RealGM

I have this discussion is so many threads, I just felt it would be handy to post it here, because I feel like people don't fully appreciate the NBA economy that existed in the pre-99 CBAs.

In the pre-99 period there were several key things that were different, which affected the NBA in ways that you know about, but which are understated when people see the balance of today's NBA.

The first thing is contracts, especially rookie ones. Yes, I'm sure you know all about them, but the degree to which they were different is something not even comparable. The pre-99 CBA's were a time when rookies could get a $64 million dollar rookie contract like Big Dog Robinson did ($101mill in today's money when adjusted for inflation). It was a time when a rookie could sign a 15 year, $74.4 mill contract like Chris Webber did, but with a 1 year opt out. Meaning rookies could force their way off their team right after being drafted. So right off the bat, teams had little to no leverage, because they were scared of players leaving them whenever they wanted, and they were scared of players asking for too much money (like KG's $126 mill contract, or Shaq's $121 mill contract- which with today's inflation is over $180 mill). Agents had huge amounts of power to force trades or make you overpay, and costs were going up and up. At the same time, overall salaries were relatively low. In 1995 the Bucks spent just over $16 mill in total on salary. 2 years later Jordan was making almost double that amount just by himself.

What all this combined to do was to create a system whereby some teams were legitimately not too fussed about winning games, or having a long term plan, just being able to make a profit each year. That's why the NBA had farm teams like the Clippers who had a winning record once in 26 years. The goal was to field some exciting, flashy, young (cheap) players who would create false hope and sell tickets (worst case they'd sell when better teams came to town), rather than to try to win. Sterling traded the 1995 #2 pick for spare parts. Why? Because he was worried about how much money the #2 pick would want. The Clippers were one of the only teams to get a work out with Kobe in 1996. They told him it was the best workout they'd ever seen. "But we can't draft you". Why? "Because people won't take us seriously if we draft a HS'er". The Clippers didn't care if Kobe was good, only if they could market him to fans (and by the time they could, he'd probably leave in free agency, assuming he didn't want too much money in the first place). The difference between a "good player" and a "better than good" player was not huge on the court, but it was huge salary wise. So a lot of teams just focused on getting good players, not great ones.

Then there was another variable to screw teams over. In the early to mid 90's, because salaries were so low (overall- not for new stars), it was still possible for stars to make much more money on endorsements than salaries. Jordan is the best known case of course- he was getting $3 mill a year on salary most of the time, but over $30 mill a year on endorsements. As the 90's progressed the gap started to shrink, but even in 1993 the salary cap was only $14 mill. This also meant a lot of teams lacked cap flexibility, driving the total price for non-star players down some years. It meant a lot of stars looked at teams and said "I can accept $4 mill from [crap team 1], or $3 mill from [good team 2], but I'll actually win on the good team, and make a tonne more in endorsements as a winner, so who cares about the $1 mill" (which is pretty much the choice Barkley made when he left Philly for the Suns, albeit by forcing a trade). The system was also in the middle of a massive adjustment- some stars were stuck on old contracts that had been absurdly long (and were still cheap), while new stars were driving salaries for marketable stars to ever more insane levels.

This created a league where the "haves" could easily get better at the expense of the "have nots". In that system, the Suns did great. They had success, a warm climate, existing good players to play with, etc. In today's CBA though those things matter very little, because players now make much more money staying with home teams, can't easily leave their home team for a long time (which creates ties to said team as well), and don't have the ability to trade endorsements for salary (because salary is usually more than endorsements per year, and because the global marketing of the NBA means city location is less important- though not completely irrelevant). And teams have stability in the salary cap to plan around- it's not just going to double in a few years.

The commonly cited analysis of Phoenix doesn't tackle that issue, which is why it's problematic. People cite the way the Suns "rebuild" after 1996 without needing to tank. The Suns were a 500. ball team in 1996 for one reason only- crippling injuries. It in no way reflected the talent on the team (who had won 59 games the year before). Then in 97 they had more injuries (and lost Barkley obviously). It wasn't a great situation, but they had a lot of talent on the team. So, how did they acquire that talent, and then rebuild into a contender again?

Well, their best player in 1998 (their next contention season) was probably McDyess. How did they get him? Denver knew he had one more year on his contract, and were terrified he'd want too much money (the same reason Sterling had traded the pick that was used to select him in the first place), so they moved him for whatever value they could get (which wasn't much- they got a pick). And you can see why- McDyess left Phoenix that offseason (ironically going back to Denver, who decided to pony up for him 6yrs, $67mill- $95 mill in today's money). A classic case of old CBA rules and uncertainty letting Phoenix acquire someone for very little.

They got Kidd for several reasons. Firstly, Kidd was unhappy in Dallas, feuding with his team mates, and wanted out. Agents had more sway then for the above mentioned reasons and others, and he got his wish. The assets traded for him? Cassell was acquired in the Barkley trade, AC Green was a solid throw in (though they were able to sign him for the reasons alluded to already), and Finley was just a good draft pick (another thing that's become harder to beat bad teams in, because scouting is much more thorough now). Dallas was one of those farm teams, who sucked for the whole 90's basically, constantly spent as little as possible, and never kept their good players (too expensive).

The other 3 best players on the 98 Suns are the usual reasons explained above. Cliff Robinson signed with them because he wanted to win and get paid at the same time. He signed a wink-wink $1 mill contract for 1 year with the Suns, who then turned around and gave him 5 years and 40 million the next offseason at age 32. Cliff's entire career prior to playing in Phoenix he had made under $14 mill over 7 years. They got #1 pick Manning because the Clippers were scared he'd want too much money, and traded him for washed up Wilkins (who had a name they could market) to save money, the same reason the Hawks didn't retain him (while the Suns pulled the same wink wink bull they'd done with Cliff- $1 mill for 1 year in the first year of Manning's tenure, then 6.8 mill a year for 6 years, a prohibitive contract at the time- that was the 6th highest salary in the NBA in 1996). Rex was just another of those "better than good but not great" players who was sick of playing for the Washington Generals (or joke owners like Shinn, whose first question during his rookie holdout for a better contract was "would you date a black woman?" http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=2061773), and went to Phoenix (he also was the recipient of an inexplicable contract- given a wink wink minimum contract the first 2 years, worth a combined 500K, he was then rewarded with a ridiculous above market 6 year contract, which paid him $13+ mill over the first 4 years, and which he was only healthy enough to play for the first 2 years- Rex was waived 2 years later, and now works for Phoenix). All the sorts of contracts (and tampering) that don't happen today, and can't happen under the current cap. The same core was what was used to be successful over the next few years, adding Googs by overpayment (because the old CBA had hamstrung the Wolves into overpaying KG, they couldn't afford Googs), and moving guys the old CBA had let them acquire (like Manning) for new guys (like Penny).

That was the environment that benefitted Phoenix, and which doesn't exist anymore. People talk about how "such and such team has always been a winner, so they always will be". It doesn't work that way.

The short version is that contenders in the post-99 period almost all assemble teams with lotto talent (at least top 10, usually much higher), either by drafting guys to play for them (e.g. The Thunder), and/or trading lotto assets for players (e.g. The Celtics in 2008). There are virtually no exceptions, and the exceptions are inherently flukes you can't copy (either because of one off circumstances that fell your way, or the team being assembled in the pre-99 CBA environment, i.e Kobe and Shaq, who would never be able to force their way to the Lakers the way they did in the modern NBA). The lottery isn't perfect, but there's a reason so many teams have realised they need to use it now- it's the least bad, least luck dependant way of getting better. Even historically incompetent or mediocre franchises have shown they can turn it around (like the Clippers for eg).

Indiana built a contender without tanking.

1) Indiana isn't a contender. They're a 50-ish win team whose claim to fame is that they give the Heatles trouble because of match ups, before the Heat get serious and beat them. They wouldn't make it out of the 1st round in the West, and I doubt if they'll make it past the 2nd round of the Eastern playoffs this coming season now that there are some plausible contenders like the Bulls and Nets again.
2) Indiana's best player is a top 10 pick.
3) The argument is not that it's impossible to do it, it's that it's extremely rare. There's a handful of cases, mostly based on fluke circumstances, over the last 15 years (since the 99 CBA). There's dozens of examples that use the traditional lotto asset formula.

2) Indiana's best player is a top 10 pick.

Well this is pretty pedantic. They didn't tank for 10th. They went for the playoffs, missed, and then drafted better than everyone else. That isn't tanking.

The problem with that sort of defence is that you can never prove when a team "tanks" and when a team "just sucks". Giving Indy points for something we can't prove is silly. They were bad enough to get a top 10 pick, and teams need top 10 picks to build contenders (usually much higher picks). That's the only relevant fact here.

Your entire argument is similarly built on these subjectives and conclusions. This is fine - it's the nature of the beast. But don't reject mine just because it wasn't yours.

And you're really unnecessarily putting this line in the sand about George being "a top 10 pick." He was 10th. Is it a game changer had he been 12th? You can't "tank" and pick 10th - it just doesn't happen. Indiana didn't tank. If you want to conclude they aren't a contender, that's fine, that's yet another subjective point we can't prove until after the fact, but they're a bloody good team these days and they did it through strong drafting and relative frugality. Teams CAN build without tanking. And whilst you concede that point with the heavy disclaimer that it's still rare....that leaves me wondering what the core point really is. Is it that teams can only compete if they manage their assets very well and repeatedly acquire good players for good prices?

Well, yeah. Obvs.

MarkDeeks wrote:Indiana built a contender without tanking.

Houston Rockets as well ... or the Bulls (they were incredible lucky in 2008, but that wasn't due to tanking)

The point is not "it can never happen", it's that the odds of it happening without top 10 (or usually much higher) picks to build off is very, very unlikely. Conversely, the odds of doing it with bottoming out, or low picks, is much, much better and more proven. There's a handful of post 99 exceptions, all near impossible to emulate, and then dozens and dozens of bottoming out examples (a method that is very emulatable, even if your front office isn't that good).

As for Houston:
Morey gets a lot of praise as some kind of genius, but he's actually been very lucky. He inherited a very good team, made marginal changes which were mostly good, then took too long to pull the trigger on the rebuild, and never fully committed to it. He spent 3 years in mediocrity, before lucking into Harden, and then massively lucking into Dwight. The problem with what Morey did in collecting (so so) assets and continuing to try and "win" (but finishing 9th) were the following:
1) If Morey had been allowed to get Pau Gasol, as he was a Stern veto away from, it blows up in his face. He no longer has the assets to get Harden, and certainly isn't getting Dwight. I know Morey fans say he'd have gotten them anyway, but that's silly- he'd have already blown his load. With Pau the Rockets make the playoffs 1-2 times, then drop out of the playoffs and have nothing to show for their 3 years of mediocrity- they're right back where they started.
2) There has only ever been one guy like Harden on the trade block in the history of the modern CBA's (so post 99 basically). By this I mean, there has only ever been one guy who was a) a young star, b) was a fairly safe bet, c) was on a rookie contract which could be matched, and d) was on a team who wanted to keep him, but couldn't because ownership couldn't afford it. You can't plan for that, because it's only ever happened once. Morey lucked into a unique situation, and then lucked out even further when a bunch of other teams who the Thunder preferred to trade with all (stupidly) said no. The Bobcats said no (for the #2 pick), the Wizards said no (for the #3 pick), the Warriors said no (for a trade based around Klay), etc. Your team shouldn't "plan" for something so unlikely to happen, because it relies on too many variables outside your control (which almost surely won't happen- but in this one case did), and there's only 1 Harden, so everyone who doesn't get him did it for nothing. Not a good plan.
3) Dwight was even luckier. If Dwight doesn't do something so stupid and unpredictable as opt into his final contract year, he's a Net. If the Lakers don't screw up huge, Dwight is a Laker still.

If I knew the lotto numbers, I'd take them, but I'd never build a team on the assumption I would win the lotto repeatedly.

You have to be lucky when tanking, too. So basically it seems we've arrived at the conclusion that you need to be lucky to be good.

No, because you need to be much, much luckier to become a contender through non-tanking. The luck required for rebuilding through the draft is nothing like as unlikely. That's what makes the lottery a far superior way to build a team.

Lets take a look:

2013 - Miami Heat, signed their players in FA, didn't tank for them, in fact, their tanking job gave them Michael Beasley
2012 - Miami Heat, look at 2013
2011 - Dallas Mavericks, second rebuild on the fly while staying competitive after 2004, no tanking job
2010 - Los Angeles Lakers, no tanking, got their final piece with Gasol in a trade
2009 - Los Angeles Lakers, no tanking, see 2010
2008 - Boston Celtics, tanked, missed out on Top pick and then actually used those drafted players to trade for established players like Kevin Garnett and Ray Allen
2007 - San Antonio Spurs, rebuild on the fly with late picks Tony Parker and Manu Ginobili
2006 - Miami Heat, tanked for Wade, but traded for O'Neal
2005 - San Antonio Spurs, see 2007
2004 - Detroit Pistons, no tanking, got Hamilton, Ben and Rasheed Wallace via trade, signed Billups in FA and got Prince with the 23rd pick
2003 - San Antonio Spurs, tanked for Duncan
2002 - Los Angeles Lakers, picked Bryant with the 13th pick (well, actually traded for him by using Vlade Divac ..), signed O'Neal in FA, no tanking
2001 - see 2002
2000 - see 2001
1999 - San Antonio Spurs, see 2003

Well, if I count, there are more teams building through trade and FA signings or rebuilding on the fly than teams actually tanking for a good player and then winning it all in close proximity to that tanking job.
What we see for those championship teams is usually: talented players who used that talent and were healthy for the championship run. At the end, it is related to luck to get such players and be healthy in order to be a contender. Just take a look at the Thunder, who were healthy all the years and then get unlucky with an injury to their second best player right at the start of the playoffs. The Bulls were unlucky in 2012, when their best player suffered a knee injury in the first game of the playoffs, etc. pp. Winning requires luck, in one way or the other, and it seems as if that is more needed than tanking.

Btw, a good scientific approach would look from the other way as well. How good are draft picks in average? Well, once you do that, everything but a top3 pick is just a pick pile of crap shots. And even those top3 picks my turn out to be Hasheem Thabeet, Michael Beasley, OJ Mayo, Greg Oden, Andrea Bargnani, Adam Morrison, Marvin Williams, Ben Gordon, Darko Milicic, Jay Williams, Kwame Brown, Stromile Swift, Darius Miles, just to name some of the top3 picks from 2000 to 2009, well, 13 of those 30 players picked in the top3 didn't equate to any major piece for a contender. Which in turn means, even with a top3 pick a team needs luck to get a desired player, and then we add the fact that a team needs to be lucky in the lottery as well, before even be able to pick in the top3. Well, and when we look how often teams with the worst record aren't getting even getting a top3 pick, I wouldn't exactly call such tanking strategy to be a really useful one, unless, obviously, a team really can't get any kind of good players.

That is just such an inaccurate analysis I don't even know where to begin.

Yes, Miami signed Lebron... but without tanking to get Wade (at #5) they would never have been able to bring over Lebron or Bosh (or Shaq). Nobody said lotto picks were the only component, but they are almost always an essential component (particularly top 10 picks). So there goes Miami.

The Spurs made many other good moves, of course, but they tanked to get Duncan, who has been a necessary component of that success.

The same applies to Boston- they tanked, got a top 5 pick and used it to get Ray Allen. It was only after getting Ray Allen that KG consented to come in a trade to the Celtics. The Celtics also tanked in 97 to try to get Duncan, and Paul Pierce was a top 10 pick the following year in which they were still recovering from that tank job.

Did you read my earlier posts? Because I did cover this in some depth.

As to the 2 remaining examples- the Lakers are a product of the pre-99 CBA conditions (Kobe, and Shaq/Odom, + they took the gas off at the end of the 2005 season to get a top 10 pick to draft Bynum), and being LA. Teams can't copy that, and even the Lakers wouldn't be able to build a team that way anymore (for reasons I've covered in great depth before, and allude to on this thread also). The Mavs under Don Nelson 100% tanked to get a top 6 pick in 1998, they then traded down a few picks to get Dirk (not to mention the GM picking #10 was on the record saying he'd have taken Dirk). Without Dirk they get no titles at all. With today's scouting guys like Dirk are even less likely to slide to #9.

The Pistons kinda, sorta hold up as an exception. But then again, the best guy on their title team (Ben Wallace) they only acquired by trading a star who they bottomed out to get (Grant Hill). The circumstances under which they got their other stars are based on pretty flukey stuff, which as a GM it would be irresponsible to plan for, because the stars aren't going to align that way twice in 20-30 years.

In terms of scientific analysis, I went through this question on another thread. You get all-nba type ish quality player in the top 10 about 33% of the time. You get a franchise type guy you can build around about 70% of the time at the #1 pick. Those odds are a heck of a lot better than planning on getting the one James Harden like player who will be available on the market in the 15 years since the 99 CBA, and then lucking into circumstances that align to give you Dwight too. If Morey had been allowed to get Pau he'd look like a clown right now, and if there had been 5 clones of Morey all doing the same thing only 1 gets Harden, and the rest fail. Sounds like a pretty crappy plan to emulate.

From 2002 to 2013, from 48 spots in the conference finals only 11 were taken by a team picking a top3 player in the draft from 2000 to 2009, where that picked player also played an important role.

2002, Nets with Kenyon Martin, picked 1st in 2000, lost in the finals
2003, Nets with Kenyon Martin, picked 1st in 2000, lost in the finals
2007, Cavaliers with LeBron James, picked 1st in 2003, lost in the finals
2007, Jazz with Deron Williams, picked 3rd in 2005, lost in the WCF
2009, Magic with Dwight Howard, picked 1st in 2004, lost in the finals
2009, Nuggets with Carmelo Anthony, picked 3rd in 2003, lost in WCF
2009, Cavaliers with LeBron James, picked 1st in 2003, lost in the ECF
2010, Magic with Dwight Howard, picked 1st in 2004, lost in the ECF
2011, Bulls with Derrick Rose, picked 1st in 2008, lost in ECF
2011, Thunder with Kevin Durant, picked 2nd in 2007, lost in WCF
2012, Thunder with Kevin Durant, picked 2nd in 2007, lost in the finals

That's it. No championship at all for a team which picked those players, 5 losses in the finals, 6 losses in the CF. Well, Kenyon Martin wasn't the best or most important player on those Nets teams, Deron Williams wasn't the best player on the 2007 Jazz. In turn, that means 37 spots in the CF, including ALL champions and 7 runner-ups, didn't have a top3 pick from 2000 to 2009 which they picked playing for them.
What exactly did tanking achieve for teams like the Minnesota Timberwolves? The Trail Blazers? The Bobcats? The Grizzlies? Etc. pp.? Usually, a tanking team is bad for multiple seasons, and if they are lucky, they end up like the Thunder not getting injured players, or have James or Howard dragging not so good casts with high payrolls to the finals just to see the top player leave them with nothing, but a bad team. Welcome to the superior strategy of tanking, where one example of the Thunder (and I mentioned it again: a team incredible lucky with not having injuries until the last playoffs) is used to create a make-belief. :)

Another good case to study: Sacramento Kings, where tanking for 7 years creates still a worse than average team and forces the team into giving a headcase a max contract.

So, and if someone thinks that is just due to "arbritarily" cutting out everything before 2000, well, check out what success Elton Brand (#1 in 1999) brought to the Bulls, Steve Francis (#2 in 1999) to the Vancouver Grizzlies or Baron Davis (#3 in 1999) to the Charlotte Hornets. Or Michael Olowakandi (#1 in 1998) to the Clippers, Mike Bibby (#2 in 1998) to the Grizzlies or Raef LaFrentz (#3 in 1998) to the Denver Nuggets. In 1997 we see the only player picked in the top3 in the draft, who actually won a championship with the team which drafted him since 1989: Tim Duncan. The next guy comes in 1989, #3 Sean Elliot, drafted by the Spurs and winning the championship in 1999, and then in 1987, David Robinson, #1 drafted by the Spurs, also winning the championship in 1999. And yeah, if someone is interested, checking out the success rate of the teams picking players in the top3 with that top3 pick on their roster, might change the mind about "tanking" as such a great idea.

The methodology in your response is ridiculous, and I think you know it. Firstly, you ignore the obvious fact that a tonne of the teams in the Conference Finals did have top 3 guys (you just exclude them out by picking arbitrary dates- no Duncan, no Iverson, etc), secondly you use the imprecise measure of "conference finals" and not looking at "who was actually a contender" (why do we care what the pretender East teams from 00-03 did? They weren't serious title challengers, the real finals happened in the West those years), and thirdly you shift the goal posts from "top 10 pick" which is what I said (usually higher of course), to "top 3 pick". Who exactly are you rebutting here? Captain Strawman of the strawpatrol? The post you made above basically ignores every single thing I said (except for the premise). Why would we look at "guys drafted by the teams" when it's just as valid to tank, get a high pick, and trade it for pieces (like the Celtics and Clippers did for eg). Just a ridiculous, and pretty disingenuous analysis.

I think you know the response to bad teams like the Kings- if your franchise is run badly, any plan will fail (though even then some badly run teams like the Clippers luck into contention thanks to the lottery), that isn't an analysis as to which plan is most likely to succeed though. But if you want a real analysis of those bad teams, I'm going to hold out for an actual honest response, not that straw man nonsense above. For instance, an analysis of who the post 99 contenders were, and how they built their teams.

Again, the core message seems to be, "run your team well and you'll do better." It's all true. I just don't think it's all that novel.

The premise of the thread is that the superior strategy to build a team would be tanking. Therefore, having a top3 guy on a team while not drafting him is not included. As it was shown, the top teams have in fact in average not tanked to essemble the team they had success with (a 9th or 10th pick is not the result of tanking), but that they actually drafted well with mid or late 1st rounders, signed the right FA, made trades (especially trading away worse players and some sort of talent for better established players) and had luck with health.
If we look at the odds that a team is actually really getting a high level player in multiple drafts, we see that they are rather low. Even the team with the worst record has already a 75% chance of not getting the top pick of the draft. At worst it ends up with the 4th pick, a pick which in about 70% of the cases in the draft between 1979 and 2010 gave a player worse than Luol Deng (by 1/4 standard deviation, I spare the details of the used metric, because as I learnt before, numbers are confusing the op). Why using Luol Deng? Because that is about the average level of a #1 pick in the draft from 1979 to 2010. Btw, #2 to #4 where in about 66% of the cases worse than Luol Deng. What is the conclusion? Well, it makes more sense to sign someone like Luol Deng in FA than trying to tank for a higher draft pick, because the odds are saying that it is more likely to pick a worse player with those expected picks.

But well, Mr. "confirmation bias" with his friend "intellectual dishonesty" will likely dismiss the facts ...

OP does a good job explaining everything if you read it.

Bottoming out is the optimal rebuilding strategy. Skill and luck play significant roles, but that doesnt change the fact that bottoming out is the optimal strategy.

Morey went on to say that "bottoming out" is the highest probability strategy for rebuilding, and that he thinks a team like Philadelphia took the best path available, given the current CBA and draft rules.

mysticbb wrote:The premise of the thread is that the superior strategy to build a team would be tanking. Therefore, having a top3 guy on a team while not drafting him is not included. As it was shown, the top teams have in fact in average not tanked to essemble the team they had success with (a 9th or 10th pick is not the result of tanking), but that they actually drafted well with mid or late 1st rounders, signed the right FA, made trades (especially trading away worse players and some sort of talent for better established players) and had luck with health.
If we look at the odds that a team is actually really getting a high level player in multiple drafts, we see that they are rather low. Even the team with the worst record has already a 75% chance of not getting the top pick of the draft. At worst it ends up with the 4th pick, a pick which in about 70% of the cases in the draft between 1979 and 2010 gave a player worse than Luol Deng (by 1/4 standard deviation, I spare the details of the used metric, because as I learnt before, numbers are confusing the op). Why using Luol Deng? Because that is about the average level of a #1 pick in the draft from 1979 to 2010. Btw, #2 to #4 where in about 66% of the cases worse than Luol Deng. What is the conclusion? Well, it makes more sense to sign someone like Luol Deng in FA than trying to tank for a higher draft pick, because the odds are saying that it is more likely to pick a worse player with those expected picks.

But well, Mr. "confirmation bias" with his friend "intellectual dishonesty" will likely dismiss the facts ...

Saying "you should sign someone like Luol Deng" is quite presumptuous. A) It surmises that a team like Milwaukee/etc can attract FAs of that quality and B)Ignores the additional benefit of the low wage scale offered by draft picks.

HurricaneKid wrote:Saying "you should sign someone like Luol Deng" is quite presumptuous.

Well, obviously that is under the assumption that someone like Deng would sign. Even overpaying in terms of salary seems to be better than trying to tank. And overall I didn't speficify any team. Different teams may have to use different strategies, depending on the circumstances. But I was talking in general, like the op. ;)

HurricaneKid wrote:B)Ignores the additional benefit of the low wage scale offered by draft picks.

I'm talking about career value here. No good player will stay on a rookie scale forever. That also has several implication in regards to possible FA signings, because once the rookie scale is up, possible capspace is gone. That forces teams into signing FA in a short amount of time and resulted into signing like Larry Hughes signing by the Cavs, because in the next season the capspace would have been gone anyway.

Also, rookies need time to develop, thus the advantage is in average smaller than most fans assume, in fact, for more than half of the first round picks the salary in their first two seasons is actually right up there with their performance level. That shifts for the 3rd year and 4th years, especially when the players are kicked out who haven't deserved that money.

nodeal wrote:OP does a good job explaining everything if you read it.

If you believe in the premise of the thread as well as being caught up by a confirmation bias, sure, it might seem as if the op has something useful to say. ;)

But if you are interested in the truth, you will realise that the op is just using anectdotal arguments while dismissing everything which speaks against his previously formed opinion. Well, check out the odds of getting that good player in the draft, and you will realise that there is more luck involved than in signing just better players.

mysticbb wrote:

HurricaneKid wrote:Saying "you should sign someone like Luol Deng" is quite presumptuous.

Well, obviously that is under the assumption that someone like Deng would sign. Even overpaying in terms of salary seems to be better than trying to tank. And overall I didn't speficify any team. Different teams may have to use different strategies, depending on the circumstances. But I was talking in general, like the op.

HurricaneKid wrote:B)Ignores the additional benefit of the low wage scale offered by draft picks.

I'm talking about career value here. No good player will stay on a rookie scale forever. That also has several implication in regards to possible FA signings, because once the rookie scale is up, possible capspace is gone. That forces teams into signing FA in a short amount of time and resulted into signing like Larry Hughes signing by the Cavs, because in the next season the capspace would have been gone anyway.

Also, rookies need time to develop, thus the advantage is in average smaller than most fans assume, in fact, for more than half of the first round picks the salary in their first two seasons is actually right up there with their performance level. That shifts for the 3rd year and 4th years, especially when the players are kicked out who haven't deserved that money.

nodeal wrote:OP does a good job explaining everything if you read it.

If you believe in the premise of the thread as well as being caught up by a confirmation bias, sure, it might seem as if the op has something useful to say.

But if you are interested in the truth, you will realise that the op is just using anectdotal arguments while dismissing everything which speaks against his previously formed opinion. Well, check out the odds of getting that good player in the draft, and you will realise that there is more luck involved than in signing just better players.

Its an unfair assumption since a great many of the teams that elect to tank do so because their FA opportunities are so limited.

Talking about career value when the rest of the people in the thread are discussing bringing in as much talent in together is simply unfair. Ideally, you bring a few young players in on rookie deals and a few FA so when it comes time to pay your young stars the team is good enough that they would want to stay and the team can go over the "cap" to kep the developing team together. Having one of your stars on a rookie deal allows you to accumulate talent. So while you are talking about obtaining a singular play, I am discussing the best way to maximize the team and to accumulate the maximum amount fo talent given the CBA and other limitations.