Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#51. The 1993 Chicago Bulls
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.60, Standard Deviations: +1.77, Won NBA Finals (Preseason 1st)
Regular Season Record: 57-25, Regular Season SRS: +6.19 (68th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.9 (34th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.9 (75th)
PG: B.J. Armstrong, +0.2 / +0.8
SG: Michael Jordan, +11.2 / +11.6
SF: Scottie Pippen, +4.0 / +2.0
PF: Horace Grant, +1.8 / +3.3
C: Bill Cartwright, -4.9 / -0.3
6th: Scott Williams, -1.6 / -1.4
Michael Jordan (SG, 29): 43 MPPG, 34% OLoad, 35 / 7 / 6 / 4 on +2.8%
Scottie Pippen (SF, 27): 42 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 20 / 8 / 7 / 3 on -2.6%
B.J. Armstrong (PG, 25): 33 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 13 / 2 / 4 / 1 on +3.4%
Horace Grant (PF, 27): 39 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 14 / 10 / 3 / 3 on -0.2%
Bill Cartwright (C, 35): 22 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 6 / 4 / 1 / 1 on -7.8%
Scott Williams (PF, 24): 21 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 6 / 7 / 1 / 2 on -2.3%
Scoring/100: Michael Jordan (43.0 / +2.8%), Scottie Pippen (25.1 / -2.6%), B.J. Armstrong (21.0 / +3.4%)
Assists/100: Scottie Pippen (8.4), Michael Jordan (7.2), B.J. Armstrong (6.9)
Heliocentrism: 58.3% (1st of 82 teams) - Jordan
Wingmen: 41.7% (26th) - Pippen & Grant
Depth: 0% (81st)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +8.91 (12th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.97 (75th)
Playoff SRS: +10.08 (62nd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.41 (49th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.27 (55th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.11 (26th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 51.9% - Jordan
Playoff Wingmen: 32.7% - Grant & Pippen
Playoff Bench: 15.4%
Round 1: Atlanta Hawks (-0.7), won 3-0, by +16.4 points per game (+15.7 SRS eq)
Round 2: Cleveland Cavaliers (+8.1), won 4-0, by +8.5 points per game (+16.6 SRS eq)
Round 3: New York Knicks (+5.0), won 4-2, by +4.7 points per game (+9.7 SRS eq)
Round 4: Phoenix Suns (+4.8), won 4-2, by +0.0 points per game (+4.8 SRS eq)
1993. The Bulls had just come off their repeat championship over the Blazers and were looking for their third. And Vegas was expecting just that. The Bulls were at +120 to win the championship, which implies close to a 50% expectation of a title. Few teams have ever had such expectations: the ‘88 Lakers were also at +120, the ‘97 Bulls were given higher odds, and the ‘17-’19 Warriors were given the highest odds ever. And, interestingly, the ‘93 Bulls were given twice the odds of winning that the ‘92 Bulls were. And yet, the ‘93 Bulls really didn’t play as well as one might have guessed.
They put up a very solid RSRS (+6.19) which was 4th in the league (though the best was only +6.66). But even there, that RSRS is unusually low for a 90s Bulls team. Here are the RSRSs from ‘91 to ‘98: +8.57, +10.07, +6.19, +2.87 (no Jordan), +4.32 (some Jordan), +11.80, +10.70 and +7.24. You know how a lot of teams historically kind of coasted in the regular season before hitting a higher gear in the playoffs? That is emphatically not something the Bulls did. Despite having some of the best PSRSs ever (4th, 5th, 24th, 27th, 35th and 62nd) they’re actually fairly average in playoff improvement (15th, 27th, 40th, 49th, 80th and 89th). This isn’t to say that the Jordan Bulls weren’t “clutch”, but instead to say that they were so good in the regular season (2nd, 5th, 9th, 14th, 37th and 68th) that they really didn’t need to get that much better in the playoffs to be really damned good. So if the Bulls put up an unusually low SRS in 1993 (for them), we shouldn’t infer that they were coasting, we should infer that they were legit not as good as they were in other years. And their roster kind of suggests it.
Don’t get me wrong, Jordan was still a monster. Pippen was still prime Pippen. And Horace Grant was pretty good. But the rest of the roster had become very thin. Bill Cartwright had long since stopped being even average at center. He was a 35 year-old center who couldn’t rebound, couldn’t shoot, couldn’t pass . . . he was a passable defender and that was about it. B.J. Armstrong was a very serviceable shooter but very weak on defense. And the bench was overall pretty weak. It was pretty standard stuff; the franchise had a tolerable core, gained a superstar and then drafted two young wingmen to back him up. But by ‘93 those big 3 were pretty much the roster. BBR’s BPM and VORP are obviously imperfect tools, but the ‘93 Bulls get the second lowest Depth rating (VORP% from everyone besides the 3 best players) on the list, and '93 Jordan has the highest Heliocentrism rating. It’s not because Jordan was at his best in ‘93, it’s because the rest of his team was in aggregate worse, which drove his percentage of contribution up. The roster needed an overhaul, but that wasn’t apparent yet.
The ‘93 Bulls didn’t actually shoot that well; compared to the ‘92 edition they were downright mediocre (8th eFG% and 26th FT/FGA). Their excellent offense was powered mostly by not turning the ball over and by crushing the offensive glass. And their merely above average defense was primarily propped up by forcing a lot of turnovers; in shot defense the ‘93 Bulls were only league average. So the Bulls entered the playoffs as a two-seed, having had a strong but not overwhelming regular season.
The first round pitted them against the below average Atlanta Hawks (-0.7) and the Bulls destroyed them in three straight wins by 16.4 points per game. Jordan had a brilliant series (against a weak defense) with a 34/7/4 on +6.6% shooting. Sure the Hawks weren’t any good, but a dominant win is a dominant win.
In the semis the Bulls faced the Cleveland Cavaliers, who had the best RSRS in the East, but who had underwhelmed against the Nets in the first round (3.2 points per game against a +1.2 SRS team) and who routinely seemed to disappoint in the playoffs. To the Cavs’ credit they shot almost even with the Bulls (+0.4% for the Cavs vs +1.3% for the Bulls). But the Bulls dominated the ball (about 6 extra shots a game) and the Bulls took the series in a clean sweep by 8.5 points per game (Jordan averaged a solid 31/5/5 on +2.1% with 2.3 steals a game). It’s notable that he did this in a very low-pace contest; adjusted for pace it’d be a 37/6/6. Jordan was posting usage rates around 38-39% in these series, evidence of how badly the Bulls relied on him to carry their offense.
Waiting for them in the Conference Finals were the New York Knicks. The Knicks had struggled to get past the Pacers in the first round and had only beaten the average Hornets by 4.4 points in the semis, so the Knicks didn’t look dominant. But they did have home-court advantage, and they always played very tough defense. That said, the Bulls hadn’t lost a game so far and were looking invincible.
The Knicks took Game 1. Jordan was held to 27/2/5 on -8.1% while the Knicks as a team shot at +8.4%. Even Jordan and Pippen contributing 4 steals each wasn’t enough to stop the Knicks who won the game by eight. Going into Game 2 Jordan clearly decided that there was no way he was going to let the Bulls lose two in a row. He posted an astounding 51.1% usage, throwing himself into the teeth of the Knicks’ defense over and over again. And the Bulls still lost. Jordan put up a 36/6/9 but on -5.9%, and the Bulls as a whole shot -2.6% for the game. Horace Grant was held to a 2/2/0 on 1 of 6 shooting. And again the Knicks shot well, at +5.1% as a team, en route to a five point victory. The seemingly invincible Bulls were now down 0-2.
In Chicago the Bulls finally won their first game, but not because of Jordan’s scoring (he put up a 22/8/11 on -10.4% with 2 steals and 2 blocks, so he helped in other ways). Scottie Pippen had a fantastic game with a 29/4/4 on +34.8% shooting. The Knicks’ hot shooting had deserted them and the Bulls triumphed by an emphatic 20 points. In Game 4 Jordan finally caught fire on a 46% usage rate, hitting 6 of his 9 threes and putting up a 54/6/2 on +24.2% with two steals and the Bulls were carried to a ten point win. Game 5 was back in New York; the Bulls were going to need to win at least one game on the road to advance. Jordan played superbly, only scoring 29 on -1.7%, but also getting 10 boards, 14 assists and contributing 2 steals. The Knicks were kept off the boards (which they had to date dominated) and the Bulls squeaked out a three point win despite not shooting well. Game 6 was tight; the Knicks dominated the glass but the Bulls forced 9 extra turnovers (Jordan and Pippen combined for 5 steals). Jordan submitted a 25/2/9 on -8.9% shooting while Pippen had a 24/6/7 on +4.5%. In the end the Bulls pulled it out, winning Game 6 at home by 8 and advancing to the NBA Finals. Jordan had been forced to carry the team with a 38.5% usage rate, and his shooting against the Knicks had really suffered, averaging -1.4% for the series. Still, the Bulls had won, even if the margin of victory (4.7 points per game) wasn’t very impressive given the Knicks only being a pretty good team.
They advanced to face the Phoenix Suns. The ‘93 Suns were the carryover from the strong Suns teams in ‘89 and ‘90, save that most of the players had aged poorly, either from getting old (Chambers and West) or from getting injured (Kevin Johnson). But they had added Charles Barkley, which seemed to put them over the top. But their playoff run was weirdly unimpressive:
In the first round against the poor Lakers (-1.2) they’d won 3-2 by only 3.8 points per game.
In the second round against the decent Spurs (+2.4) they’d won 4-2 by 0 points per game
In the Conference Finals they faced a very good Sonics team (+6.0) and won 4-3 by 0.1 points per game
So, upside, they kept winning. But none of those wins looked particularly dominant. Pretty much every single series could have been lost easily, two going to the full length and two by the barest of margins of victory. So OSRS looks quite down on the ‘93 Suns, and viewed the ‘93 Bulls as a five point favorite. And that’s not even counting that the Suns were down Cedric Ceballos, a promising young scorer who had begun starting by mid-season. Even Phoenix having home-court advantage didn’t seem like a worrying factor.
And, as anticipated, the Bulls rolled to a Game 1 win in Phoenix by 8 points. Jordan put up a 31/6/5 on -1.5% with 5 steals and the Bulls held the Suns to -6% shooting as a team. In Game 2 the Suns fought back behind Barkley’s 42/13/4 on +13.5% shooting. But Jordan (on 45% usage) had a 42/12/9 on +1.4% with 2 steals. The Bulls barely snuck out Game 2, taking the second road game of the series by 3 points. Heading back to Chicago things seemed well in hand. But the Suns refused to lose, forcing Game 3 into three overtimes before finally prevailing by 8 points. Dan Majerle put up a 28/7/4 on +24.7% with 2 steals, while Jordan had a 44/9/6 on -5.4% shooting. That said, the entire rest of the Bulls put up game-level BPMs of +2 or worse, with Pippen shooting at -17.4% for the game.
Game 4 was another tough match. Barkley played superbly with a 32/12/10 on +8.9% and three steals but Jordan (on 45% usage) had a 55/8/4 on +7.6% shooting. And in the end that was enough, with the Bulls winning Game 4 by 6. Up 3-1, the Bulls prepared to play their last home game of the series. Jordan had an excellent 41/7/7 on +7.8%, but every other Bulls starter shot at -6% or worse, while the Suns shot +3.6% as a team and dominated the boards. Jordan’s heroics weren’t enough for the Bulls to prevail and the Suns won by 10. Game 6 was in Phoenix, and it was tight (like every game in this series). The Bulls led by 8 going into the fourth quarter. But for the first six minutes of the final period the Bulls failed to score and the Suns surged back and took the lead. With 16 seconds to go, and up by 2, the Suns got a wide-open look for Dan Majerle. Instead of giving the Suns a perhaps insurmountable four point lead Majerle airballed the shot and Pippen grabbed the rebound and called timeout. With 14.1 seconds left in the game the Bulls had the ball, needing a two to tie or a three to win. The Bulls inbounded the ball to Jordan, with the Suns certain that he would receive the last shot. Instead Jordan proved once again that he is a TRUE COWARD IN THE PLAYOFFS BY PASSING THE BALL TO A TEAMMATE WITH THE NBA CHAMPIONSHIP ON THE LINE (sorry, retro-Skip Bayless took over the keyboard for a sec, I’m back now). Jordan passed to Pippen, Barkley went for the steal and whiffed which forced Ainge off of John Paxson onto Pippen, who passed to Grant who dished to a wide open Paxson. Paxson drilled it. The Suns last shot attempt was blocked and the Bulls won their third championship in a row.
OSRS does not view this series kindly for the Bulls. Their average MoV for the series was actually zero, and the Suns hadn’t exactly been dominating the playoffs before this game. It sees the Bulls having two spectacular series, a decent series against the Knicks and then really struggling to put the Suns away despite the Suns having seemingly lucked their way into the Finals. In their end their playoff SRS was +10.08, which is good but only 62nd on this list. And their regular season SRS was only 68th on this list. Look, they won the championship (which is why they’re this high), but the ‘93 Bulls really didn’t shine in these playoffs like other versions had. Jordan had to put up stratospheric usage rates to keep the offense moving (which it certainly did). Jordan’s 38% usage rate for the playoffs was the highest he’d posted since ‘86 and ‘87, when he was the entire team. Of course, he was no longer a pure scorer, having become a very solid facilitator. In many ways I see Jordan’s ‘93 campaign as reminiscent of Kobe. When the rest of his offense couldn’t carry the load Jordan stepped it up, shooting a ton, converting a decent efficiency. And even when his shot wasn’t falling he added value through defense, passing and rebounding, buying space for his teammates to do what they did best (except of course that Jordan did this notably better than Kobe did).
It may be blasphemy to put a championship Jordan Bulls team this low. But this is easily the weakest edition of the roster. And looking at it objectively, I don’t have a problem with the ranking.
You know one of my favorite parts of this project? Stripping the mystique away from Jordan. There were absolutely games where Jordan struggled to score efficiently (he added value in other ways, but still). And the Bulls weren’t magically fantastic in the fourth quarter. In fact, in the Finals, the major fourth quarter storyline was the Bulls blowing a lead in the 4th of Game 6 and nearly losing. Of course, take away the “Jordan is magic” reputation and you’re still left with an insanely valuable player.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2014 Jose Calderon
SG: 2011 LeBron James (more scoring, less passing, better defense)
SF: 2015 Marc Gasol
PF: 2012 Joakim Noah (better offense, worse defense)
C: 2017 Domantas Sabonis
6th: 2016 Rudy Gobert (worse offense, better defense)
It’s weird, because looking at these comps you’d guess that the Bulls had a really good defense . . . and they didn’t. But of course, young Sabonis and young Gobert are each only playing half a game, so they’re really only one player. Marc Gasol as Pippen isn’t great but it’s a little inevitable; combine lots of rebounding and defense and you veer into big man territory, not unlike Larry Bird. But you can definitely see the limitations of the offense. Calderon is a decent shooter but no facilitator, Gasol can carry some of the load, but Noah, Sabonis and Gobert are fairly dead ends on offense. Really this is LeBron making it happen, Gasol backing him up and everyone else doing their best to play their role.
Regular Season Record: 57-25, Regular Season SRS: +6.19 (68th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.9 (34th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.9 (75th)
PG: B.J. Armstrong, +0.2 / +0.8
SG: Michael Jordan, +11.2 / +11.6
SF: Scottie Pippen, +4.0 / +2.0
PF: Horace Grant, +1.8 / +3.3
C: Bill Cartwright, -4.9 / -0.3
6th: Scott Williams, -1.6 / -1.4
Michael Jordan (SG, 29): 43 MPPG, 34% OLoad, 35 / 7 / 6 / 4 on +2.8%
Scottie Pippen (SF, 27): 42 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 20 / 8 / 7 / 3 on -2.6%
B.J. Armstrong (PG, 25): 33 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 13 / 2 / 4 / 1 on +3.4%
Horace Grant (PF, 27): 39 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 14 / 10 / 3 / 3 on -0.2%
Bill Cartwright (C, 35): 22 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 6 / 4 / 1 / 1 on -7.8%
Scott Williams (PF, 24): 21 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 6 / 7 / 1 / 2 on -2.3%
Scoring/100: Michael Jordan (43.0 / +2.8%), Scottie Pippen (25.1 / -2.6%), B.J. Armstrong (21.0 / +3.4%)
Assists/100: Scottie Pippen (8.4), Michael Jordan (7.2), B.J. Armstrong (6.9)
Heliocentrism: 58.3% (1st of 82 teams) - Jordan
Wingmen: 41.7% (26th) - Pippen & Grant
Depth: 0% (81st)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +8.91 (12th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.97 (75th)
Playoff SRS: +10.08 (62nd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.41 (49th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.27 (55th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.11 (26th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 51.9% - Jordan
Playoff Wingmen: 32.7% - Grant & Pippen
Playoff Bench: 15.4%
Round 1: Atlanta Hawks (-0.7), won 3-0, by +16.4 points per game (+15.7 SRS eq)
Round 2: Cleveland Cavaliers (+8.1), won 4-0, by +8.5 points per game (+16.6 SRS eq)
Round 3: New York Knicks (+5.0), won 4-2, by +4.7 points per game (+9.7 SRS eq)
Round 4: Phoenix Suns (+4.8), won 4-2, by +0.0 points per game (+4.8 SRS eq)
1993. The Bulls had just come off their repeat championship over the Blazers and were looking for their third. And Vegas was expecting just that. The Bulls were at +120 to win the championship, which implies close to a 50% expectation of a title. Few teams have ever had such expectations: the ‘88 Lakers were also at +120, the ‘97 Bulls were given higher odds, and the ‘17-’19 Warriors were given the highest odds ever. And, interestingly, the ‘93 Bulls were given twice the odds of winning that the ‘92 Bulls were. And yet, the ‘93 Bulls really didn’t play as well as one might have guessed.
They put up a very solid RSRS (+6.19) which was 4th in the league (though the best was only +6.66). But even there, that RSRS is unusually low for a 90s Bulls team. Here are the RSRSs from ‘91 to ‘98: +8.57, +10.07, +6.19, +2.87 (no Jordan), +4.32 (some Jordan), +11.80, +10.70 and +7.24. You know how a lot of teams historically kind of coasted in the regular season before hitting a higher gear in the playoffs? That is emphatically not something the Bulls did. Despite having some of the best PSRSs ever (4th, 5th, 24th, 27th, 35th and 62nd) they’re actually fairly average in playoff improvement (15th, 27th, 40th, 49th, 80th and 89th). This isn’t to say that the Jordan Bulls weren’t “clutch”, but instead to say that they were so good in the regular season (2nd, 5th, 9th, 14th, 37th and 68th) that they really didn’t need to get that much better in the playoffs to be really damned good. So if the Bulls put up an unusually low SRS in 1993 (for them), we shouldn’t infer that they were coasting, we should infer that they were legit not as good as they were in other years. And their roster kind of suggests it.
Don’t get me wrong, Jordan was still a monster. Pippen was still prime Pippen. And Horace Grant was pretty good. But the rest of the roster had become very thin. Bill Cartwright had long since stopped being even average at center. He was a 35 year-old center who couldn’t rebound, couldn’t shoot, couldn’t pass . . . he was a passable defender and that was about it. B.J. Armstrong was a very serviceable shooter but very weak on defense. And the bench was overall pretty weak. It was pretty standard stuff; the franchise had a tolerable core, gained a superstar and then drafted two young wingmen to back him up. But by ‘93 those big 3 were pretty much the roster. BBR’s BPM and VORP are obviously imperfect tools, but the ‘93 Bulls get the second lowest Depth rating (VORP% from everyone besides the 3 best players) on the list, and '93 Jordan has the highest Heliocentrism rating. It’s not because Jordan was at his best in ‘93, it’s because the rest of his team was in aggregate worse, which drove his percentage of contribution up. The roster needed an overhaul, but that wasn’t apparent yet.
The ‘93 Bulls didn’t actually shoot that well; compared to the ‘92 edition they were downright mediocre (8th eFG% and 26th FT/FGA). Their excellent offense was powered mostly by not turning the ball over and by crushing the offensive glass. And their merely above average defense was primarily propped up by forcing a lot of turnovers; in shot defense the ‘93 Bulls were only league average. So the Bulls entered the playoffs as a two-seed, having had a strong but not overwhelming regular season.
The first round pitted them against the below average Atlanta Hawks (-0.7) and the Bulls destroyed them in three straight wins by 16.4 points per game. Jordan had a brilliant series (against a weak defense) with a 34/7/4 on +6.6% shooting. Sure the Hawks weren’t any good, but a dominant win is a dominant win.
In the semis the Bulls faced the Cleveland Cavaliers, who had the best RSRS in the East, but who had underwhelmed against the Nets in the first round (3.2 points per game against a +1.2 SRS team) and who routinely seemed to disappoint in the playoffs. To the Cavs’ credit they shot almost even with the Bulls (+0.4% for the Cavs vs +1.3% for the Bulls). But the Bulls dominated the ball (about 6 extra shots a game) and the Bulls took the series in a clean sweep by 8.5 points per game (Jordan averaged a solid 31/5/5 on +2.1% with 2.3 steals a game). It’s notable that he did this in a very low-pace contest; adjusted for pace it’d be a 37/6/6. Jordan was posting usage rates around 38-39% in these series, evidence of how badly the Bulls relied on him to carry their offense.
Waiting for them in the Conference Finals were the New York Knicks. The Knicks had struggled to get past the Pacers in the first round and had only beaten the average Hornets by 4.4 points in the semis, so the Knicks didn’t look dominant. But they did have home-court advantage, and they always played very tough defense. That said, the Bulls hadn’t lost a game so far and were looking invincible.
The Knicks took Game 1. Jordan was held to 27/2/5 on -8.1% while the Knicks as a team shot at +8.4%. Even Jordan and Pippen contributing 4 steals each wasn’t enough to stop the Knicks who won the game by eight. Going into Game 2 Jordan clearly decided that there was no way he was going to let the Bulls lose two in a row. He posted an astounding 51.1% usage, throwing himself into the teeth of the Knicks’ defense over and over again. And the Bulls still lost. Jordan put up a 36/6/9 but on -5.9%, and the Bulls as a whole shot -2.6% for the game. Horace Grant was held to a 2/2/0 on 1 of 6 shooting. And again the Knicks shot well, at +5.1% as a team, en route to a five point victory. The seemingly invincible Bulls were now down 0-2.
In Chicago the Bulls finally won their first game, but not because of Jordan’s scoring (he put up a 22/8/11 on -10.4% with 2 steals and 2 blocks, so he helped in other ways). Scottie Pippen had a fantastic game with a 29/4/4 on +34.8% shooting. The Knicks’ hot shooting had deserted them and the Bulls triumphed by an emphatic 20 points. In Game 4 Jordan finally caught fire on a 46% usage rate, hitting 6 of his 9 threes and putting up a 54/6/2 on +24.2% with two steals and the Bulls were carried to a ten point win. Game 5 was back in New York; the Bulls were going to need to win at least one game on the road to advance. Jordan played superbly, only scoring 29 on -1.7%, but also getting 10 boards, 14 assists and contributing 2 steals. The Knicks were kept off the boards (which they had to date dominated) and the Bulls squeaked out a three point win despite not shooting well. Game 6 was tight; the Knicks dominated the glass but the Bulls forced 9 extra turnovers (Jordan and Pippen combined for 5 steals). Jordan submitted a 25/2/9 on -8.9% shooting while Pippen had a 24/6/7 on +4.5%. In the end the Bulls pulled it out, winning Game 6 at home by 8 and advancing to the NBA Finals. Jordan had been forced to carry the team with a 38.5% usage rate, and his shooting against the Knicks had really suffered, averaging -1.4% for the series. Still, the Bulls had won, even if the margin of victory (4.7 points per game) wasn’t very impressive given the Knicks only being a pretty good team.
They advanced to face the Phoenix Suns. The ‘93 Suns were the carryover from the strong Suns teams in ‘89 and ‘90, save that most of the players had aged poorly, either from getting old (Chambers and West) or from getting injured (Kevin Johnson). But they had added Charles Barkley, which seemed to put them over the top. But their playoff run was weirdly unimpressive:
In the first round against the poor Lakers (-1.2) they’d won 3-2 by only 3.8 points per game.
In the second round against the decent Spurs (+2.4) they’d won 4-2 by 0 points per game
In the Conference Finals they faced a very good Sonics team (+6.0) and won 4-3 by 0.1 points per game
So, upside, they kept winning. But none of those wins looked particularly dominant. Pretty much every single series could have been lost easily, two going to the full length and two by the barest of margins of victory. So OSRS looks quite down on the ‘93 Suns, and viewed the ‘93 Bulls as a five point favorite. And that’s not even counting that the Suns were down Cedric Ceballos, a promising young scorer who had begun starting by mid-season. Even Phoenix having home-court advantage didn’t seem like a worrying factor.
And, as anticipated, the Bulls rolled to a Game 1 win in Phoenix by 8 points. Jordan put up a 31/6/5 on -1.5% with 5 steals and the Bulls held the Suns to -6% shooting as a team. In Game 2 the Suns fought back behind Barkley’s 42/13/4 on +13.5% shooting. But Jordan (on 45% usage) had a 42/12/9 on +1.4% with 2 steals. The Bulls barely snuck out Game 2, taking the second road game of the series by 3 points. Heading back to Chicago things seemed well in hand. But the Suns refused to lose, forcing Game 3 into three overtimes before finally prevailing by 8 points. Dan Majerle put up a 28/7/4 on +24.7% with 2 steals, while Jordan had a 44/9/6 on -5.4% shooting. That said, the entire rest of the Bulls put up game-level BPMs of +2 or worse, with Pippen shooting at -17.4% for the game.
Game 4 was another tough match. Barkley played superbly with a 32/12/10 on +8.9% and three steals but Jordan (on 45% usage) had a 55/8/4 on +7.6% shooting. And in the end that was enough, with the Bulls winning Game 4 by 6. Up 3-1, the Bulls prepared to play their last home game of the series. Jordan had an excellent 41/7/7 on +7.8%, but every other Bulls starter shot at -6% or worse, while the Suns shot +3.6% as a team and dominated the boards. Jordan’s heroics weren’t enough for the Bulls to prevail and the Suns won by 10. Game 6 was in Phoenix, and it was tight (like every game in this series). The Bulls led by 8 going into the fourth quarter. But for the first six minutes of the final period the Bulls failed to score and the Suns surged back and took the lead. With 16 seconds to go, and up by 2, the Suns got a wide-open look for Dan Majerle. Instead of giving the Suns a perhaps insurmountable four point lead Majerle airballed the shot and Pippen grabbed the rebound and called timeout. With 14.1 seconds left in the game the Bulls had the ball, needing a two to tie or a three to win. The Bulls inbounded the ball to Jordan, with the Suns certain that he would receive the last shot. Instead Jordan proved once again that he is a TRUE COWARD IN THE PLAYOFFS BY PASSING THE BALL TO A TEAMMATE WITH THE NBA CHAMPIONSHIP ON THE LINE (sorry, retro-Skip Bayless took over the keyboard for a sec, I’m back now). Jordan passed to Pippen, Barkley went for the steal and whiffed which forced Ainge off of John Paxson onto Pippen, who passed to Grant who dished to a wide open Paxson. Paxson drilled it. The Suns last shot attempt was blocked and the Bulls won their third championship in a row.
OSRS does not view this series kindly for the Bulls. Their average MoV for the series was actually zero, and the Suns hadn’t exactly been dominating the playoffs before this game. It sees the Bulls having two spectacular series, a decent series against the Knicks and then really struggling to put the Suns away despite the Suns having seemingly lucked their way into the Finals. In their end their playoff SRS was +10.08, which is good but only 62nd on this list. And their regular season SRS was only 68th on this list. Look, they won the championship (which is why they’re this high), but the ‘93 Bulls really didn’t shine in these playoffs like other versions had. Jordan had to put up stratospheric usage rates to keep the offense moving (which it certainly did). Jordan’s 38% usage rate for the playoffs was the highest he’d posted since ‘86 and ‘87, when he was the entire team. Of course, he was no longer a pure scorer, having become a very solid facilitator. In many ways I see Jordan’s ‘93 campaign as reminiscent of Kobe. When the rest of his offense couldn’t carry the load Jordan stepped it up, shooting a ton, converting a decent efficiency. And even when his shot wasn’t falling he added value through defense, passing and rebounding, buying space for his teammates to do what they did best (except of course that Jordan did this notably better than Kobe did).
It may be blasphemy to put a championship Jordan Bulls team this low. But this is easily the weakest edition of the roster. And looking at it objectively, I don’t have a problem with the ranking.
You know one of my favorite parts of this project? Stripping the mystique away from Jordan. There were absolutely games where Jordan struggled to score efficiently (he added value in other ways, but still). And the Bulls weren’t magically fantastic in the fourth quarter. In fact, in the Finals, the major fourth quarter storyline was the Bulls blowing a lead in the 4th of Game 6 and nearly losing. Of course, take away the “Jordan is magic” reputation and you’re still left with an insanely valuable player.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2014 Jose Calderon
SG: 2011 LeBron James (more scoring, less passing, better defense)
SF: 2015 Marc Gasol
PF: 2012 Joakim Noah (better offense, worse defense)
C: 2017 Domantas Sabonis
6th: 2016 Rudy Gobert (worse offense, better defense)
It’s weird, because looking at these comps you’d guess that the Bulls had a really good defense . . . and they didn’t. But of course, young Sabonis and young Gobert are each only playing half a game, so they’re really only one player. Marc Gasol as Pippen isn’t great but it’s a little inevitable; combine lots of rebounding and defense and you veer into big man territory, not unlike Larry Bird. But you can definitely see the limitations of the offense. Calderon is a decent shooter but no facilitator, Gasol can carry some of the load, but Noah, Sabonis and Gobert are fairly dead ends on offense. Really this is LeBron making it happen, Gasol backing him up and everyone else doing their best to play their role.
#50. The 1984 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +7.48, Standard Deviations: +2.15, Won NBA Finals (Preseason X)
Regular Season Record: 62-20, Regular Season SRS: +6.42 (59th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.3 (54th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.2 (58th)
PG: Dennis Johnson, +1.4 / -0.3
SG: Gerald Henderson, +1.1 / +1.8
SF: Larry Bird, +7.6 / +10.3
PF: Cedric Maxwell, +0.4 / +1.4
C: Robert Parish, +1.9 / +0.2
6th: Kevin McHale, +2.3 / +1.1
Larry Bird (SF, 27): 38 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 24 / 10 / 7 / 3 on +0.9%
Kevin McHale (PF, 26): 32 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 19 / 8 / 1 / 2 on +6.2%
Robert Parish (C, 30): 36 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 19 / 11 / 2 / 2 on +2.7%
Gerald Henderson (SG, 28): 27 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 12 / 2 / 4 / 2 on +2.7%
Dennis Johnson (PG, 29): 33 MPPG, 19% OLoad, 13 / 4 / 4 / 2 on -2.8%
Cedric Maxwell (PF, 28): 31 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 12 / 6 / 3 / 1 on +6.7%
Scoring/100: Larry Bird (30.3 / +0.9%), Kevin McHale (28.2 / +6.2%), Robert Parish (25.5 / +2.7%)
Assists/100: Larry Bird (8.3), Gerald Henderson (6.9), Dennis Johnson (6.1)
Heliocentrism: 43.2% (20th of 83 teams) - Bird
Wingmen: 33.1% (63rd) - McHale & Parish
Depth: 23.7% (49th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.40 (41st), Playoff Defensive Rating: -0.47 (93rd)
Playoff SRS: +8.02 (95th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.06 (82nd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.27 (94th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.40 (40th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 55.6% - Bird
Playoff Wingmen: 22.2% - Maxwell & Henderson
Playoff Bench: 22.2%
Round 1: Washington Bullets (-2.4), won 3-1, by +2.7 points per game (+0.3 SRS eq)
Round 2: New York Knicks (+3.5), won 4-3, by +8.0 points per game (+11.5 SRS eq)
Round 3: Milwaukee Bucks (+5.1), won 4-1, by +9.0 points per game (+14.1 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+6.9), won 4-3, outscored by 2.3 points per game (+4.6 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2018 Josh Richardson
SG: 2012 Jeff Teague
SF: 2017 Giannis Antentokounmpo
PF: 2015 Amir Johnson
C: 2010 Al Horford (more scoring, worse passing)
6th: 2014 David Lee
I’m consistently amazed by how unimpressive Bird’s supporting casts are. Dennis Johnson at this point was a decent passer and sufficient scorer, but most of his value came on the defensive end (at least in ‘84). Henderson is basically a bad version of what Danny Ainge would become; decent shooting and decent passing. Cedrix Maxwell and Kevin McHale were like copies of the same premise: a stupid efficient interior scoring power forward. But there were differences. Peak McHale was the better defender (when he wanted to be), McHale was generally the better rebounder (Maxwell was comparable earlier in his career) and peak McHale could carry a larger share of the offense. At this point McHale (being younger) had pretty much passed Maxwell in most ways; Maxwell passed more but his turnover rate more than stripped that of its value. This was the last year that Maxwell would hold onto a starting job. Robert Parish was a very solid player; strong rebounding, capable of carrying a decent load at decent efficiency and playing solid defense. But the ‘84 Celtics were completely built around Bird. It genuinely baffles me that an essentially off-ball player could rack up assists at these rates. Giannis is obviously a terrible comp stylistically. But statistically? They both used a lot of possessions, they both passed a lot (though Bird did more), they were both monster rebounders for small forwards, neither shot threes and they both played excellent defense. The big difference in my mind wasn’t stylistic (that Giannis’ superpower was attacking the basket while that was Bird’s kryptonite), but instead that Giannis was super ball-dominant and didn’t make great decisions if pressed, while Bird operated off-ball and was something of a savant. In other words, in the regular season this was a fair comp, but in the playoffs Giannis suffered while peak Bird could take a real step forward. As he did in 1984.
Speaking of which, 1984 was stupid competitive. There were 23 teams in the league and none of them were worse than -5 SRS. In fact, 20 of them were between -4 and +4. The best team in the West was at +3.32 (the Lakers) and the 2nd best team in the NBA was at +4.04. The Celtics went 62-20 and put up a +6.42 SRS. This is a long way of saying that the Celtics were far and away the best regular season team in the NBA that year. Their offense was pretty good, but was curious for not having a particular strength. They crashed the boards well (but not great), they got to the line a lot (but not a ton), they didn’t turn the ball over much and they shot well. But they weren’t great at anything specific. The curious part is that in the playoffs their offense took off (not a coincidence that Bird got way better in the playoffs this year). Their defense was excellent, specifically at defensive rebounding and shot defense, but their defense was only average in the playoffs. How curious. Let’s dive in!
In the first round they drew the Washington Bullets, who were pretty weak (-2.4). Surprising everyone, the Celtics really struggled. The Celtics gained no advantage on the boards and shot worse from the field. Parish averaged a 14/13/2/3 on -7.7% and Bird had a 23/8/8/4 on +0.8%. The Celtics did prevail by 2.7 points a game, but against a below average team it was an extremely disappointing performance.
They had more success against the Knicks (+3.5). As one might expect, the Celtics dominated in no one thing, but had an advantage in most. Their superior ball control was worth more than 5 shooting possessions a game, and they outshot the Knicks in those possessions. Bird had a fantastic series averaging 30/11/7/4 on +10.6% and McHale had a 18/8/1/2 on +7.4%. The Celtics won by 8 points a game, a strong showing. The Celtics advanced to face the Milwaukee Bucks (+5.1), who had swept them in the playoffs the year before. Bird had played with a dislocated finger and the flu, posting a disappointing 19/12/6/4 on -8%. Bird and the Celtics were looking forward to payback. Predictably, the Celtics wrecked the Bucks. Bird averaged a 27/10/6/3 on +6% and the Celtics won by 9 points a game. The Celtics advanced to face the Lakers in the NBA Finals.
I know that when I say “Celtics / Lakers” it immediately conjures up that historic rivalry. Whether Russell vs West or Bird vs Magic, the Celtics/Lakers rivalry may have been the greatest in NBA history. But you need to understand; in 1984 the second part of that rivalry hadn’t happened yet. 1984 was the first time those two teams had played each other in the playoffs since 1969. This was to be the first time that Bird and Magic had ever clashed.
The Lakers were formidable. They’d made the Finals four of the past five years, and won two of those. They’d won their playoff series so far by an average of 9.2 points per game (against admittedly pedestrian opponents). They still featured veteran Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and the phenomenal Magic Johnson. OSRS favored Boston by only 1.4 points.
The Lakers showed they weren’t to be trifled with, winning Game 1 in Boston by 6. Boston controlled the boards but the Lakers’ shooting couldn’t be stopped, and every Celtic starter besides Bird shot at -7% or worse. It was hardly an auspicious beginning to the series. In Game 2 they bounced back. I won’t sell you on the idea that they outshot the Lakers; they emphatically did not (very few teams ever could in the playoffs). But the Celtics owned the ball, taking twenty extra shots, and even with that edge they barely won, by 3 in overtime. Game 3 was all Lakers, where the Celtics were crushed in all four factors and lost by 33. Bird had a 30/7/2/4 on +12.1%; the team besides him shot a -14.3%. Game 4 was a re-enactment of Game 2, with the Celtics negating the Lakers’ superior shooting by owning the ball, taking 25 extra shots, just enough to win by 4.
In Game 5, back in Boston, the Celtics finally outshot the Lakers and won by 18. Bird had a spectacular 34/17/2/3 on +23.8%; the Celtics without Bird shot at -0.6%. In Game 6 the Lakers won in LA by 9. Game 6 was an inversion to the formula, where the Lakers controlled the ball, but the Celtics shot better. They actually shot worse from the field but got to the line a ton. Bird had a 28/14/8/4 on +29.4%, and 12 of those 26 points were on free throws (12 of 13 from the line). So Game 7 went back to Boston. Boston dominated the ball again (12 extra shots) but the Lakers shot far better from the field. The difference was that the Celtics took 51 free throws. And that was the difference, as the Celtics won the game (and championship) by 9.
So, upside, Celtics victory. Downside, the Lakers outscored the Celtics by 2.3 points per game. Upside, Bird played splendidly, averaging a 27/14/4/3 on +5.2%. Downside, the rest of the Celtics really struggled to score at all. The non-Bird Celtics shot at -4.8% for the series, with every player but Maxwell shooting below league average (and Maxwell only scored 13 a game on 14% usage, so his impact was pretty small). Detractors would argue that Bird gave up passing and called his own number for the series. The counter is that, given how his teammates shot, it’s not clear that doing so was the wrong choice. Either way. The Celtics had won, but there was reason to think that the Lakers might have been the better team (which was slightly confirmed when the same rosters met in the subsequent year’s final and had the Lakers winning in 6). It’s also nice to see the Bird that people talk about in the playoffs. He struggled in a surprising number of postseasons (generally for reasons unrelated to skill) - but this was not one of them.
So the ‘84 Celtics finished with a +8.02 PSRS, the 6th lowest in the list. How did they get ranked at #50? Because their regular season SRS was pretty high, first off. And second, they were one of the top two teams that year by a mile. After their +7.48 OSRS, the next closest team below them was the Bucks at +3.8. So the Celtics’ OSRS may not have been particularly high, but they were so far above the third place team that they get a lot of credit. And they also won the championship. That does count. Some.
Regular Season Record: 62-20, Regular Season SRS: +6.42 (59th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.3 (54th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.2 (58th)
PG: Dennis Johnson, +1.4 / -0.3
SG: Gerald Henderson, +1.1 / +1.8
SF: Larry Bird, +7.6 / +10.3
PF: Cedric Maxwell, +0.4 / +1.4
C: Robert Parish, +1.9 / +0.2
6th: Kevin McHale, +2.3 / +1.1
Larry Bird (SF, 27): 38 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 24 / 10 / 7 / 3 on +0.9%
Kevin McHale (PF, 26): 32 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 19 / 8 / 1 / 2 on +6.2%
Robert Parish (C, 30): 36 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 19 / 11 / 2 / 2 on +2.7%
Gerald Henderson (SG, 28): 27 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 12 / 2 / 4 / 2 on +2.7%
Dennis Johnson (PG, 29): 33 MPPG, 19% OLoad, 13 / 4 / 4 / 2 on -2.8%
Cedric Maxwell (PF, 28): 31 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 12 / 6 / 3 / 1 on +6.7%
Scoring/100: Larry Bird (30.3 / +0.9%), Kevin McHale (28.2 / +6.2%), Robert Parish (25.5 / +2.7%)
Assists/100: Larry Bird (8.3), Gerald Henderson (6.9), Dennis Johnson (6.1)
Heliocentrism: 43.2% (20th of 83 teams) - Bird
Wingmen: 33.1% (63rd) - McHale & Parish
Depth: 23.7% (49th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.40 (41st), Playoff Defensive Rating: -0.47 (93rd)
Playoff SRS: +8.02 (95th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.06 (82nd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.27 (94th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.40 (40th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 55.6% - Bird
Playoff Wingmen: 22.2% - Maxwell & Henderson
Playoff Bench: 22.2%
Round 1: Washington Bullets (-2.4), won 3-1, by +2.7 points per game (+0.3 SRS eq)
Round 2: New York Knicks (+3.5), won 4-3, by +8.0 points per game (+11.5 SRS eq)
Round 3: Milwaukee Bucks (+5.1), won 4-1, by +9.0 points per game (+14.1 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+6.9), won 4-3, outscored by 2.3 points per game (+4.6 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2018 Josh Richardson
SG: 2012 Jeff Teague
SF: 2017 Giannis Antentokounmpo
PF: 2015 Amir Johnson
C: 2010 Al Horford (more scoring, worse passing)
6th: 2014 David Lee
I’m consistently amazed by how unimpressive Bird’s supporting casts are. Dennis Johnson at this point was a decent passer and sufficient scorer, but most of his value came on the defensive end (at least in ‘84). Henderson is basically a bad version of what Danny Ainge would become; decent shooting and decent passing. Cedrix Maxwell and Kevin McHale were like copies of the same premise: a stupid efficient interior scoring power forward. But there were differences. Peak McHale was the better defender (when he wanted to be), McHale was generally the better rebounder (Maxwell was comparable earlier in his career) and peak McHale could carry a larger share of the offense. At this point McHale (being younger) had pretty much passed Maxwell in most ways; Maxwell passed more but his turnover rate more than stripped that of its value. This was the last year that Maxwell would hold onto a starting job. Robert Parish was a very solid player; strong rebounding, capable of carrying a decent load at decent efficiency and playing solid defense. But the ‘84 Celtics were completely built around Bird. It genuinely baffles me that an essentially off-ball player could rack up assists at these rates. Giannis is obviously a terrible comp stylistically. But statistically? They both used a lot of possessions, they both passed a lot (though Bird did more), they were both monster rebounders for small forwards, neither shot threes and they both played excellent defense. The big difference in my mind wasn’t stylistic (that Giannis’ superpower was attacking the basket while that was Bird’s kryptonite), but instead that Giannis was super ball-dominant and didn’t make great decisions if pressed, while Bird operated off-ball and was something of a savant. In other words, in the regular season this was a fair comp, but in the playoffs Giannis suffered while peak Bird could take a real step forward. As he did in 1984.
Speaking of which, 1984 was stupid competitive. There were 23 teams in the league and none of them were worse than -5 SRS. In fact, 20 of them were between -4 and +4. The best team in the West was at +3.32 (the Lakers) and the 2nd best team in the NBA was at +4.04. The Celtics went 62-20 and put up a +6.42 SRS. This is a long way of saying that the Celtics were far and away the best regular season team in the NBA that year. Their offense was pretty good, but was curious for not having a particular strength. They crashed the boards well (but not great), they got to the line a lot (but not a ton), they didn’t turn the ball over much and they shot well. But they weren’t great at anything specific. The curious part is that in the playoffs their offense took off (not a coincidence that Bird got way better in the playoffs this year). Their defense was excellent, specifically at defensive rebounding and shot defense, but their defense was only average in the playoffs. How curious. Let’s dive in!
In the first round they drew the Washington Bullets, who were pretty weak (-2.4). Surprising everyone, the Celtics really struggled. The Celtics gained no advantage on the boards and shot worse from the field. Parish averaged a 14/13/2/3 on -7.7% and Bird had a 23/8/8/4 on +0.8%. The Celtics did prevail by 2.7 points a game, but against a below average team it was an extremely disappointing performance.
They had more success against the Knicks (+3.5). As one might expect, the Celtics dominated in no one thing, but had an advantage in most. Their superior ball control was worth more than 5 shooting possessions a game, and they outshot the Knicks in those possessions. Bird had a fantastic series averaging 30/11/7/4 on +10.6% and McHale had a 18/8/1/2 on +7.4%. The Celtics won by 8 points a game, a strong showing. The Celtics advanced to face the Milwaukee Bucks (+5.1), who had swept them in the playoffs the year before. Bird had played with a dislocated finger and the flu, posting a disappointing 19/12/6/4 on -8%. Bird and the Celtics were looking forward to payback. Predictably, the Celtics wrecked the Bucks. Bird averaged a 27/10/6/3 on +6% and the Celtics won by 9 points a game. The Celtics advanced to face the Lakers in the NBA Finals.
I know that when I say “Celtics / Lakers” it immediately conjures up that historic rivalry. Whether Russell vs West or Bird vs Magic, the Celtics/Lakers rivalry may have been the greatest in NBA history. But you need to understand; in 1984 the second part of that rivalry hadn’t happened yet. 1984 was the first time those two teams had played each other in the playoffs since 1969. This was to be the first time that Bird and Magic had ever clashed.
The Lakers were formidable. They’d made the Finals four of the past five years, and won two of those. They’d won their playoff series so far by an average of 9.2 points per game (against admittedly pedestrian opponents). They still featured veteran Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and the phenomenal Magic Johnson. OSRS favored Boston by only 1.4 points.
The Lakers showed they weren’t to be trifled with, winning Game 1 in Boston by 6. Boston controlled the boards but the Lakers’ shooting couldn’t be stopped, and every Celtic starter besides Bird shot at -7% or worse. It was hardly an auspicious beginning to the series. In Game 2 they bounced back. I won’t sell you on the idea that they outshot the Lakers; they emphatically did not (very few teams ever could in the playoffs). But the Celtics owned the ball, taking twenty extra shots, and even with that edge they barely won, by 3 in overtime. Game 3 was all Lakers, where the Celtics were crushed in all four factors and lost by 33. Bird had a 30/7/2/4 on +12.1%; the team besides him shot a -14.3%. Game 4 was a re-enactment of Game 2, with the Celtics negating the Lakers’ superior shooting by owning the ball, taking 25 extra shots, just enough to win by 4.
In Game 5, back in Boston, the Celtics finally outshot the Lakers and won by 18. Bird had a spectacular 34/17/2/3 on +23.8%; the Celtics without Bird shot at -0.6%. In Game 6 the Lakers won in LA by 9. Game 6 was an inversion to the formula, where the Lakers controlled the ball, but the Celtics shot better. They actually shot worse from the field but got to the line a ton. Bird had a 28/14/8/4 on +29.4%, and 12 of those 26 points were on free throws (12 of 13 from the line). So Game 7 went back to Boston. Boston dominated the ball again (12 extra shots) but the Lakers shot far better from the field. The difference was that the Celtics took 51 free throws. And that was the difference, as the Celtics won the game (and championship) by 9.
So, upside, Celtics victory. Downside, the Lakers outscored the Celtics by 2.3 points per game. Upside, Bird played splendidly, averaging a 27/14/4/3 on +5.2%. Downside, the rest of the Celtics really struggled to score at all. The non-Bird Celtics shot at -4.8% for the series, with every player but Maxwell shooting below league average (and Maxwell only scored 13 a game on 14% usage, so his impact was pretty small). Detractors would argue that Bird gave up passing and called his own number for the series. The counter is that, given how his teammates shot, it’s not clear that doing so was the wrong choice. Either way. The Celtics had won, but there was reason to think that the Lakers might have been the better team (which was slightly confirmed when the same rosters met in the subsequent year’s final and had the Lakers winning in 6). It’s also nice to see the Bird that people talk about in the playoffs. He struggled in a surprising number of postseasons (generally for reasons unrelated to skill) - but this was not one of them.
So the ‘84 Celtics finished with a +8.02 PSRS, the 6th lowest in the list. How did they get ranked at #50? Because their regular season SRS was pretty high, first off. And second, they were one of the top two teams that year by a mile. After their +7.48 OSRS, the next closest team below them was the Bucks at +3.8. So the Celtics’ OSRS may not have been particularly high, but they were so far above the third place team that they get a lot of credit. And they also won the championship. That does count. Some.
#49. The 1977 Portland Trail Blazers
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +7.30, Standard Deviations: +2.26, Won NBA Finals (Preseason X)
Regular Season Record: 49-33, Regular Season SRS: +5.39 (59th), Earned the 3 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.7 (50th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.5 (81st)
PG: Lionel Hollins, +0.1 / -1.1
SG: Johnny Davis, -1.6 / +2.1
SF: Bob Gross, +3.0 / +5.6
PF: Maurice Lucas, +0.8 / +4.2
C: Bill Walton, +6.7 / +6.0
6th: Dave Twardzik, +3.0 / +0.9
Lionel Hollins (PG, 23): 27 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 14 / 3 / 4 / 3 on -3.4%
Maurice Lucas (PF, 24): 34 MPPG, 24% OLoad, 19 / 11 / 3 / 2 on +0.5%
Bill Walton (C, 24): 32 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 17 / 13 / 4 / 4 on +5.2%
Johnny Davis (SG, 21): 17 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 7 / 2 / 2 / 1 on -0.2%
Bob Gross (SF, 23): 25 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 11 / 4 / 3 / 2 on +6.9%
Dave Twardzik (PG, 26): 24 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 10 / 3 / 3 / 2 on +17.8%
Scoring/100: Maurice Lucas (24.8 / +0.5%), Bill Walton (23.7 / +5.2%), Lionel Hollins (22.4 / -3.4%)
Assists/100: Lionel Hollins (6.3), Dave Twardzik (5.7), Bill Walton (4.8)
Heliocentrism: 32.2% (46th of 83 teams) - Walton
Wingmen: 34.2% (57th) - Gross & Twardzik
Depth: 33.6% (26th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +2.13 (78th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.43 (42nd)
Playoff SRS: +8.47 (90th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.91 (63rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.13 (79th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.13 (47th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 32.6% - Walton
Playoff Wingmen: 47.8% - Lucas & Gross
Playoff Bench: 19.6%
Round 1: Chicago Bulls (+0.9), won 2-1, by +6.0 points per game (+6.9 SRS eq)
Round 2: Denver Nuggets (+5.0), won 4-2, by +1.7 points per game (+6.7 SRS eq)
Round 3: Los Angeles Lakers (+4.1), won 4-0, by +5.8 points per game (+9.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: Philadelphia 76ers (+3.8), won 4-2, by +6.3 points per game (+10.1 SRS eq)
It’s impossible to talk about the ‘77 Blazers without talking about Bill Walton. Walton’s one of those super-polarizing players that’s impossible to rate accurately. Walton devotees gush about his passing, his defense, his incredible potential and his winning chops. Walton detractors point to the fact that he played 13k minutes in his entire career (slightly more than the 25 year-old Karl-Anthony Towns has played so far). And they’re both right (within reason).
Bill Walton had won throughout his basketball career. In high school he led his team 49 consecutive wins, and two California state championships. He had entered high school at 6 foot and graduated as a 7 footer (as seems to be the backstory to a number of extremely skilled tall passers). His senior year he shot 78.3 percent from the field, and racked up the 3rd most rebounds in a high school season . . . ever. In college for Bill Wooden at UCLA he led the Bruins to two 30-0 seasons and two national championships. In the title game his junior year he scored 44 points on 21 of 22 shooting. In the huddle Wooden quipped, “Walton, I used to think you were a good player . . . until you missed that one shot.” That said, he had to leave the title game with injuries, perhaps foretelling that throughout his career winning and injuries would be forever intertwined.
He was drafted first overall by the Portland Trail Blazers. His rookie year he averaged a 13/13/5 but only played in 35 games (the Blazers were +0.27 that year). In 1976 (his second year), he averaged a 16/13/4 but only played in 51 games (the Blazers were -1.11). In 1977 two very important things happened. One was that Walton managed to play 65 games, the most he would ever play as a starter. The other was that the ABA merged much of its roster into the NBA. This added a number of players to the Blazers’ roster. Maurice Lucas was an outstanding young power forward, coming off averaging a 17/11/3 in his age 23 season. And Dave Twardzik, a young sharp-shooting point guard with a turnover problem joined from the Virginia Squires. These additions make it disingenuous to say that Walton being healthy transformed the Blazers single-handedly. He went from a 16/13/4 to a 19/14/4 and from 51 games to 65 games. Notable improvements, but not worth a 6 point jump. The addition of Lucas and Twardzik (especially Lucas) was a big deal too.
Together the Blazers put up a +5.39 SRS, which may seem low (which it is) but it was the highest in its year. 1977 (as with most of the mid-late 70s) was particularly competitive. Of 22 teams, only three had RSRSs above +3.1, and only three were below -3. In spite of the Blazers’ excellent SRS, they finished four games behind Kareem’s Lakers and ended up with the three seed. A quick check of Walton’s games made and missed suggests how important he was to the team. In the games he made the Blazers went 44-21 with an average MoV of +7.92. In games he sat out the Blazers went 5-12 with a -3.35 MoV. This is a small sample size. And Walton almost certainly wasn’t a 12-point player. But that’s a heck of a swing.
In the first round the Blazers faced Artis Gilmore’s Chicago Bulls (+0.9). The Bulls’ frontcourt of Gilmore and Mickey Johnson dominated the glass (almost 10 offensive boards between them a game), but the Blazers countered that advantage by generating lots of steals. And the Blazers shot very well, +4.7% as a team. Maurice Lucas averaged a 22/8/6 with 4 blocks on +11.8% shooting and Walton averaged a 17/12/4 with 4 blocks on +3.6% shooting. The Blazers prevailed in three (2-1) by 6 points a game. It was a solid win, but perhaps a little disappointing against the quality of opponent.
In the semis the Blazers faced the team that had the 2nd best OSRS in the league (at that point), the Denver Nuggets (+5.0). You may say “The Denver Nuggets!? Since when were they ever really good historically?” But in 1976 the Nuggets had gone 60-24 with a +5.45 SRS, losing in the ABA Finals (by 1.5 points a game) to Julius Erving’s Nets. And their team had come pretty much intact into the NBA. They featured veteran Dan Issell (a skilled scoring big with light defensive impact), second-year phenom David Thompson (basically the proto-Jordan that never quite took off) and the subtly fantastic Bobby Jones (best known for being a stud 6th man for the 80s Sixers, a monster defender). So I’m basically saying, the ‘77 Nuggets weren’t some flash in the pan iteration, they were really good.
It was a struggle. The Blazers were a good rebounding team but the Nuggets controlled the boards and the ball (Bobby Jones alone generated almost 3 steals a game), and these advantages bought the Nuggets a four shot per game advantage. But the Blazers were able to slow their shooting: Jones shot a -0.7% and Thompson a +0.2%; only Issel scored well (22 a game on +5.9%). Walton struggled to score but played the facilitator, averaging an 18/13/6 on -1.1% with three blocks a game, while Maurice Lucas scored 21 a game on +6.6% and Bob Gross and Dave Twardzik combined for 25.9 points a game on +9.5% scoring. The Blazers outshot the Nuggets by +2.8%, and that was enough to squeak out a 1.7 point a game victory. It was a narrow victory, but the Nuggets were probably the second best team in the NBA that year (even with an underwhelming OSRS).
In the Conference Finals they faced the one-seed, Kareem’s Los Angeles Lakers (+4.1). It is difficult to overstate how much Kareem was carrying this roster; had the ‘77 Lakers made the Top 100 (which they were in no danger of doing) Kareem’s regular season Heliocentrism score of 68.5% would have been by far the highest. I’m serious, that team was Kareem and not much else. So I’m sure the talking heads of the day would have happily billed this matchup as Kareem v. Walton. If it was billed that way, it was a disappointing match. Kareem averaged a 30/16/4 on +14.9% with 1.3 steals and 3.8 blocks, while Walton struggled to average more than a 19/15/6 on -0.4% (1.0 steals and 2.3 blocks). I can’t even deflect those numbers by saying that Kareem played way more minutes; he didn’t. The difference in the series (as often happens) was not determined by the stars. Members of the Lakers not answering to the moniker “Captain Skyhook” (that he didn’t have his own spinoff kids series where he fights crime is a tragedy) shot at -3.5% and Walton’s teammates shot at +2.4% (notably Maurice Lucas with a 23/12/4 on +6.3% shooting). The Blazers prevailed, sweeping the Lakers by 5.8 points per game. The cursory examination assessment (Walton vs Kareem and Walton’s team sweeps Kareem’s team therefore Walton dominated Kareem) really isn’t substantiated by the facts. It’s certainly possible that there were things going on in the series that the box score didn’t catch, but it’s hard not to read it as “Kareem (being the best player in the league and all) outplayed Walton but the Blazers overall were the better team”. And yes, Walton’s passing certainly played a role in his teammates’ performance. Still. It was a strong win.
In the Finals the Blazers faced the Philadelphia 76ers (+3.8). The Sixers had most of the component parts of their future dominant teams but they weren’t as good as you’d guess. Yes they had Julius Erving who was quite good (if emphatically nowhere near Kareem’s level) but their other pieces hadn’t quite developed. Darryl Dawkins was only 20. Bobby Jones was still on the Nuggets. Maurice Cheeks was still in college, Andrew Toney was still in high school. The Sixers got the one-seed, but only had an RSRS of +3.8. In their first round they beat a mediocre team (the -0.5 OSRS Celtics) by 4.9, and in the Conference Finals they beat the decent Rockets (+2.0 OSRS) by 1.3 points per game. From an OSRS point of view, they were a paper tiger, never even putting together a series above +5 SRS eq, which is a pretty low bar. For all of their high-flying reputation, the Sixers were very likely inferior to the Blazers going into the series (OSRS has the Blazers as +2.8 point favorites).
The Blazers controlled the boards (Walton averaged almost 4 offensive boards a game) but the Sixers generated more steals, the balance between them giving the Blazers two extra shots a game. And from there, the Blazers outshot the Sixers by almost two points, 1.2 to -0.7. While Erving averaged an excellent 30/7/5 on +9.3% (2.7 steals and 1.2 blocks) the Blazers were able to greatly slow the Sixers’ other scorers. And while Maurice Lucas struggled to score efficiently in the series (20/11/4 on -1.0%), Walton had a very Waltonian 19/19/5 on +6.5% with 3.7 blocks a game. The Blazers prevailed in six by 6.3 points per game. The Blazers had won their first and only (to date) championship, and had done so in fairly convincing fashion. The most exciting part was that the Blazers were so young. Of their starters, all were 24 or younger. It was easy to look at this team and dream. In 1978 they went 50-10 to open the season before Walton broke his foot. Even still they finished with the best SRS in the league. Before his injury BBR had rated him at a +8.1 BPM.
1978 with Walton: 48-10, +10.0 MoV
1978 without Walton: 10-14, -3.25 MoV
He came back for two games in the playoffs before being forced to sit out. The Blazers lost. In 1979, frustrated with his medical treatment by the Blazers’ staff (and no doubt with his seemingly endless string of injuries that were derailing his career) he demanded a trade. He was denied that trade and sat out the 1979 season. Without him the Blazers went 45-37 (+1.12 SRS) and were knocked out in the first round. And Walton went free agent the season after.
So what to make of all this? Well, the Blazers only have the 59th best RSRS and the 90th best PSRS on this list. Which doesn’t especially argue for putting them high up. But remember how 1977 was crazy competitive? The Blazers were *by far* the best team in this tight league. The Top 5 teams in OSRS: Blazers (+7.3), Nuggets (+4.6), Lakers (+3.4), Warriors (+3.3), Sixers (+3.1). That’s a massive lead over the other best teams in the year (and note that the Blazers beat three of those four others). So what do you do when a team is objectively not that dominant, but is clearly far better than the rest of their league? Apparently put them somewhere in the middle like this.
And what do we make of Walton? As a scorer he wasn’t particularly strong (though certainly decent for a big). But he was an exceptional rebounder, unusually good-passing big and an apparently amazing defender (particularly in ways that don’t hit the box score, which is why the Blazers’ low Helio rating shouldn’t be taken too seriously). His box score stats don’t jump off the page, but those with/without numbers in ‘77 and ‘78 are a little insane, and his rebounding and passing alone don’t remotely explain swings that big without him being a defensive monster. How to evaluate Walton historically? At his peak he was clearly really good. I’m not convinced that he was Kareem-good but that he’s even in the conversation is notable. But those injuries . . . in a different universe I’d love for him to be played 20 minutes a night, let his teams slip into the playoffs with a low seed and then go on a tear.
But Walton’s career with manageable injuries was just like Portland’s incipient dynasty. Not to be.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2010 J.R. Smith (less shooting and spacing)
SG: 2017 Austin Rivers
SF: 2013 Andrei Kirilenko (better shooting, worse passing)
PF: 2013 David Lee
C: 2015 Tim Duncan
6th: 2014 George Hill
I’ll be honest, I hate the comps for pre-1980 teams because the stats used to evaluate them are pretty limited. So I think they’re considerably worse than the comps for more modern players, but I’m posting them anyway. If nothing else it forces me to look at the players in more detail. Which helps, especially when I had only heard of one of these players. ‘77 Walton as old-man Duncan is probably selling him short, but it does hint at the kind of player he was.
Regular Season Record: 49-33, Regular Season SRS: +5.39 (59th), Earned the 3 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.7 (50th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.5 (81st)
PG: Lionel Hollins, +0.1 / -1.1
SG: Johnny Davis, -1.6 / +2.1
SF: Bob Gross, +3.0 / +5.6
PF: Maurice Lucas, +0.8 / +4.2
C: Bill Walton, +6.7 / +6.0
6th: Dave Twardzik, +3.0 / +0.9
Lionel Hollins (PG, 23): 27 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 14 / 3 / 4 / 3 on -3.4%
Maurice Lucas (PF, 24): 34 MPPG, 24% OLoad, 19 / 11 / 3 / 2 on +0.5%
Bill Walton (C, 24): 32 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 17 / 13 / 4 / 4 on +5.2%
Johnny Davis (SG, 21): 17 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 7 / 2 / 2 / 1 on -0.2%
Bob Gross (SF, 23): 25 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 11 / 4 / 3 / 2 on +6.9%
Dave Twardzik (PG, 26): 24 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 10 / 3 / 3 / 2 on +17.8%
Scoring/100: Maurice Lucas (24.8 / +0.5%), Bill Walton (23.7 / +5.2%), Lionel Hollins (22.4 / -3.4%)
Assists/100: Lionel Hollins (6.3), Dave Twardzik (5.7), Bill Walton (4.8)
Heliocentrism: 32.2% (46th of 83 teams) - Walton
Wingmen: 34.2% (57th) - Gross & Twardzik
Depth: 33.6% (26th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +2.13 (78th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.43 (42nd)
Playoff SRS: +8.47 (90th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.91 (63rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.13 (79th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.13 (47th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 32.6% - Walton
Playoff Wingmen: 47.8% - Lucas & Gross
Playoff Bench: 19.6%
Round 1: Chicago Bulls (+0.9), won 2-1, by +6.0 points per game (+6.9 SRS eq)
Round 2: Denver Nuggets (+5.0), won 4-2, by +1.7 points per game (+6.7 SRS eq)
Round 3: Los Angeles Lakers (+4.1), won 4-0, by +5.8 points per game (+9.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: Philadelphia 76ers (+3.8), won 4-2, by +6.3 points per game (+10.1 SRS eq)
It’s impossible to talk about the ‘77 Blazers without talking about Bill Walton. Walton’s one of those super-polarizing players that’s impossible to rate accurately. Walton devotees gush about his passing, his defense, his incredible potential and his winning chops. Walton detractors point to the fact that he played 13k minutes in his entire career (slightly more than the 25 year-old Karl-Anthony Towns has played so far). And they’re both right (within reason).
Bill Walton had won throughout his basketball career. In high school he led his team 49 consecutive wins, and two California state championships. He had entered high school at 6 foot and graduated as a 7 footer (as seems to be the backstory to a number of extremely skilled tall passers). His senior year he shot 78.3 percent from the field, and racked up the 3rd most rebounds in a high school season . . . ever. In college for Bill Wooden at UCLA he led the Bruins to two 30-0 seasons and two national championships. In the title game his junior year he scored 44 points on 21 of 22 shooting. In the huddle Wooden quipped, “Walton, I used to think you were a good player . . . until you missed that one shot.” That said, he had to leave the title game with injuries, perhaps foretelling that throughout his career winning and injuries would be forever intertwined.
He was drafted first overall by the Portland Trail Blazers. His rookie year he averaged a 13/13/5 but only played in 35 games (the Blazers were +0.27 that year). In 1976 (his second year), he averaged a 16/13/4 but only played in 51 games (the Blazers were -1.11). In 1977 two very important things happened. One was that Walton managed to play 65 games, the most he would ever play as a starter. The other was that the ABA merged much of its roster into the NBA. This added a number of players to the Blazers’ roster. Maurice Lucas was an outstanding young power forward, coming off averaging a 17/11/3 in his age 23 season. And Dave Twardzik, a young sharp-shooting point guard with a turnover problem joined from the Virginia Squires. These additions make it disingenuous to say that Walton being healthy transformed the Blazers single-handedly. He went from a 16/13/4 to a 19/14/4 and from 51 games to 65 games. Notable improvements, but not worth a 6 point jump. The addition of Lucas and Twardzik (especially Lucas) was a big deal too.
Together the Blazers put up a +5.39 SRS, which may seem low (which it is) but it was the highest in its year. 1977 (as with most of the mid-late 70s) was particularly competitive. Of 22 teams, only three had RSRSs above +3.1, and only three were below -3. In spite of the Blazers’ excellent SRS, they finished four games behind Kareem’s Lakers and ended up with the three seed. A quick check of Walton’s games made and missed suggests how important he was to the team. In the games he made the Blazers went 44-21 with an average MoV of +7.92. In games he sat out the Blazers went 5-12 with a -3.35 MoV. This is a small sample size. And Walton almost certainly wasn’t a 12-point player. But that’s a heck of a swing.
In the first round the Blazers faced Artis Gilmore’s Chicago Bulls (+0.9). The Bulls’ frontcourt of Gilmore and Mickey Johnson dominated the glass (almost 10 offensive boards between them a game), but the Blazers countered that advantage by generating lots of steals. And the Blazers shot very well, +4.7% as a team. Maurice Lucas averaged a 22/8/6 with 4 blocks on +11.8% shooting and Walton averaged a 17/12/4 with 4 blocks on +3.6% shooting. The Blazers prevailed in three (2-1) by 6 points a game. It was a solid win, but perhaps a little disappointing against the quality of opponent.
In the semis the Blazers faced the team that had the 2nd best OSRS in the league (at that point), the Denver Nuggets (+5.0). You may say “The Denver Nuggets!? Since when were they ever really good historically?” But in 1976 the Nuggets had gone 60-24 with a +5.45 SRS, losing in the ABA Finals (by 1.5 points a game) to Julius Erving’s Nets. And their team had come pretty much intact into the NBA. They featured veteran Dan Issell (a skilled scoring big with light defensive impact), second-year phenom David Thompson (basically the proto-Jordan that never quite took off) and the subtly fantastic Bobby Jones (best known for being a stud 6th man for the 80s Sixers, a monster defender). So I’m basically saying, the ‘77 Nuggets weren’t some flash in the pan iteration, they were really good.
It was a struggle. The Blazers were a good rebounding team but the Nuggets controlled the boards and the ball (Bobby Jones alone generated almost 3 steals a game), and these advantages bought the Nuggets a four shot per game advantage. But the Blazers were able to slow their shooting: Jones shot a -0.7% and Thompson a +0.2%; only Issel scored well (22 a game on +5.9%). Walton struggled to score but played the facilitator, averaging an 18/13/6 on -1.1% with three blocks a game, while Maurice Lucas scored 21 a game on +6.6% and Bob Gross and Dave Twardzik combined for 25.9 points a game on +9.5% scoring. The Blazers outshot the Nuggets by +2.8%, and that was enough to squeak out a 1.7 point a game victory. It was a narrow victory, but the Nuggets were probably the second best team in the NBA that year (even with an underwhelming OSRS).
In the Conference Finals they faced the one-seed, Kareem’s Los Angeles Lakers (+4.1). It is difficult to overstate how much Kareem was carrying this roster; had the ‘77 Lakers made the Top 100 (which they were in no danger of doing) Kareem’s regular season Heliocentrism score of 68.5% would have been by far the highest. I’m serious, that team was Kareem and not much else. So I’m sure the talking heads of the day would have happily billed this matchup as Kareem v. Walton. If it was billed that way, it was a disappointing match. Kareem averaged a 30/16/4 on +14.9% with 1.3 steals and 3.8 blocks, while Walton struggled to average more than a 19/15/6 on -0.4% (1.0 steals and 2.3 blocks). I can’t even deflect those numbers by saying that Kareem played way more minutes; he didn’t. The difference in the series (as often happens) was not determined by the stars. Members of the Lakers not answering to the moniker “Captain Skyhook” (that he didn’t have his own spinoff kids series where he fights crime is a tragedy) shot at -3.5% and Walton’s teammates shot at +2.4% (notably Maurice Lucas with a 23/12/4 on +6.3% shooting). The Blazers prevailed, sweeping the Lakers by 5.8 points per game. The cursory examination assessment (Walton vs Kareem and Walton’s team sweeps Kareem’s team therefore Walton dominated Kareem) really isn’t substantiated by the facts. It’s certainly possible that there were things going on in the series that the box score didn’t catch, but it’s hard not to read it as “Kareem (being the best player in the league and all) outplayed Walton but the Blazers overall were the better team”. And yes, Walton’s passing certainly played a role in his teammates’ performance. Still. It was a strong win.
In the Finals the Blazers faced the Philadelphia 76ers (+3.8). The Sixers had most of the component parts of their future dominant teams but they weren’t as good as you’d guess. Yes they had Julius Erving who was quite good (if emphatically nowhere near Kareem’s level) but their other pieces hadn’t quite developed. Darryl Dawkins was only 20. Bobby Jones was still on the Nuggets. Maurice Cheeks was still in college, Andrew Toney was still in high school. The Sixers got the one-seed, but only had an RSRS of +3.8. In their first round they beat a mediocre team (the -0.5 OSRS Celtics) by 4.9, and in the Conference Finals they beat the decent Rockets (+2.0 OSRS) by 1.3 points per game. From an OSRS point of view, they were a paper tiger, never even putting together a series above +5 SRS eq, which is a pretty low bar. For all of their high-flying reputation, the Sixers were very likely inferior to the Blazers going into the series (OSRS has the Blazers as +2.8 point favorites).
The Blazers controlled the boards (Walton averaged almost 4 offensive boards a game) but the Sixers generated more steals, the balance between them giving the Blazers two extra shots a game. And from there, the Blazers outshot the Sixers by almost two points, 1.2 to -0.7. While Erving averaged an excellent 30/7/5 on +9.3% (2.7 steals and 1.2 blocks) the Blazers were able to greatly slow the Sixers’ other scorers. And while Maurice Lucas struggled to score efficiently in the series (20/11/4 on -1.0%), Walton had a very Waltonian 19/19/5 on +6.5% with 3.7 blocks a game. The Blazers prevailed in six by 6.3 points per game. The Blazers had won their first and only (to date) championship, and had done so in fairly convincing fashion. The most exciting part was that the Blazers were so young. Of their starters, all were 24 or younger. It was easy to look at this team and dream. In 1978 they went 50-10 to open the season before Walton broke his foot. Even still they finished with the best SRS in the league. Before his injury BBR had rated him at a +8.1 BPM.
1978 with Walton: 48-10, +10.0 MoV
1978 without Walton: 10-14, -3.25 MoV
He came back for two games in the playoffs before being forced to sit out. The Blazers lost. In 1979, frustrated with his medical treatment by the Blazers’ staff (and no doubt with his seemingly endless string of injuries that were derailing his career) he demanded a trade. He was denied that trade and sat out the 1979 season. Without him the Blazers went 45-37 (+1.12 SRS) and were knocked out in the first round. And Walton went free agent the season after.
So what to make of all this? Well, the Blazers only have the 59th best RSRS and the 90th best PSRS on this list. Which doesn’t especially argue for putting them high up. But remember how 1977 was crazy competitive? The Blazers were *by far* the best team in this tight league. The Top 5 teams in OSRS: Blazers (+7.3), Nuggets (+4.6), Lakers (+3.4), Warriors (+3.3), Sixers (+3.1). That’s a massive lead over the other best teams in the year (and note that the Blazers beat three of those four others). So what do you do when a team is objectively not that dominant, but is clearly far better than the rest of their league? Apparently put them somewhere in the middle like this.
And what do we make of Walton? As a scorer he wasn’t particularly strong (though certainly decent for a big). But he was an exceptional rebounder, unusually good-passing big and an apparently amazing defender (particularly in ways that don’t hit the box score, which is why the Blazers’ low Helio rating shouldn’t be taken too seriously). His box score stats don’t jump off the page, but those with/without numbers in ‘77 and ‘78 are a little insane, and his rebounding and passing alone don’t remotely explain swings that big without him being a defensive monster. How to evaluate Walton historically? At his peak he was clearly really good. I’m not convinced that he was Kareem-good but that he’s even in the conversation is notable. But those injuries . . . in a different universe I’d love for him to be played 20 minutes a night, let his teams slip into the playoffs with a low seed and then go on a tear.
But Walton’s career with manageable injuries was just like Portland’s incipient dynasty. Not to be.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2010 J.R. Smith (less shooting and spacing)
SG: 2017 Austin Rivers
SF: 2013 Andrei Kirilenko (better shooting, worse passing)
PF: 2013 David Lee
C: 2015 Tim Duncan
6th: 2014 George Hill
I’ll be honest, I hate the comps for pre-1980 teams because the stats used to evaluate them are pretty limited. So I think they’re considerably worse than the comps for more modern players, but I’m posting them anyway. If nothing else it forces me to look at the players in more detail. Which helps, especially when I had only heard of one of these players. ‘77 Walton as old-man Duncan is probably selling him short, but it does hint at the kind of player he was.
#48. The 1973 New York Knicks
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +9.48, Standard Deviations: +1.59, Won NBA Finals (Preseason X)
Regular Season Record: 57-25, Regular Season SRS: +6.07 (69th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.1 (75th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.3 (37th)
PG: Walt Frazier, 0.196 / 0.189
SG: Earl Monroe, 0.158 / 0.177
SF: Bill Bradley, 0.112 / 0.078
PF: Dave DeBusschere, 0.113 / 0.079
C: Willis Reed, 0.149 / 0.096
6th: Jerry Lucas, 0.188 / 0.125
Walt Frazier (PG, 27): 39 MPPG, 23% OLoad, 20 / 7 / 6 on +3.6%
Earl Monroe (SG, 28): 30 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 15 / 3 / 4 on +2.7%
Dave DeBusschere (PF, 32): 35 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 15 / 10 / 3 on -2.8%
Bill Bradley (SF, 29): 35 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 15 / 4 / 4 on -0.5%
Willis Reed (C, 30): 26 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 10 / 8 / 2 on +0.2%
Jerry Lucas (PF, 32): 27 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 9 / 7 / 4 on +4.2%
Scoring/100: Walt Frazier (23.5 / +3.6%), Earl Monroe (22.2 / +2.7%), Dave DeBusschere (20.2 / -2.8%)
Assists/100: Walt Frazier (5.6), Bill Bradley (4.2), Jerry Lucas (4.2)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.46 (38th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.32 (63rd)
Playoff SRS: +11.83 (33rd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +3.41 (33rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.15 (77th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -4.89 (2nd)
Round 1:
Round 2: Baltimore Bullets (+2.9), won 4-1, by +8.2 points per game (+11.1 SRS eq)
Round 3: Boston Celtics (+7.5), won 4-3, by +3.7 points per game (+11.2 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+9.7), won 4-1 by +3.8 points per game (+13.5 SRS eq)
In 1970 the Knicks had won their first NBA title, built around chemistry, tough defense and the development of the young Walt Frazier. They had torn through the regular season of 1970 with such ferocity it would be easy to assume that they’d supplant the Celtics as the next dynasty in the East. But it didn’t quite work out that way. In 1971 the Knicks posted by far the best SRS in the conference, but fell hard to a decent Bullets team in the Conference Finals (by 5.9 points a game). In 1972 the Knicks destroyed the Celtics (suddenly reborn) in the Conference Finals, only to fall to the juggernaut Lakers. Compounding matters: the core of the Knicks was *old*. DeBusschere and Lucas were both 32, Willis Reed was 30, Monroe was 28, Bill Bradley was 29 and Walt Frazier was 27. Remember, in 1973 it was relatively rare for players to play at a high level into their mid-30s. There was every reason to think that the Knicks’ window was closing.
In the regular season the Knicks went 57-25 with a +6.07 SRS, which sounds dominant but it wasn’t as much as you’d guess. In 1971 the league expanded and added three teams, which doesn’t sound like a lot, but there were only 14 teams back then; it’d be like adding 6 teams now. The ABA had already watered down the competition some; expanding by so much led to three of the least competitive seasons in NBA history. So here’s the NBA of 1973:
24% of the league was at +6 SRS or higher
18% of the league was at +7 SRS or higher
12% of the league was at -8.5 SRS or lower
24% of the league was at -5 SRS or lower
This is one of the most skewed years ever; the modern game simply doesn’t have years like this (2016 is the closest, with an OSRS standard deviation of 5.76, as opposed to 1973 with a 5.97). So the Knicks’ RSRS of +6.07 sounds respectable (69th on the list) but it was fourth in a 17-team league, behind a +7.35, a +7.84 and a +8.16 team. So it’s not quite as good as it looks. Their main competition in the East was the Celtics (who got the one-seed); any path to a title would inevitably go through Boston.
In the semis (17 team league equals guaranteed semifinals if you make the playoffs) they were to face the decent Baltimore Bullets, the team that had dispatched them ignominiously in ‘71. They had already gotten revenge in ‘72 (9 points a game) but the Knicks were unlikely to be content with that solitary showing. Both teams played a slow, methodical kind of game and both had strong defenses. The Knicks controlled the ball (2 extra shots a game, mostly through turnovers I’m inferring) but more to the point scored very well. While the Knicks weren’t able to effectively contain the Bullets’ scorers (they shot 1.1% better than their regular season average), the Bullets simply couldn’t contain the Knicks’ guards. Earl Monroe averaged a 22/3/4 on +8.0% and Walt Frazier averaged a 21/8/7 on +7.6%, both of which were sensational efficiencies for guards in the days before the three-point line. Behind those hot hands the Knicks prevailed decisively by 8.2 points a game, an excellent showing.
In the Conference Finals they would face the Celtics, who had dispatched their first round opponent (the Hawks) by almost as decisive a margin. The Celtics, again, were a decent enough offense (mostly through ball control instead of shooting) but their defense was the best in the league. As expected, the Knicks (and the aging Willis Reed) couldn’t negate the Celtics’ strength in rebounding. But they were able to limit it; the Celtics only got 3.5 extra shooting possessions a game. And the Celtics shot almost exactly at their regular season average: -0.9%. Again, it was Walt Frazier blazing the way, averaging a 26/7/6 on +8% shooting. The rest of the Knicks shot well enough and they were able to pull out a victory in seven games, by 3.7 points per game. It was a narrow victory, but the Celtics were an excellent team.
It's worth mentioning that Celtics' small forward John Havlicek had hurt his shoulder late in Game 3, missed Game 4, and then come back to play big minutes off the bench. Here's the breakdown of record and MoV (for the Knicks) per game:
Games 1-3: 2-1 Knicks, +4.7 points per game
Game 4: 1-0 Knicks, +7 points per game
Games 5-7: 1-2 Knicks, +1.7 points per game
So the Knicks definitely gained an edge in Game 4, when Hondo didn't play, but it's hard to draw conclusions past that. I'd still estimate that the Knicks outplayed the Celtics even notwithstanding Havlicek's injury, but it would no doubt have been closer.
And in the Finals were the Los Angeles Lakers, the team that had defeated them in the Finals the year before. And the Lakers too were approaching the end of their tether. The extraordinary Jerry West was 34 and Wilt Chamberlain was 36. Both remained good players, but neither as good as the year before. It’s sort of sad; two historic franchises, two great rosters, both facing off in their twilight against each other. Have you ever seen Once Upon a Time in China? It’s been a while, but the story is set in late 18th century China, as the Europeans (with their guns and industrialization) are interjecting themselves ever further into the affairs of the Chinese government/people. And there’s a climactic fight between Jet Li (the hero) and a rival martial artist over who is the greater martial arts master, even as battle is breaking out between Chinese forces and Europeans. Jet Li prevails of course, but in the confusion after the fight the rival chases after him into the battle and is shot down by the Europeans. Jet Li rushes to him, and as the rival expires he says “Martial arts stand no chance against guns”. And at the end of the movie Jet Li’s character and his family, having made it through, get their picture taken with European technology, implicitly admitting that even a victory goes forward in a world that was explicitly no longer fully Chinese. It’s quite poignant.
I’m not suggesting that the *style* of these two teams was passing on; that wasn’t the case. Instead it was that both teams were on borrowed time, that whoever won, the NBA going forward would be the domain of other teams. 1973 would be the swan song for both franchises; even if one were to win today, tomorrow would be lost for them both. The Knicks prevailed, but it was an ugly affair. The Lakers shot badly at -2.2%. Jerry West scored 21 a game on -1.1% and Wilt scored 12 a game on -0.4%. Frazier’s volume was limited to 17/7/5 on +2.2%, but his teammates all pitched in: Bradley averaged a 19/5/3 on -0.1%, Reed a 16/9/3 on +3.4% and Earl Monroe a 16/3/4 on +7.1%. When the dust had cleared the Knicks had won by 3.8 points a game, a victory over an outstanding team. The Knicks had won the championship, the last their franchise would see for a long, long time. In two years both teams would be below average.
The Knicks put together an outstanding playoff stretch, with a +11.83 PSRS (33rd on the list). And thanks to that run, they finish with the best OSRS of the year. But again, the penalty for playing in a very non-competitive league hurts here. An OSRS of +9.48 is really good, but in a league with such an imbalance of quality, it can’t quite be taken at face value. The same mechanics that reward so many of the Russell Celtics (for being by far the best team in a competitive league) punish the Knicks (for being only narrowly the best team in a very non-competitive league). They were really good, to be sure. And Walt Frazier (though he never put up particularly high usage rates compared to what we would expect from a stud in modern times) submitted an outstanding postseason. Their comparably weak regular season brings their numbers down. It’s always hard to know where to rank teams like this; I think in the 40s is as good as anywhere.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2014 Dwyane Wade (but playing a full season)
SG: 2017 Eric Gordon
SF: 2012 Jeff Teague
PF: 2005 Rasheed Wallace
C: 2016 Gorgui Dieng
6th: 2018 Al Horford
I know I’ve said that the pre-turnover comps are pretty weak, but I’ll repeat that here. The ‘73 Knicks are really difficult because they’re very much an ensemble. ‘14 Wade looks weak here in place of Frazier, but Frazier (a decently high usage, high-rebounding, good-passing guard who scored pretty efficiently) actually matches Wade pretty well in the regular season (obviously Frazier gets better in the playoffs). And Rasheed Wallace as DeBusschere isn’t unreasonable, given that they’re both defensive 4s with decent range that keep showing up on strong teams. Still. Not a big fan of these; take them for whatever they’re worth.
Regular Season Record: 57-25, Regular Season SRS: +6.07 (69th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.1 (75th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.3 (37th)
PG: Walt Frazier, 0.196 / 0.189
SG: Earl Monroe, 0.158 / 0.177
SF: Bill Bradley, 0.112 / 0.078
PF: Dave DeBusschere, 0.113 / 0.079
C: Willis Reed, 0.149 / 0.096
6th: Jerry Lucas, 0.188 / 0.125
Walt Frazier (PG, 27): 39 MPPG, 23% OLoad, 20 / 7 / 6 on +3.6%
Earl Monroe (SG, 28): 30 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 15 / 3 / 4 on +2.7%
Dave DeBusschere (PF, 32): 35 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 15 / 10 / 3 on -2.8%
Bill Bradley (SF, 29): 35 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 15 / 4 / 4 on -0.5%
Willis Reed (C, 30): 26 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 10 / 8 / 2 on +0.2%
Jerry Lucas (PF, 32): 27 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 9 / 7 / 4 on +4.2%
Scoring/100: Walt Frazier (23.5 / +3.6%), Earl Monroe (22.2 / +2.7%), Dave DeBusschere (20.2 / -2.8%)
Assists/100: Walt Frazier (5.6), Bill Bradley (4.2), Jerry Lucas (4.2)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.46 (38th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.32 (63rd)
Playoff SRS: +11.83 (33rd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +3.41 (33rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.15 (77th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -4.89 (2nd)
Round 1:
Round 2: Baltimore Bullets (+2.9), won 4-1, by +8.2 points per game (+11.1 SRS eq)
Round 3: Boston Celtics (+7.5), won 4-3, by +3.7 points per game (+11.2 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+9.7), won 4-1 by +3.8 points per game (+13.5 SRS eq)
In 1970 the Knicks had won their first NBA title, built around chemistry, tough defense and the development of the young Walt Frazier. They had torn through the regular season of 1970 with such ferocity it would be easy to assume that they’d supplant the Celtics as the next dynasty in the East. But it didn’t quite work out that way. In 1971 the Knicks posted by far the best SRS in the conference, but fell hard to a decent Bullets team in the Conference Finals (by 5.9 points a game). In 1972 the Knicks destroyed the Celtics (suddenly reborn) in the Conference Finals, only to fall to the juggernaut Lakers. Compounding matters: the core of the Knicks was *old*. DeBusschere and Lucas were both 32, Willis Reed was 30, Monroe was 28, Bill Bradley was 29 and Walt Frazier was 27. Remember, in 1973 it was relatively rare for players to play at a high level into their mid-30s. There was every reason to think that the Knicks’ window was closing.
In the regular season the Knicks went 57-25 with a +6.07 SRS, which sounds dominant but it wasn’t as much as you’d guess. In 1971 the league expanded and added three teams, which doesn’t sound like a lot, but there were only 14 teams back then; it’d be like adding 6 teams now. The ABA had already watered down the competition some; expanding by so much led to three of the least competitive seasons in NBA history. So here’s the NBA of 1973:
24% of the league was at +6 SRS or higher
18% of the league was at +7 SRS or higher
12% of the league was at -8.5 SRS or lower
24% of the league was at -5 SRS or lower
This is one of the most skewed years ever; the modern game simply doesn’t have years like this (2016 is the closest, with an OSRS standard deviation of 5.76, as opposed to 1973 with a 5.97). So the Knicks’ RSRS of +6.07 sounds respectable (69th on the list) but it was fourth in a 17-team league, behind a +7.35, a +7.84 and a +8.16 team. So it’s not quite as good as it looks. Their main competition in the East was the Celtics (who got the one-seed); any path to a title would inevitably go through Boston.
In the semis (17 team league equals guaranteed semifinals if you make the playoffs) they were to face the decent Baltimore Bullets, the team that had dispatched them ignominiously in ‘71. They had already gotten revenge in ‘72 (9 points a game) but the Knicks were unlikely to be content with that solitary showing. Both teams played a slow, methodical kind of game and both had strong defenses. The Knicks controlled the ball (2 extra shots a game, mostly through turnovers I’m inferring) but more to the point scored very well. While the Knicks weren’t able to effectively contain the Bullets’ scorers (they shot 1.1% better than their regular season average), the Bullets simply couldn’t contain the Knicks’ guards. Earl Monroe averaged a 22/3/4 on +8.0% and Walt Frazier averaged a 21/8/7 on +7.6%, both of which were sensational efficiencies for guards in the days before the three-point line. Behind those hot hands the Knicks prevailed decisively by 8.2 points a game, an excellent showing.
In the Conference Finals they would face the Celtics, who had dispatched their first round opponent (the Hawks) by almost as decisive a margin. The Celtics, again, were a decent enough offense (mostly through ball control instead of shooting) but their defense was the best in the league. As expected, the Knicks (and the aging Willis Reed) couldn’t negate the Celtics’ strength in rebounding. But they were able to limit it; the Celtics only got 3.5 extra shooting possessions a game. And the Celtics shot almost exactly at their regular season average: -0.9%. Again, it was Walt Frazier blazing the way, averaging a 26/7/6 on +8% shooting. The rest of the Knicks shot well enough and they were able to pull out a victory in seven games, by 3.7 points per game. It was a narrow victory, but the Celtics were an excellent team.
It's worth mentioning that Celtics' small forward John Havlicek had hurt his shoulder late in Game 3, missed Game 4, and then come back to play big minutes off the bench. Here's the breakdown of record and MoV (for the Knicks) per game:
Games 1-3: 2-1 Knicks, +4.7 points per game
Game 4: 1-0 Knicks, +7 points per game
Games 5-7: 1-2 Knicks, +1.7 points per game
So the Knicks definitely gained an edge in Game 4, when Hondo didn't play, but it's hard to draw conclusions past that. I'd still estimate that the Knicks outplayed the Celtics even notwithstanding Havlicek's injury, but it would no doubt have been closer.
And in the Finals were the Los Angeles Lakers, the team that had defeated them in the Finals the year before. And the Lakers too were approaching the end of their tether. The extraordinary Jerry West was 34 and Wilt Chamberlain was 36. Both remained good players, but neither as good as the year before. It’s sort of sad; two historic franchises, two great rosters, both facing off in their twilight against each other. Have you ever seen Once Upon a Time in China? It’s been a while, but the story is set in late 18th century China, as the Europeans (with their guns and industrialization) are interjecting themselves ever further into the affairs of the Chinese government/people. And there’s a climactic fight between Jet Li (the hero) and a rival martial artist over who is the greater martial arts master, even as battle is breaking out between Chinese forces and Europeans. Jet Li prevails of course, but in the confusion after the fight the rival chases after him into the battle and is shot down by the Europeans. Jet Li rushes to him, and as the rival expires he says “Martial arts stand no chance against guns”. And at the end of the movie Jet Li’s character and his family, having made it through, get their picture taken with European technology, implicitly admitting that even a victory goes forward in a world that was explicitly no longer fully Chinese. It’s quite poignant.
I’m not suggesting that the *style* of these two teams was passing on; that wasn’t the case. Instead it was that both teams were on borrowed time, that whoever won, the NBA going forward would be the domain of other teams. 1973 would be the swan song for both franchises; even if one were to win today, tomorrow would be lost for them both. The Knicks prevailed, but it was an ugly affair. The Lakers shot badly at -2.2%. Jerry West scored 21 a game on -1.1% and Wilt scored 12 a game on -0.4%. Frazier’s volume was limited to 17/7/5 on +2.2%, but his teammates all pitched in: Bradley averaged a 19/5/3 on -0.1%, Reed a 16/9/3 on +3.4% and Earl Monroe a 16/3/4 on +7.1%. When the dust had cleared the Knicks had won by 3.8 points a game, a victory over an outstanding team. The Knicks had won the championship, the last their franchise would see for a long, long time. In two years both teams would be below average.
The Knicks put together an outstanding playoff stretch, with a +11.83 PSRS (33rd on the list). And thanks to that run, they finish with the best OSRS of the year. But again, the penalty for playing in a very non-competitive league hurts here. An OSRS of +9.48 is really good, but in a league with such an imbalance of quality, it can’t quite be taken at face value. The same mechanics that reward so many of the Russell Celtics (for being by far the best team in a competitive league) punish the Knicks (for being only narrowly the best team in a very non-competitive league). They were really good, to be sure. And Walt Frazier (though he never put up particularly high usage rates compared to what we would expect from a stud in modern times) submitted an outstanding postseason. Their comparably weak regular season brings their numbers down. It’s always hard to know where to rank teams like this; I think in the 40s is as good as anywhere.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2014 Dwyane Wade (but playing a full season)
SG: 2017 Eric Gordon
SF: 2012 Jeff Teague
PF: 2005 Rasheed Wallace
C: 2016 Gorgui Dieng
6th: 2018 Al Horford
I know I’ve said that the pre-turnover comps are pretty weak, but I’ll repeat that here. The ‘73 Knicks are really difficult because they’re very much an ensemble. ‘14 Wade looks weak here in place of Frazier, but Frazier (a decently high usage, high-rebounding, good-passing guard who scored pretty efficiently) actually matches Wade pretty well in the regular season (obviously Frazier gets better in the playoffs). And Rasheed Wallace as DeBusschere isn’t unreasonable, given that they’re both defensive 4s with decent range that keep showing up on strong teams. Still. Not a big fan of these; take them for whatever they’re worth.
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