replaced Jackson, did a marvelous fill-in job in 'Luke's absence, second best is never quite as good as the original. Losing Jackson put a double rebounding burden on Philadelphia's two starting forwards, Billy Cunningham and Chet Walker. Cunningham had a sensational year. He was great on the offensive board, he was excellent on defense; and he scored almost 25 a game.

Imhoff, the starting center, is one of the best passers in the league for a big man. He averaged 30 minutes of strong basketball. a game and he got good backup help from George Wilson, who came over to the 76ers in mid-season in a deal with Phoenix. Wally Jones and Hal Greer, the backcourt guards, complement each other nicely in what they do. Greer is a great scorer - one of the best middle-distance shooters in the history of the game. Jones is either all-on or all-off as a scorer, but his defense always the texture of barbed-wire.





Sports Illustrated - October 21, 1968

If the Boston-New York equation is to be upset, Philadelphia is the most likely team to do it. Jack Ramsay, the general manager, will coach the 76ers this year. He had to leave college coaching because he was so intense that the emotional strain was producing a threat to his eyesight. He has reportedly recovered, but it took only one close exhibition loss to deprive him of a good sleep. Ramsay is a well-loved man, and some of his friends are privately distressed that he is coaching again. Hopefully, their concern is only an affectionate overreaction.

Ramsay is asking a great deal of his charges, who will again play their home games at the Spectrum if the roof doesn't blow off a third time. He will go to the fast break, to a half-court press from a man-to-man defense and a full-court press off a 3-1-1 zone—a gambling, scrambling defense that requires a collegiate dedication. The team has responded to such typically Ramsay candor as: "I want you to be the best physically conditioned team in the league. When you're playing four nights in a row in four cities that may span the country you have to learn to play with fatigue and still play well."

The 76ers' backcourt—Hal Greer, Archie Clark, Wally Jones and Swingman Matt Guokas—is among the very best offensively and will have to scratch for steals, too, because the 76ers will no longer always get the ball off the boards. The forwards lack muscle. Luke Jackson has returned to center in place of Chamberlain, and none of the other cornermen—Chet Walker, Billy Cunningham, Guokas or Johnny Green—has the strength to handle the big forwards.

Darrall Imhoff came from Los Angeles in the Chamberlain deal, and he will not only spell Jackson in the pivot, but will probably start there against some teams so that Jackson can be freed to muscle somebody else in the corner. Another center, rookie Craig Raymond, does not figure to see much action; neither, for now, does Shaler Halimon, the potentially outstanding swingman from Utah State.

Jackson tends to put on weight. He came in at 272 when Ramsay had been hoping for 240, but the extra pounds may serve big Luke well in the middle. He is no novice there, anyway. In pre-Chamberlain days the 76ers twice beat the Celtics, with Jackson battling Russell underneath. He has a good outside shot, too, and both he and Imhoff can play the high post. Shooters like Greer and Walker know how to use a good postman, having worked with the best, Johnny Kerr, when they were at Syracuse. Greer prefers to go off a pick anyway, and this should be his greatest scoring year. It is rebounding, though, that will probably keep the 76ers from matching Boston or New York.




Sports Illustrated - February 24, 1969

Philadelphia really has no business being in the race. The 76ers traded Wilt Chamberlain, the greatest scorer and second-best rebounder in the history of the game, to the Lakers, and their fine coach, Alex Hannum, switched over to the ABA. Then in December 6'9" Lucious Jackson, Chamberlain's burly replacement, went out with an Achilles' tendon injury and it seemed time to deflate the basketballs and disband. Yet, there stands Philadelphia right up near the head of the class and attendance at the Spectrum is running about 2,000 a game ahead of last season. If high winds do not damage the Spectrum's roof again, the lid might be blown off by sheer fan enthusiasm.

"After Wilt was traded, the best the papers could say was we'd be a more exciting team without him," says Billy Cunningham. "That's like somebody fixing you up with an ugly blind date and then trying to hide what a loser she is by saying she's a great dancer."

The main reason for the 76ers' surprise success is Cunningham, the brash forward from Brooklyn who is known as The Kangaroo Kid or just Kang. He is only 6'6", a sapling in a courtful of redwoods, but he is the team leader in rebounds and 10th in the NBA. That, he says, is what, comes of growing up practicing on playgrounds with guys nicknamed Airplane, Helicopter and The Elevator Man.

Operating last season as one of the league's best sixth men, Cunningham scored 19 points a game. Now, as a starter (and an All-Star pick), he is averaging almost 25, some baskets coming on the long jump shot he has perfected since his college days at North Carolina but most coming in heavy traffic close to the hoop. He loves to free-lance and is much more effective now that Chamberlain is not clogging up the key.

"You can't really stop him, he takes bad shots," said an Eastern Division opponent. "I don't think he can make 'em when you're not on him. He needs contact. He likes to go down the middle or across the middle, sort of like Elgin Baylor used to play—hanging up there and making shots under his arm and every which way."

"I wasn't too good at outside shooting before I turned pro," explains Cunningham, "because when I was learning basketball at home in Brooklyn we always played outdoors. Nobody shot jumpers much because you had to know where the wind was blowing from and compensate for it. Mostly it was a driving game."

Not only does he rebound and score, but he officiates, too. Many NBA players grouse about decisions that affect them directly. Cunningham likes to get in a word or two or three on almost every play, even if he is a floor length away from the incident. If a fellow 76er is the victim of a foul, Cunningham often makes the call before the referee has a chance to blow his whistle. In a game in New York he was, as usual, playing and officiating at the same time when Knickerbocker Coach Red Holzman, not having much luck with the refs that night, hollered in desperation, "Billy, if you're going to referee, how about calling them both ways."

Cunningham denies he deserves an honorary striped shirt, saying, with a touch of modesty, "I don't call three-second violations much."

Philadelphia is not all Cunningham, of course. After General Manager Jack Ramsay reluctantly replaced Hannum with himself, he installed a full-court press that is feared all around the league. He decided to put Guards Hal Greer, Wally Jones and Archie Clark in at the same time, backed up by Cunningham, and the result was a sort of dash-and-scramble mayhem that helps make up for the rebounding strength that disappeared with Chamberlain and Jackson.

"I figure with our speed and extra defense we can give away 10 rebounds a game and still win," says Ramsay. "To do it we must force turnovers and then handle the ball well when we get it. So far, it's worked."

[Dipper 13]

viewtopic.php?f=344&t=955514#p21695849


What about the 1968 Sixers—the year they lost in the playoffs after having dethroned the Celtics in 1967?

http://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key= ... fbVE&hl=en

A much better rebounding team than either of the Celtics teams. Wilt is, as usual, over 20 in Reb %. Luke Jackson and Wilt combined for a Reb % of about 33.5, which is very good for a frontcourt combo. The SF position was strong too with Chet Walker and Billy Cunningham, and even though the team's guards did not hit the glass well, the 1968 Sixers grabbed about 51.5% of the rebounds per game...in modern pace, they'd outrebound their opponents by about 2.5 boards a game.

But Billy Cunningham...isn't he supposedly a great rebounder? Why is he (only) around 10 in Reb %? Because he played next to Wilt. Look what happened in 1969, after Wilt left.

http://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key= ... Ndnc&hl=en

Luke Jackson got hurt early this season (his Reb % went up as wellm though...a ten percent or so increase to around 14.6). This forced Cunningham to play PF; the Sixers were a very small team. (C—Imhoff/Green, PF—Cunningham/Jackson, SF—Walker, SG—Greer, PG—Jones.) But when we look at it by position, the Sixers lost almost all of their rebounding at a specific position...the Center position. If you compare the PFs of 1968 and 1969, you find that Cunningham rebounded about as well as Luke Jackson did in 1968. Chet Walker rebounded as well as Cunningham (and, well, Chet Walker) had in 1968. Wali Jones and Hal Greer had fairly insigificant rises in their rebounding at the guard positions. But Darrel Imhoff, Jumpin' Johnny Green and George Wilson combined for about a Reb % of about 15.5. That's a drop of about 4.7% for that position. Over 3800 minutes (which is what Imhoff/Green/Wilson played in 1969, and Wilt played in 1968), that's a difference of about 430 rebounds. The 1968 Sixers outrebounded their opponents by an estimated 300 boards; the 1969 Sixers were outrebounded by an estimated 240 boards. 80% of that difference is Wilt's leaving.

[MisterWestside]

Fuzzy buzzword? We've actually had historical quotes here talking about Wilt's choice in '68 to pass to jump shooters instead of drivers in order to maximize his chances of an assist. More generally, Wilt's obsession with his own stats, and at different times different stats, is well known. If it wasn't quantified, then Wilt just didn't focus on it as much.

This gets away a bit from my original point, but the downside to waiting for the perfect assist opportunity is that if you don't pass the ball, you're more likely to have to take the shot yourself with the shot clock running down (which is a higher risk proposition than any pass you'll make). Of course you could also fling it out to an open shooter with a second left, but back in the no-3 pt line/unpolished jumpshooting NBA, that's likely not to be an assist anyway.

And even with all of that said, maintaining a solid ts% while shooting the ball 22+ times a game (and unassisted shots, to boot; Wilt was not shy about taking the tough shot) is the most taxing thing for any basketball player to carry out on offense. Try it in your next pickup game.

To refuse to go against the norm, is to dare to go against Hannum, which should be a vastly more daunting prospect to people.

Didn't say Hannum wasn't correct to make Wilt a more passing hub than low-post scorer to help his teams. Again, this goes right back to the point I made earlier; this strategy was more beneficial based on the era of basketball that Wilt played in. Put the celebrated but shot-chucking Hakeem or the low-post bruiser Shaq back in the 60s, and they would run into the same issues.

[Lightning25]

Since we are at #28, I've decided to compile my own personal top 25 peaks of all-time

1. 1991 Jordan
2. 1967 Wilt
3. 2000 Shaq
4. 1994 Hakeem
5. 1965 Russell
6. 1977 Kareem
7. 2012 Lebron
8. 1986 Bird
9. 1987 Magic
10. 1977 Walton
11. 2003 Duncan
12. 2008 Kobe
13. 2009 Wade
14. 1976 Erving
15. 1963 Oscar
16. 2004 Garnett
17. 1995 Robinson
18. 1990 Ewing
19. 1966 West
20. 2011 Dirk
21. 2008 CP3
22. 2005 Nash
23. 1983 Moses
24. 1993 Barkley
25. 1998 Malone

[ardee]

Since we are at #28, I've decided to compile my own personal top 25 peaks of all-time

1. 1991 Jordan
2. 1967 Wilt
3. 2000 Shaq
4. 1994 Hakeem
5. 1965 Russell
6. 1977 Kareem
7. 2012 Lebron
8. 1986 Bird
9. 1987 Magic
10. 1977 Walton
11. 2003 Duncan
12. 2008 Kobe
13. 2009 Wade
14. 1976 Erving
15. 1963 Oscar
16. 2004 Garnett
17. 1995 Robinson
18. 1990 Ewing
19. 1966 West
20. 2011 Dirk
21. 2008 CP3
22. 2005 Nash
23. 1983 Moses
24. 1993 Barkley
25. 1998 Malone

That's a pretty good list, but aren't Magic and Bird a bit low?

[Lightning25]

That's a pretty good list, but aren't Magic and Bird a bit low?

I'm considering putting Magic, Bird, and Lebron above Kareem but I do think Lebron had a better peak than both.

[Doctor MJ]

Fuzzy buzzword? We've actually had historical quotes here talking about Wilt's choice in '68 to pass to jump shooters instead of drivers in order to maximize his chances of an assist. More generally, Wilt's obsession with his own stats, and at different times different stats, is well known. If it wasn't quantified, then Wilt just didn't focus on it as much.

This gets away a bit from my original point, but the downside to waiting for the perfect assist opportunity is that if you don't pass the ball, you're more likely to have to take the shot yourself with the shot clock running down (which is a higher risk proposition than any pass you'll make). Of course you could also fling it out to an open shooter with a second left, but back in the no-3 pt line/unpolished jumpshooting NBA, that's likely not to be an assist anyway.

And even with all of that said, maintaining a solid ts% while shooting the ball 22+ times a game (and unassisted shots, to boot; Wilt was not shy about taking the tough shot) is the most taxing thing for any basketball player to carry out on offense. Try it in your next pickup game.

You're side-stepping here. You took issue with my previous point as if I was taking one obscure stat and alleging a conspiracy for an explanation. I'm literally telling you that Wilt chose not to pass it to players who drive in '68 because he wanted more assists.

In general I find that so much of the issue when I talk to people about Wilt is that there's just so many facts that they find to unbelievable to be true. They think it's crazy, because they contradict the image in their head so badly, and this is because the image in their head is just so far from reality.

Re: taxing, you try it. Why would I try it when it's so clear it's a stupid strategy? That's the point more than anything else. Wilt's scoring is still something to marvel at, and no, not many players ever could have done it (if any), but if it wasn't accomplishing much...it wasn't accomplishing much.

To refuse to go against the norm, is to dare to go against Hannum, which should be a vastly more daunting prospect to people.

Didn't say Hannum wasn't correct to make Wilt a more passing hub than low-post scorer to help his teams. Again, this goes right back to the point I made earlier; this strategy was more beneficial based on the era of basketball that Wilt played in. Put the celebrated but shot-chucking Hakeem or the low-post bruiser Shaq back in the 60s, and they would run into the same issues.

I feel like the conversation is drifting, and part of that is me forgetting how we started, but to try to be clear:

Mainstream opinion has always been that there might be some minor issues with Wilt's scoring, but he was still having huge impact. While it's not uncommon for people to champion his '67 season as his peak, it's typically done from the lens of Wilt simply being super-adaptive and showing he was the best not only at scoring, but being the best at basically all facets of the game.

When we recognize that the very strategy Wilt was using to achieve that volume scoring simply wasn't working, this should be a profound shock.

I think oftentimes too people view history through the lens of inevitability. "Oh would you look at Henry Ford and his cars. Keen!". I think more thought needs to be given to the problems before the solution and the risks involved in attempting a fix. Let's consider Hannum's choice.

Taking the man most associated with scoring and having him be the last scoring options was an ASTOUNDING risk. Put yourself in Hannum's shoes. Can you imagine what the rest of his basketball career would be like (and how he'd be remembered to day) if the strategy had flopped? His livelihood would be gone, and he be considered the biggest joke in the history of the NBA.

For him to do what he did, he was seeing HUGE problems on a scale that are seldom seen, and so he made the most bizarre and massive strategic shift of a superstar since Babe Ruth stopped being a pitcher, risking everything about his reputation in the process. And the result? A far, far, FAR bigger improvement than we'd ever seen with Wilt before that time.

Bottom line is that I don't see how one can understand that perspective, and spend more time talking about "era differences" than about the actual fact what Wilt was doing wasn't working.

For those who are aware of the issues, but don't really grok it, the trend I see is actually USING '67 to VALIDATE the earlier Wilt years. "Oh yeah there were issues, but all he needed was a good coach, and those were cleared right up." Nah, the coach only fixed things by saying "What everyone considers Wilt's primary strength is actually a weakness, and there's enough other talent on this team if I just get him to stop using that weakness."

A bit more to than that naturally, but there should be no "oh it's okay after all" thinking about Wilt's scoring simply because good things happened later. HIs scoring DID NOT WORK, and that needs to be set on a monolith for posterity.

So then when we judge Wilt based on what he actually did to achieve the great impact, it needs to be done based on what he actually did WHEN he succeeded, and perhaps based on his ability to decoy, but not based on more than that.

[MisterWestside]

Whatever you say, Doctor MJ.

[ElGee]

Whatever you say, Doctor MJ.

Surprised to see you say this -- it's typically viewed as a pretty snarky, disrespectful response...and more germanely I don't understand why you wouldn't respond to the content of what Doc just said. Having followed this conversation and read your other posts I did not anticipate this response...

Doc, I think you go too far when you say Wilt's scoring "didn't work." It worked. It worked well (The 62 Warriors had an estimated +1.7 ORtg, for eg). The crux of the issue with "volume-scoring" Chamberlain is that it did not work NEARLY as well as the raw numbers led people to believe. "Wilt's an unstoppable force!" Maybe in a one-on-one sense, but that only gets you so far (and his individual ppp on shooting alone wasn't an outlier, to say nothing of untracked turnovers). eg the 1960 Warriors added a 38 ppg, above-average efficiency scorer and the team's offense barely budged (-3.9 to -2.5). You can make all the offense-defense adustments and "but if's" that you want but it's mathematically unlikely that team was even an average offense.* The issue is that if you put a 38 ppg scorer on a team he doesn't suddenly make the team an unstoppable force, but this is the impression most people have had for 50 years.

And really, when we examine it (and other models) under different circumstances, it doesn't create an ideal team offense for GOOD offensive teams. This is because basketball is not additive, but interactive. Before this year, how many people do you think knew that the guard-led Princeton-style offense of the 1968 Lakers was better than the 1969 Lakers offense (w/Wilt), the famed 1967 Warriors offense and CRUSHED the 1962 Warriors offense?*

*This refers to ORTG, which is a pretty accurate estimation of offensive success. We can leave some wiggle room for the pre-74 pace estimation (maybe up to 2 pts in outlying cases) and for offense-defense strategy (maybe another 2-pts), and to the diversity of an offense (being +4 against everyone is more valuable than being +8 against most and -2 against some), but in general, this is what the evidence points to.

[Doctor MJ]

Doc, I think you go too far when you say Wilt's scoring "didn't work." It worked. It worked well (The 62 Warriors had an estimated +1.7 ORtg, for eg). The crux of the issue with "volume-scoring" Chamberlain is that it did not work NEARLY as well as the raw numbers led people to believe. "Wilt's an unstoppable force!" Maybe in a one-on-one sense, but that only gets you so far (and his individual ppp on shooting alone wasn't an outlier, to say nothing of untracked turnovers). eg the 1960 Warriors added a 38 ppg, above-average efficiency scorer and the team's offense barely budged (-3.9 to -2.5). You can make all the offense-defense adustments and "but if's" that you want but it's mathematically unlikely that team was even an average offense.* The issue is that if you put a 38 ppg scorer on a team he doesn't suddenly make the team an unstoppable force, but this is the impression most people have had for 50 years.

And really, when we examine it (and other models) under different circumstances, it doesn't create an ideal team offense for GOOD offensive teams. This is because basketball is not additive, but interactive. Before this year, how many people do you think knew that the guard-led Princeton-style offense of the 1968 Lakers was better than the 1969 Lakers offense (w/Wilt), the famed 1967 Warriors offense and CRUSHED the 1962 Warriors offense?*

*This refers to ORTG, which is a pretty accurate estimation of offensive success. We can leave some wiggle room for the pre-74 pace estimation (maybe up to 2 pts in outlying cases) and for offense-defense strategy (maybe another 2-pts), and to the diversity of an offense (being +4 against everyone is more valuable than being +8 against most and -2 against some), but in general, this is what the evidence points to.

I'm fine with your correction. I'm using simplistic & hyperbolic language at this point to convey the force of how big a deal I think these things are. It's certainly not the case that super-scoring-Wilt led to hideously ineffective offenses all the time, but it is the case that they typically led to mediocrity which is an amazing fact given his glaring talent superiority.

[MisterWestside]

Surprised to see you say this -- it's typically viewed as a pretty snarky, disrespectful response...and more germanely I don't understand why you wouldn't respond to the content of what Doc just said. Having followed this conversation and read your other posts I did not anticipate this response...

Yes. Sorry to disappoint you.

As for Doctor MJ's post, he doesn't actually address any of the salient points I made, then he accuses me of side-stepping after I originally took him to the task of explaining his "hacking" comment as it relates to Wilt's chucking/above-average ts%. Instead, he decides to talk about Wilt and assists (which I know well about, by the way), and I patiently rebutted his post anyway...only to be called a side-stepper later. Perhaps I was too kind to let him get away with it in the first place. He then states that shooting the ball a ton (and taking/making tough shots, which Wilt did) while maintaining a good ts% is "stupid strategy", which, while apposite in the discussion of the offensive performance of Wilt's 1960s teams (note the underlined decade), has nothing to do with the conservation (showing how Wilt "hacked" his shooting numbers). His Hannum anecdotes (which I also know well about, and which also have been repeated ad nauseam) shows that he still doesn't grasp the basic objective of the on-court strategies of the era that Dipper13 and I pointed out earlier. Hannum might have seemed like the cooky coach when he used Wilt as a passer to cutters instead of a "ZOMG POINTS!" low-post scoring presence, but he didn't do anything truly revolutionary when you think about it; he simply brought Wilt back into the brand of basketball that they played in the 60s. It's not a coincidence that Wilt's teams played better when he played more like a passing-hub C instead of a low-post C scorer, and it's also not a coincidence that teams didn't use the "throw me the ball on the low block, and I'll create a shot on my own" style of play until the game opened up in the late 70s/80s (only Kareem compares to Wilt in this regard, and he played with someone like Oscar for most of his early career. And on a Bucks team that regressed on offense once Oscar retired).

I had a productive and enjoyable discussion with tsherkin about Wilt sometime back. I don't read that here.

[ElGee]

Ha -- why are you sorry to disappoint me?

Well yes, I just re-read the dialogue and if you wanted to drive home your original point about era strategy, I think you should have stayed there (would have been clearer). I thought Doc's "hacking' analogy was sound, NOT because of Wilt consciously chasing stats (assists, FG%) later in his career, but because of the same way Dantley or JR Rider "hacks" a stat...it APPEARS there should be a ballpark level of impact we should expect from big raw stats, but there clearly isn't. (This is because we aren't measuring enough confounding variables in basketball, eg time of possession, when a player shoots, ball-stopping, spacing and creation stats like Opportunities Created.) Thus, the posers are "hacking" a stat...maybe not the best way to view it but I assumed that was where he was going. Although, yes, there are multiple sources I've heard say Chamberlain ALWAYS quibbled about how many points he scored, for reasons I'll address in a second.

Your point seems to simply be about some era-specific problem. It's not doing much for me for 2 reasons:

(1) All I care about is how someone plays in THEIR era -- mileage may vary, but I've talked about the HUGE number of variables that makes era transportation incredibly fuzzy. That aside...

(2) Players can only play in their eras! They only know the rules and strategies of their own era!

While it may be valid in many cases to observe that guys would be better fit for different (future) eras, WILT didn't know what future era strategy would bring. Instead, he opted to implement a non-optimal strategy in his time, and perhaps by his own admission, so be could be absolved of blame with some kind of "tangible" evidence...points. (Wilt cared a lot about what others thought of him and talks about how this was most certainly on his mind when he played because he did not like the whole "blame Goliath" pattern that started when he was young.)

I mean, what if the game shifts in such a direction that stretch 4's launching 3's and pounding the dribble would become a far more viable offensive strategy...but that doesn't make Antoine Walker a better player (implicit in that sentence is "while he played"). A basketball player is as good as the application of his skillset. The issue, as far as I can tell, is that Walker did not optimally apply his skillset. Wilt did not optimally apply his either. To overlook this (the "mental" aspect) to me is to overlook the player himself (it's inseparable). It's also overlooking that Wilt had 100% knowledge of the way the game worked when he played and wasn't able to impact in the same way as, say, Bill Russell. Russell is a great counter-example here, as his style we saw in the 60's wouldn't be as dominant today (eg 3-point line), but he played to win the game that he was...you know...playing in.

[Doctor MJ]

Thus, the posers are "hacking" a stat...maybe not the best way to view it but I assumed that was where he was going.

It is where I was going, and while not very modest of me to say, I think "hack" pretty much the only word I could use for what I mean there that conveys as much on point meaning. Apparently for other people though it still isn't working very well.

The term "hack" in tech actually gets used in a lot of different ways so it can be pretty hard to pin down, but:

When the press reports that a company gets "hacked", it means that someone found a way to make the company's system think it's doing it's job, when actually it's being used to do something else.

When you fix a bug with a "hack", you're doing a quick-fix that you know isn't a long term solution, you're just putting something in place that makes it look like you've really made a robust solution when in reality you're prioritizing something else.

When someone talks about "hacking" a test, they don't mean that they have the answers that they can cheat from, they mean they've found some little short cut that let's them guess some right answers despite not actually spending the effort needed for them to actually understand the material fully.

These are 3 distinct meanings with similar connotations, and what Wilt was doing is very much related to all three of them.

I like your mention of Walker btw, great example.

[lorak]

It's also overlooking that Wilt had 100% knowledge of the way the game worked when he played and wasn't able to impact in the same way as, say, Bill Russell. Russell is a great counter-example here, as his style we saw in the 60's wouldn't be as dominant today (eg 3-point line), but he played to win the game that he was...you know...playing in.

But Russell was so weak offensive player he doesn't even can play other way.
Wilt on the other hand was so good, so talented AND skilled that early on his career coaches wanted him to score as much as possible (probably because they thought that would attract the people, you know, theoretically in early 60s there's no better attraction than 7 foot monster who scored +40 ppg). So he did that. But he definitely was capable of playing Russell way, what he proved later in his career.

Anyway, you guys forget that Wilt was victim of circumstances (his enormous talent which allows him to do everything and era - what affected the way he was used by coaches and what they teach him as young player), but as player his talent and skillset was GOAT level (and it's not some "what if"; he showed that talent and skilles on the court). As a center he fit to any team in history. You can't say the same about Russell. That's all if we want to talk about application of player's skillset...

[MisterWestside]

Well yes, I just re-read the dialogue and if you wanted to drive home your original point about era strategy, I think you should have stayed there (would have been clearer). I thought Doc's "hacking' analogy was sound, NOT because of Wilt consciously chasing stats (assists, FG%) later in his career, but because of the same way Dantley or JR Rider "hacks" a stat...it APPEARS there should be a ballpark level of impact we should expect from big raw stats, but there clearly isn't. (This is because we aren't measuring enough confounding variables in basketball, eg time of possession, when a player shoots, ball-stopping, spacing and creation stats like Opportunities Created.) Thus, the posers are "hacking" a stat...maybe not the best way to view it but I assumed that was where he was going.

I did as well. But I don't think it was unfair to demand a more tangible explanation of what DocMJ meant. As I said before, the issue with impact stats is that they don't explain the WHY. That's important, and it's not dissimilar to the reason that I don't also pick up a box score and say "WOW! POINTS! GREATEST EVAR!11111111".

(Re: Dantley, I'll rant about his "impact" in another thread.)

I mean, what if the game shifts in such a direction that stretch 4's launching 3's and pounding the dribble would become a far more viable offensive strategy...but that doesn't make Antoine Walker a better player (implicit in that sentence is "while he played"). A basketball player is as good as the application of his skillset. The issue, as far as I can tell, is that Walker did not optimally apply his skillset. Wilt did not optimally apply his either.

Optimal team strategy notwithstanding, the key difference however is that Wilt was at least still good at his craft (low-post scoring). Walker was not. His skillset* was inherently flawed (he was a wildly inconsistent shooter), which was why he was quite execrable as a stretch-4 in the first place. I wouldn't employ him in any game in which my team could use such a player.

*Of course, I'm admittedly cheating here, because I'm still comparing the players' skills with that of their respective peers. It's why I wouldn't simply drop 60s Wilt (and his 60s knowledge of how to play on the low block) into a modern game and ask him to dominate either, but his approach and style of play is more suited to the modern game. As well as his physical makeup. (You could argue that Walker's "stretch-4" game is more friendly in 2012, but I want to see some evidence that he implemented his skills to some degree of effectiveness. Wilt did that, even if it wasn't necessarily 60s "team happy".) Your thoughts about Wilt's obsession with how others viewed his game wouldn't be as much of an issue when his game is a essential component of modern basketball in the first place. He wouldn't be a freak in a sideshow; he'd be an actual asset. As a matter of fact, I think he'd feel more at home.

To overlook this (the "mental" aspect) to me is to overlook the player himself (it's inseparable). It's also overlooking that Wilt had 100% knowledge of the way the game worked when he played and wasn't able to impact in the same way as, say, Bill Russell. Russell is a great counter-example here, as his style we saw in the 60's wouldn't be as dominant today (eg 3-point line), but he played to win the game that he was...you know...playing in.

Just for the record, I do put Russell ahead of Wilt in my historcial rankings. You're right in your assessment of a player's "mental aspect" apropos of era-specific basketball strategy, and in a ranking of highest historical peaks, I have no qualms with putting Russell ahead of Wilt.

BUT -- and your reservations about this are noted, by the way -- you know that basketball fans on this board (and in general!) like comparing players across eras anyway. And these other factors (skills? strategy?) are pertinent to the discussion.

[penbeast0]

...But Russell was so weak offensive player he doesn't even can play other way.

Russell as a low post center in his first 5 years was top 5 in efficiency 4 of the 5 years. He wasn't Chamberlain level (no one was) but no reason to think he can't play (a) low post with reasonable scoring efficiency and decent (not superstar) level volume or (b) high post with lower scoring and efficiency but excellent passing. After all, he DID play both of those styles although his scoring (if not his overall game) wasn't particularly good from the high post. It wasn't Ben Wallace level ever -- and Wallace won a title too.

Wilt on the other hand was so good, so talented AND skilled that early on his career coaches wanted him to score as much as possible (probably because they thought that would attract the people, you know, theoretically in early 60s there's no better attraction than 7 foot monster who scored +40 ppg). So he did that. But he definitely was capable of playing Russell way, what he proved later in his career.

The Russell way but without the Russell defensive impact which is why 69 Russell with far less talent around him than Wilt was able to take his team to the finals and go to the end of game 7 where Wilt's team (or coach) could choke it away letting Russell win again. Did Wilt have any years where his team's defensive numbers approached even an average Russell year? If so, I will apologize. And this isn't to slam Wilt who I consider #3 all-time but to point out the ridiculous outlier effect of Bill Russell and his defense/rebounding/smarts combination.

Anyway, you guys forget that Wilt was victim of circumstances (his enormous talent which allows him to do everything and era - what affected the way he was used by coaches and what they teach him as young player), but as player his talent and skillset was GOAT level (and it's not some "what if"; he showed that talent and skilles on the court). As a center he fit to any team in history. You can't say the same about Russell. That's all if we want to talk about application of player's skillset...

I'm sorry, name me one team in history that can't fit in a Bill Russell -- GOAT defender, GOAT candidate rebounder, able to guard even SF's out on the floor -- aka Chet Walker in Dipper's post about matching up with Philly in the RPOY project. There are teams that are built around a scoring low post center -- which Wilt was not in the 70s. There are teams built around a high post passing center, which Wilt was not as he never played out of the low post even as a passing hub for Hannum -- thus possibly clogging the middle for low post scorers like, say, Bailey Howell or an Adrian Dantley. The point is that if you have a Russell (or Wilt) you adjust your team to them, not the other way around. The only teams that couldn't win a ring with Russell are the ones that have no chance anyway -- there haven't been any ring winners with no one else able to take up scoring slack if you increase the team's defense and rebounding appreciably. None.