Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I then cover the three highest players in Usage% (assuming the season has those numbers), the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's nothing fancy; it's literally just me feeding the player's regular season numbers into Stathead and looking for player-seasons in the recent past (the more recent the better) that are reasonably comparable. This is *not* intended to be anything other than fun. I find it to be a neat way to re-conceive what a roster truly was when translated out of the trappings of their laundry and era. The method suffers when translating man defense, as steals/blocks/defensive rating are very approximate estimates of a player's defensive contributions. When I say something like:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I then cover the three highest players in Usage% (assuming the season has those numbers), the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's nothing fancy; it's literally just me feeding the player's regular season numbers into Stathead and looking for player-seasons in the recent past (the more recent the better) that are reasonably comparable. This is *not* intended to be anything other than fun. I find it to be a neat way to re-conceive what a roster truly was when translated out of the trappings of their laundry and era. The method suffers when translating man defense, as steals/blocks/defensive rating are very approximate estimates of a player's defensive contributions. When I say something like:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#85. The 1989 Phoenix Suns
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.97, Standard Deviations: +1.58, Lost in the Conference Finals
Regular Season Record: 55-27, Regular Season SRS: +6.84 (50th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +5.3 (27th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.1 (72nd)
PG: Kevin Johnson (22), +4.2 / +5.4
SG: Jeff Hornacek (25), +2.7 / +2.6
SF: Eddie Johnson (29), +2.1 / -1.3
PF: Tom Chambers (29), +1.4 / +2.5
C: Tyrone Corbin (26), +1.6 / +4.3
6th: Dan Majerle (23), +0.3 / -0.1
Usage Rate: Eddie Johnson (28.3%), Tom Chambers (28.2%), Kevin Johnson (21.2%)
Scoring/100: Eddie Johnson (33.8 / +2.7%), Tom Chambers (31.9 / +1.0%), Kevin Johnson (23.8 / +1.1%)
Assists/100: Kevin Johnson (14.3), Jeff Hornacek (8.6), Dan Majerle (4.4)
Heliocentrism: 28.2% (60th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 31.6% (68th)
Depth: 40.2% (11th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.18 (42nd), Playoff Defensive Rating: -3.23 (72nd)
Playoff SRS: +11.05 (44th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.13 (57th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.03 (57th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.58 (79th)
Round 1: Denver Nuggets (+0.9), won 3-0 by +9.3 points per game (+10.2 SRS eq)
Semis: Golden State Warriors (+2.1), won 4-1 by +15.8 points per game (+17.9 SRS eq)
WCF: Los Angeles Lakers (+8.6), lost 0-4 by -5.5 points per game (+3.1 SRS eq)
Finals:
One of the best parts of this project is getting to know teams and players I didn’t really know before. One of the weirdest parts is getting to know different versions of the same teams. This is a the version of the Suns a year before the roster that’s #96 on this list. And it’s weird. First, KJ is only a 21% usage player. I don’t know why, maybe I’m a sentimentalist, but it bothers me to see KJ, who had such a narrow peak, be more of a role-player. At the same time, given his relatively low efficiency on lower usage, it’s clear that he made a leap in scoring from ‘89 to ‘90. Also, it’s weird that Eddie Johnson, who is basically the Suns’ unremarkable 6th man in 1990 is so high usage here (and with decent scoring, if bad passing). It’s not traditionally a great sign when your highest usage player isn’t on your top 3 assists/100 list.
But I digress. This iteration of the Suns was almost identical to the subsequent year: very solid SRS, very strong offense (27th and 30th on this list) but only decent defense (72nd and 74th). But there was one difference; this version of the Suns had a considerably higher playoff SRS. Their playoff lineups were weird: they’d start huge with KJ, Hornacek, Chambers, West and Corbin, but Corbin and West would combine for 45 minutes a game between them while Majerle and Eddie Johnson would put up more minutes than both off the bench. In the first round they whipped a mediocre Nuggets team by 9 points per game. But in the second round they blew apart the ‘89 Warriors, and it’s this series that has them higher than the ‘90 version.
The ‘89 Warriors actually had a decent defense but their weak spot was defensive rebounding (23rd in the league). And the Suns destroyed them on the boards, pulling in 44% of available offensive rebounds. Six different Suns players pulled in double-digit offensive rebounds over the five games and Tyrone Corbin averaged an offensive board every five minutes. This gave the Suns an extra five shots a game, which the Suns used to good effect by shooting better than the Warriors. Nobody shot particularly amazingly, but the main roster shot above league average (minus Eddie Johnson). When the dust cleared the Suns had won by 15.8 points per game, an outstanding showing over a decent team. A +18 SRS series will always make you look good, and this was no exception.
And then they advanced to the Conference Finals and got decisively beaten by the Lakers (5.5 points per game). Chambers shot at -4.9%, Majerle shot at -9.3% and Eddie Johnson stunk it up at -16%. KJ was the sole positive, averaging a 23/2/13 on +10.1% shooting; the Lakers it seemed really could not contain him. But the Lakers played excellently, and Magic averaged a characteristic 20/7/14 on +6.5% shooting. And that was that.
Honestly? I like the ‘90 version better. I like Johnson’s increased role, and I prefer a +1.6 win over the ‘90 Lakers and a loss to the ‘90 Blazers that involved them outscoring the opposition by 5.7 points a game over a 15.8 point blowout of the ‘89 Warriors and a nasty loss to the ‘89 Lakers. I prefer the two strong series against good teams over one blowout of a decent team and one bad loss to a very good team. But SRS favors the ‘89 version. Alas. Maybe a tweak for version 2 of this list, someday.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2009 Rajon Rondo (way better scoring, way worse defense and rebounding)
SG: 2018 Fred VanVleet (but playing full time)
SF: 2020 Jordan Clarkson (better rebounding, better defense, more shots)
PF: 2013 LaMarcus Aldridge (better in most ways, but worse rebounding)
C: 2017 Steven Adams (much better passing)
6th: 2015 Jae Crowder
It’s so interesting that Hornacek’s comp at this point in his career was a point guard. And Rondo seems a weird comp for KJ, but Rondo's usually the only one left when you want both high assist% and high steal% in the last ten years. This is such an interesting mix of players. Nice bigs, really nice offensive point guard, nice passing spacing shooting guard and a high volume small forward. I like the ‘90 version better. Maybe I’m biased.
Regular Season Record: 55-27, Regular Season SRS: +6.84 (50th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +5.3 (27th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.1 (72nd)
PG: Kevin Johnson (22), +4.2 / +5.4
SG: Jeff Hornacek (25), +2.7 / +2.6
SF: Eddie Johnson (29), +2.1 / -1.3
PF: Tom Chambers (29), +1.4 / +2.5
C: Tyrone Corbin (26), +1.6 / +4.3
6th: Dan Majerle (23), +0.3 / -0.1
Usage Rate: Eddie Johnson (28.3%), Tom Chambers (28.2%), Kevin Johnson (21.2%)
Scoring/100: Eddie Johnson (33.8 / +2.7%), Tom Chambers (31.9 / +1.0%), Kevin Johnson (23.8 / +1.1%)
Assists/100: Kevin Johnson (14.3), Jeff Hornacek (8.6), Dan Majerle (4.4)
Heliocentrism: 28.2% (60th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 31.6% (68th)
Depth: 40.2% (11th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.18 (42nd), Playoff Defensive Rating: -3.23 (72nd)
Playoff SRS: +11.05 (44th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.13 (57th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.03 (57th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.58 (79th)
Round 1: Denver Nuggets (+0.9), won 3-0 by +9.3 points per game (+10.2 SRS eq)
Semis: Golden State Warriors (+2.1), won 4-1 by +15.8 points per game (+17.9 SRS eq)
WCF: Los Angeles Lakers (+8.6), lost 0-4 by -5.5 points per game (+3.1 SRS eq)
Finals:
One of the best parts of this project is getting to know teams and players I didn’t really know before. One of the weirdest parts is getting to know different versions of the same teams. This is a the version of the Suns a year before the roster that’s #96 on this list. And it’s weird. First, KJ is only a 21% usage player. I don’t know why, maybe I’m a sentimentalist, but it bothers me to see KJ, who had such a narrow peak, be more of a role-player. At the same time, given his relatively low efficiency on lower usage, it’s clear that he made a leap in scoring from ‘89 to ‘90. Also, it’s weird that Eddie Johnson, who is basically the Suns’ unremarkable 6th man in 1990 is so high usage here (and with decent scoring, if bad passing). It’s not traditionally a great sign when your highest usage player isn’t on your top 3 assists/100 list.
But I digress. This iteration of the Suns was almost identical to the subsequent year: very solid SRS, very strong offense (27th and 30th on this list) but only decent defense (72nd and 74th). But there was one difference; this version of the Suns had a considerably higher playoff SRS. Their playoff lineups were weird: they’d start huge with KJ, Hornacek, Chambers, West and Corbin, but Corbin and West would combine for 45 minutes a game between them while Majerle and Eddie Johnson would put up more minutes than both off the bench. In the first round they whipped a mediocre Nuggets team by 9 points per game. But in the second round they blew apart the ‘89 Warriors, and it’s this series that has them higher than the ‘90 version.
The ‘89 Warriors actually had a decent defense but their weak spot was defensive rebounding (23rd in the league). And the Suns destroyed them on the boards, pulling in 44% of available offensive rebounds. Six different Suns players pulled in double-digit offensive rebounds over the five games and Tyrone Corbin averaged an offensive board every five minutes. This gave the Suns an extra five shots a game, which the Suns used to good effect by shooting better than the Warriors. Nobody shot particularly amazingly, but the main roster shot above league average (minus Eddie Johnson). When the dust cleared the Suns had won by 15.8 points per game, an outstanding showing over a decent team. A +18 SRS series will always make you look good, and this was no exception.
And then they advanced to the Conference Finals and got decisively beaten by the Lakers (5.5 points per game). Chambers shot at -4.9%, Majerle shot at -9.3% and Eddie Johnson stunk it up at -16%. KJ was the sole positive, averaging a 23/2/13 on +10.1% shooting; the Lakers it seemed really could not contain him. But the Lakers played excellently, and Magic averaged a characteristic 20/7/14 on +6.5% shooting. And that was that.
Honestly? I like the ‘90 version better. I like Johnson’s increased role, and I prefer a +1.6 win over the ‘90 Lakers and a loss to the ‘90 Blazers that involved them outscoring the opposition by 5.7 points a game over a 15.8 point blowout of the ‘89 Warriors and a nasty loss to the ‘89 Lakers. I prefer the two strong series against good teams over one blowout of a decent team and one bad loss to a very good team. But SRS favors the ‘89 version. Alas. Maybe a tweak for version 2 of this list, someday.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2009 Rajon Rondo (way better scoring, way worse defense and rebounding)
SG: 2018 Fred VanVleet (but playing full time)
SF: 2020 Jordan Clarkson (better rebounding, better defense, more shots)
PF: 2013 LaMarcus Aldridge (better in most ways, but worse rebounding)
C: 2017 Steven Adams (much better passing)
6th: 2015 Jae Crowder
It’s so interesting that Hornacek’s comp at this point in his career was a point guard. And Rondo seems a weird comp for KJ, but Rondo's usually the only one left when you want both high assist% and high steal% in the last ten years. This is such an interesting mix of players. Nice bigs, really nice offensive point guard, nice passing spacing shooting guard and a high volume small forward. I like the ‘90 version better. Maybe I’m biased.
#84. The 2002 Sacramento Kings
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.07, Standard Deviations: +1.88, Lost in the Conference Finals
Regular Season Record: 61-21, Regular Season SRS: +7.61 (29th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.5 (38th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.4 (53rd)
PG: Mike Bibby (23), +0.4 / +4.1
SG: Doug Christie (31), +2.4 / +2.6
SF: Peja Stojakovic (24), +3.0 / -0.7
PF: Chris Webber (28), +5.4 / +5.6
C: Vlade Divac (33), +2.8 / +2.2
6th: Hedo Turkoglu (22), +0.8 / -2.0
7th: Bobby Jackson (28), +2.1/ +2.9
Usage Rate: Chris Webber (29.0%), Peja Stojakovic (23.2%), Bobby Jackson (22.0%)
Scoring/100: Chris Webber (32.1 / +2.0%), Peja Stojakovic (28.6 / +7.2%), Bobby Jackson (25.7 / +1.7%)
Assists/100: Mike Bibby (7.6), Chris Webber (6.3), Vlade Divac (6.2)
Heliocentrism: 20.5% (79th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 33.7% (61st)
Depth: 45.8% (7th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +2.0 (81st), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.43 (43rd)
Playoff SRS: +8.4 (93rd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.46 (92nd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +4.83 (2nd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.2 (86th)
Round 1: Utah Jazz (+1.2), won 3-1 by +1.0 points per game (+2.2 SRS eq)
Round 2: Dallas Mavericks (+6.4), won 4-1 by +6.0 points per game (+12.4 SRS eq)
Round 3: Los Angeles Lakers (+8.8), lost 3-4 by +0.3 points per game (+9.1 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2019 Fred VanVleet
SG: 2005 Andre Iguodala (more passing, less rebounds, more usage, better shooting)
SF: 2016 Klay Thompson (better shooting but less of it, more rebounds)
PF: 2017 DeMarcus Cousins (lower usage and rebounds)
C: 2015 Draymond Green (worse on defense)
6th: 2008 Marvin Williams
7th: 2014 Patty Mills (worse shooting, better rebounding)
So. I’ll be honest. I went into this knowing very little about the Kings, except that they were very good and kept running into the Shaqobe Lakers. I have to say, this is a fascinating roster. I’m prepared to get bashed on the Cousins / Webber comparison but I have to say, Webber is hekkin’ weird. He’s a high usage, high passing, rebounder who doesn’t shoot great but is quick enough to get steals? That is a rare combo of things; Kevin Garnett had the most seasons that fit the criteria but he was too old; not much point in a “modern comp” that’s three years older. Cousins is the only modern big that fits these descriptors without being too good (Jokic’s TS%, REB% and AST% were all too high). And Iguodala is a weird comp for Christie, but there aren’t a lot of players that have Christie’s statistical footprint; Iguodala seems to come up a lot when the player is a combo high-steals, decent rebounding passing guard (like Dennis Johnson). The Klay Thompson -> Peja Stojakovic works for me fine obviously, and Draymond is a weird comp for Divac, but they’re both high passing defensive bigs (if defensive in different ways).
So this is a nicely deep roster, that actually operates from the inside out, with Webber and Divac doing a ton of the passing (how often do you see the 4 and 5 both in the top three of AST/100?). Christie was the defensive wrecking ball, Stojakovic was the gunner/spacer and Bibby was the solid little bit of everything. And their bench wasn’t bad; the Kings have the 2nd highest “Bench” rating, which is to say, that players besides Webber, Christie and Peja contributed a *ton* to the team’s success. This was a very deep team, though I’d be curious about their ISO scoring. Their regular season SRS was 29th on this list, and that’s with Webber only playing 54 regular season games.
The Kings won the top seed in a very nasty Western conference (in addition to the Lakers going for their threepeat the Spurs and Mavs were also extremely good, and the conference had seven different +3 SRS teams). The Kings opened against the Jazz (Malone and Stockton had a combined age of 77 for the series), and it really went badly. Stockton racked up 11 steals in four games as five of the Kings top seven players ran turnover percentages north of 16%. Webber shot -3% and the Kings’ offense struggled overall. The only saving grace was that the Jazz struggled more, with Malone shooting -5.1% and Bryon Russell shooting an atrocious -14.9%. The Kings squeaked through the series by a point a game, but for a team hoping to challenge the Lakers, it was not an auspicious start.
In Round 2 the Kings faced a tougher test in the Nash / Nowitzki (only 23) Mavs, and handled it much better. The Kings’ offense performed well across the board: they grabbed a ton of offensive rebounds (Weber and Divac combined for 7 per game) and shot well (Webber scoring 25 on +4% efficiency and Divac shooting +10.7%). The Mavs did reasonably well (though Dirk’s -0.7% shooting wasn’t ideal), but the Kings still ran away with it by 6 points a game. But the result came with a cost; Peja Stojakovic had sprained his ankle during the series and would not play for much of the Conference Finals. Young Hedo Turkoglu would start in his place. And of course, they faced the Lakers.
And it was a defensive slugfest. The ‘02 Kings are notable for playing an insane slate of offenses (2nd toughest of this list), but they did a very creditable job slowing the Lakers down. In game 1 the Lakers won by 7 on the road, with Robert Horry’s +11.4% shooting leading the way even as Hedo Turkoglu shot an awkward 0 for 8. In game 2 the Kings bounced back, winning by 6; Shaq’s 6 offensive boards and 35 points (+3%) weren’t enough to compensate for Bryant shooting -4.6% and Fisher going 1 for 9. In game 3 the Kings took the initiative, winning at the Staples Center by 13. Webber put up a 26/9/6 (+5.1%) with 3 steals and Christie put up a 17/12/6 (+10.9%) with 3 steals, while both Kobe and Shaq shot -7.8%.
Game 4 was a heartbreaker. Going into the 4th quarter the Kings were up by 7. The Lakers slowly closed the gap and, with the clock winding down, the Lakers pushed down the floor for the final shot. Kobe Bryant gets past Doug Christie and takes an off-balance shot against Divac just outside of the charge circle. The ball glances off the rim, Shaq rebounds it but misses the putback, and somehow the ball gets kicked out to a wide open Robert Horry at the top of the arc who releases it with 0.7 seconds left on the clock. Nothing but net.
Game 5 also went down to the wire, with the Kings down by 1 in the final minute. Mike Bibby made the go-ahead bucket with 8 seconds left. The Lakers inbounded, passed to Kobe who couldn’t get past Bobby Jackson, tried a turnaround three and clanked it off the front of the rim. The Kings won, going up 3-2 in the series. But game 6 would be all Lakers; Kobe had his best game of the series, posting an 31/11/5 (+10.4%) while the Kings struggled to score (both Christie and Divac shot -10% or worse). Game 7 was played in Sacramento and it went to overtime (of course it did). And in that overtime period Chris Webber and Doug Christie went a combined 1 of 7, while the Lakers got to the line 8 times and canned all 8. The Lakers won the series and advanced to the NBA Finals.
The Kings lost, and they’d never again get this close. But they actually outscored the Lakers by 0.3 points a game, and could have won if any one of a hundred tiny things had changed. They’d done a great job defending Kobe, whose 27/6/4 was marred by a -2.9% shooting efficiency. Chris Webber hadn’t played particularly well, with his 24/11/6 at -0.6%. The Kings were so close to facing the Nets in the Finals (a team that the Kings would very likely have beaten). They don’t rank particularly high on this list, mostly on account of their playoffs. Their struggles with the Jazz are the real black mark here; with only three series to prove yourself it’s bad juju to barely beat a decent team. This may have been the best Kings team ever; it was certainly the highest on this list.
Regular Season Record: 61-21, Regular Season SRS: +7.61 (29th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.5 (38th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.4 (53rd)
PG: Mike Bibby (23), +0.4 / +4.1
SG: Doug Christie (31), +2.4 / +2.6
SF: Peja Stojakovic (24), +3.0 / -0.7
PF: Chris Webber (28), +5.4 / +5.6
C: Vlade Divac (33), +2.8 / +2.2
6th: Hedo Turkoglu (22), +0.8 / -2.0
7th: Bobby Jackson (28), +2.1/ +2.9
Usage Rate: Chris Webber (29.0%), Peja Stojakovic (23.2%), Bobby Jackson (22.0%)
Scoring/100: Chris Webber (32.1 / +2.0%), Peja Stojakovic (28.6 / +7.2%), Bobby Jackson (25.7 / +1.7%)
Assists/100: Mike Bibby (7.6), Chris Webber (6.3), Vlade Divac (6.2)
Heliocentrism: 20.5% (79th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 33.7% (61st)
Depth: 45.8% (7th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +2.0 (81st), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.43 (43rd)
Playoff SRS: +8.4 (93rd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.46 (92nd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +4.83 (2nd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.2 (86th)
Round 1: Utah Jazz (+1.2), won 3-1 by +1.0 points per game (+2.2 SRS eq)
Round 2: Dallas Mavericks (+6.4), won 4-1 by +6.0 points per game (+12.4 SRS eq)
Round 3: Los Angeles Lakers (+8.8), lost 3-4 by +0.3 points per game (+9.1 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2019 Fred VanVleet
SG: 2005 Andre Iguodala (more passing, less rebounds, more usage, better shooting)
SF: 2016 Klay Thompson (better shooting but less of it, more rebounds)
PF: 2017 DeMarcus Cousins (lower usage and rebounds)
C: 2015 Draymond Green (worse on defense)
6th: 2008 Marvin Williams
7th: 2014 Patty Mills (worse shooting, better rebounding)
So. I’ll be honest. I went into this knowing very little about the Kings, except that they were very good and kept running into the Shaqobe Lakers. I have to say, this is a fascinating roster. I’m prepared to get bashed on the Cousins / Webber comparison but I have to say, Webber is hekkin’ weird. He’s a high usage, high passing, rebounder who doesn’t shoot great but is quick enough to get steals? That is a rare combo of things; Kevin Garnett had the most seasons that fit the criteria but he was too old; not much point in a “modern comp” that’s three years older. Cousins is the only modern big that fits these descriptors without being too good (Jokic’s TS%, REB% and AST% were all too high). And Iguodala is a weird comp for Christie, but there aren’t a lot of players that have Christie’s statistical footprint; Iguodala seems to come up a lot when the player is a combo high-steals, decent rebounding passing guard (like Dennis Johnson). The Klay Thompson -> Peja Stojakovic works for me fine obviously, and Draymond is a weird comp for Divac, but they’re both high passing defensive bigs (if defensive in different ways).
So this is a nicely deep roster, that actually operates from the inside out, with Webber and Divac doing a ton of the passing (how often do you see the 4 and 5 both in the top three of AST/100?). Christie was the defensive wrecking ball, Stojakovic was the gunner/spacer and Bibby was the solid little bit of everything. And their bench wasn’t bad; the Kings have the 2nd highest “Bench” rating, which is to say, that players besides Webber, Christie and Peja contributed a *ton* to the team’s success. This was a very deep team, though I’d be curious about their ISO scoring. Their regular season SRS was 29th on this list, and that’s with Webber only playing 54 regular season games.
The Kings won the top seed in a very nasty Western conference (in addition to the Lakers going for their threepeat the Spurs and Mavs were also extremely good, and the conference had seven different +3 SRS teams). The Kings opened against the Jazz (Malone and Stockton had a combined age of 77 for the series), and it really went badly. Stockton racked up 11 steals in four games as five of the Kings top seven players ran turnover percentages north of 16%. Webber shot -3% and the Kings’ offense struggled overall. The only saving grace was that the Jazz struggled more, with Malone shooting -5.1% and Bryon Russell shooting an atrocious -14.9%. The Kings squeaked through the series by a point a game, but for a team hoping to challenge the Lakers, it was not an auspicious start.
In Round 2 the Kings faced a tougher test in the Nash / Nowitzki (only 23) Mavs, and handled it much better. The Kings’ offense performed well across the board: they grabbed a ton of offensive rebounds (Weber and Divac combined for 7 per game) and shot well (Webber scoring 25 on +4% efficiency and Divac shooting +10.7%). The Mavs did reasonably well (though Dirk’s -0.7% shooting wasn’t ideal), but the Kings still ran away with it by 6 points a game. But the result came with a cost; Peja Stojakovic had sprained his ankle during the series and would not play for much of the Conference Finals. Young Hedo Turkoglu would start in his place. And of course, they faced the Lakers.
And it was a defensive slugfest. The ‘02 Kings are notable for playing an insane slate of offenses (2nd toughest of this list), but they did a very creditable job slowing the Lakers down. In game 1 the Lakers won by 7 on the road, with Robert Horry’s +11.4% shooting leading the way even as Hedo Turkoglu shot an awkward 0 for 8. In game 2 the Kings bounced back, winning by 6; Shaq’s 6 offensive boards and 35 points (+3%) weren’t enough to compensate for Bryant shooting -4.6% and Fisher going 1 for 9. In game 3 the Kings took the initiative, winning at the Staples Center by 13. Webber put up a 26/9/6 (+5.1%) with 3 steals and Christie put up a 17/12/6 (+10.9%) with 3 steals, while both Kobe and Shaq shot -7.8%.
Game 4 was a heartbreaker. Going into the 4th quarter the Kings were up by 7. The Lakers slowly closed the gap and, with the clock winding down, the Lakers pushed down the floor for the final shot. Kobe Bryant gets past Doug Christie and takes an off-balance shot against Divac just outside of the charge circle. The ball glances off the rim, Shaq rebounds it but misses the putback, and somehow the ball gets kicked out to a wide open Robert Horry at the top of the arc who releases it with 0.7 seconds left on the clock. Nothing but net.
Game 5 also went down to the wire, with the Kings down by 1 in the final minute. Mike Bibby made the go-ahead bucket with 8 seconds left. The Lakers inbounded, passed to Kobe who couldn’t get past Bobby Jackson, tried a turnaround three and clanked it off the front of the rim. The Kings won, going up 3-2 in the series. But game 6 would be all Lakers; Kobe had his best game of the series, posting an 31/11/5 (+10.4%) while the Kings struggled to score (both Christie and Divac shot -10% or worse). Game 7 was played in Sacramento and it went to overtime (of course it did). And in that overtime period Chris Webber and Doug Christie went a combined 1 of 7, while the Lakers got to the line 8 times and canned all 8. The Lakers won the series and advanced to the NBA Finals.
The Kings lost, and they’d never again get this close. But they actually outscored the Lakers by 0.3 points a game, and could have won if any one of a hundred tiny things had changed. They’d done a great job defending Kobe, whose 27/6/4 was marred by a -2.9% shooting efficiency. Chris Webber hadn’t played particularly well, with his 24/11/6 at -0.6%. The Kings were so close to facing the Nets in the Finals (a team that the Kings would very likely have beaten). They don’t rank particularly high on this list, mostly on account of their playoffs. Their struggles with the Jazz are the real black mark here; with only three series to prove yourself it’s bad juju to barely beat a decent team. This may have been the best Kings team ever; it was certainly the highest on this list.
#83. The 1986 Los Angeles Lakers
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.54, Standard Deviations: +1.72, Lost in the Conference Finals
Regular Season Record: 62-20, Regular Season SRS: +6.84 (49th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +6.1 (17th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.4 (84th)
PG: Magic Johnson (26), +6.7 / +9.3
SG: Byron Scott (24), -0.3 / -0.4
SF: James Worthy (24), +3.9 / +0.7
PF: Kurt Rambis (27), +0.6 / +0.4
C: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (38), +5.4 / +4.9
6th: Michael Cooper (29), +1.8 / +2.9
7th: Maurice Lucas (33), -2.3 / -2.6
Usage Rate: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (26.6%), James Worthy (22.6%), Byron Scott (21.7%)
Scoring/100: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (32.8 / +6.2%), James Worthy (28.6 / +7.2%), Byron Scott (25.0 / +0.9%)
Assists/100: Magic Johnson (16.4), Michael Cooper (9.6), Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (5.0)
Heliocentrism: 32.6% (44th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 48.6% (5th)
Depth: 18.8% (63rd)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.41 (40th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.29 (83rd)
Playoff SRS: +9.95 (66th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.70 (68th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.99 (24th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: +1.99 (100th)
Round 1: San Antonio Spurs (-2.1), won 3-0 by +31.7 points per game (+29.6 SRS eq)
Round 2: Dallas Mavericks (+1.5), won 4-2 by +5.0 points per game (+6.5 SRS eq)
Round 3: Houston Rockets (+6.0), lost 1-4 by -3.6 points per game (+2.4 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2006 Steve Nash (more rebounds and steals, worse and less shooting)
SG: 2007 Kyle Korver (better defense, worse shooting)
SF: 2011 Kevin Durant (way lower usage, higher efficiency)
PF: 1986 Kurt Rambis (tons of rebounds and efficiency, no usage, passing, tons of turnovers)
C: 2017 Karl Anthony Towns (half the rebounds)
6th: 2014 Andre Iguodala
7th: 2007 Udonis Haslem (more rebounds, more turnovers, more shots (not a good thing))
“The ‘86 Lakers?” I hear you asking. “How did they make the list? Didn’t the Rockets win the West that year? And weren’t the Celtics the best team?” All true. But bear with me.
The ‘86 Lakers actually put up a very good regular season SRS (top 50 for this list), and the 17th best offensive rating on this list. They earned the one-seed; they had some serious game.
But let’s take a moment for this roster. I didn’t realize how late in the 80s the Lakers became the team that I associate with the “Showtime Lakers”. Look at Magic not having one of the top three usage rates on the team, nor one of the top three scoring rates. In ‘86 he was far more of a facilitator (arguably greatest ever, but still) and less of a combo passer/scorer. And note Kareem. He led the team in usage (27%), scoring (33 pts per 100 at +6 efficiency) and his closest comp was 2017 Karl Anthony Towns (not counting rebounding) - basically Kareem was an extremely effective scorer (best scorer on the team) with decent passing, but with very low rebounding and defensive footprint for a big. But did I mention that he was THIRTY EIGHT YEARS OLD! It’s one thing to read a lot about Kareem’s longevity, but it’s another to see him as the best scorer on an all-time great offense fifteen years after his dominant apex. Sheesh.
So. In 1985 the Lakers were coming off winning the championship, in fairly convincing fashion. But in the offseason the Celtics traded Cedric Maxwell and a 1st rounder for the extremely good, extremely injured Bill Walton. The ‘86 Celtics proceeded to go 67-15 with the 4th best regular season SRS ever (to that point) and would proceed to rip through the East like a five year-old through wrapping paper on Christmas. That was what the ‘86 Lakers were up against, if they were to make the Finals. The West was really thin; the Lakers way on top, and only one other team with an SRS above +1 (the Rockets - probably won’t come up later).
In the first round they played the Spurs. Now, to be clear, the Spurs were bad. They were a 35-47 team (-2 SRS) that only made the playoffs because the NBA took a lot of playoff teams back then (the West took the top 8 of 12 - you think the regular season doesn’t matter now?) Well the Lakers tore them apart like few teams have ever been torn apart, by 31.7 points per game. The Lakers rebounded 43% of their own misses, but had no player average more than 2 per game. How is that possible? First, the Lakers had a lot of decent rebounders. But second, the Lakers simply didn’t miss that much, so there weren’t many rebounds to get. The Lakers shot +8.6% as a team. Kareem, Magic, Worthy and Lucas all shot +9% or better. Predictably, SRS wets itself over a victory like this. You could say that there’s little glory in blowing out a weak team, and you’d be right. But here’s the thing: non-great teams simply don’t do this. I still remember one of the first stat-analysis articles I read almost 20 years ago. It was a Football Outsiders piece, trying to use two different conceptions of what made teams good. It first ranked teams by the most “Guts”, which is to say, which team won the most close games (on the theory that a team that wins close games can execute when the chips are down, etc). Then it ranked teams by the most “Stomps”, which is to say, the number of times they blew another team out (by 20+ points I think). In the end the “Stomps” teams wildly outperformed the “Guts” teams. This is mostly because (in theory), it takes a pretty good team to blow another team out; the mark of a great team isn’t winning close games (though that helps), it’s winning without getting into close games (because anything can happen in a close game). This is a long way of saying: SRS guaranteed overrates the ‘86 Lakers for this series. But it still speaks very well of them to blow *anyone* out by that kind of margin.
In the next round the Lakers faced the above-average Mavericks (+1.5 SRS) and won, but didn’t look good doing it. The Mavs held their own on the boards and the Lakers had to win by out-shooting them (which they did). Kareem shot +8.8% (29 points a game) and all of the Lakers’ starters shot above league average. They won by 5 points a game, which is solid, but not a strong showing against a +1.5 SRS team. And they advanced to face the Rockets. The Rockets had looked decent all year, and had two straight +10 SRS series or better, but they weren’t seriously expected to challenge the Lakers.
Well they freakin’ did. The Lakers outshot them (they usually outshot everybody) but not by much; only Magic was well above league average (+6.1%), and Kareem struggled at -1.3%. The Rockets still shot decently, led by Hakeem’s 31 points a game on +4.3% shooting. Where the Rockets made their hay was on ball control and boards. The Rockets got an extra five shooting possessions a game on offensive rebounding (Hakeem bagged 5 a game) and turnovers (Hakeem averaged two steals a game). Hakeem basically played his butt off, averaging 31-11-2 with 5 offensive boards, 2 steals and 4 blocks a game. It wasn’t an all-time great series (the relatively low efficiency and weak passing hurts it), but Hakeem outplayed Kareem by a lot, and the rest of the Rockets did enough to not lose it. The Lakers fell to the Rockets by 3.6 points a game. The Rockets were “rewarded” by getting to face the ‘86 Celtics; it went about as well for them as you’d expect.
And so went the ‘86 Lakers. Excellent during the regular season, blew the snot out of the Spurs, handled a decent Mavs team reasonably well and then fell to the Rockets pretty hard. And that series served as a changing of the guard. Not that the Rockets took over the West (maybe it should have happened, but it definitely didn’t). But ‘87 was the year when Kareem’s usage dropped down into the low 20s and Magic took over as the dominant offensive engine. And the ‘87 Lakers would go on to post the best offense ever (at the time, on this list) and the best playoff offense ever (at the time, on this list, minimum of 3 series). So I’d say it worked out for them long-term.
Regular Season Record: 62-20, Regular Season SRS: +6.84 (49th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +6.1 (17th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.4 (84th)
PG: Magic Johnson (26), +6.7 / +9.3
SG: Byron Scott (24), -0.3 / -0.4
SF: James Worthy (24), +3.9 / +0.7
PF: Kurt Rambis (27), +0.6 / +0.4
C: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (38), +5.4 / +4.9
6th: Michael Cooper (29), +1.8 / +2.9
7th: Maurice Lucas (33), -2.3 / -2.6
Usage Rate: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (26.6%), James Worthy (22.6%), Byron Scott (21.7%)
Scoring/100: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (32.8 / +6.2%), James Worthy (28.6 / +7.2%), Byron Scott (25.0 / +0.9%)
Assists/100: Magic Johnson (16.4), Michael Cooper (9.6), Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (5.0)
Heliocentrism: 32.6% (44th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 48.6% (5th)
Depth: 18.8% (63rd)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.41 (40th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.29 (83rd)
Playoff SRS: +9.95 (66th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.70 (68th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.99 (24th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: +1.99 (100th)
Round 1: San Antonio Spurs (-2.1), won 3-0 by +31.7 points per game (+29.6 SRS eq)
Round 2: Dallas Mavericks (+1.5), won 4-2 by +5.0 points per game (+6.5 SRS eq)
Round 3: Houston Rockets (+6.0), lost 1-4 by -3.6 points per game (+2.4 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2006 Steve Nash (more rebounds and steals, worse and less shooting)
SG: 2007 Kyle Korver (better defense, worse shooting)
SF: 2011 Kevin Durant (way lower usage, higher efficiency)
PF: 1986 Kurt Rambis (tons of rebounds and efficiency, no usage, passing, tons of turnovers)
C: 2017 Karl Anthony Towns (half the rebounds)
6th: 2014 Andre Iguodala
7th: 2007 Udonis Haslem (more rebounds, more turnovers, more shots (not a good thing))
“The ‘86 Lakers?” I hear you asking. “How did they make the list? Didn’t the Rockets win the West that year? And weren’t the Celtics the best team?” All true. But bear with me.
The ‘86 Lakers actually put up a very good regular season SRS (top 50 for this list), and the 17th best offensive rating on this list. They earned the one-seed; they had some serious game.
But let’s take a moment for this roster. I didn’t realize how late in the 80s the Lakers became the team that I associate with the “Showtime Lakers”. Look at Magic not having one of the top three usage rates on the team, nor one of the top three scoring rates. In ‘86 he was far more of a facilitator (arguably greatest ever, but still) and less of a combo passer/scorer. And note Kareem. He led the team in usage (27%), scoring (33 pts per 100 at +6 efficiency) and his closest comp was 2017 Karl Anthony Towns (not counting rebounding) - basically Kareem was an extremely effective scorer (best scorer on the team) with decent passing, but with very low rebounding and defensive footprint for a big. But did I mention that he was THIRTY EIGHT YEARS OLD! It’s one thing to read a lot about Kareem’s longevity, but it’s another to see him as the best scorer on an all-time great offense fifteen years after his dominant apex. Sheesh.
So. In 1985 the Lakers were coming off winning the championship, in fairly convincing fashion. But in the offseason the Celtics traded Cedric Maxwell and a 1st rounder for the extremely good, extremely injured Bill Walton. The ‘86 Celtics proceeded to go 67-15 with the 4th best regular season SRS ever (to that point) and would proceed to rip through the East like a five year-old through wrapping paper on Christmas. That was what the ‘86 Lakers were up against, if they were to make the Finals. The West was really thin; the Lakers way on top, and only one other team with an SRS above +1 (the Rockets - probably won’t come up later).
In the first round they played the Spurs. Now, to be clear, the Spurs were bad. They were a 35-47 team (-2 SRS) that only made the playoffs because the NBA took a lot of playoff teams back then (the West took the top 8 of 12 - you think the regular season doesn’t matter now?) Well the Lakers tore them apart like few teams have ever been torn apart, by 31.7 points per game. The Lakers rebounded 43% of their own misses, but had no player average more than 2 per game. How is that possible? First, the Lakers had a lot of decent rebounders. But second, the Lakers simply didn’t miss that much, so there weren’t many rebounds to get. The Lakers shot +8.6% as a team. Kareem, Magic, Worthy and Lucas all shot +9% or better. Predictably, SRS wets itself over a victory like this. You could say that there’s little glory in blowing out a weak team, and you’d be right. But here’s the thing: non-great teams simply don’t do this. I still remember one of the first stat-analysis articles I read almost 20 years ago. It was a Football Outsiders piece, trying to use two different conceptions of what made teams good. It first ranked teams by the most “Guts”, which is to say, which team won the most close games (on the theory that a team that wins close games can execute when the chips are down, etc). Then it ranked teams by the most “Stomps”, which is to say, the number of times they blew another team out (by 20+ points I think). In the end the “Stomps” teams wildly outperformed the “Guts” teams. This is mostly because (in theory), it takes a pretty good team to blow another team out; the mark of a great team isn’t winning close games (though that helps), it’s winning without getting into close games (because anything can happen in a close game). This is a long way of saying: SRS guaranteed overrates the ‘86 Lakers for this series. But it still speaks very well of them to blow *anyone* out by that kind of margin.
In the next round the Lakers faced the above-average Mavericks (+1.5 SRS) and won, but didn’t look good doing it. The Mavs held their own on the boards and the Lakers had to win by out-shooting them (which they did). Kareem shot +8.8% (29 points a game) and all of the Lakers’ starters shot above league average. They won by 5 points a game, which is solid, but not a strong showing against a +1.5 SRS team. And they advanced to face the Rockets. The Rockets had looked decent all year, and had two straight +10 SRS series or better, but they weren’t seriously expected to challenge the Lakers.
Well they freakin’ did. The Lakers outshot them (they usually outshot everybody) but not by much; only Magic was well above league average (+6.1%), and Kareem struggled at -1.3%. The Rockets still shot decently, led by Hakeem’s 31 points a game on +4.3% shooting. Where the Rockets made their hay was on ball control and boards. The Rockets got an extra five shooting possessions a game on offensive rebounding (Hakeem bagged 5 a game) and turnovers (Hakeem averaged two steals a game). Hakeem basically played his butt off, averaging 31-11-2 with 5 offensive boards, 2 steals and 4 blocks a game. It wasn’t an all-time great series (the relatively low efficiency and weak passing hurts it), but Hakeem outplayed Kareem by a lot, and the rest of the Rockets did enough to not lose it. The Lakers fell to the Rockets by 3.6 points a game. The Rockets were “rewarded” by getting to face the ‘86 Celtics; it went about as well for them as you’d expect.
And so went the ‘86 Lakers. Excellent during the regular season, blew the snot out of the Spurs, handled a decent Mavs team reasonably well and then fell to the Rockets pretty hard. And that series served as a changing of the guard. Not that the Rockets took over the West (maybe it should have happened, but it definitely didn’t). But ‘87 was the year when Kareem’s usage dropped down into the low 20s and Magic took over as the dominant offensive engine. And the ‘87 Lakers would go on to post the best offense ever (at the time, on this list) and the best playoff offense ever (at the time, on this list, minimum of 3 series). So I’d say it worked out for them long-term.
#82. The 1969 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +7.64, Standard Deviations: +1.57, Won the NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 48-34, Regular Season SRS: +5.35 (83rd), Earned the 4 Seed (out of 4)
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -1.7 (96th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -6.4 (15th)
PG: Em Bryant (30), 0.066 / 0.056
SG: Sam Jones (35), 0.128 / 0.069
SF: John Havlicek (28), 0.110 / 0.161
PF: Bailey Howell (32), 0.215 / 0.142
C: Bill Russell (34), 0.159 / 0.082
6th: Larry Siegfried (29), 0.106 / 0.110
Scoring/36m: Sam Jones (22.5 / -1.0%), Bailey Howell (21.9 / +4.1%), John Havlicek (20.1 / -3.2%)
Assists/36m: Larry Siegfried (5.2), John Havlicek (5.0), Em Bryant (4.6)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +0.95 (91st), Playoff Defensive Rating: -6.05 (35th)
Playoff SRS: +9.14 (78th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.29 (55th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.86 (31st), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.41 (66th)
Round 1:
Round 2: Philadelphia 76ers (+4.8), won 4-1 by +10.4 points per game (+15.2 SRS eq)
Round 3: New York Knicks (+7.5), won 4-2 by +1.2 points per game (+8.7 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+5.6), won 4-3 by -0.4 points per game (+5.2 SRS eq)
So. This is a team from 51 years ago, so I need to give some background.
First. No three point shot. That’s a thing for a long time (1979 is when it’s introduced). This means that spacing is a bit . . . limited. The best shot is the closest to the basket, and the farther away from the hoop it is the worse it is. Obviously defense always plays a role, but this was a very defense-driven league. By that I mean that, generally, the gap between the best and worst defense was bigger than the gap between the best and worst offense. This may seem counterintuitive if you check the points per game numbers: even the lowest scoring teams managed 101.7 points per game. This sounds offensively oriented but it was actually the opposite - every offensive possession in 1958 was worth about 0.888 points, compared to 1.106 points in 2020. The difference was made up in pace - teams back then played very, very fast. In 1958 they averaged 119.7 possessions per game per team, compared with 100.3 in 2020. Teams used way fewer pick and rolls and ball-handlers broke down defenders far less with their dribble (because palming the ball was actually called back then), so shots tended to get put up very quickly once in the half-court. And because of the limited spacing there was a limit on how much passing could crack a defense; Oscar Robertson was probably the best passer before 1980 but the impact his passing made on his teams was limited compared to, say, Nash or Magic. The best possible thing you could have was players that denied shots close to the paint, and either you had it (and it was awesome) or you didn’t (and it was less awesome).
Enter Bill Russell.
The year before he arrived in Boston the Celtics went 39-33 and were knocked out in the semis. In Russell’s rookie year the Celtics’ SRS jumped four points (all defense) and the Celtics won the championship. It is impossible to overstate the effect of Russell on the Celtics. And it’s really hard to wrap our heads around a player whose defensive impact was this valuable. It was the perfect meeting: arguably the best rim protector/defender ever, playing in an era where that particular trait was disproportionately valuable.
Not persuaded? Here’s a wad of Boston’s regular Season SRSs starting from 1954 (and if you’re not sure when Russell joined and when he retired, it’ll be pretty obvious):
+1.97, -0.03, +0.72, +4.78, +5.02, +5.84, +7.62, +4.94, +8.25, +6.38, +6.93, +7.46, +4.34, +7.24, +3.87, +5.35, -1.60, +2.30
While we’re at it, here are the Celtics’ net defensive ratings in that timeframe (remember, lower is better):
+2.5, +3.2, +1.4, -4.9, -5.2, -5.7, -6.2, -7.6, -8.5, -8.5, -10.8, -9.4, -6.6, -5.1, -4.4, -6.4, -0.1, -1.9
So adding Russell caused an immediate +4 SRS jump and a 6.3 defensive rating improvement, and losing him was a -7 SRS drop and a 6 point defensive rating drop. Data like this isn’t everything, but hopefully I’ve made clear that Russell was exactly as valuable as people from his era acted like he was. Oh, and he coached the ‘69 Celtics. I don’t mean like LeBron-coached. I mean, he was the freaking coach.
This was his last year. The Celtics finished 4th in the East (though with the 2nd best SRS). Wilt Chamberlain had joined Jerry West and the Lakers (who would go on to win their conference handily). And the East had two strong teams in the Bullets (led by 22 year-old Wes Unseld and Earl Monroe) and 76ers (led by Billy Cunningham, Hal Greer and Chet Walker). But the real threat was the New York Knicks. In ‘68 the Knicks had two great big men in Willis Reed and Walt Bellamy, and there was tension between the two. So, in the middle of the 1969 season, the Knicks flipped Bellamy for Dave DeBusschere. By the box score Bellamy was obviously the better player. But at the time of the trade the Knicks were 18-17; after the trade they went on a 27-4 run and finished with the best SRS in the league. Against all this the Celtics had 34 year-old Bill Russell and 35 year-old Sam Jones; 28 year-old John Havlicek was their only good, young player. And remember, in the 60s, when careers were shorter, those ages were even worse than they sounded.
In the first round the Celtics faced the one-seed 76ers. The Sixers were held to ten points per game under their regular season average and their leading scorer Billy Cunningham averaged only 24 per game at -3.5% efficiency (Greer shot even worse at -7.8%). The ancient Russell only scored 7 points a game on efficiency so low I won’t print it here, but he pulled down 19 boards and generated 6 assists per game, while Havlicek put up a sweet 27/8/6 on +4.3% shooting. It was a decisive 10.4 point per game win (over the one-seed), and proved that the Celtics weren’t going anywhere. And in the conference finals were, of course, the New York Knicks, fresh off whipping the Bullets by a comparable margin.
The series proved to be a defensive bloodbath; both teams scored 7-10 points below their regular per game averages. Havlicek struggled to score (21 per game on -0.4% efficiency), and Sam Jones was a problematic -10.3%. Of the Knicks, only Willis Reed scored well (24 a game on +7.3%); Frazier shot at +3% while Barnett and DeBusschere scored at -8% or worse. And the Celtics had some decent efforts of their own: Bailey Howell scored 17 a game on a gonzo +17.6% while Russell had a very Russell 16-21-5 on +1.8% shooting. In the end the Celtics pulled the series out by a narrow margin, 1.2 points per game and won the deciding Game 6 by a single point.
It would be Russell’s last playoff series, last NBA Finals. And it was against the two players he’d faced the most noted opposition from, Jerry West and Wilt Chamberlain, united on the Lakers. Of course it was. And it went to seven. Of course it did.
Jerry West was masterful, averaging a ridiculous 38/5/7 on +7.5% shooting, but the rest of the Lakers struggled to score above league average; Wilt posted 12 points per game at -1.5% efficiency but contributed 25 boards and 3 assists per game. The Celtics had some solid efforts (Havlicek with 28/11/4 at +3.6%, Russell with 9/21/5 at -5.6%), but overall the Lakers shot better. It all came down to game 7. West played out of his mind (42/13/12 on +7.8%); I don’t care what pace you play at that’s an insane stat line (West played all 48 minutes, which makes the effort more impressive, but the rate of it less impressive). But aside from Wilt (18 points on +16.5%) the Lakers really struggled to score; every other Laker (EVERY OTHER LAKER) shot at -12% or worse. The Celtics scored well as a team, with Havlicek posting a 26/9/5 at +9.8% and Sam Jones with a 24/7/6 on +18.5%. In the end the Celtics prevailed by two points, though the Lakers had outscored the Celtics by 0.4 points per game for the series.
Maybe that was the perfect end to Russell’s career. By the box score his team didn’t have close to the best player; that would have been Jerry West. By the box score, the Lakers were probably the better team (maybe they were). And by the box score data available to us Russell wasn’t that great (below 10 points per game on considerably below average efficiency). But, appropriately, the box score never had shown the things he was best at. And, of course, Russell’s team won in the end.
This isn’t close to Russell’s best season, or his best team. But it was a heck of a way to go out.
Regular Season Record: 48-34, Regular Season SRS: +5.35 (83rd), Earned the 4 Seed (out of 4)
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -1.7 (96th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -6.4 (15th)
PG: Em Bryant (30), 0.066 / 0.056
SG: Sam Jones (35), 0.128 / 0.069
SF: John Havlicek (28), 0.110 / 0.161
PF: Bailey Howell (32), 0.215 / 0.142
C: Bill Russell (34), 0.159 / 0.082
6th: Larry Siegfried (29), 0.106 / 0.110
Scoring/36m: Sam Jones (22.5 / -1.0%), Bailey Howell (21.9 / +4.1%), John Havlicek (20.1 / -3.2%)
Assists/36m: Larry Siegfried (5.2), John Havlicek (5.0), Em Bryant (4.6)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +0.95 (91st), Playoff Defensive Rating: -6.05 (35th)
Playoff SRS: +9.14 (78th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.29 (55th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.86 (31st), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.41 (66th)
Round 1:
Round 2: Philadelphia 76ers (+4.8), won 4-1 by +10.4 points per game (+15.2 SRS eq)
Round 3: New York Knicks (+7.5), won 4-2 by +1.2 points per game (+8.7 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+5.6), won 4-3 by -0.4 points per game (+5.2 SRS eq)
So. This is a team from 51 years ago, so I need to give some background.
First. No three point shot. That’s a thing for a long time (1979 is when it’s introduced). This means that spacing is a bit . . . limited. The best shot is the closest to the basket, and the farther away from the hoop it is the worse it is. Obviously defense always plays a role, but this was a very defense-driven league. By that I mean that, generally, the gap between the best and worst defense was bigger than the gap between the best and worst offense. This may seem counterintuitive if you check the points per game numbers: even the lowest scoring teams managed 101.7 points per game. This sounds offensively oriented but it was actually the opposite - every offensive possession in 1958 was worth about 0.888 points, compared to 1.106 points in 2020. The difference was made up in pace - teams back then played very, very fast. In 1958 they averaged 119.7 possessions per game per team, compared with 100.3 in 2020. Teams used way fewer pick and rolls and ball-handlers broke down defenders far less with their dribble (because palming the ball was actually called back then), so shots tended to get put up very quickly once in the half-court. And because of the limited spacing there was a limit on how much passing could crack a defense; Oscar Robertson was probably the best passer before 1980 but the impact his passing made on his teams was limited compared to, say, Nash or Magic. The best possible thing you could have was players that denied shots close to the paint, and either you had it (and it was awesome) or you didn’t (and it was less awesome).
Enter Bill Russell.
The year before he arrived in Boston the Celtics went 39-33 and were knocked out in the semis. In Russell’s rookie year the Celtics’ SRS jumped four points (all defense) and the Celtics won the championship. It is impossible to overstate the effect of Russell on the Celtics. And it’s really hard to wrap our heads around a player whose defensive impact was this valuable. It was the perfect meeting: arguably the best rim protector/defender ever, playing in an era where that particular trait was disproportionately valuable.
Not persuaded? Here’s a wad of Boston’s regular Season SRSs starting from 1954 (and if you’re not sure when Russell joined and when he retired, it’ll be pretty obvious):
+1.97, -0.03, +0.72, +4.78, +5.02, +5.84, +7.62, +4.94, +8.25, +6.38, +6.93, +7.46, +4.34, +7.24, +3.87, +5.35, -1.60, +2.30
While we’re at it, here are the Celtics’ net defensive ratings in that timeframe (remember, lower is better):
+2.5, +3.2, +1.4, -4.9, -5.2, -5.7, -6.2, -7.6, -8.5, -8.5, -10.8, -9.4, -6.6, -5.1, -4.4, -6.4, -0.1, -1.9
So adding Russell caused an immediate +4 SRS jump and a 6.3 defensive rating improvement, and losing him was a -7 SRS drop and a 6 point defensive rating drop. Data like this isn’t everything, but hopefully I’ve made clear that Russell was exactly as valuable as people from his era acted like he was. Oh, and he coached the ‘69 Celtics. I don’t mean like LeBron-coached. I mean, he was the freaking coach.
This was his last year. The Celtics finished 4th in the East (though with the 2nd best SRS). Wilt Chamberlain had joined Jerry West and the Lakers (who would go on to win their conference handily). And the East had two strong teams in the Bullets (led by 22 year-old Wes Unseld and Earl Monroe) and 76ers (led by Billy Cunningham, Hal Greer and Chet Walker). But the real threat was the New York Knicks. In ‘68 the Knicks had two great big men in Willis Reed and Walt Bellamy, and there was tension between the two. So, in the middle of the 1969 season, the Knicks flipped Bellamy for Dave DeBusschere. By the box score Bellamy was obviously the better player. But at the time of the trade the Knicks were 18-17; after the trade they went on a 27-4 run and finished with the best SRS in the league. Against all this the Celtics had 34 year-old Bill Russell and 35 year-old Sam Jones; 28 year-old John Havlicek was their only good, young player. And remember, in the 60s, when careers were shorter, those ages were even worse than they sounded.
In the first round the Celtics faced the one-seed 76ers. The Sixers were held to ten points per game under their regular season average and their leading scorer Billy Cunningham averaged only 24 per game at -3.5% efficiency (Greer shot even worse at -7.8%). The ancient Russell only scored 7 points a game on efficiency so low I won’t print it here, but he pulled down 19 boards and generated 6 assists per game, while Havlicek put up a sweet 27/8/6 on +4.3% shooting. It was a decisive 10.4 point per game win (over the one-seed), and proved that the Celtics weren’t going anywhere. And in the conference finals were, of course, the New York Knicks, fresh off whipping the Bullets by a comparable margin.
The series proved to be a defensive bloodbath; both teams scored 7-10 points below their regular per game averages. Havlicek struggled to score (21 per game on -0.4% efficiency), and Sam Jones was a problematic -10.3%. Of the Knicks, only Willis Reed scored well (24 a game on +7.3%); Frazier shot at +3% while Barnett and DeBusschere scored at -8% or worse. And the Celtics had some decent efforts of their own: Bailey Howell scored 17 a game on a gonzo +17.6% while Russell had a very Russell 16-21-5 on +1.8% shooting. In the end the Celtics pulled the series out by a narrow margin, 1.2 points per game and won the deciding Game 6 by a single point.
It would be Russell’s last playoff series, last NBA Finals. And it was against the two players he’d faced the most noted opposition from, Jerry West and Wilt Chamberlain, united on the Lakers. Of course it was. And it went to seven. Of course it did.
Jerry West was masterful, averaging a ridiculous 38/5/7 on +7.5% shooting, but the rest of the Lakers struggled to score above league average; Wilt posted 12 points per game at -1.5% efficiency but contributed 25 boards and 3 assists per game. The Celtics had some solid efforts (Havlicek with 28/11/4 at +3.6%, Russell with 9/21/5 at -5.6%), but overall the Lakers shot better. It all came down to game 7. West played out of his mind (42/13/12 on +7.8%); I don’t care what pace you play at that’s an insane stat line (West played all 48 minutes, which makes the effort more impressive, but the rate of it less impressive). But aside from Wilt (18 points on +16.5%) the Lakers really struggled to score; every other Laker (EVERY OTHER LAKER) shot at -12% or worse. The Celtics scored well as a team, with Havlicek posting a 26/9/5 at +9.8% and Sam Jones with a 24/7/6 on +18.5%. In the end the Celtics prevailed by two points, though the Lakers had outscored the Celtics by 0.4 points per game for the series.
Maybe that was the perfect end to Russell’s career. By the box score his team didn’t have close to the best player; that would have been Jerry West. By the box score, the Lakers were probably the better team (maybe they were). And by the box score data available to us Russell wasn’t that great (below 10 points per game on considerably below average efficiency). But, appropriately, the box score never had shown the things he was best at. And, of course, Russell’s team won in the end.
This isn’t close to Russell’s best season, or his best team. But it was a heck of a way to go out.
#81. The 2011 Miami Heat
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +7.88, Standard Deviations: +1.71, Lost in the NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 58-24, Regular Season SRS: +6.76 (51st), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.4 (41st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.8 (45th)
PG: Mario Chalmers (24), -0.8 / +1.5
SG: Dwyane Wade (29), +6.6 / +8.4
SF: LeBron James (26), +8.1 / +7.1
PF: Chris Bosh (26), +1.3 / +1.1
C: Joel Anthony (28), -1.6 / -0.6
6th: Mike Bibby (32), -1.5 / -4.6
Usage Rate: Dwyane Wade (31.6%), LeBron James (31.5%), Chris Bosh (23.5%)
Scoring/100: LeBron James (36.4 / +5.3%), Dwyane Wade (36.3 / +4.0%), Chris Bosh (27.2 / +2.8%)
Assists/100: LeBron James (9.6), Dwyane Wade (6.5), Mario Chalmers (5.9)
Heliocentrism: 41.7% (23rd of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 44.9% (15th)
Depth: 13.4% (69th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +3.64 (67th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.40 (61st)
Playoff SRS: +8.50 (89th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.12 (78th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.5 (89th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -4.54 (4th)
Round 1: Philadelphia 76ers (+1.0), won 4-1 by +7.4 points per game (+8.4 SRS eq)
Round 2: Boston Celtics (+5.9), won 4-1 by +4.4 points per game (+10.3 SRS eq)
Round 3: Chicago Bulls (+6.6), won 4-1 by +2.2 points per game (+8.8 SRS eq)
Round 4: Dallas Mavericks (+9.2), lost 2-4 by -2.4 points per game (+6.8 SRS eq)
Ugh. A team that was remembered for all the wrong reasons. I mean, where do you put them? They weren’t bad. Their regular season SRS was quality, their offense and defense were good. And they made the Finals. Their loss to the Mavericks wasn’t by much, and the playoff SRS, while not good on this list, isn’t horrible. This is honestly not a bad place for them to be ranked.
The problem with this team is expectations. When LeBron joined forces with Dwyane Wade most of the league seemed to think that it was all over. Heck, LeBron seemed to think so. For a true student of the game, his “Not one, not two, not three . . .” comes off at the intersection of ignorant and self-congratulatory (which is not a good look). I mean, LeBron was a super ball-dominant athletic wing facilitator, whose weaknesses were that he had no real three point range and that he needed the ball in his hands to maximize damage. And he joined Dwyane Wade who was . . . a super ball-dominant athletic wing facilitator, whose weaknesses were that he had no three point range whatsoever and that he needed the ball in his hands to maximize damage. Who thought this was a good idea? I mean, yeah, they’re both good, and this comes with built-in redundancy, but oh my gosh. At least Harden and Chris Paul could each spot-up shoot for each other. Unlike LeBron joining an off-ball defensive big (*cough* Anthony Davis *cough*) this arrangement was going to have serious diminishing returns. So expectations that LeBron + Wade = instant championship were unfair to everyone involved.
There’s another serious wrinkle to this team / season and it’s about LeBron. (Brace yourself, amateur psychology coming through - take it with a grain of salt.) One of the biggest differences between Jordan and LeBron lies in their self-consciousness. Jordan always seemed 100% confident in himself, totally natural. Of course, he wasn’t 100% confident; the kind of pathological competitive streak he had can only arise from a kind of insecurity. But you’d never know it from looking at him. “Cool” is a nebulous concept, but Jordan’s behavior embodied it from top to bottom; he never seemed to worry whether people liked him or not, or what his legacy would be. He was Michael; the world needed him, not the other way around.
This was not the case with LeBron. LeBron, for all of his athletic gifts, was blessed with a spectacular mind and a photographic memory. He has demonstrated an uncanny ability to recall coverages used half a decade ago or recount the play-by-play of one of several games he watched the night before. J.J. Reddick has tied this to LeBron’s ability to “solve” teams, how the later in the series it gets the better LeBron gets, like Deep Blue solving Kasparov. But of course, as LeBron points out, this also means that he remembers his impoverished childhood impeccably, including the years where he and his mother would have to move from lodging to lodging in hopes of finding a stable living situation. My point is, LeBron is extraordinarily self-aware. Which also means that he was extremely self-conscious, especially when he was younger.
LeBron, it seems, has always had two driving goals. One was to be the greatest of all time. Now that he’s older this is his dominant motivation and he has bent himself to it relentlessly. Teammates speak in awe of his recovery regimen, of how much time he spends practicing, of how much time he spends studying, of how carefully he eats. The kind of stories you hear about Jordan all the time (gambling, late-night carousing etc) simply don’t happen for older LeBron. They might get in the way of his goal. He’s become like some sort of weird basketball monk, dedicated his life almost totally to the pursuit of greatness. His self-awareness coupled with that goal manifests as a single-minded diligence.
But he has another goal: to be liked. LeBron *loves* teammate chemistry. Many of his teams (late aughts Cavs, 2020 Lakers, etc) are notable for the apparent joy they had for playing together. This is something that LeBron often seems to foster (but not always), but it would be totally alien for Jordan. The desire for chemistry, on a certain level, bespeaks a degree of interpersonal dependence; Jordan wasn’t dependent on nobody. LeBron often seems happier when other people are happier; I think it’s not unlike how he gets more pleasure from setting up a teammate with a pass than being set up himself. And when he was younger, I maintain that this second drive, to be liked, was the stronger of the two. Sure he talked a big game at times, but who hasn’t (in their teens and early 20s) talked honestly about ambitious goals and then flushed the next month down the tubes playing WoW or Call of Duty? The need for approval from others tends to wane as one gets older, while the ability to put aside the short-term benefit for the long-term goal tends to increase. So LeBron transitioning in this way (assuming that I’m not talking out of my butt) would be totally normal.
2011 is the year where that transition, from being liked to focusing on personal achievement, becomes a big deal. Seven years before, LeBron had been drafted by his hometown team. Everybody loved him - yay! Through sheer excellence he was able to lift his hometown team to be one of the best in the league - yay! He single-handedly took his team to the Finals - yay! In 2009 he led a bunch of role-players to the 13th best regular season SRS ever - yay! LeBron was a hero to his hometown fans. He was very well liked.
But.
It was becoming clear that the Cavs were pretty unlikely to win a title (I personally maintain that had they not run into such an ideal counter to their own makeup in the Magic that they’d have given the ‘09 Lakers a run, but that’s beside the point). And even though by most standards LeBron was the best player in the league and had been for several years, he was beginning to be disparaged for the lack of rings. When LeBron averaged 39/8/8 on +4.7% shooting against the Magic, the story wasn’t “holy cow, was that the best playoff series by a player ever?” but instead “LeBron only goes 25-7-7 in Game 7, wilts under spotlight” (I’m twisting the narrative, both were said, but to a self-conscious human like LeBron I believe the latter hit far harder). I truly believe in my heart of hearts that LeBron would have been happiest if he’d been able to stay in Cleveland the whole time and won a few titles. But his desire to stay with the hometown team and be loved was beginning to hurt him in other ways. Because he *did* want to be considered the greatest of all-time, and even at 24-25 it was clear that lifting the bad news bears to the conference finals every year wasn’t going to get it done, even if he was playing out of his mind. We were beginning to see a bit of a backlash against LeBron (not unlike the one that happened to Jordan pre-’91 Finals) where his objective greatness was being attacked because he couldn’t win. And that was a different kind of being liked that he wanted, respect, and he was losing it even though he was playing better than ever.
Look, I’ve heard the Delonte West rumors (who hasn’t) and I certainly can’t speak to their veracity. But isn’t it just possible that he just kind of snapped? Isn’t it possible that he realized that doing what he’d always wanted (staying home and being loved) was going to take away everything he wanted for his future? Remember, LeBron grew up with a single mother, moving from apartment to apartment in the slums of Akron, unable to afford to stay anywhere permanent. In 4th grade he missed 82 of 160 school days; his life was heading down a bad road. And in the end, nine year-old LeBron had to leave his mom and move in with his local youth football coach, Frank Walker (the man who, a year later, would introduce him to basketball). And it was that decision that started his life down the path we recognize now. That’s not too different from leaving his home team for another, is it? In both cases there was the place he wanted to be in the present with the future he didn’t want, and in the other case he had to leave and start over to have the future he *did* want. Who is to say that LeBron, in the middle of the 2010 series against the Celtics didn’t feel his gut clenching, knowing on some level that leaving home was the best thing, all over again? (Obviously this is wildly speculative, but tell me there isn’t something here?)
So in the offseason after 2010 LeBron makes a Decision. This is super-awkward for him. At least when he was nine, adults basically made the decision for him. This time he had to be the one to do the leaving and own it as an adult. Even though he wanted so much to be liked, he wanted something for himself, for his future. And, on some level, maybe he wasn’t sure if he had the right to want something for himself like that. He decides to leave Cleveland and join the Miami Heat. But at the intersection of all of this insecurity and uncertainty about this, he handles it in the most tone-deaf, thoughtless, borderline-offensive way possible. Him leaving Cleveland was understandable - he really couldn’t have done anything more there. But calling public attention to his decision to blindside his hometown teams and fans with abandonment . . . It was epic dumb. (Side note, by doing the Decision publicly like that he did raise 2.5 million dollars for the Boys and Girls club so it was good in another way, even if it came off horribly.)
I don’t think that LeBron was prepared to be vilified. And also, look at the team he went to. He was joining Pat Riley, an old hand at winning. Not unlike his moving in with his football coach, he was trading loved uncertainty for a stable environment with a father figure to guide him (I don’t want to overplay this but I do think that the Riley / Walker analogy isn’t crazy). But that father figure already had a favorite son in Wade, a similar player who was two years older and already wearing the ring that LeBron lacked. On one hand LeBron moved into an environment with a better future that was more conducive to winning, but he also moved into an environment that infantilized him a little bit. Two steps forward and one step back.
So anyhow, the 2011 Heat (sorry for the digression). They play really well, posting a strong SRS (51st on the list), but finishing four games behind the Derrick Rose Bulls. So they were good . . . but not quite as good as you’d have thought. And look at those usage rates. LeBron is literally 0.1% below Wade. That’s obviously a coincidence . . . but it so fits with the narrative that LeBron was holding himself back, trying not to usurp Wade’s place on the team. And this is another Jordan difference. Imagine Jordan joining the Lakers; do you think Jordan would have deferred to Magic? Hell no. He’d have torched him over and over again until everyone knew who the real Alpha was (within reason, this exact thing did happen with the Dream Team). But not LeBron; that was not yet something he was comfortable with doing.
In the first round of the playoffs the Heat beat the 76ers pretty easily (though a +7 MoV against a +1 SRS team is pretty weak for this list). Here’s the dual banjos breakdown: efficiency (LeBron +4.6, Wade -1.4), Rebounding (LeBron 13.8%, Wade 12.1%) and Assist% (LeBron 30.1%, Wade 29.6%). But Usage? LeBron 25.2%, Wade 30.1%. LeBron played better on offense, but Wade carried more of it. Round 2 against the Celtics, where the Heat won by 4.4 points a game (a very good win over a very good team). Wade ran 33% of the offense, LeBron ran 31.7% of the offense (though, in fairness, Wade completely outplayed LeBron that series, posting a 30/7/5 on +7.5% vs 28/8/4 on +1.2%).
In the Eastern Conference Finals they faced the one-seed Bulls. The Heat took the Bulls by 2.2 points a game (a decent win) and they shut Derrick Rose down (-10.5% shooting). The Banjo Breakdown? Efficiency (LeBron +2.8%, Wade -4.3%), Rebounding (LeBron 10.2%, Wade 9.7%), Assist% (LeBron 32.3%, Wade 11.7%) and Usage (LeBron 29.8%, Wade 29.8%). LeBron was clearly the best player on the floor that series, and still LeBron wouldn’t use more possessions than Wade. How weird is this?
And so, of course, this ends in the Finals against the Mavericks. Now the Mavs may have been a lower seed but they didn’t have a bad SRS (+5.86) and they *vaporized* the three-peat seeking Lakers by 14 points a game. Overall SRS actually thought that the Mavericks were the better team going into the Finals. Built around Dirk Nowitzki’s offense (with some help from Jason Terry) the rest of the Mavs were athletic defenders, ranging from Tyson Chandler to Sean Marion to Jason Kidd. I won’t belabor the point, the Mavs won in six (2.4 points per game). Dwyane Wade actually played great (almost certainly the best player of the series with a 27/7/5 on +7.3% shooting). LeBron’s stat-line? 18/7/7 on league average shooting. Wade’s usage rate? 30.2%. LeBron’s? 22.9%.
Out of a perverse curiosity I fed LeBron’s Finals stat-line into my comp-finder and you know the best modern match I could find? 2014 Lance Stevenson (but with better defense). That’s not bad. Unless you’re, you know, the best player in the league. Then it’s a little disappointing. Or as Clayton Crowley summarized in his eminently watchable Making the Case video for LeBron as the GOAT, “He sucked”. I’ve read articles trying to argue that LeBron’s struggles were brought on by the Mavs’ excellent defense but I don’t buy it for a second. Not that the Mavs’ defense wasn’t good, it was. But that wouldn’t explain why LeBron’s usage rate dropped so far. The problem wasn’t that he didn’t make shots (though his efficiency was quite low), it’s that he didn’t take shots. There’s almost no way not to see this as a mental issue. I don’t see it as LeBron being afraid to play on the biggest stage; he’d done just fine in the Conference Finals. I see it as LeBron being afraid to overshadow Wade, to threaten his big brother, to destabilize the hierarchy of his new home. But frankly, I don’t really know. All I can say is that he got in his own head and really underperformed. And it probably cost the Heat a title. Not that the Mavericks weren’t really good (that thrashing of the Lakers should show that they were plenty good).
But in a weird way maybe it worked out. Because in the offseason he worked with Hakeem Olajuwon on post moves (something that I don’t think Jordan would have let himself do), going into the 2012 season with a complete back-to-the-basket game. He also came into the season as a 36% three-point shooter, beginning to make a strength out of something that had long been a weakness. And from that point forward, we would never again see LeBron James flinch (at least not like that). From 2012 on LeBron would consistently be the best player in the playoffs every single year. Maybe it took the loss in the 2011 Finals to finish the reorientation of his priorities: going forward he would dedicate his considerable mental abilities to the task of becoming the greatest player ever. Going forward, his mental game became one of his biggest strengths.
And yeah, the 2011 Finals were rough, but their playoff SRS was still decent. And their regular season SRS was pretty good. And they won their conference. I can’t really see putting them lower than this. Thanks for bearing with me on the LeBron-o-Rama.
Regular Season Record: 58-24, Regular Season SRS: +6.76 (51st), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.4 (41st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.8 (45th)
PG: Mario Chalmers (24), -0.8 / +1.5
SG: Dwyane Wade (29), +6.6 / +8.4
SF: LeBron James (26), +8.1 / +7.1
PF: Chris Bosh (26), +1.3 / +1.1
C: Joel Anthony (28), -1.6 / -0.6
6th: Mike Bibby (32), -1.5 / -4.6
Usage Rate: Dwyane Wade (31.6%), LeBron James (31.5%), Chris Bosh (23.5%)
Scoring/100: LeBron James (36.4 / +5.3%), Dwyane Wade (36.3 / +4.0%), Chris Bosh (27.2 / +2.8%)
Assists/100: LeBron James (9.6), Dwyane Wade (6.5), Mario Chalmers (5.9)
Heliocentrism: 41.7% (23rd of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 44.9% (15th)
Depth: 13.4% (69th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +3.64 (67th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.40 (61st)
Playoff SRS: +8.50 (89th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.12 (78th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.5 (89th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -4.54 (4th)
Round 1: Philadelphia 76ers (+1.0), won 4-1 by +7.4 points per game (+8.4 SRS eq)
Round 2: Boston Celtics (+5.9), won 4-1 by +4.4 points per game (+10.3 SRS eq)
Round 3: Chicago Bulls (+6.6), won 4-1 by +2.2 points per game (+8.8 SRS eq)
Round 4: Dallas Mavericks (+9.2), lost 2-4 by -2.4 points per game (+6.8 SRS eq)
Ugh. A team that was remembered for all the wrong reasons. I mean, where do you put them? They weren’t bad. Their regular season SRS was quality, their offense and defense were good. And they made the Finals. Their loss to the Mavericks wasn’t by much, and the playoff SRS, while not good on this list, isn’t horrible. This is honestly not a bad place for them to be ranked.
The problem with this team is expectations. When LeBron joined forces with Dwyane Wade most of the league seemed to think that it was all over. Heck, LeBron seemed to think so. For a true student of the game, his “Not one, not two, not three . . .” comes off at the intersection of ignorant and self-congratulatory (which is not a good look). I mean, LeBron was a super ball-dominant athletic wing facilitator, whose weaknesses were that he had no real three point range and that he needed the ball in his hands to maximize damage. And he joined Dwyane Wade who was . . . a super ball-dominant athletic wing facilitator, whose weaknesses were that he had no three point range whatsoever and that he needed the ball in his hands to maximize damage. Who thought this was a good idea? I mean, yeah, they’re both good, and this comes with built-in redundancy, but oh my gosh. At least Harden and Chris Paul could each spot-up shoot for each other. Unlike LeBron joining an off-ball defensive big (*cough* Anthony Davis *cough*) this arrangement was going to have serious diminishing returns. So expectations that LeBron + Wade = instant championship were unfair to everyone involved.
There’s another serious wrinkle to this team / season and it’s about LeBron. (Brace yourself, amateur psychology coming through - take it with a grain of salt.) One of the biggest differences between Jordan and LeBron lies in their self-consciousness. Jordan always seemed 100% confident in himself, totally natural. Of course, he wasn’t 100% confident; the kind of pathological competitive streak he had can only arise from a kind of insecurity. But you’d never know it from looking at him. “Cool” is a nebulous concept, but Jordan’s behavior embodied it from top to bottom; he never seemed to worry whether people liked him or not, or what his legacy would be. He was Michael; the world needed him, not the other way around.
This was not the case with LeBron. LeBron, for all of his athletic gifts, was blessed with a spectacular mind and a photographic memory. He has demonstrated an uncanny ability to recall coverages used half a decade ago or recount the play-by-play of one of several games he watched the night before. J.J. Reddick has tied this to LeBron’s ability to “solve” teams, how the later in the series it gets the better LeBron gets, like Deep Blue solving Kasparov. But of course, as LeBron points out, this also means that he remembers his impoverished childhood impeccably, including the years where he and his mother would have to move from lodging to lodging in hopes of finding a stable living situation. My point is, LeBron is extraordinarily self-aware. Which also means that he was extremely self-conscious, especially when he was younger.
LeBron, it seems, has always had two driving goals. One was to be the greatest of all time. Now that he’s older this is his dominant motivation and he has bent himself to it relentlessly. Teammates speak in awe of his recovery regimen, of how much time he spends practicing, of how much time he spends studying, of how carefully he eats. The kind of stories you hear about Jordan all the time (gambling, late-night carousing etc) simply don’t happen for older LeBron. They might get in the way of his goal. He’s become like some sort of weird basketball monk, dedicated his life almost totally to the pursuit of greatness. His self-awareness coupled with that goal manifests as a single-minded diligence.
But he has another goal: to be liked. LeBron *loves* teammate chemistry. Many of his teams (late aughts Cavs, 2020 Lakers, etc) are notable for the apparent joy they had for playing together. This is something that LeBron often seems to foster (but not always), but it would be totally alien for Jordan. The desire for chemistry, on a certain level, bespeaks a degree of interpersonal dependence; Jordan wasn’t dependent on nobody. LeBron often seems happier when other people are happier; I think it’s not unlike how he gets more pleasure from setting up a teammate with a pass than being set up himself. And when he was younger, I maintain that this second drive, to be liked, was the stronger of the two. Sure he talked a big game at times, but who hasn’t (in their teens and early 20s) talked honestly about ambitious goals and then flushed the next month down the tubes playing WoW or Call of Duty? The need for approval from others tends to wane as one gets older, while the ability to put aside the short-term benefit for the long-term goal tends to increase. So LeBron transitioning in this way (assuming that I’m not talking out of my butt) would be totally normal.
2011 is the year where that transition, from being liked to focusing on personal achievement, becomes a big deal. Seven years before, LeBron had been drafted by his hometown team. Everybody loved him - yay! Through sheer excellence he was able to lift his hometown team to be one of the best in the league - yay! He single-handedly took his team to the Finals - yay! In 2009 he led a bunch of role-players to the 13th best regular season SRS ever - yay! LeBron was a hero to his hometown fans. He was very well liked.
But.
It was becoming clear that the Cavs were pretty unlikely to win a title (I personally maintain that had they not run into such an ideal counter to their own makeup in the Magic that they’d have given the ‘09 Lakers a run, but that’s beside the point). And even though by most standards LeBron was the best player in the league and had been for several years, he was beginning to be disparaged for the lack of rings. When LeBron averaged 39/8/8 on +4.7% shooting against the Magic, the story wasn’t “holy cow, was that the best playoff series by a player ever?” but instead “LeBron only goes 25-7-7 in Game 7, wilts under spotlight” (I’m twisting the narrative, both were said, but to a self-conscious human like LeBron I believe the latter hit far harder). I truly believe in my heart of hearts that LeBron would have been happiest if he’d been able to stay in Cleveland the whole time and won a few titles. But his desire to stay with the hometown team and be loved was beginning to hurt him in other ways. Because he *did* want to be considered the greatest of all-time, and even at 24-25 it was clear that lifting the bad news bears to the conference finals every year wasn’t going to get it done, even if he was playing out of his mind. We were beginning to see a bit of a backlash against LeBron (not unlike the one that happened to Jordan pre-’91 Finals) where his objective greatness was being attacked because he couldn’t win. And that was a different kind of being liked that he wanted, respect, and he was losing it even though he was playing better than ever.
Look, I’ve heard the Delonte West rumors (who hasn’t) and I certainly can’t speak to their veracity. But isn’t it just possible that he just kind of snapped? Isn’t it possible that he realized that doing what he’d always wanted (staying home and being loved) was going to take away everything he wanted for his future? Remember, LeBron grew up with a single mother, moving from apartment to apartment in the slums of Akron, unable to afford to stay anywhere permanent. In 4th grade he missed 82 of 160 school days; his life was heading down a bad road. And in the end, nine year-old LeBron had to leave his mom and move in with his local youth football coach, Frank Walker (the man who, a year later, would introduce him to basketball). And it was that decision that started his life down the path we recognize now. That’s not too different from leaving his home team for another, is it? In both cases there was the place he wanted to be in the present with the future he didn’t want, and in the other case he had to leave and start over to have the future he *did* want. Who is to say that LeBron, in the middle of the 2010 series against the Celtics didn’t feel his gut clenching, knowing on some level that leaving home was the best thing, all over again? (Obviously this is wildly speculative, but tell me there isn’t something here?)
So in the offseason after 2010 LeBron makes a Decision. This is super-awkward for him. At least when he was nine, adults basically made the decision for him. This time he had to be the one to do the leaving and own it as an adult. Even though he wanted so much to be liked, he wanted something for himself, for his future. And, on some level, maybe he wasn’t sure if he had the right to want something for himself like that. He decides to leave Cleveland and join the Miami Heat. But at the intersection of all of this insecurity and uncertainty about this, he handles it in the most tone-deaf, thoughtless, borderline-offensive way possible. Him leaving Cleveland was understandable - he really couldn’t have done anything more there. But calling public attention to his decision to blindside his hometown teams and fans with abandonment . . . It was epic dumb. (Side note, by doing the Decision publicly like that he did raise 2.5 million dollars for the Boys and Girls club so it was good in another way, even if it came off horribly.)
I don’t think that LeBron was prepared to be vilified. And also, look at the team he went to. He was joining Pat Riley, an old hand at winning. Not unlike his moving in with his football coach, he was trading loved uncertainty for a stable environment with a father figure to guide him (I don’t want to overplay this but I do think that the Riley / Walker analogy isn’t crazy). But that father figure already had a favorite son in Wade, a similar player who was two years older and already wearing the ring that LeBron lacked. On one hand LeBron moved into an environment with a better future that was more conducive to winning, but he also moved into an environment that infantilized him a little bit. Two steps forward and one step back.
So anyhow, the 2011 Heat (sorry for the digression). They play really well, posting a strong SRS (51st on the list), but finishing four games behind the Derrick Rose Bulls. So they were good . . . but not quite as good as you’d have thought. And look at those usage rates. LeBron is literally 0.1% below Wade. That’s obviously a coincidence . . . but it so fits with the narrative that LeBron was holding himself back, trying not to usurp Wade’s place on the team. And this is another Jordan difference. Imagine Jordan joining the Lakers; do you think Jordan would have deferred to Magic? Hell no. He’d have torched him over and over again until everyone knew who the real Alpha was (within reason, this exact thing did happen with the Dream Team). But not LeBron; that was not yet something he was comfortable with doing.
In the first round of the playoffs the Heat beat the 76ers pretty easily (though a +7 MoV against a +1 SRS team is pretty weak for this list). Here’s the dual banjos breakdown: efficiency (LeBron +4.6, Wade -1.4), Rebounding (LeBron 13.8%, Wade 12.1%) and Assist% (LeBron 30.1%, Wade 29.6%). But Usage? LeBron 25.2%, Wade 30.1%. LeBron played better on offense, but Wade carried more of it. Round 2 against the Celtics, where the Heat won by 4.4 points a game (a very good win over a very good team). Wade ran 33% of the offense, LeBron ran 31.7% of the offense (though, in fairness, Wade completely outplayed LeBron that series, posting a 30/7/5 on +7.5% vs 28/8/4 on +1.2%).
In the Eastern Conference Finals they faced the one-seed Bulls. The Heat took the Bulls by 2.2 points a game (a decent win) and they shut Derrick Rose down (-10.5% shooting). The Banjo Breakdown? Efficiency (LeBron +2.8%, Wade -4.3%), Rebounding (LeBron 10.2%, Wade 9.7%), Assist% (LeBron 32.3%, Wade 11.7%) and Usage (LeBron 29.8%, Wade 29.8%). LeBron was clearly the best player on the floor that series, and still LeBron wouldn’t use more possessions than Wade. How weird is this?
And so, of course, this ends in the Finals against the Mavericks. Now the Mavs may have been a lower seed but they didn’t have a bad SRS (+5.86) and they *vaporized* the three-peat seeking Lakers by 14 points a game. Overall SRS actually thought that the Mavericks were the better team going into the Finals. Built around Dirk Nowitzki’s offense (with some help from Jason Terry) the rest of the Mavs were athletic defenders, ranging from Tyson Chandler to Sean Marion to Jason Kidd. I won’t belabor the point, the Mavs won in six (2.4 points per game). Dwyane Wade actually played great (almost certainly the best player of the series with a 27/7/5 on +7.3% shooting). LeBron’s stat-line? 18/7/7 on league average shooting. Wade’s usage rate? 30.2%. LeBron’s? 22.9%.
Out of a perverse curiosity I fed LeBron’s Finals stat-line into my comp-finder and you know the best modern match I could find? 2014 Lance Stevenson (but with better defense). That’s not bad. Unless you’re, you know, the best player in the league. Then it’s a little disappointing. Or as Clayton Crowley summarized in his eminently watchable Making the Case video for LeBron as the GOAT, “He sucked”. I’ve read articles trying to argue that LeBron’s struggles were brought on by the Mavs’ excellent defense but I don’t buy it for a second. Not that the Mavs’ defense wasn’t good, it was. But that wouldn’t explain why LeBron’s usage rate dropped so far. The problem wasn’t that he didn’t make shots (though his efficiency was quite low), it’s that he didn’t take shots. There’s almost no way not to see this as a mental issue. I don’t see it as LeBron being afraid to play on the biggest stage; he’d done just fine in the Conference Finals. I see it as LeBron being afraid to overshadow Wade, to threaten his big brother, to destabilize the hierarchy of his new home. But frankly, I don’t really know. All I can say is that he got in his own head and really underperformed. And it probably cost the Heat a title. Not that the Mavericks weren’t really good (that thrashing of the Lakers should show that they were plenty good).
But in a weird way maybe it worked out. Because in the offseason he worked with Hakeem Olajuwon on post moves (something that I don’t think Jordan would have let himself do), going into the 2012 season with a complete back-to-the-basket game. He also came into the season as a 36% three-point shooter, beginning to make a strength out of something that had long been a weakness. And from that point forward, we would never again see LeBron James flinch (at least not like that). From 2012 on LeBron would consistently be the best player in the playoffs every single year. Maybe it took the loss in the 2011 Finals to finish the reorientation of his priorities: going forward he would dedicate his considerable mental abilities to the task of becoming the greatest player ever. Going forward, his mental game became one of his biggest strengths.
And yeah, the 2011 Finals were rough, but their playoff SRS was still decent. And their regular season SRS was pretty good. And they won their conference. I can’t really see putting them lower than this. Thanks for bearing with me on the LeBron-o-Rama.
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