Grade The Offseason

[Nivek]

So, the argument is that Portland liked Maynor so much that they refused to pay him $3.5 million, drafted two guys at his position, and signed a third?

Now that I see it all laid out, I'm totally convinced.

[hands11]

So, the argument is that Portland liked Maynor so much that they refused to pay him $3.5 million, drafted two guys at his position, and signed a third?

Now that I see it all laid out, I'm totally convinced.

Whos argument is that ?

Personally, I like Portlands draft. CJM as a combo guard ( slotted as a SG for them) and Crabbe slotted as a SG drafted 31st, plus Witney 39th.

CJM 2.3M
Crabbe 825K

http://espn.go.com/nba/team/depth/_/nam ... il-blazers

Looks like Mo 2.6M (30) and Watson 1.3M (34) are their back up PGs ( Mo and Watson are the only players over 28 on the team. Looks like they wanted to add some mature vets to me.

Maynor (26) signed for 2M with us, not the 3.5M Portland declined as well.

Not sure what point you are trying to make. That we should have hoped Mo Williams would come here for 2.6M and 2.7M vs Mayor at 2M and 2.1M ?

Maybe I'm missing something but isn't 2.6 more then the BAE ?

Maybe you are saying you wanted CJ Watson over Maynor ?

Or that we should have drafted CJM instead of Otto ?

[Kanyewest]

Do you guys think the Wizards ruled out getting Robinson because in the past he has been somewhat of a knucklehead? Other than that, I guess that Maynor is more of pass first point guard who is willing to set up his teammates but Robinson did have a pretty good season with the Bulls. I wonder though if the Bulls defense helped hide Robinson's defensive deficiencies while the Blazers frontline brought Maynor's to the front.

[closg00]

Do you guys think the Wizards ruled out getting Robinson because in the past he has been somewhat of a knucklehead? Other than that, I guess that Maynor is more of pass first point guard who is willing to set up his teammates but Robinson did have a pretty good season with the Bulls. I wonder though if the Bulls defense helped hide Robinson's defensive deficiencies while the Blazers frontline brought Maynor's to the front front.

Speaking of defensive deficiencies, this is what SI had to say about Manor.

Webster’s four-year, $22 million deal (which includes a nonguaranteed fourth year) looks no better than fair as it stands, and it could prove to be burdensome if back injuries that limited him from 2010-12 pop up again. Maynor is clearly not the same player he was before tearing his ACL in January 2012, and while he should be an upgrade over the likes of A.J. Price and Shaun Livingston, he struggled defensively and with his shot last season.

http://nba.si.com/2013/08/15/nba-washin ... son-grade/

[thinker07]

So, the argument is that Portland liked Maynor so much that they refused to pay him $3.5 million, drafted two guys at his position, and signed a third?

Now that I see it all laid out, I'm totally convinced.

No Kevin, that wasn't my argument, in fact I stated that they didn't like him for $3.5 million. Nobody likes Maynor at that price. But they did like him as a player a lot. Circumstances simply led them in a very different direction. And circumstances are always the key. What your analysis consistently lacks is an appreciation for the sequencing and timing and in the moment decision making that people who actually do this for a living have to do. A lot of people think that you can look at the final result and be able to then very simply decide whether some particular decision was good or bad. I figured out a long time ago that sometimes good decisions turn out badly and sometimes bad decisions turn out well. Just saying that if something turned out badly INHERENTLY that makes it a bad decision is lazy and unsophisticated. It's very easy to say - bad result = bad decision, and people on this board love that Monday morning quarterbacking

Signing Arenas to the big contract was a bad decision that turned out badly.

Acquiring Jordan Crawford was a good move/decision that turned out badly.

I think that signing Baltche to the extension was a good decision that turned out horribly badly. Obviously it's easy to disagree with me on this one.

I don't have a Wiz example of a bad decision that turned out well - but those are pretty rare.

Again if you separate out the result from the decision, many analytical possibilities exist.

[hands11]

Do you guys think the Wizards ruled out getting Robinson because in the past he has been somewhat of a knucklehead? Other than that, I guess that Maynor is more of pass first point guard who is willing to set up his teammates but Robinson did have a pretty good season with the Bulls. I wonder though if the Bulls defense helped hide Robinson's defensive deficiencies while the Blazers frontline brought Maynor's to the front front.

Right, and that's what they wanted. If they wanted more of a shooting PG, they would have kept Price. The team seemed to like him. He really supported him teammates well. Good locker room guy. But not very good at running the offense.

If they wanted a chucking PG more like a mini version on Gil, they would have went for Nate.. if they could have even got him.

If they wanted a rookie back up PG, they could have drafted Wolters.

I think you can tell what the criteria was. Sure you can even find it in interviews. Vet PG that runs the offense, playoff experience. Good in the locker room. BAE level money. Can play with a star PG when needed.

Sounds like Maynor.

[hands11]

So, the argument is that Portland liked Maynor so much that they refused to pay him $3.5 million, drafted two guys at his position, and signed a third?

Now that I see it all laid out, I'm totally convinced.

No Kevin, that wasn't my argument, in fact I stated that they didn't like him for $3.5 million. Nobody likes Maynor at that price. But they did like him as a player a lot. Circumstances simply led them in a very different direction. And circumstances are always the key. What your analysis consistently lacks is an appreciation for the sequencing and timing and in the moment decision making that people who actually do this for a living have to do. A lot of people think that you can look at the final result and be able to then very simply decide whether some particular decision was good or bad. I figured out a long time ago that sometimes good decisions turn out badly and sometimes bad decisions turn out well. Just saying that if something turned out badly INHERENTLY that makes it a bad decision is lazy and unsophisticated. It's very easy to say - bad result = bad decision, and people on this board love that Monday morning quarterbacking

Signing Arenas to the big contract was a bad decision that turned out badly.

Acquiring Jordan Crawford was a good move/decision that turned out badly.

I think that signing Baltche to the extension was a good decision that turned out horribly badly. Obviously it's easy to disagree with me on this one.

I don't have a Wiz example of a bad decision that turned out well - but those are pretty rare.

Again if you separate out the result from the decision, many analytical possibilities exist.

Drafting Ves and Singleton and next year getting the #3 to get Beal because CHA passed on him

But Ves is still in play so that story isn't over. They know he was a longer turn project and a strike was ahead. Kind of like if someone drafted Noel this year only Ves was not the consensus #1. But he was a top Euro prospect..

Signing Gil that turned into Lewis that turned into Okafor and Trevor A. Plus Gils Gun leading to a total blow up that lead to the #1 which ended up being Wall.

So that Gil signing lead to - Wall, Trevor A and Okafor. Not to shabby.

And I wouldn't say Crawford turned out bad. It was MEH. He served a need while here. Could have been used better. Getting nothing for him looks like a poor move. Timing.

And Dray could have turned out better if they decided to keep him one more year. Then trade him for something. Well maybe it would have turned out better. Would depend on the trade, etc. But the signing at the time was an solid move given what the team was at the time.

[payitforward]

A lot of people think that you can look at the final result and be able to then very simply decide whether some particular decision was good or bad.

Why, yes, you are right, they do. It is by results that we know whether a decision was good or bad. Barring unforeseeable elements (injuries, etc.) that is.

Acquiring Jordan Crawford was a good move/decision that turned out badly. ...signing Baltche to the extension was a good decision that turned out horribly badly.

Would you please explain what you mean by these two statements? If you mean that acquiring Crawford was taking a chance that cost us nothing, and when he didn't work out it didn't cost us anything to get rid of him, I agree with you. About Dray not so obvious.

[doclinkin]

So, the argument is that Portland liked Maynor so much that they refused to pay him $3.5 million, drafted two guys at his position, and signed a third?

Now that I see it all laid out, I'm totally convinced.

He was so good it took 3 guys to replace him.

But I dunno why Eric Maynor's deal is the pass/fail mark on this team.

So okay his qualifying offer was $3.5m, which he is not worth and Portland figured they could find better value for the $. Fine but we got him for a little over $2m/yr.

Advanced Stats suggest that AJ Price would have been a better value since he protects the ball better and is a better defender, would have come cheaper, shorter term. Okay but those stats reveal mostly that AJ Price is a conservative player who takes fewer risks, he doesn't force a pass. He himself may be a lower risk individual piece, but does he make his teammates better? Does he play the role we require from the position?

I'd posit that he doesn't. That Maynor is a better fit. He may make a riskier pass, but on this team the role we need from a PG is to push the ball, find seams in the defense, and create shots for others. We saw how this squad was unable to score when Wall was out of the game, deadly dull predictable and nobody was able to force the action. Maynor forces the action a little better.

Is that worth two years of a lower level exception? Well consider how many people dropped their tickets saying they couldn't watch this team fail to find the basket, and consider Maynor's reputation across the league as a dynamic and interesting young cat (compared with Price's complete lack of a reputation) and this may be a move to budge the needle of interest a little bit, which may not translate into wins on the court but for the hoi polloi makes the team much more of a fun watch. And by contrast to a scoring combo guard (Robinson et al) a pass-first creative floor general raises the value and perceived value of the other players on his squad even if this does not translate directly immediately to wins.

Maynor's no savior. but he comes relatively cheap and provides a needed service. And if we need him too often, this club is positively screwed anyway and would prefer a few dynamic fun losses rather than deadly boring slow-paced conservative ones. We need a front court lotto pick if we ever hope to contend in the upper echelon. And unlike a MLE type combo guard, if he's our only option at PG well, Eric Maynor does not jeopardize our chances to still properly suck

[Nivek]

So, the argument is that Portland liked Maynor so much that they refused to pay him $3.5 million, drafted two guys at his position, and signed a third?

Now that I see it all laid out, I'm totally convinced.

No Kevin, that wasn't my argument, in fact I stated that they didn't like him for $3.5 million. Nobody likes Maynor at that price. But they did like him as a player a lot. Circumstances simply led them in a very different direction. And circumstances are always the key. What your analysis consistently lacks is an appreciation for the sequencing and timing and in the moment decision making that people who actually do this for a living have to do. A lot of people think that you can look at the final result and be able to then very simply decide whether some particular decision was good or bad. I figured out a long time ago that sometimes good decisions turn out badly and sometimes bad decisions turn out well. Just saying that if something turned out badly INHERENTLY that makes it a bad decision is lazy and unsophisticated. It's very easy to say - bad result = bad decision, and people on this board love that Monday morning quarterbacking

Either you don't actually read much of what I write, or I need to do a much better job of writing clearly. I'm always coming at this from the position of looking at process. It's one of the things that bugs me about the front office -- from what THEY say about their process, and from the moves they make, I think their decision-making process is flawed. Saying they need "veterans" when what they needed was talent and maturity, for example. I talk all the time (at least I think I do) about good decisions sometimes having bad outcomes and bad decisions sometimes having good outcomes. That's not usually the way things work, however.

Signing Arenas to the big contract was a bad decision that turned out badly.

Actually, not really. I won't call it a good decision, but it was a reasonable one. He had the injury, but it was the kind of injury that has a very high recovery rate, especially in guys as young, well-conditioned and hard-working as Arenas. It definitely turned out bad, but it wasn't a bad decision. (Despite CCJ's constant insistence that it was. )

Acquiring Jordan Crawford was a good move/decision that turned out badly.

I guess. The move didn't thrill me at the time, but I thought it was an acceptable chance to take. I wouldn't say it turned out badly. Crawford just kept doing what he'd been doing, which wasn't much good.

I think that signing Baltche to the extension was a good decision that turned out horribly badly. Obviously it's easy to disagree with me on this one.

Nope. It was a bad decision at the time, which I said and wrote at the time. Blatche was being colossally overrated by fans and by the front office, which seemed to operating under the delusion that wanting a guy to be good would make it so. Like most, I always recognized that Blatche had talent -- if only he got in shape, improved his mental approach, took fewer bad shots, played hard, and so on. I thought it was a bad decision because -- Blatche had only a brief stint of playing well (and even then it wasn't all that great), and it was premature (he still had a couple years left on his previous deal). It turned out worse that even I had anticipated -- I thought he'd muddle along at about average with ups and downs. What happened, of course, was that he was so abysmal, the best move was to amnesty him before the extension even began.

Again if you separate out the result from the decision, many analytical possibilities exist.

Yep. A point I have attempted to make many times. It's the Wizards decision-making that worries me so much.

[Nivek]

So, the argument is that Portland liked Maynor so much that they refused to pay him $3.5 million, drafted two guys at his position, and signed a third?

Now that I see it all laid out, I'm totally convinced.

He was so good it took 3 guys to replace him.

But I dunno why Eric Maynor's deal is the pass/fail mark on this team.

So okay his qualifying offer was $3.5m, which he is not worth and Portland figured they could find better value for the $. Fine but we got him for a little over $2m/yr.

Advanced Stats suggest that AJ Price would have been a better value since he protects the ball better and is a better defender, would have come cheaper, shorter term. Okay but those stats reveal mostly that AJ Price is a conservative player who takes fewer risks, he doesn't force a pass. He himself may be a lower risk individual piece, but does he make his teammates better? Does he play the role we require from the position?

I'd posit that he doesn't. That Maynor is a better fit. He may make a riskier pass, but on this team the role we need from a PG is to push the ball, find seams in the defense, and create shots for others. We saw how this squad was unable to score when Wall was out of the game, deadly dull predictable and nobody was able to force the action. Maynor forces the action a little better.

Is that worth two years of a lower level exception? Well consider how many people dropped their tickets saying they couldn't watch this team fail to find the basket, and consider Maynor's reputation across the league as a dynamic and interesting young cat (compared with Price's complete lack of a reputation) and this may be a move to budge the needle of interest a little bit, which may not translate into wins on the court but for the hoi polloi makes the team much more of a fun watch. And by contrast to a scoring combo guard (Robinson et al) a pass-first creative floor general raises the value and perceived value of the other players on his squad even if this does not translate directly immediately to wins.

Maynor's no savior. but he comes relatively cheap and provides a needed service. And if we need him too often, this club is positively screwed anyway and would prefer a few dynamic fun losses rather than deadly boring slow-paced conservative ones. We need a front court lotto pick if we ever hope to contend in the upper echelon. And unlike a MLE type combo guard, if he's our only option at PG well, Eric Maynor does not jeopardize our chances to still properly suck

I hope you're right. I'm pretty dubious about this ability of his to make the offense better. It hasn't shown up in the on/off stats with any consistency -- for his career his teams have been about the same offensively with or without them. In general, teams tend to be better when they have better players. The margin between Price and Maynor isn't exactly an ocean, but it's there.

My issue is that they used a cap resource on him to provide a service they could have gotten for less, which prevented them from adding other services they also need with that cap resource -- specifically someone decent for the frontcourt. Instead, they were left spending the minimum for a "stretch 4" who is much more like a SF (of which they already have plenty).

[barelyawake]

I'd give the offseason a B.

A - Didn't blow our cap for non-star players. Perhaps the greatest offseason move was not settling for "win now" players, who would destroy our chances of building a contender. Obviously, most here won't think that's to be counted as a positive (should one get credit for not doing something?). I think credit should be given considering many here and many GMs would have signed (or traded for) a non-star stretch four.

B - Porter. Obviously, he was overrated (in terms of immediate impact). I think now he's being underrated, in terms of the actual impact he provides right away. Obviously, I think Noel will be better eventually. But, I do think Porter will help us next season with smart passes, defense and outside shooting. And he'll be efficient. Top three pick worthy? Not next year. Perhaps eventually. But, he'll be much better than our back-up SGs last year (where Webster can now shift).

C - Maynor. I think Maynor is going to be much better than thought. He has playoff experience. I love that we got a mentor/distributor/leader for this young team. I especially think it's a good idea to have a mentor here if we end up trading Okafor (which is unlikely, but it's better to have the option if a star demands a trade). I think leadership is an undervalued stat.

A - Harrington. One year as a back-up. Someone who has played with Nene. A tested back-up (unlike Booker). I know people are going to see a dramatic difference between Vesley getting minutes and Harrington getting them. I've always liked Harrington. Tough guy. Plus:

“I’m going to compete. I don’t want nobody to give me nothing. Nobody gave me nothing my whole career, so I’m just going to go out and compete against those guys and help them also. The one thing that I learned when I first came in… I was with Antonio and Dale Davis, and they put their arms around me and told me a lot, and Derrick McKey. Those were the three guys that really taught me a lot and helped me mold my game. So I feel like I just have to give back, and the way I give back is helping those young guys.”

He's another mentor. I want this team packed with leaders to help development of the pieces that matter.

A - Wall. Resigning Wall to the max was unavoidable. And I still believe the speed of that contract ingratiates us to Fegan (see Harrington).

B - Webster. Little too much for his current value. If he continues to develop, he's a steal. Can back two positions. I predict people start loving a line-up of Maynor/Webster/Porter/Harrington/Nene much more than they envision.

C+ - Rice. We have almost no alpha-male-scorers on the bench. Rice might be that alpha-scorer we need, especially during injuries.


For not blowing their wad, we got quite a bit. I think people are under-grading how much better our bench will be.

[Chocolate City Jordanaire]

Yes, constant!

Signing Arenas to the big contract was a bad decision that turned out badly.

Actually, not really. I won't call it a good decision, but it was a reasonable one. He had the injury, but it was the kind of injury that has a very high recovery rate, especially in guys as young, well-conditioned and hard-working as Arenas. It definitely turned out bad, but it wasn't a bad decision. (Despite CCJ's constant insistence that it was. )

I knew it was a bad decision, Nivek. I said it before they resigned him. I'm saying the same thing five years later.

Just look at this timeline:

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/200 ... -timeline/

April 4, 2007 - Arenas tears the lateral meniscus in his left knee in a 108-100 loss to Charlotte and has season-ending surgery.

Nov. 21, 2007 - Arenas undergoes a second surgery to repair a partial meniscus tear in the same knee - believed to be caused by overstrenuous rehabilitation from the first surgery - and is expected to miss three months of action.

April 30, 2008 - Arenas announces before Game 5 of the Wizards’ playoff series with Cleveland that he is done for the season after his knee fails to respond positively. He expects a summer of rest to cure the pain and discomfort hobbling him.

June 10, 2008 - Despite an injury-plagued year, Arenas opts out of the final season of his $65 million contract in search of a max deal worth up to $127 million.

July 3, 2008 - Arenas agrees to a six-year contract from the Wizards worth $111 million. The Wizards offer the max, but Arenas “leaves $16 million on the table” to help the team.

Sept. 17, 2008 - Arenas has his surgically repaired knee operated on a third time, this time to remove lingering debris, which has caused continual pain and discomfort. He will miss all of training camp and at least the first month of the coming season.

Back in June/July 2008, I posted several things: Gilbert was opting out hurt, that was worse than what Boozer did to Cleveland, he knows his body is breaking down, the Wizards are in for years of salary cap hell, and I would let both Arenas and Jamison walk. I felt he was turning into another Grant Hill in terms of injuries robbing him of his ability. Many alternatives were on the table, including Baron Davis at half what Gilbert asked for.

I'll always think it was a bad decision because Arenas had already had two surgeries and knee problems for over one year when the Wizards maxed him out. They maxed out an injured player who never was the same.

[thinker07]

A lot of people think that you can look at the final result and be able to then very simply decide whether some particular decision was good or bad.

Why, yes, you are right, they do. It is by results that we know whether a decision was good or bad. Barring unforeseeable elements (injuries, etc.) that is.

Acquiring Jordan Crawford was a good move/decision that turned out badly. ...signing Baltche to the extension was a good decision that turned out horribly badly.

Would you please explain what you mean by these two statements? If you mean that acquiring Crawford was taking a chance that cost us nothing, and when he didn't work out it didn't cost us anything to get rid of him, I agree with you. About Dray not so obvious.

PIF,

The way that I understand the world working is that many decisions are very tough to be sure about. Lots of times, you have to think of results in probabilities. For example, "If we sign X player, there is a 30% chance that he'll be a star, a 30% chance that he'll be a bust, and a 40% chance he'll be in between." So you sign that player and he was a bust - is that necessarily a bad DECISION? I understand that it didn't turn out the way they wanted but is it a bad decision? The quality of the decision rests more on whether you assessed the probabilities correctly and whether you considered the positive and negative consequences properly. And finally, did you make an informed decision will full knowledge of what the risks and consequences were? This is the basic type of analysis that everybody uses on their draft board -- Do you want a medium upside with a high floor? Do you prefer a high upside with a low floor? People that make tough decisions all of the time generally try to focus on using a good process for decisions more so than just seeing what ultimately happened.

Put another way, if the weatherman says there's a 60% chance of rain and it doesn't rain, was the weatherman wrong? If you listened to the weatherman and decided to cancel your outdoor party, did you make a bad decision?

The Crawford decision took a chance on a talented player. It used up an asset (Kirk Hinrich) to acquire him. What if EG had insisted on and received a different player from Atlanta - maybe a player that the Wiz could have ultimately used? What might some other team have offered for Hinrich? I think this was a good decision that didn't turn out well. We had to essentially pay him to leave (by taking on the salary of Barbosa and Collins - neither of who were expected to play). So it didn't turn out horribly badly, but it was still a bad outcome because we might have gotten something else for Hinrich and we wasted two years developing and playing a guy who ended up being a bad guy in the locker room and on the floor.

Baltche is a much tougher decision. I think EG believed that Baltche had turned the corner as an impact player and he decided to lock him up at a pretty decent rate before his price got too high. OBVIOUSLY Baltche had NOT turned the corner. EG took a gamble and he lost bigtime. If Baltche had become a "near" allstar it would have been a fabulous outcome. I don't think it was a bad decision because in assessing the probabilities, I think they saw the chances of him being a near allstar were better than him playing so badly that the city would turn against him and boo him off the team via amnesty.

edit - Obviously I can appreciate that many reasonable people could disagree with this last conclusion.

[thinker07]

Yes, constant!

Signing Arenas to the big contract was a bad decision that turned out badly.

Actually, not really. I won't call it a good decision, but it was a reasonable one. He had the injury, but it was the kind of injury that has a very high recovery rate, especially in guys as young, well-conditioned and hard-working as Arenas. It definitely turned out bad, but it wasn't a bad decision. (Despite CCJ's constant insistence that it was. )

I knew it was a bad decision, Nivek. I said it before they resigned him. I'm saying the same thing five years later.

Just look at this timeline:

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/200 ... -timeline/

April 4, 2007 - Arenas tears the lateral meniscus in his left knee in a 108-100 loss to Charlotte and has season-ending surgery.

Nov. 21, 2007 - Arenas undergoes a second surgery to repair a partial meniscus tear in the same knee - believed to be caused by overstrenuous rehabilitation from the first surgery - and is expected to miss three months of action.

April 30, 2008 - Arenas announces before Game 5 of the Wizards’ playoff series with Cleveland that he is done for the season after his knee fails to respond positively. He expects a summer of rest to cure the pain and discomfort hobbling him.

June 10, 2008 - Despite an injury-plagued year, Arenas opts out of the final season of his $65 million contract in search of a max deal worth up to $127 million.

July 3, 2008 - Arenas agrees to a six-year contract from the Wizards worth $111 million. The Wizards offer the max, but Arenas “leaves $16 million on the table” to help the team.

Sept. 17, 2008 - Arenas has his surgically repaired knee operated on a third time, this time to remove lingering debris, which has caused continual pain and discomfort. He will miss all of training camp and at least the first month of the coming season.

Read more: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/200 ... z2cGPF0spP
Follow us: @washtimes on Twitter

Back in June/July 2008, I posted several things: Gilbert was opting out hurt, that was worse than what Boozer did to Cleveland, he knows his body is breaking down, the Wizards are in for years of salary cap hell, and I would let both Arenas and Jamison walk. I felt he was turning into another Grant Hill in terms of injuries robbing him of his ability. Many alternatives were on the table, including Baron Davis at half what Gilbert asked for.

I'll always think it was a bad decision because Arenas had already had two surgeries and knee problems for over one year when the Wizards maxed him out. They maxed out an injured player who never was the same.

I think you are exactly right, CCJ. The injury risk was just simply too great. Portland made the same bad decision giving Brandon Roy the huge contract when his knees were already bone-on-bone. Another factor that made the Arenas signing a BAD decision was that Arenas had already shown himself to not be a team leader who would submit to coaching. Finally, another part of the flawed process leading to a bad decision was Abe's inserting his personal sentiment into the equation. Really liking a player personally and using that as a rationale for action offers plenty of possibility for miscalculation.

[payitforward]

The way that I understand the world working is that many decisions are very tough to be sure about. Lots of times, you have to think of results in probabilities. For example, "If we sign X player, there is a 30% chance that he'll be a star, a 30% chance that he'll be a bust, and a 40% chance he'll be in between." So you sign that player and he was a bust - is that necessarily a bad DECISION? I understand that it didn't turn out the way they wanted but is it a bad decision? The quality of the decision rests more on whether you assessed the probabilities correctly and whether you considered the positive and negative consequences properly. And finally, did you make an informed decision will full knowledge of what the risks and consequences were?

Of course. But if you consistently make decisions where you don't properly assess probabilities, you'll also get more bad results. Across the range of moves a team makes -- assuming that random factors affect teams randomly -- the results tell you how good your decisions were.

The Crawford decision took a chance on a talented player. It used up an asset (Kirk Hinrich) to acquire him. What if EG had insisted on and received a different player from Atlanta - maybe a player that the Wiz could have ultimately used? What might some other team have offered for Hinrich? I think this was a good decision that didn't turn out well. We had to essentially pay him to leave (by taking on the salary of Barbosa and Collins - neither of who were expected to play). So it didn't turn out horribly badly, but it was still a bad outcome because we might have gotten something else for Hinrich and we wasted two years developing and playing a guy who ended up being a bad guy in the locker room and on the floor.

Nah. It was a great trade -- and anyway your entire argument hangs on your caricatures of people's skepticism and "whining." But no one questioned this trade! You seem to forget that we also got Atlanta's 2011 Round 1 pick, which unfortunately we blew on Singleton. Had we made a good decision to take Faried, you'd be calling it a great trade too -- i.e. outcomes make the difference.

Baltche is a much tougher decision. I think EG believed that Baltche had turned the corner as an impact player and he decided to lock him up at a pretty decent rate before his price got too high.

*Of course* EG believed that! The point is that there was no reason to believe it. It was a terrible decision, and the results showed it to be a terrible decision.

[thinker07]

The way that I understand the world working is that many decisions are very tough to be sure about. Lots of times, you have to think of results in probabilities. For example, "If we sign X player, there is a 30% chance that he'll be a star, a 30% chance that he'll be a bust, and a 40% chance he'll be in between." So you sign that player and he was a bust - is that necessarily a bad DECISION? I understand that it didn't turn out the way they wanted but is it a bad decision? The quality of the decision rests more on whether you assessed the probabilities correctly and whether you considered the positive and negative consequences properly. And finally, did you make an informed decision will full knowledge of what the risks and consequences were?

Of course. But if you consistently make decisions where you don't properly assess probabilities, you'll also get more bad results. Across the range of moves a team makes -- assuming that random factors affect teams randomly -- the results tell you how good your decisions were.

The Crawford decision took a chance on a talented player. It used up an asset (Kirk Hinrich) to acquire him. What if EG had insisted on and received a different player from Atlanta - maybe a player that the Wiz could have ultimately used? What might some other team have offered for Hinrich? I think this was a good decision that didn't turn out well. We had to essentially pay him to leave (by taking on the salary of Barbosa and Collins - neither of who were expected to play). So it didn't turn out horribly badly, but it was still a bad outcome because we might have gotten something else for Hinrich and we wasted two years developing and playing a guy who ended up being a bad guy in the locker room and on the floor.

Nah. It was a great trade -- and anyway your entire argument hangs on your caricatures of people's skepticism and "whining." But no one questioned this trade! You seem to forget that we also got Atlanta's 2011 Round 1 pick, which unfortunately we blew on Singleton. Had we made a good decision to take Faried, you'd be calling it a great trade too -- i.e. outcomes make the difference.

Baltche is a much tougher decision. I think EG believed that Baltche had turned the corner as an impact player and he decided to lock him up at a pretty decent rate before his price got too high.

*Of course* EG believed that! The point is that there was no reason to believe it. It was a terrible decision, and the results showed it to be a terrible decision.

I wasn't using Crawford as an example of a decision that people complained about. I used this example to analyze the decision making process. And yes I said that I thought the Hinrich trade was a good decision. Even though it didn't turn out well. And your point about Singleton being the pick used - Well yes that's my point to begin with - it didn't turn out well, but it still was a good decision.

The next decision, to take Singleton with the Atlanta pick stands on its own. I don't think I understand talent evaluation well enough to say whether the Singleton pick was a good decision. A good draft decision requires following your talent evaluations. Most people would say you should draft the highest rated player available on the board regardless of position. And if you have equally rated players, then you pick the one that fits your needs the best. So Vesely and Singleton might very well have been good "decisions" that were informed by really **** talent evaluations. But I can't know that because there are no reports of how the scouts and evaluators rated the different players and whether EG followed their scouting recommendations or over ruled them. By the way, that's the way decisions are analyzed after the fact in the real world.

If there was a special prosecutor investigating the crime of selecting Singleton or Vesely, they would start by looking at what the scouts said. They would move on to examine how the team's draft board was constructed. They would try to determine did EG follow the scouts recommendations; did Ted tell EG a preference; Did some other factor get taken into consideration that shouldn't have been. To understand whether it was a good decision you would have to know what EG's rationale was, and whether it was supported by the evidence. I believe the Wiz gave serious consideration to taking Singleton 6th and might have taken him there if Vesely had been off the board. Or maybe the Wiz would have taken Leonard if Vesely was off the board. Of all the kinds of information available, there's virtually none available on how any team evaluated different players.

I never liked either pick because at the time I really wanted shooters since I thought that was what the Wiz needed the most. I liked Klay Thompson, Tobias Harris, and Jordan Hamilton in that draft because I thought those were the best shooters that might work for the Wiz. And I liked Justin Harper, Charles Jenkins and Jon Leuer for the second round pick. But regardless both picks were DISASTROUS when you consider how other players drafted later have developed.

Also none of my points reference whining.

[hands11]

I'd give the offseason a B.

A - Didn't blow our cap for non-star players. Perhaps the greatest offseason move was not settling for "win now" players, who would destroy our chances of building a contender. Obviously, most here won't think that's to be counted as a positive (should one get credit for not doing something?). I think credit should be given considering many here and many GMs would have signed (or traded for) a non-star stretch four.

B - Porter. Obviously, he was overrated (in terms of immediate impact). I think now he's being underrated, in terms of the actual impact he provides right away. Obviously, I think Noel will be better eventually. But, I do think Porter will help us next season with smart passes, defense and outside shooting. And he'll be efficient. Top three pick worthy? Not next year. Perhaps eventually. But, he'll be much better than our back-up SGs last year (where Webster can now shift).

C - Maynor. I think Maynor is going to be much better than thought. He has playoff experience. I love that we got a mentor/distributor/leader for this young team. I especially think it's a good idea to have a mentor here if we end up trading Okafor (which is unlikely, but it's better to have the option if a star demands a trade). I think leadership is an undervalued stat.

A - Harrington. One year as a back-up. Someone who has played with Nene. A tested back-up (unlike Booker). I know people are going to see a dramatic difference between Vesley getting minutes and Harrington getting them. I've always liked Harrington. Tough guy. Plus:

“I’m going to compete. I don’t want nobody to give me nothing. Nobody gave me nothing my whole career, so I’m just going to go out and compete against those guys and help them also. The one thing that I learned when I first came in… I was with Antonio and Dale Davis, and they put their arms around me and told me a lot, and Derrick McKey. Those were the three guys that really taught me a lot and helped me mold my game. So I feel like I just have to give back, and the way I give back is helping those young guys.”

He's another mentor. I want this team packed with leaders to help development of the pieces that matter.

A - Wall. Resigning Wall to the max was unavoidable. And I still believe the speed of that contract ingratiates us to Fegan (see Harrington).

B - Webster. Little too much for his current value. If he continues to develop, he's a steal. Can back two positions. I predict people start loving a line-up of Maynor/Webster/Porter/Harrington/Nene much more than they envision.

C+ - Rice. We have almost no alpha-male-scorers on the bench. Rice might be that alpha-scorer we need, especially during injuries.


For not blowing their wad, we got quite a bit. I think people are under-grading how much better our bench will be.

You grade for Wiz was a B
Grade for the write up. A

Though if Rice is that, he is worth more then a C+

I think Rice has a good chance to come in an produce right away in limited minutes. He is my Nick 2.0

And with Wall and Beal settling in quickly, and Maynor, Webster, Trevor A, Nene, Okafor and now Al as vets on the team, I'm starting to feel like Kevin, Ves, Singleton and Booker are senior draft picks.

The team has finally settled down. They have 6 good vets that can actually play and 2 stud top 3 draft picks that are already productive vets in Wall and Beal. That's 8 players right there that know how to play the game.

So then you have basically these previous draft pick finally with quality around them. Something for them to plug into. Almost like they were all just drafted. If just one or two of them step it up to be legit reliable production, then you are 9 or 10 deep. Otto, Glen, Temple, Kevin, Ves, Booker, and Singleton.

Consider that your draft class with Otto the Fresh, Glen a Jr, and 4 Seniors plus Temples as a FA pick up at the min.

That's not so bad.

[hands11]

A lot of people think that you can look at the final result and be able to then very simply decide whether some particular decision was good or bad.

Why, yes, you are right, they do. It is by results that we know whether a decision was good or bad. Barring unforeseeable elements (injuries, etc.) that is.

Acquiring Jordan Crawford was a good move/decision that turned out badly. ...signing Baltche to the extension was a good decision that turned out horribly badly.

Would you please explain what you mean by these two statements? If you mean that acquiring Crawford was taking a chance that cost us nothing, and when he didn't work out it didn't cost us anything to get rid of him, I agree with you. About Dray not so obvious.

PIF,

The way that I understand the world working is that many decisions are very tough to be sure about. Lots of times, you have to think of results in probabilities. For example, "If we sign X player, there is a 30% chance that he'll be a star, a 30% chance that he'll be a bust, and a 40% chance he'll be in between." So you sign that player and he was a bust - is that necessarily a bad DECISION? I understand that it didn't turn out the way they wanted but is it a bad decision? The quality of the decision rests more on whether you assessed the probabilities correctly and whether you considered the positive and negative consequences properly. And finally, did you make an informed decision will full knowledge of what the risks and consequences were? This is the basic type of analysis that everybody uses on their draft board -- Do you want a medium upside with a high floor? Do you prefer a high upside with a low floor? People that make tough decisions all of the time generally try to focus on using a good process for decisions more so than just seeing what ultimately happened.

Put another way, if the weatherman says there's a 60% chance of rain and it doesn't rain, was the weatherman wrong? If you listened to the weatherman and decided to cancel your outdoor party, did you make a bad decision?

The Crawford decision took a chance on a talented player. It used up an asset (Kirk Hinrich) to acquire him. What if EG had insisted on and received a different player from Atlanta - maybe a player that the Wiz could have ultimately used? What might some other team have offered for Hinrich? I think this was a good decision that didn't turn out well. We had to essentially pay him to leave (by taking on the salary of Barbosa and Collins - neither of who were expected to play). So it didn't turn out horribly badly, but it was still a bad outcome because we might have gotten something else for Hinrich and we wasted two years developing and playing a guy who ended up being a bad guy in the locker room and on the floor.

Baltche is a much tougher decision. I think EG believed that Baltche had turned the corner as an impact player and he decided to lock him up at a pretty decent rate before his price got too high. OBVIOUSLY Baltche had NOT turned the corner. EG took a gamble and he lost bigtime. If Baltche had become a "near" allstar it would have been a fabulous outcome. I don't think it was a bad decision because in assessing the probabilities, I think they saw the chances of him being a near allstar were better than him playing so badly that the city would turn against him and boo him off the team via amnesty.

edit - Obviously I can appreciate that many reasonable people could disagree with this last conclusion.

And Dray did bounce back last year.

One of the problems I see with Dray is something I have seen with other people. Some people can't deal with success. Dray worked better as an underdog when he felt he was being under appreciated and he was disgruntled. That when we got the 7 Day Dray summer. I thought it was a good singing at the time. And the way the did it pulled money forward because they had some cap space.

But that was also pre Gil wasn't it. Pre the team getting blown up. Pre him being the best player on the team. Well he let that go to him immature head. But he did hit bottom and he did bounce back as I expected he would. I thought they should have kept him. He had no where to go but up. He learned his lesson. With the additions of Nene, Okafor, Webster, Trevor A, etc, he would have just as likely done what he did in NJ but done it here. Then you decide if you want to keep him or not. You paid him anyway. So I thought the extension was a good decision. I question the letting him go for nothing and playing him. But I do understand why they did it.

As for Gil, I was saying the same thing CCJ just posted. Let him walk. Actually, I said trade him two years earlier when he was worth the most because I never saw them going anywhere with him as the PG, I don't want to be the captain but I want to be the captain. They could have gotten a king ransom for him. He was all the buzz at the time.

[closg00]

I think you are exactly right, CCJ. The injury risk was just simply too great. Portland made the same bad decision giving Brandon Roy the huge contract when his knees were already bone-on-bone. Another factor that made the Arenas signing a BAD decision was that Arenas had already shown himself to not be a team leader who would submit to coaching. Finally, another part of the flawed process leading to a bad decision was Abe's inserting his personal sentiment into the equation. Really liking a player personally and using that as a rationale for action offers plenty of possibility for miscalculation.

...and add to the mix an incompetent GM who negotiates contracts. Grunfeld let Gilbert name his price and the organization ended-up with zero protection despite Gilbert's multiple knee surgeries, the org would be on the hook for the entire term of the contract. This on-top of giving a 32 y/o AJ a 4-year $50 mil extension. Mind boggling.

Negotiating with Ernie Grunfeld must be an agent/GM's dream come-true.