Was Watching Game 7 of the 2001 ECF (Sixers vs Bucks)

[picc]

Recently. Lots of interesting things in the game, but notably Ray Allen got injured late with a knee sprain and had to leave the game and hit the locker room for a while. Of course he came back in the game because its game 7. And when he did, he was limping so bad he could barely make it upcourt.

Milwaukee had Ray guarding Eric Snow, and everyone else available on Iverson. Naturally, I was expecting Philly take advantage of Ray's injury and have AI get him on switches or crossmatching for an easy iso or a forced double. Or for Snow to go at him.

Never happened. They didn't make the slightest attempt to bring Ray in on the action. Just let him exist on the other side of the court with a busted knee and Eric Snow 6 feet away. Didn't have Snow go at him. Didn't have Snow bring him into Iverson's screen action. Didn't try to force a switch. Didn't seek him in transition. Nothing. Meanwhile, Iverson just went at whatever defender George Karl assigned to him while Ray chilled on the weak side.

As surprising as this was, it did remind me that switch/bum hunting didn't really take off until the Warriors/Cavs finals. And that offensive strategy and coaching have gotten a lot better over the past 20 years. While we can blame them for not innovating earlier, it just wasn't the paradigm at the time.

Which makes me wonder if and how the NBA historic landscape would be different if this strategy had existed earlier.

But thats the question. Would NBA history be different if teams had been relentlessly hunting weak links on defense they way they do now, but in the 80s? The 90s? 00s?

[bonita_the_frog]

But there'd be 0% chance of Ray Allen switching from Snow to Iverson. Ray Allen would avoid guarding Iverson no matter what, even if it meant slipping under a screen and leaving Snow wide open. The Bucks would love for Snow to shoot instead of Iverson anyway... Snow is a .208 career three-point shooter, and was 0-7 in the 2001 playoffs!

[picc]

Let's assume you're right. There's still a 100% chance that a defender who can't physically move being involved in your offensive actions benefits said actions and compromises the team defense. But it was never so much as considered.

Btw the screens back then (as well as most offensive actions) were closer, so it would have been a wide open Snow mid-ranger. Which he was taking and hitting during the game.

[og15]

Mismatch hunting and targeting defenders really changed how some players could be used, that's certainly true. It was easier to hide guys in the past than it is now.

It was definitely getting more popularity before the Warriors, but maybe that series pushed it over the edge, it's always tough to truly say when the change fully happened.

But there'd be 0% chance of Ray Allen switching from Snow to Iverson. Ray Allen would avoid guarding Iverson no matter what, even if it meant slipping under a screen and leaving Snow wide open. The Bucks would love for Snow to shoot instead of Iverson anyway... Snow is a .208 career three-point shooter, and was 0-7 in the 2001 playoffs!

The idea here would be to force Ray into actions.

So, for example, Snow would be screening for AI, you bring Ray into the play to try to force him to guard AI in some way, either having to help his teammate, switch, whatever it is, the idea is just attacking a hobbled defender and making him defend and going at the weak link.

With Snow, again, the idea isn't for Snow to shoot, and Snow is a weak offensive player, but the idea is for example, run pick and roll with Snow, make Ray guard, and make the defense have to cover for Ray who is struggling to move. Snow would also be running mid-range pick and roll. Teams did a lot of that, it wasn't mainy 3PT line.

Teams would attack a hobbled player if he was the direct matchup of a scorer, but it wasn't the prevailing strategy to try and bring a hobbled defender into the play to either break down the defense or get him off the court.

[picc]

Mismatch hunting and targeting defenders really changed how some players could be used, that's certainly true. It was easier to hide guys in the past than it is now.

It was definitely getting more popularity before the Warriors, but maybe that series pushed it over the edge, it's always tough to truly say when the change fully happened.

But there'd be 0% chance of Ray Allen switching from Snow to Iverson. Ray Allen would avoid guarding Iverson no matter what, even if it meant slipping under a screen and leaving Snow wide open. The Bucks would love for Snow to shoot instead of Iverson anyway... Snow is a .208 career three-point shooter, and was 0-7 in the 2001 playoffs!

The idea here would be to force Ray into actions.

So, for example, Snow would be screening for AI, you bring Ray into the play to try to force him to guard AI in some way, either having to help his teammate, switch, whatever it is, the idea is just attacking a hobbled defender and making him defend and going at the weak link.

With Snow, again, the idea isn't for Snow to shoot, and Snow is a weak offensive player, but the idea is for example, run pick and roll with Snow, make Ray guard, and make the defense have to cover for Ray who is struggling to move.

Teams would attack a hobbled player if he was the direct matchup of a scorer, but it wasn't the prevailing strategy to try and bring a hobbled defender into the play to either break down the defense or get him off the court.

Yes, you get it. Whether Ray switches or not, it puts the offense in advantageous position.

They just let him exist on the other side of the court. It was pretty wild to see. That'd be unheard of these days.

[bonita_the_frog]

Let's assume you're right. There's still a 100% chance that a defender who can't physically move being involved in your offensive actions benefits said actions and compromises the team defense. But it was never so much as considered.

Btw the screens back then (as well as most offensive actions) were closer, so it would have been a wide open Snow mid-ranger. Which he was taking and hitting during the game.

But were the screens closer for Philadelphia? Because Iverson averaged 6.5 three-point attempts per game in the 2001 playoffs, so there must have been a lot of screens at the 3-point-line...

Let's assume your right, would the Bucks rather Snow have a wide open shot (from mid-range or 3) or would they rather Iverson take all the shots?

[picc]

Let's assume you're right. There's still a 100% chance that a defender who can't physically move being involved in your offensive actions benefits said actions and compromises the team defense. But it was never so much as considered.

Btw the screens back then (as well as most offensive actions) were closer, so it would have been a wide open Snow mid-ranger. Which he was taking and hitting during the game.

Were the screens closer for Philadelphia? Because Iverson averaged 6.5 three-point attempts per game in the 2001 playoffs, so their must have been a lot of screens at the 3-point-line...

But let's assume your right, would the Bucks rather Snow have a wide open shot (from mid-range or 3) or would they rather Iverson take all the shots?

Eric Snow was a .368 shooter from 16feet to 3PT in the 2001 Playoffs.
https://www.basketball-reference.com/players/s/snower01.html

Most of Iverson's threes weren't from calling for a screen at the arc, navigating it, and pulling up like Dame or Steph. Hence why he was assisted on such a high % of them. Moreso from running to the arc through traffic or in transition.

But the more I argue tangentially relevant things like how Iverson acquired his 3pt attempts or what Mil would prefer in a question that's hard to answer about a choice they never had to make, the further I'll get from what I was interested in re: the thread. So just going to focus on that for the time being.

[HotelVitale]

OP, this doesn't directly address your question, but have you factored in that in 2001 teams rarely used screens or pn'r in their regular offense and tended to always initiate via low- or-high-post or run off-ball things for mid-range shots instead? The team would have to completely change their offensive rhythm and flow to start off with a couple screens--especially screens that weren't involving a big. Still wouldn't be a bad idea or anything to use screens to isolate a bad defender, but it would require much more complete commitment to that streategy.

By the 2016 Warriors-Cavs series you're talking about almost all offense was initiated via pn'r (or at least some kind of set involving screens). It didn't really take them out of the way at all to run those screens towards the weak defender and then run your play.

Also shedding your initial defender wasn't as valuable in the pre-spaced floor days, both because you'd run into the crowded lane and because you couldn't just kick it to shooters for an open 3. So it was less valuable in general to get a weak defender to attack on the perimeter. IIRC teams tended to set up and attack mismatches in the post (whether a big or a smaller guy who had post game) back then.

EDIT: also I think that teams did attack mismatches quite a bit back then. Can remember a few series where that was pretty regular, and Iverson in particular was an obvious target for wing creators/shooters because of his size.

[Yank3525]

But thats the question. Would NBA history be different if teams had been relentlessly hunting weak links on defense they way they do now, but in the 80s? The 90s? 00s?

One series that was already ugly but would be even uglier today would be Suns vs Lakers in 1990. Cotton would definitely hunt Magic with KJ relentlessly.

[picc]

OP, this doesn't directly address your question, but have you factored in that in 2001 teams rarely used screens or pn'r in their regular offense and tended to always initiate via low- or-high-post or run off-ball things for mid-range shots instead? The team would have to completely change their offensive rhythm and flow to start off with a couple screens--especially screens that weren't involving a big. Still wouldn't be a bad idea or anything to use screens to isolate a bad defender, but it would require much more complete commitment to that streategy.

By the 2016 Warriors-Cavs series you're talking about almost all offense was initiated via pn'r (or at least some kind of set involving screens). It didn't really take them out of the way at all to run those screens towards the weak defender and then run your play.

Also shedding your initial defender wasn't as valuable in the pre-spaced floor days, both because you'd run into the crowded lane and because you couldn't just kick it to shooters for an open 3. So it was less valuable in general to get a weak defender to attack on the perimeter. IIRC teams tended to set up and attack mismatches in the post (whether a big or a smaller guy who had post game) back then.

EDIT: also I think that teams did attack mismatches quite a bit back then. Can remember a few series where that was pretty regular, and Iverson in particular was an obvious target for wing creators/shooters because of his size.

Very true that offense was more post-oriented back then with less PnR action. However that's also not totally relevant to the thread question.

What happened in the game just surprised and fascinated me after being so used to seeing the opposite done for coming on a decade now, and was worth remarking on.

But the question I asked in the OP wasn't "why didn't teams attack weak links more back then?", nor was it being critical of them for not doing so.

The thread question was, "What if they did?"

A hypothetical thought experiment -- not a retroactive critique.

[HotelVitale]

OP, this doesn't directly address your question, but have you factored in that in 2001 teams rarely used screens or pn'r in their regular offense and tended to always initiate via low- or-high-post or run off-ball things for mid-range shots instead? The team would have to completely change their offensive rhythm and flow to start off with a couple screens--especially screens that weren't involving a big. Still wouldn't be a bad idea or anything to use screens to isolate a bad defender, but it would require much more complete commitment to that streategy.

By the 2016 Warriors-Cavs series you're talking about almost all offense was initiated via pn'r (or at least some kind of set involving screens). It didn't really take them out of the way at all to run those screens towards the weak defender and then run your play.

Also shedding your initial defender wasn't as valuable in the pre-spaced floor days, both because you'd run into the crowded lane and because you couldn't just kick it to shooters for an open 3. So it was less valuable in general to get a weak defender to attack on the perimeter. IIRC teams tended to set up and attack mismatches in the post (whether a big or a smaller guy who had post game) back then.

EDIT: also I think that teams did attack mismatches quite a bit back then. Can remember a few series where that was pretty regular, and Iverson in particular was an obvious target for wing creators/shooters because of his size.

Very true that offense was more post-oriented back then with less PnR action. However that's also not totally relevant to the thread question.

What happened in the game just surprised and fascinated me after being so used to seeing the opposite done for coming on a decade now, and was worth remarking on.

But the question I asked in the OP wasn't "why didn't teams attack weak links more back then?", nor was it being critical of them for not doing so.

The thread question was simply, "What if they did?".

A hypothetical thought experiment -- not a retroactive critique.

Tried to make a few points about that. 1) it wouldn't be quite as effective as it is now/recently because getting a gap in the defense is more valuable in a spaced court, and 2) it would take more time and effort to do that back then as well.

More concretely, I'm imagining some sets where Iverson would get Ray Allen on an island and be able to blow past him--there would already be defenders in the lane (because there always was back then) and he would probably either try to finish around them (always tough) or kick it out to like Aaron McKie for a 18 foot jumper. That's probably better offense than the Sixers would often get back in those days so, sure, it probably would've worked. But maybe been more awkward and less effective than it is now.

[Karate Diop]

Recently. Lots of interesting things in the game, but notably Ray Allen got injured late with a knee sprain and had to leave the game and hit the locker room for a while. Of course he came back in the game because its game 7. And when he did, he was limping so bad he could barely make it upcourt.

Milwaukee had Ray guarding Eric Snow, and everyone else available on Iverson. Naturally, I was expecting Philly take advantage of Ray's injury and have AI get him on switches or crossmatching for an easy iso or a forced double. Or for Snow to go at him.

Never happened. They didn't make the slightest attempt to bring Ray in on the action. Just let him exist on the other side of the court with a busted knee and Eric Snow 6 feet away. Didn't have Snow go at him. Didn't have Snow bring him into Iverson's screen action. Didn't try to force a switch. Didn't seek him in transition. Nothing. Meanwhile, Iverson just went at whatever defender George Karl assigned to him while Ray chilled on the weak side.

As surprising as this was, it did remind me that switch/bum hunting didn't really take off until the Warriors/Cavs finals. And that offensive strategy and coaching have gotten a lot better over the past 20 years. While we can blame them for not innovating earlier, it just wasn't the paradigm at the time.

Which makes me wonder if and how the NBA historic landscape would be different if this strategy had existed earlier.

But thats the question. Would NBA history be different if teams had been relentlessly hunting weak links on defense they way they do now, but in the 80s? The 90s? 00s?

The bolded isn't even remotely true...

[picc]

Tried to make a few points about that. 1) it wouldn't be quite as effective as it is now/recently because getting a gap in the defense is more valuable in a spaced court, and 2) it would take more time and effort to do that back then as well.

More concretely, I'm imagining some sets where Iverson would get Ray Allen on an island and be able to blow past him--there would already be defenders in the lane (because there always was back then) and he would probably either try to finish around them (always tough) or kick it out to like Aaron McKie for a 18 foot jumper. That's probably better offense than the Sixers would often get back in those days so, sure, it probably would've worked. But maybe been more awkward and less effective than it is now.

Or imagine a set where Iverson gets Allen on an island and is able to more easily break him with his dribble for an open jumpshot instead of a highly contested one.

Or Iverson gets into the lane easily and now has to finish over just lane defenders instead of lane defenders + his primary defender.

Or the Bucks send a double and someone's open. Etc.

No matter what, someone has an advantage they didn't have before. For an elite offensive player that can be the difference between winning and losing a game.

MJ, or Tmac, or Pierce, or whoever, having a weak defender on them instead of Bruce Bowen or Joe Dumars would probably help them regardless of who was in the paint, don't you think? My assumption is that it'd be higher % to rise up and shoot over someone who wasn't an All-NBA defender. Or to punish the double when the defense tries to prevent that.

To your earlier point, I do remember feeling like Steve Nash used to hunt Dirk on screen-switches. It felt like he shot 100% against him. But none of the teams spammed that kind of thing as much as they could have.

[picc]

The bolded isn't even remotely true...

Speak on it.

[boomershadow]

OP, this doesn't directly address your question, but have you factored in that in 2001 teams rarely used screens or pn'r in their regular offense and tended to always initiate via low- or-high-post or run off-ball things for mid-range shots instead? The team would have to completely change their offensive rhythm and flow to start off with a couple screens--especially screens that weren't involving a big. Still wouldn't be a bad idea or anything to use screens to isolate a bad defender, but it would require much more complete commitment to that streategy.

By the 2016 Warriors-Cavs series you're talking about almost all offense was initiated via pn'r (or at least some kind of set involving screens). It didn't really take them out of the way at all to run those screens towards the weak defender and then run your play.

Also shedding your initial defender wasn't as valuable in the pre-spaced floor days, both because you'd run into the crowded lane and because you couldn't just kick it to shooters for an open 3. So it was less valuable in general to get a weak defender to attack on the perimeter. IIRC teams tended to set up and attack mismatches in the post (whether a big or a smaller guy who had post game) back then.

EDIT: also I think that teams did attack mismatches quite a bit back then. Can remember a few series where that was pretty regular, and Iverson in particular was an obvious target for wing creators/shooters because of his size.

Very true that offense was more post-oriented back then with less PnR action. However that's also not totally relevant to the thread question.

What happened in the game just surprised and fascinated me after being so used to seeing the opposite done for coming on a decade now, and was worth remarking on.

But the question I asked in the OP wasn't "why didn't teams attack weak links more back then?", nor was it being critical of them for not doing so.

The thread question was, "What if they did?"

A hypothetical thought experiment -- not a retroactive critique.

Pick and roll. Both defenders double Iverson. Option A: Iverson ends up with the ball with 2 defenders on him (or 1.5 considering the injury.) Option B. Snow ends up with the ball but can't do anything with it given his offensive limitations.

[Mavrelous]

During Heat/Knicks PO series few years ago, Butler rolled his ankle but stayed on the court, and Knicks didn't targey him, also wondered why then.

[dhsilv2]

Let's assume you're right. There's still a 100% chance that a defender who can't physically move being involved in your offensive actions benefits said actions and compromises the team defense. But it was never so much as considered.

Btw the screens back then (as well as most offensive actions) were closer, so it would have been a wide open Snow mid-ranger. Which he was taking and hitting during the game.

Open snow or AI mid range jumpers beyond 15 is hardly a bad thing for the defense to offer up.

But I think the logic is also if you're going to run a screen, you want it with a big as that means one less big man inside when AI drives in.

[nate33]

Good thread for discussion.

I don't know if mismatch hunting the way it is done today could really have worked out 20 years ago. The difference today is the spacing and the ability of every team being able to put 4 guys on the floor who can hit threes (plus a center). If a defense sends double team help to rescue a poor defender, the end result is inevitably a wide-open corner 3 by a 37% shooter, which is effectively an eFG% of 55.5%, and that's bad math (for the defense).

In 2001, if the Sixers tried to exploit Ray Allen's defense, Milwaukee would have sent help. The difference is that the Sixers probably would have ended up with a guy shooting an open midrange shot with a 44% FG%, something Milwaukee could live with.

[mattg]

During Heat/Knicks PO series few years ago, Butler rolled his ankle but stayed on the court, and Knicks didn't targey him, also wondered why then.

Forcing the offense to attack a perceived mismatch often backfires even in the modern NBA. Part of it is that it's entirely predictable, the defense knows EXACTLY what the offense is going to try and do and that's much easier to defend AND now the defense is actually dictating how the possession plays out rather than the offense. The best example of this is when there is a smaller defender switched onto a bigger player in the post. You see it all the time now, the offense will try and force feed to perceived mismatch and the defense just forced the offense to go to a post up as their offensive action which is often already a win on it's own. Factor in that often the times the smaller defender who is being posted up can just get lower than the offensive player and is unable to be moved and the "mismatch" results in a turnaround jumper or contested shot going away from the basket.

[Rdude22]

Recently. Lots of interesting things in the game, but notably Ray Allen got injured late with a knee sprain and had to leave the game and hit the locker room for a while. Of course he came back in the game because its game 7. And when he did, he was limping so bad he could barely make it upcourt.

Milwaukee had Ray guarding Eric Snow, and everyone else available on Iverson. Naturally, I was expecting Philly take advantage of Ray's injury and have AI get him on switches or crossmatching for an easy iso or a forced double. Or for Snow to go at him.

Never happened. They didn't make the slightest attempt to bring Ray in on the action. Just let him exist on the other side of the court with a busted knee and Eric Snow 6 feet away. Didn't have Snow go at him. Didn't have Snow bring him into Iverson's screen action. Didn't try to force a switch. Didn't seek him in transition. Nothing. Meanwhile, Iverson just went at whatever defender George Karl assigned to him while Ray chilled on the weak side.

As surprising as this was, it did remind me that switch/bum hunting didn't really take off until the Warriors/Cavs finals. And that offensive strategy and coaching have gotten a lot better over the past 20 years. While we can blame them for not innovating earlier, it just wasn't the paradigm at the time.

Which makes me wonder if and how the NBA historic landscape would be different if this strategy had existed earlier.

But thats the question. Would NBA history be different if teams had been relentlessly hunting weak links on defense they way they do now, but in the 80s? The 90s? 00s?

Great observation bud!

It's funny because back then there became this prevalent strategy (that brought some criticism) that star players of the same position would no longer guard each other until the 4th quarter (to avoid foul trouble or expending energy). i.e. if it's Orl vs Tor, then TMac and Vince may only sparingly guard each other for the first 3 quarters.

But now we're at a point where we don't expect, say, Luka and Shai to guard each other. We know Dort will be on Luka, Vanderbuilt will be on Shai, and that both stars will instinctively scan the floor for the weakest defender to force a switch if or when it's time for them to go on the offensive.

But, to your question... a team like the 90s Bulls ran an offense that was the precursor to the Curry Warriors, so they wouldn't necessary have a need for it. However, early/pre-triangle Jordan probably would've had more seasons like the 33/8/8 year he had but the team success likely wouldn't have changed.

A team like the 80s Lakers, in which their half court offense was dump the ball into Kareem and react off the defense, they wouldn't necessarily have a need for it either. Like, if Worthy had a smaller defender switched on to him, he'd probably just try to reposition in the post anyway and it'd be a similar dynamic as how they play inside out. However, defensively, it could get interesting if shifty guards like Isiah made an emphasis to get Kareem on an island. However, like the other post said, with the lack of prevalent 3 point shooting... at best it'd result in more semi open 15 foot jumpers (semi bc defenses can recover that ground quicker than if it were a 25 foot 3).

If anything, it may expedite the evolution and necessity of the 3 ball. Maybe. That illegal defense existed and teams couldn't probably crowd/zone up on players like that is another element that we'd have to factor.