Vikings Lead Up
Posted: Mon Nov 19, 2018 3:13 am
Pretty much a must win for a shot at the playoffs, IMO.
Sports is our Business
https://forums.realgm.com/boards/
https://forums.realgm.com/boards/viewtopic.php?f=161&t=1768874
MickeyDavis wrote:A big chunk of King's weekly column is about how he was allowed to embed himself with the Saints staff the night before the game. Some interesting stuff, especially how Payton came up with a new play. I can only imagine the difference between Saints game planning and MM.
Also in the column is an analysis of MM'S punt decision.
https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2018/11/19/new-orleans-saints-drew-brees-sean-payton-fmia-nfl-week-11-peter-king/
HaroldinGMinor wrote:McCarthy said his "analytics" told him to punt. This is either a lie or his analytics consist of him thinking about something for 3 - 4 seconds.
Ron Swanson wrote:McCarthy is the dumb jock who pretends to understand "analytics" in the media pressers but secretly despises any additional number-crunching outside of adding sales tax and tip on his Denny's order. Pretty much a must-win seeing as we have to win the division to get a playoff berth.
Kerb Hohl wrote:I am not sure if I put this in the postgame thread, but I have been an anti-McCarthy guy for several years. There are some plays early in playoff games where we'd kick a FG when it was clear we'd need 40 to win (@Atl playoff game, etc) that I'd pull my hair out on.
Punting at the end on Thursday was the dumbest decision in his tenure and that is saying something. I went from, "whatever, I think he's an idiot but Godgers could still come back and at least sneak us into the playoffs to "I am probably not watching anymore this year."
That was mind-numbingly stupid. The Seahawks need 1-2 first downs to end it. Who cares which end of the field it is on.
Much folderol about the Packers’ decision that may have cost them the game at Seattle on Thursday night. I want to focus on it here analytically, because coach Mike McCarthy said after the game, in making the decision he did, that “we played the numbers.”
The situation: Green Bay, down 27-24 with 4:20 to play in the fourth quarter, had a 4th-and-2 at its 33-yard line, with one timeout left. Key defenders Kenny Clark and Mike Daniels were out with injuries. McCarthy decided to punt.
McCarthy doubled down Friday, back in Green Bay. “Three-and-out there, I think, puts us right about the two-minute [warning],” he said. “I have great confidence in our two-minute offense, especially with Aaron … It’s a solid decision.”
I asked the analytics pros at Pro Football Focus on Friday to run their numbers for me, and for their opinion on the McCarthy call.
“It’s very difficult for me to conceive of a sound mathematical process that concludes punting was the right decision here,” said George Chahrouri, the director of research and development for PFF.
According to the PFF numbers:
• Green Bay’s chance of converting on 4th-and-2: 60 percent.
• Green Bay’s chance of winning after punting: 21 percent.
• Green Bay’s chance of winning after converting the fourth down: 38 percent.
• Green Bay’s chance of winning if they don’t convert the fourth down: 20 percent.
Translated, the PFF numbers say the Packers would convert fourth-and-two six out of 10 times, and the number say if they convert, they’d have nearly 4 in 10 chance to win the game. But a punt there, per PFF, gives Green Bay a 2 in 10 chance of winning.
Extrapolating further: If Green Bay punts, Seattle likely needs two first downs to run out the clock.
If the Packers go for it and make it, Aaron Rodgers needs to go about 60 yards in four minutes to score the go-ahead touchdown—or about 40 yards to try a field goal to tie. If they fail to make it, and they hold Seattle on its possession, a Sebastian Janikowski field goal (no sure thing) would give Seattle a 30-24 lead—and would give Rodgers the ball back, needing to go the length of the field in, say, two minutes for the win.
With a defense that allowed 77 and 75-yard drives on Seattle’s previous two possessions, and with a defense playing without two of its best players on the front seven, McCarthy—seriously—might want to examine how he calculates whether to go for it or punt in that case. It’s odd to put the burden on a faltering defense to stop Seattle, instead of putting the burden on Rodgers to make a manageable fourth-and-two. Neither “the numbers” nor common sense seems to back up McCarthy. However, this losing is not all McCarthy’s fault. In Seattle, Rodgers made some exquisite throws in the game, but his worm-burner incompletion on what should have been an easy third-and-two play forced the fourth-and-two decision. Mason Crosby missed his seventh kick in seven games, a 47-yarder wide left early in the game, that factored late.
McCarthy and staff have done a good job getting unknown young running backs and receivers up to speed this year. It’s not all bad, certainly. But the Packers just feel like a team going in the wrong direction. And with a quarterback as good as Rodgers, club president Mark Murphy and GM Brian Gutekunst have to decide whether a team that’s stumbled with and without Rodgers in the lineup needs a coaching change and a fresh voice in 2019.
Mags FTW wrote:A lot of the old guard of coaches were/are not the brightest.
Think about it. When the 2-point conversion was instituted, many of them had to carry around a flippin’ card that told them when they should go for 2.
Ron Swanson wrote:You don't even need to throw any numbers or percentages in there to conclude that punting in that situation was a dumb as **** move. There's "analytics" and then there's common sense.
BUCKnation wrote:Mags FTW wrote:A lot of the old guard of coaches were/are not the brightest.
Think about it. When the 2-point conversion was instituted, many of them had to carry around a flippin’ card that told them when they should go for 2.
I'm surprised we haven't come across a coach to go for 2 more often. Tomlin occasionally does it on his first TD, but if you could become an expert at converting a 2 yard play at the endzone, it'd pay massive dividends during the game and especially in cases like that 4th and 2. With the XP becoming harder, sooner or later it'll happen.
MickeyDavis wrote:From King's columnMuch folderol about the Packers’ decision that may have cost them the game at Seattle on Thursday night. I want to focus on it here analytically, because coach Mike McCarthy said after the game, in making the decision he did, that “we played the numbers.”
The situation: Green Bay, down 27-24 with 4:20 to play in the fourth quarter, had a 4th-and-2 at its 33-yard line, with one timeout left. Key defenders Kenny Clark and Mike Daniels were out with injuries. McCarthy decided to punt.
McCarthy doubled down Friday, back in Green Bay. “Three-and-out there, I think, puts us right about the two-minute [warning],” he said. “I have great confidence in our two-minute offense, especially with Aaron … It’s a solid decision.”
I asked the analytics pros at Pro Football Focus on Friday to run their numbers for me, and for their opinion on the McCarthy call.
“It’s very difficult for me to conceive of a sound mathematical process that concludes punting was the right decision here,” said George Chahrouri, the director of research and development for PFF.
According to the PFF numbers:
• Green Bay’s chance of converting on 4th-and-2: 60 percent.
• Green Bay’s chance of winning after punting: 21 percent.
• Green Bay’s chance of winning after converting the fourth down: 38 percent.
• Green Bay’s chance of winning if they don’t convert the fourth down: 20 percent.
Translated, the PFF numbers say the Packers would convert fourth-and-two six out of 10 times, and the number say if they convert, they’d have nearly 4 in 10 chance to win the game. But a punt there, per PFF, gives Green Bay a 2 in 10 chance of winning.
Extrapolating further: If Green Bay punts, Seattle likely needs two first downs to run out the clock.
If the Packers go for it and make it, Aaron Rodgers needs to go about 60 yards in four minutes to score the go-ahead touchdown—or about 40 yards to try a field goal to tie. If they fail to make it, and they hold Seattle on its possession, a Sebastian Janikowski field goal (no sure thing) would give Seattle a 30-24 lead—and would give Rodgers the ball back, needing to go the length of the field in, say, two minutes for the win.
With a defense that allowed 77 and 75-yard drives on Seattle’s previous two possessions, and with a defense playing without two of its best players on the front seven, McCarthy—seriously—might want to examine how he calculates whether to go for it or punt in that case. It’s odd to put the burden on a faltering defense to stop Seattle, instead of putting the burden on Rodgers to make a manageable fourth-and-two. Neither “the numbers” nor common sense seems to back up McCarthy....