Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#43. The 2017 Cleveland Cavaliers
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +9.46, Standard Deviations: +1.91, Lost in NBA Finals (Preseason 2nd)
Regular Season Record: 51-31, Regular Season SRS: +2.87 (99th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.8 (35th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: +1.5 (99th)
PG: Kyrie Irving, +3.4 / +2.2
SG: J.R. Smith, -2.1 / +0.5
SF: LeBron James, +7.6 / +9.8
PF: Tristan Thompson, -0.7 / -0.1
C: Kevin Love, +2.1 / +3.2
LeBron James (SF, 32): 39 MPPG, 32% OLoad, 27 / 9 / 9 / 2 on +6.7%
Kyrie Irving (PG, 24): 37 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 26 / 3 / 6 / 2 on +2.8%
Kevin Love (C, 28): 33 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 20 / 12 / 2 / 1 on +2.1%
J.R. Smith (SG, 31): 30 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 9 / 3 / 2 / 1 on -6.8%
Tristan Thompson (PF, 25): 31 MPPG, 11% OLoad, 8 / 10 / 1 / 2 on +4.2%
Scoring/100: Kyrie Irving (35.9 / +2.8%), LeBron James (34.9 / +6.7%), Kevin Love (30.2 / +2.1%)
Assists/100: LeBron James (11.5), Kyrie Irving (8.3), Kevin Love (3.1)
Heliocentrism: 50.0% (7th of 83 teams) - LeBron
Wingmen: 39.6% (34th) - Irving & Love
Depth: 10.4% (74th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +13.17 (2nd), Playoff Defensive Rating: +0.01 (95th)
Playoff SRS: +13.74 (18th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +6.59 (2nd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +3.29 (19th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.67 (61st)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 45.8% (10th of 84 teams) - LeBron
Playoff Wingmen: 31.3% (68th) - Irving & Love
Playoff Bench: 22.9% (49th)
Round 1: Indiana Pacers (-0.6), won 4-0 by +4.0 points per game (+3.4 SRS eq)
Round 2: Toronto Raptors (+2.5), won 4-0, by +15.3 points per game (+17.8 SRS eq)
Round 3: Boston Celtics (+3.3), won 4-1, by +20.0 points per game (+23.3 SRS eq)
Round 4: Golden State Warriors (+16.1), lost 1-4, outscored by 6.8 points per game (+9.3 SRS eq)
From 2011 to 2016 there was a consistent thread in Vegas; that LeBron’s team was the best bet to win the NBA Championship. That doesn’t mean that Vegas predicted six straight championships for LeBron, just that each year he was the favorite (the odds ranged from 36% in 2011 to 26% in 2016). For the curious, the aggregate expectation was 1.84 rings in those six years; so despite only winning in three of those six years, he outperformed Vegas’ expectations. Point being, LeBron being the favorite was a longtime fixture. But in 2017 that changed. Going into the season the oddsmakers were giving the Golden State Warriors the most generous title odds *ever*. Why? Let’s talk about Kevin Durant.
Kevin Durant is arguably the best regular season scorer ever. Aside from defensive rebounding in other areas are limited, but then, being one of the best scorers ever is quite enough. In 2011 he and his gang of phenoms (Westbrook, Harden and Ibaka) made it all the way to the Conference Finals before getting knocked out in five by the Mavericks. In 2012 the Thunder ripped through the West before coming up decisively short to the Cavaliers in the Finals. In the offseason the Thunder traded James Harden to the Rockets for picks and prospects, but in spite of that decision the team’s future still looked bright. In 2013 the Thunder had by far the highest SRS in the league, but saw Westbrook tear his meniscus two games into the playoffs. Without Westbrook the Thunder struggled, falling in the second round to the Grizzlies. In 2014 the Thunder were healthy and made it as far as the Conference Finals, only to be destroyed by the buzzsaw that was the 2014 San Antonio Spurs. In 2015 Durant injured his foot, knocking him out for the year and ending the Thunder’s title hopes. And in 2016 the Thunder were formidable (+7.09 SRS), only to find themselves behind a pair of +10 SRS teams in the Warriors and Spurs. And the Thunder, despite clearly being outstanding, were knocked out in the semis.
So. You’ve got one of the very best players in the league. He’s got two years where his team was really good, but perhaps too young to challenge the eventual champion. He’s got two years where his team was potentially the best team in the league (particularly 2013) but injuries stole the season. And in two seasons the Thunder were extremely good, but ran into a juggernaut of historical proportions. And let’s not forget about the hot garbage of James Harden being traded off the team unnecessarily. A strange thing happens to superstars that don’t seem to be able to win championships after their first 6-7 years. All the adulation and love from the fans and media starts suffering from poisonous parenthesis. “He’s great (but he’s not a winner)”. Superstars and rings are like steaks and seasoning. A steak is great no matter what . . . but without the seasoning it’s only half a dish. Not that a straight steak is bad, but even as you’re eating it you’re imagining the dish that it could have been. And dishes that are a lot less sexy on the face of it suddenly become more appealing because they’re well seasoned (with rings). For a legacy-conscious athlete this strain can become considerable, and Durant has proven himself more self-conscious than most. So he did the unthinkable after 2016; he left the Thunder as a free agent and signed with the 73-9 Golden State Warriors.
That’s why the bettors were more sure about the Warriors than they’d ever been about any team. They were a 73-9 team that had just added one of the best players in the league. While he lacked the team-first playmaking chops that the Warriors loved, his incredible scoring acumen and his off-ball chops made him an upgrade of epic proportions.
The 2016 Cavs had just pulled off one of the biggest wins in NBA history, coming from down 3-1 against the team with the best record ever. And yet going into 2017 they were somewhat of an afterthought. And honestly, their roster wasn’t exactly kicking down anybody’s door. They had Kevin Love, who had scaled down his usage to become a third option, who functioned as a smart stretch 5. They had Kyrie Irving, a historically great creator if mostly for himself. He wasn’t much of a defender, but his ability to generate isolation offense off the dribble was remarkable. Beyond that there was just a grab-bag of specialists (Tristan Thompson) and shooters (J.R. Smith for example). Oh. And LeBron James. At this point, it had been made clear that LeBron in the playoffs was on a different level from almost every player ever. But was there any chance of the Cavs challenging the super-Warriors?
In the regular season it sure didn’t seem so. Their 51-31 record got them a two seed in the East, but in the West that could have seeded them as low as sixth. Their RSRS of +2.87 was the 7th best in the league and the second worst on this list. Their offense was quite good, but their defense was quite bad (second worst on this sheet). This was an extremely flawed team. There’s an interesting article from 538 (https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/are-the-cavs-overrated-or-underrated/) about whether or not the Cavs were even remote contenders, about whether or not “Playoff LeBron” was enough of a thing to save what in some ways seemed a struggling team.
In the first round the Cavs struggled with the average Indiana Pacers (-0.6). They won in a sweep, but the margins were extremely close (1, 6, 5 and 4 points). It wasn’t Cleveland’s offense that struggled; they put up an adjusted ORating of +11 (from Indiana’s regular season average). LeBron averaged a 33/10/9 on +5% with 3 steals and 2 blocks a game. It was that the Pacers’ mediocre offense had a lot of success, getting a 2 shot-a-game advantage and shooting a solid +1.2%. The most generous interpretation would say that the Cavs conserved their energy and won each game by the bare minimum. My formula doesn’t share that interpretation, seeing a mere 4 point a game win over an average team, and it sends the Cavs into the next round with the 7th best OSRS in the league (though 2nd in the East).
The second round featured a matchup against the Toronto Raptors. The ‘17 Raptors were struggling equally. Despite a +3.65 RSRS (nothing to write home about) they barely got through the first round, taking six games to get past the -0.5 Milwaukee Bucks, winning by only +0.6 a game. Going into Game 1 the Cavs were favored by 6.5 points, trusting that playoff LeBron would be enough to carry the day, but uncertain about whether the Cavs porous defense could slow the Raptors. The Cavs won Game 1 by eleven. They won the next three by 22, 21 and 7. The Cavs’ offense had ripped through the Raptors by +12.5 (to put this in context, only the top 9 playoff offenses in this list have relative playoff offenses at +10 or higher; the Cavs had just done it twice). The team as a whole shot at +8.5% (!!) and LeBron had averaged a 36/8/5 on +17.7%. And the Raptors had actually been held below their regular reason offense. The Cavs had swept the Raptors by 15.3 points per game, an extremely dominant win, even against a merely decent team.
Going into the Conference Finals the Cavs’ OSRS had been raised to +5.99, 3rd best in the league (the top two were meeting in the Western Conference Finals). The Cavs instead faced the +3.3 Boston Celtics, another decent but unremarkable team. After the beating the Cavs had put on the Raptors, nobody took the Celtics’s chances particularly seriously. That said, the Celtics would have home court advantage, so that had to count for something, right? The Cavs won in five by 20 points a game. Their wins were by 13, 44, 13 and 33 points. You may be concerned that those point totals are padded, and they really aren’t. In Game 2 the Cavs led by 41 *at the half*. You can’t pull your starters at halftime . . . So the Cavs coasted the rest of the way (running up the score by another 3 points) but you can’t really condemn the Cavs for piling onto their lead . . . before halftime had even happened. In Game 5 the Cavs led by 18 at halftime, but by 35 after 3. And then the bench was put in. The Cavs weren’t running up the score. They were just that much better than the Celtics. Was Isaiah Thomas out for the last three games? Yes. Do I think it made any difference? Not really. Look, the Celtics weren’t a great team by a long shot; they were a run-of-the-mill good team that happened to win a one-seed because the 2017 Eastern Conference was weak as heck. But the Cavs beat them by 20 a game. That is pretty insane. The Cavs relative ORating for the series? +20. The Cavs shot at +11% (wtf?!). LeBron, Kyrie and Love combined for 78 a game on +9.4% or better. And the Celtics, in turn, were held to a few points below their normal offensive rating. These were two of the best offensive series ever, and two extremely dominant performances. Were they only against good teams? Definitely. Still. The Cavs had proved that the regular season didn’t matter, that when they were on their game they were in a class all their own . . .
But those Finals though. The Warriors had put up an RSRS of +11.35 and their playoffs had been massacres. -0.2 Blazers? +18 points a game. +4.6 Jazz? 15 points a game. +8.9 Spurs? 16 points a game. It didn’t seem to matter who they played. So that’s who the Cavs were up against in the Finals. One of the best teams ever. But the Cavs had Playoff LeBron and a healthy supporting cast so anything was possible . . . wasn't it?
In Game 1 the Cavs’ offense struggled, shooting -8.3%, and LeBron could only generate a 28/15/8 on +0.3% shooting with 8 turnovers. Let the record show that the Warriors also had the 2nd best defense in the league. The Warriors won by 22 (though the Cavs did hold them below their regular season average). In Game 2 LeBron was masterful, putting up a 29/11/14 on +16.6% with 3 steals. The Cavs lost by 19. In Game 3, in Cleveland, LeBron had a 39/11/9 on +5.6% while Kyrie put up a 38/6/3 on +4.9%. They lost by 5. In Game 4 the Cavs’ offense broke through and ran amok. They shot +12.9% as a team, LeBron had a 31/10/11 on +3.5% and Kyrie had a 40/7/4 on +14.3%. And the Cavs won by 21. In Game 5 LeBron put up a 41/13/8 on +9.3% but Kyrie shot at -3.4%. The Cavs’ offense overall was formidable (+17.4 on the game) but the Warriors prevailed by 9. It was over; the Cavs had lost.
Their offense had played extremely well; even against the Warriors’ defense they’d managed a +10.6 relative ORating. And they’d managed to lose to the Warriors by only 6.7 points a game. Which is an incredible achievement, given that the Warriors had just beaten the Spurs by 16 a game in the Conference Finals.
Here’s the Stem plot for OSRS in 2017:
16 | Warriors
15 |
14 |
13 |
12 |
11 |
10 |
9 | Cavs
8 |
7 | Spurs
6 |
5 | Rockets
4 |
3 | Clippers, Jazz
2 |
1 | Wizards
0 | Celtics, Bucks, Grizzlies, Heat, Nuggets
-0 | Raptors, Pacers, Thunder, Hornets, Timberwolves
-1 | Hawks, Bulls, Blazers, Pistons, Pelicans
-2 | Mavericks
-3 | Knicks, Kings
-4 |
-5 | 76ers, Suns
-6 | Magic, Nets, Lakers
-7 |
-8 |
-9 |
-10|
Wow. That’s a pretty competitive league . . . and the Warriors. Note that the Raptors and Celtics are only that low *after* playing the Cavs and losing by massive margins. Much of what looks like a competitive league is all the “good” teams being smashed by either the Cavs or Warriors so hard that they fell toward average.
Where does this leave the 2017 Cleveland Cavaliers? Well, first, with the 2nd best playoff offense ever. If you want to ding them for facing fairly average defenses that’s fair, but note that their defenses faced are only 61st on this list, so below average but not by a lot. Even against the Warriors in playoff mode (who averaged a -6.9 DRating in the playoffs) the Cavs managed to put up a +10.6 (higher if you adjust it for the postseason). And their defense in the playoffs was only league average. But hey, compare that to the 2005 Suns with the #1 offense but a defense that couldn’t stop anyone. For one of the very best offenses ever, a league average defense isn’t awful. But it was a notable step down from the 2016 Cavs (-3.8 through the playoffs).
The 2017 Cavs. One of the worst regular season teams on this list. One of the best postseason teams on this list. And so good that they only lost to the 2017 Warriors by 6.8 points per game.
Regular Season Record: 51-31, Regular Season SRS: +2.87 (99th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.8 (35th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: +1.5 (99th)
PG: Kyrie Irving, +3.4 / +2.2
SG: J.R. Smith, -2.1 / +0.5
SF: LeBron James, +7.6 / +9.8
PF: Tristan Thompson, -0.7 / -0.1
C: Kevin Love, +2.1 / +3.2
LeBron James (SF, 32): 39 MPPG, 32% OLoad, 27 / 9 / 9 / 2 on +6.7%
Kyrie Irving (PG, 24): 37 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 26 / 3 / 6 / 2 on +2.8%
Kevin Love (C, 28): 33 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 20 / 12 / 2 / 1 on +2.1%
J.R. Smith (SG, 31): 30 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 9 / 3 / 2 / 1 on -6.8%
Tristan Thompson (PF, 25): 31 MPPG, 11% OLoad, 8 / 10 / 1 / 2 on +4.2%
Scoring/100: Kyrie Irving (35.9 / +2.8%), LeBron James (34.9 / +6.7%), Kevin Love (30.2 / +2.1%)
Assists/100: LeBron James (11.5), Kyrie Irving (8.3), Kevin Love (3.1)
Heliocentrism: 50.0% (7th of 83 teams) - LeBron
Wingmen: 39.6% (34th) - Irving & Love
Depth: 10.4% (74th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +13.17 (2nd), Playoff Defensive Rating: +0.01 (95th)
Playoff SRS: +13.74 (18th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +6.59 (2nd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +3.29 (19th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.67 (61st)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 45.8% (10th of 84 teams) - LeBron
Playoff Wingmen: 31.3% (68th) - Irving & Love
Playoff Bench: 22.9% (49th)
Round 1: Indiana Pacers (-0.6), won 4-0 by +4.0 points per game (+3.4 SRS eq)
Round 2: Toronto Raptors (+2.5), won 4-0, by +15.3 points per game (+17.8 SRS eq)
Round 3: Boston Celtics (+3.3), won 4-1, by +20.0 points per game (+23.3 SRS eq)
Round 4: Golden State Warriors (+16.1), lost 1-4, outscored by 6.8 points per game (+9.3 SRS eq)
From 2011 to 2016 there was a consistent thread in Vegas; that LeBron’s team was the best bet to win the NBA Championship. That doesn’t mean that Vegas predicted six straight championships for LeBron, just that each year he was the favorite (the odds ranged from 36% in 2011 to 26% in 2016). For the curious, the aggregate expectation was 1.84 rings in those six years; so despite only winning in three of those six years, he outperformed Vegas’ expectations. Point being, LeBron being the favorite was a longtime fixture. But in 2017 that changed. Going into the season the oddsmakers were giving the Golden State Warriors the most generous title odds *ever*. Why? Let’s talk about Kevin Durant.
Kevin Durant is arguably the best regular season scorer ever. Aside from defensive rebounding in other areas are limited, but then, being one of the best scorers ever is quite enough. In 2011 he and his gang of phenoms (Westbrook, Harden and Ibaka) made it all the way to the Conference Finals before getting knocked out in five by the Mavericks. In 2012 the Thunder ripped through the West before coming up decisively short to the Cavaliers in the Finals. In the offseason the Thunder traded James Harden to the Rockets for picks and prospects, but in spite of that decision the team’s future still looked bright. In 2013 the Thunder had by far the highest SRS in the league, but saw Westbrook tear his meniscus two games into the playoffs. Without Westbrook the Thunder struggled, falling in the second round to the Grizzlies. In 2014 the Thunder were healthy and made it as far as the Conference Finals, only to be destroyed by the buzzsaw that was the 2014 San Antonio Spurs. In 2015 Durant injured his foot, knocking him out for the year and ending the Thunder’s title hopes. And in 2016 the Thunder were formidable (+7.09 SRS), only to find themselves behind a pair of +10 SRS teams in the Warriors and Spurs. And the Thunder, despite clearly being outstanding, were knocked out in the semis.
So. You’ve got one of the very best players in the league. He’s got two years where his team was really good, but perhaps too young to challenge the eventual champion. He’s got two years where his team was potentially the best team in the league (particularly 2013) but injuries stole the season. And in two seasons the Thunder were extremely good, but ran into a juggernaut of historical proportions. And let’s not forget about the hot garbage of James Harden being traded off the team unnecessarily. A strange thing happens to superstars that don’t seem to be able to win championships after their first 6-7 years. All the adulation and love from the fans and media starts suffering from poisonous parenthesis. “He’s great (but he’s not a winner)”. Superstars and rings are like steaks and seasoning. A steak is great no matter what . . . but without the seasoning it’s only half a dish. Not that a straight steak is bad, but even as you’re eating it you’re imagining the dish that it could have been. And dishes that are a lot less sexy on the face of it suddenly become more appealing because they’re well seasoned (with rings). For a legacy-conscious athlete this strain can become considerable, and Durant has proven himself more self-conscious than most. So he did the unthinkable after 2016; he left the Thunder as a free agent and signed with the 73-9 Golden State Warriors.
That’s why the bettors were more sure about the Warriors than they’d ever been about any team. They were a 73-9 team that had just added one of the best players in the league. While he lacked the team-first playmaking chops that the Warriors loved, his incredible scoring acumen and his off-ball chops made him an upgrade of epic proportions.
The 2016 Cavs had just pulled off one of the biggest wins in NBA history, coming from down 3-1 against the team with the best record ever. And yet going into 2017 they were somewhat of an afterthought. And honestly, their roster wasn’t exactly kicking down anybody’s door. They had Kevin Love, who had scaled down his usage to become a third option, who functioned as a smart stretch 5. They had Kyrie Irving, a historically great creator if mostly for himself. He wasn’t much of a defender, but his ability to generate isolation offense off the dribble was remarkable. Beyond that there was just a grab-bag of specialists (Tristan Thompson) and shooters (J.R. Smith for example). Oh. And LeBron James. At this point, it had been made clear that LeBron in the playoffs was on a different level from almost every player ever. But was there any chance of the Cavs challenging the super-Warriors?
In the regular season it sure didn’t seem so. Their 51-31 record got them a two seed in the East, but in the West that could have seeded them as low as sixth. Their RSRS of +2.87 was the 7th best in the league and the second worst on this list. Their offense was quite good, but their defense was quite bad (second worst on this sheet). This was an extremely flawed team. There’s an interesting article from 538 (https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/are-the-cavs-overrated-or-underrated/) about whether or not the Cavs were even remote contenders, about whether or not “Playoff LeBron” was enough of a thing to save what in some ways seemed a struggling team.
In the first round the Cavs struggled with the average Indiana Pacers (-0.6). They won in a sweep, but the margins were extremely close (1, 6, 5 and 4 points). It wasn’t Cleveland’s offense that struggled; they put up an adjusted ORating of +11 (from Indiana’s regular season average). LeBron averaged a 33/10/9 on +5% with 3 steals and 2 blocks a game. It was that the Pacers’ mediocre offense had a lot of success, getting a 2 shot-a-game advantage and shooting a solid +1.2%. The most generous interpretation would say that the Cavs conserved their energy and won each game by the bare minimum. My formula doesn’t share that interpretation, seeing a mere 4 point a game win over an average team, and it sends the Cavs into the next round with the 7th best OSRS in the league (though 2nd in the East).
The second round featured a matchup against the Toronto Raptors. The ‘17 Raptors were struggling equally. Despite a +3.65 RSRS (nothing to write home about) they barely got through the first round, taking six games to get past the -0.5 Milwaukee Bucks, winning by only +0.6 a game. Going into Game 1 the Cavs were favored by 6.5 points, trusting that playoff LeBron would be enough to carry the day, but uncertain about whether the Cavs porous defense could slow the Raptors. The Cavs won Game 1 by eleven. They won the next three by 22, 21 and 7. The Cavs’ offense had ripped through the Raptors by +12.5 (to put this in context, only the top 9 playoff offenses in this list have relative playoff offenses at +10 or higher; the Cavs had just done it twice). The team as a whole shot at +8.5% (!!) and LeBron had averaged a 36/8/5 on +17.7%. And the Raptors had actually been held below their regular reason offense. The Cavs had swept the Raptors by 15.3 points per game, an extremely dominant win, even against a merely decent team.
Going into the Conference Finals the Cavs’ OSRS had been raised to +5.99, 3rd best in the league (the top two were meeting in the Western Conference Finals). The Cavs instead faced the +3.3 Boston Celtics, another decent but unremarkable team. After the beating the Cavs had put on the Raptors, nobody took the Celtics’s chances particularly seriously. That said, the Celtics would have home court advantage, so that had to count for something, right? The Cavs won in five by 20 points a game. Their wins were by 13, 44, 13 and 33 points. You may be concerned that those point totals are padded, and they really aren’t. In Game 2 the Cavs led by 41 *at the half*. You can’t pull your starters at halftime . . . So the Cavs coasted the rest of the way (running up the score by another 3 points) but you can’t really condemn the Cavs for piling onto their lead . . . before halftime had even happened. In Game 5 the Cavs led by 18 at halftime, but by 35 after 3. And then the bench was put in. The Cavs weren’t running up the score. They were just that much better than the Celtics. Was Isaiah Thomas out for the last three games? Yes. Do I think it made any difference? Not really. Look, the Celtics weren’t a great team by a long shot; they were a run-of-the-mill good team that happened to win a one-seed because the 2017 Eastern Conference was weak as heck. But the Cavs beat them by 20 a game. That is pretty insane. The Cavs relative ORating for the series? +20. The Cavs shot at +11% (wtf?!). LeBron, Kyrie and Love combined for 78 a game on +9.4% or better. And the Celtics, in turn, were held to a few points below their normal offensive rating. These were two of the best offensive series ever, and two extremely dominant performances. Were they only against good teams? Definitely. Still. The Cavs had proved that the regular season didn’t matter, that when they were on their game they were in a class all their own . . .
But those Finals though. The Warriors had put up an RSRS of +11.35 and their playoffs had been massacres. -0.2 Blazers? +18 points a game. +4.6 Jazz? 15 points a game. +8.9 Spurs? 16 points a game. It didn’t seem to matter who they played. So that’s who the Cavs were up against in the Finals. One of the best teams ever. But the Cavs had Playoff LeBron and a healthy supporting cast so anything was possible . . . wasn't it?
In Game 1 the Cavs’ offense struggled, shooting -8.3%, and LeBron could only generate a 28/15/8 on +0.3% shooting with 8 turnovers. Let the record show that the Warriors also had the 2nd best defense in the league. The Warriors won by 22 (though the Cavs did hold them below their regular season average). In Game 2 LeBron was masterful, putting up a 29/11/14 on +16.6% with 3 steals. The Cavs lost by 19. In Game 3, in Cleveland, LeBron had a 39/11/9 on +5.6% while Kyrie put up a 38/6/3 on +4.9%. They lost by 5. In Game 4 the Cavs’ offense broke through and ran amok. They shot +12.9% as a team, LeBron had a 31/10/11 on +3.5% and Kyrie had a 40/7/4 on +14.3%. And the Cavs won by 21. In Game 5 LeBron put up a 41/13/8 on +9.3% but Kyrie shot at -3.4%. The Cavs’ offense overall was formidable (+17.4 on the game) but the Warriors prevailed by 9. It was over; the Cavs had lost.
Their offense had played extremely well; even against the Warriors’ defense they’d managed a +10.6 relative ORating. And they’d managed to lose to the Warriors by only 6.7 points a game. Which is an incredible achievement, given that the Warriors had just beaten the Spurs by 16 a game in the Conference Finals.
Here’s the Stem plot for OSRS in 2017:
16 | Warriors
15 |
14 |
13 |
12 |
11 |
10 |
9 | Cavs
8 |
7 | Spurs
6 |
5 | Rockets
4 |
3 | Clippers, Jazz
2 |
1 | Wizards
0 | Celtics, Bucks, Grizzlies, Heat, Nuggets
-0 | Raptors, Pacers, Thunder, Hornets, Timberwolves
-1 | Hawks, Bulls, Blazers, Pistons, Pelicans
-2 | Mavericks
-3 | Knicks, Kings
-4 |
-5 | 76ers, Suns
-6 | Magic, Nets, Lakers
-7 |
-8 |
-9 |
-10|
Wow. That’s a pretty competitive league . . . and the Warriors. Note that the Raptors and Celtics are only that low *after* playing the Cavs and losing by massive margins. Much of what looks like a competitive league is all the “good” teams being smashed by either the Cavs or Warriors so hard that they fell toward average.
Where does this leave the 2017 Cleveland Cavaliers? Well, first, with the 2nd best playoff offense ever. If you want to ding them for facing fairly average defenses that’s fair, but note that their defenses faced are only 61st on this list, so below average but not by a lot. Even against the Warriors in playoff mode (who averaged a -6.9 DRating in the playoffs) the Cavs managed to put up a +10.6 (higher if you adjust it for the postseason). And their defense in the playoffs was only league average. But hey, compare that to the 2005 Suns with the #1 offense but a defense that couldn’t stop anyone. For one of the very best offenses ever, a league average defense isn’t awful. But it was a notable step down from the 2016 Cavs (-3.8 through the playoffs).
The 2017 Cavs. One of the worst regular season teams on this list. One of the best postseason teams on this list. And so good that they only lost to the 2017 Warriors by 6.8 points per game.
#42. The 2006 Dallas Mavericks
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.87, Standard Deviations: +2.16, Lost in NBA Finals (Preseason 6th)
Regular Season Record: 60-22, Regular Season SRS: +5.96 (71st), Earned the 4 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +5.6 (21st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.2 (88th)
PG: Jason Terry, +3.3 / +2.4
SG: Devin Harris, +1.4 / -1.6
SF: Josh Howard, +2.2 / +2.5
PF: Dirk Nowitzki, +8.1 / +9.2
C: Erick Dampier, -1.7 / +1.9
6th: Jerry Stackhouse, -1.5 / +0.1
Dirk Nowitzki (PF, 27): 43 MPPG, 29% OLoad, 30 / 10 / 3 / 2 on +5.3%
Jerry Stackhouse (SF, 31): 32 MPPG, 26% OLoad, 15 / 3 / 3 / 1 on -2.5%
Devin Harris (SG, 22): 26 MPPG, 23% OLoad, 11 / 3 / 4 / 1 on +0.8%
Jason Terry (PG, 28): 40 MPPG, 23% OLoad, 20 / 2 / 4 / 2 on +3.9%
Josh Howard (SF, 25): 37 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 18 / 7 / 2 / 2 on +0.0%
Erick Dampier (C, 30): 27 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 7 / 9 / 1 / 2 on -0.5%
Scoring/100: Dirk Nowitzki (38.1 / +5.3%), Jason Terry (26.8 / +3.9%), Josh Howard (26.4 / +0.0%)
Assists/100: Devin Harris (7.6), Jason Terry (6.0), Jerry Stackhouse (5.7)
Heliocentrism: 44.0% (18th of 84 teams) - Nowitzki
Wingmen: 32.0% (67th) - Terry & Howard
Depth: 23.6% (60th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +7.36 (26th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.91 (77th)
Playoff SRS: +10.35 (53rd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.91 (41st)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.41 (50th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.36 (20th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 44.4% (13th of 84 teams) - Nowitzki
Playoff Wingmen: 28.6% (78th) - Terry & Howard
Playoff Depth: 27.0% (27th)
Round 1: Memphis Grizzlies (+3.7), won 4-0, by +14.0 points per game (+17.7 SRS eq)
Round 2: San Antonio Spurs (+8.2), won 4-3, by +4.0 points per game (+12.2 SRS eq)
Round 3: Phoenix Suns (+5.7), won 4-2, by +2.6 points per game (+8.3 SRS eq)
Round 4: Miami Heat (+6.3), lost 2-4, outscored by -1.0 point per game (+5.3 SRS eq)
In Wurzburg, West Germany, on June 19th, 1978, a tiny baby was born to extremely athletic parents (a professional basketball player and an international handball player). He didn’t stay tiny for long. Dirk Nowitzki was taller than children of his age by a foot for most of his life. He competed in sports with great success, becoming a ranked junior tennis player but eventually gravitated toward basketball. A former international basketball player discovered him and offered to coach him for two or three days a week. Eventually it became clear that Dirk was on the path to become the best basketball player in Germany, but his coach asked him if he wanted to play in the NBA. He believed that Dirk had the ability, but that it would take far more work. After days of consideration, Dirk accepted the challenge. His game kept improving until he began to gain international notice. At nineteen he competed at the Nike Hoop Summit, turning eyes with a 33/14 performance. Nowitzki chose to pass on college and go straight to the pros. He was drafted #9 by the Milwaukee Bucks but then immediately traded to the Mavericks for pieces of inconsequential value. While Dirk struggled as a rookie (he compared going from Second Bundesliga to the NBA to jumping out of an airplane and hoping the parachute would somehow open) he eventually played into form.
The early-aughts Mavericks boasted young Dirk and young Nash (well, pre-Suns Nash) and had moderate success. In ‘01 they made the semis before being demolished by the Spurs. In ‘02 they made the semis before being beaten soundly by the excellent ‘02 Kings. In ‘03 the Mavericks posted the highest RSRS in the league but ended up being beaten by the ‘03 Spurs in the Conference Finals. In ‘04 they were matched up with the +5.4 Kings in the first round and lost in five, despite outscoring them by 1.4 points per game. Basically, the Mavs for that four-year stretch were very good (OSRS has them as the 7th, 4th, 3rd and 6th in the league in those years) but short of the top. And because the West in the early aughts was extremely loaded, Dallas was often fielding strong teams and not even sniffing the NBA Finals. Owner Mark Cuban became frustrated and the roster was blown up and reassembled - Dirk was only 24 at that time which meant that a long-term team built around him had a lot of upside. Steve Nash departed in free agency, Antoine Walker was traded for Jason Terry and Antawn Jamison was traded for Devin Harris and Jerry Stackhouse. Josh Howard moved into the starting lineup and Erick Dampier was acquired from the Warriors to be the defense-first center that Dirk seemed to need. This new roster did well enough in 2005, getting knocked out in the semis (to Nash’s Suns and finishing 5th in OSRS).
It’s really interesting to note Nowitzki’s changed statline upon Nash leaving. Here are his rTS%, 3PAr, FTr, USG%, OBPM and 2P Assisted% for the two years before losing Nash and the two years after:
2003: +6.2% shooting, 0.262 3PAr, 0.368 FTr, 27.4% Usage, +5.8 OBPM, 58.7% 2PAstd
2004: +4.7% shooting, 0.221 3PAr, 0.323 FTr, 24.5% Usage, +3.8 OBPM, 67.0% 2PAstd
2005: +4.9% shooting, 0.158 3PAr, 0.490 FTr, 28.7% Usage, +5.8 OBPM, 49.1% 2PAstd
2006: +5.3% shooting, 0.173 3PAr, 0.382 FTr, 30.0% Usage, +7.8 OBPM, 43.8% 2PAstd
In 2003 he’s more of a three-point gunner, taking lots of threes, shooting efficiently and using a lot of shots. In 2004 (the year he played center) his usage drops as does his shooting efficiency. After losing Nash his three pointers drop, his free throws go up, his usage goes up and his efficiency, while not reaching the heights of 2003, steadily improves. It’s easy to paint a picture here: with Nash, Dirk was more of a stretch 4 (or stretch 5 in 2004, which doesn’t seem to have helped his numbers at all). When Nash left they built the offense around Dirk more, letting him gun from distance and attack the interior. The tradeoff from more efficient threes to less efficient twos was balanced out by the increased free throws (which Nowitzki converted with incredible success). And the more mixed attack allowed Dirk to increase his usage while also increasing his efficiency. Dirk went from being a really good finisher with Nash to being able to create his own offense. I don’t want the above to be read as “Nash was holding Dirk back”; let’s not forget that Dirk was still young and peaking, so these changes (at least in the sense of getting better) were likely inevitable. Let us instead simply say that Cuban let Nash walk, successfully betting that Dirk’s incredible skill and upside made the retention of a wizard like Nash less optimal than it would be for more limited rosters. The new-look Mavs flanked Dirk with a lot of shooting, some passing, and a defense-first center to have his back. It was all built on the idea that peak Dirk plus strong role players could win a title. It appears to have been a good bet. Let’s talk comps quick:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2018 J.J. Reddick
SG: 2014 Jeremy Lin
SF: 2014 Markieff Morris
PF: 2012 Kevin Durant (but better on offense)
C: 2015 Steven Adams (remember, 21 years old)
6th: 2016 Zach LaVine
Jason Terry was nominally the point guard, but in practice he supplied a lot of shooting. And Devin Harris, in contrast, was basically a slashing passer who wasn’t terribly successful but could certainly disrupt defenses. Josh Howard was a solid 3 and Erick Dampier was an extremely limited but still capable rebounding defender. Jerry Stackhouse being compared to young Zach LaVine suggests the considerable amounts of sizzle but only modest amounts of steak that Stackhouse brought to the table. And Dirk as Durant . . . it’s not as crazy as it sounds. They’re both limited passers, both high usage, both good floor spacers, both good rebounders (on defense), both not as good defenders as you’d think and both efficient scorers.
You know what jumps out? How Dirk really didn’t have a strong #2. The Mavs’ Wingmen rating is 67th (RS) and 78th (PS) out of 84 teams. In contrast, Dirk posts extremely respectable Heliocentrism scores. The list of players with higher postseason Heliocentrism than his, with teams ranked #60 or higher? Kareem, Jordan (x2), Bird, LeBron (x4) and Duncan. That’s a really good list to be part of. Obviously it’s subject to the limitations of BBR’s BPM (which are going to implicitly favor scorers like Nowitzki) . . . still. The ‘06 Mavs were an unusually weak supporting cast for a 21st century NBA contender; Dirk made it work.
In 2006 the Mavericks stormed out of the gate, posting the third highest record and SRS in the NBA. However, they happened to be in the same division as the San Antonio Spurs (who were second and first in those metrics). So Dallas finished 2nd in their division, and due to a defunct playoff seeding rule, the Mavs had to be seeded #4 so that the other two division winners (the +5.5 Phoenix Suns and the +0.36 Denver Nuggets) could be seeded above them. Fairly dumb; it was cancelled for a reason. The Mavs had the #1 offense in the NBA that year, but it wasn’t as much through shooting. Instead it was driven by getting to the line a lot, grabbing offensive boards (which was Dampier’s explicit responsibility on offense) and doing decently enough on floor shooting and not turning it over. It wasn’t sexy, but it worked. And Nowitzki should get a bit of credit for the offensive rebounding, not because he was good at it but because his spacing forced his defender away from the hoop.
In the first round the Mavericks vaporized the poor five-seed Memphis Grizzlies (+3.7). Dirk posted a 31/8/3 on +9.1% shooting (this is on a 82.5 pace game; this would be more like a 38/10/3 in a 100 pace era. Tell me that this doesn’t look like a Kevin Durant line). The Mavericks won by 14 points a game, an extremely dominant performance against a pretty decent team.
In the semis they faced the San Antonio Spurs (who by OSRS were the other best team in the league). And they faced each other in the semis because, again, the Mavericks were seeded fourth. Which weirdly punished not only the Mavericks but also the one-seeded Spurs by forcing them to play each other so early. Let’s not forget that the Spurs had been responsible for knocking the Mavericks out of the playoffs several times in the past few years. This was to be an epic matchup, considered by many to be one of the best playoff series ever. It featured the #1 offense Mavs against the #1 defense Spurs. It pitted all-time great power forward Dirk Nowitzki early in his prime against all-time great power forward Tim Duncan late in his prime. Underdog Mavericks against old guard dynasty Spurs. The two best teams in the league meeting in the semifinals.
SPURS! MAVERICKS! NEXT!
Game One would be a tight defensive battle. Dirk struggled to score with a 20/14/0 on -9.4% while Duncan carried his team with a 31/13/4 on -0.7%. The game went down to the wire (a lot of games from this series did). Jerry Stackhouse got the ball with 15 seconds to go with an open path to the hoop. Instead of scoring to tie it, he dribbled back to the three point line and launched what may have been the most contested jumper in history (no joke, he and his defender were pretty much groin to groin), missing the shot and giving the Spurs the win.
In Game 2 the Mavericks stole the series back. Tim Duncan played an extraordinary game (28/9/3 on +33% with 4 blocks) but the Mavs controlled possession, getting a ridiculous 15 extra shooting possessions on a combination of rebounds and turnovers. Dirk had a 21/9/1 on +21% (with 3 steals) and Josh Howard had a 27/9/2 on +8.2%. The Mavericks ran away with it by 21. The series headed to Dallas, where the Mavericks hoped to put their home court advantage to good use. Duncan had another mammoth game (35/12/2 on +12.4%) but fouled out late in the 4th, as the Mavs got to the line over and over again (50 times in total). Dirk put up a 27/15/3 on +15.4%. The Spurs led the game by 1 going into the final 15 seconds. The Mavs inbounded and Jerry Stackhouse put up a three. As the ball went up, Nowitzki swooped past Bruce Bowen and boxed him out. When the ball missed Nowitzki grabbed it and was fouled on the putback. Dirk, being Dirk, sank both free throws, giving the Mavs the lead and (shortly thereafter) the win. Game 4 was another tight one, going into overtime. In that extra period the Mavs crashed the boards hard, nabbing 4 of the 6 possible offensive rebounds and giving themselves 3 extra shots, which was enough to give them a five point win. The series went back to San Antonio with the Mavericks in the driver’s seat, up 3-1.
In Game 5 again the Mavs owned the glass but the Spurs shot better. Dirk had a 31/10/4 (with 2 steals) on +11.6% but Duncan had a 36/12/4 on +16.7% with 3 blocks. The game was tied at 97 when Manu Ginobili made one of two free throws with two minutes out. The remaining two minutes was a defensive struggle, where neither side could score. With the clock winding down Jason Terry missed a long two and Dirk, grabbing the miss, was unable to convert the putback. And the Spurs managed to win by 1. In Game 6 the Spurs’ defense re-asserted itself; while Dirk put up a 26/21/5 on +13%, no other Mavericks’ scorers shot even close to league average. The teams were tied going into the fourth but Dirk shot 2 of 5 and Stackhouse and Devin Harris combined to go 4 of 12 from the floor for the quarter, while Ginobili scored 8 on 7 and Duncan scored 7 on 7.5. The Spurs win the quarter, and the game, by 5. Game 7 in San Antonio went to overtime. Dirk had a 37/15/3 on +14.8% and Duncan had a 41/15/6 on +6.5%. In the overtime period Duncan went a demoralizing 1 of 7 from the floor and the Mavericks pulled the game out by 8.
The Mavericks had prevailed. Their offense had trounced the Spurs’ defense, posting a relative ORating of +8.5 (relative to league average, so basically they made the best defense in the league allow points like the worst defense in the league). Perhaps Duncan had outplayed Dirk (of course, Dirk was playing against the best defense in the league), but Duncan had been unable to protect the defensive glass from the Mavs’ attack and the Mavs’ shooters did just enough to win. The Mavs won by four points a game, a very respectable achievement against a team as good as the Spurs. The Mavs were past the other best team in the league.
In the Conference Finals they dispatched the Nash Suns that had knocked them out the year before. It wasn’t an overwhelming victory but it counted, at 2.6 points per game with Dirk averaging a 28/13/4 on +4.1%. As per usual the Mavs were outshot (normal for the Suns) but controlled possession so much that it didn’t matter (7 extra shots a game). And the Mavs advanced into the Finals to face the surprise underdog Miami Heat.
Enough has been written about that series that I won’t go into it too much. It was surprising in several ways. First, the Mavs weren’t able to control the boards. Shaq deserves the lion’s share of the credit, but Wade, Antoine Walker and James Posey all posted extremely high DReb% numbers. The Mavs controlled turnovers (enough to get an extra 1.5 shots a game) but that was a far narrower edge than they’d enjoyed in any prior series. And the Mavericks really struggled to shoot. Dirk was held to a 23/11/3 on -0.6%, but Howard, Stackhouse and Harris all shot at -5% or worse. The Heat outshot the Mavs -0.9% to -2.3%, and that was more than enough to give the Heat the edge. Did Wade get a ton of free throw calls? Definitely. But the Mavs weren’t a particularly good defense, they did tend to foul a lot (19th in the league at FT/FGA allowed) and Wade at that time had one of the best first steps ever. The Heat won the series by a point a game. If some of Wade’s calls were taken away, could the Mavs have prevailed? Definitely. But that doesn’t have anything to do with Miami’s defense smothering the Mavs’ offense in a way that the Spurs’ defense failed to do (which, frankly, is the biggest, if least salacious, factor in the outcome of the series). The Mavs were held to 6.3 points per 100 below league average, a massive shutdown. If the Mavs had scored even at league average they would have won the series handily. They didn’t.
Here’s the thing. You don’t need to take away from the Heat’s victory to credit the Mavs with being the best team in the league that year. They totally were. The Heat had been an average regular season team, and hadn’t decisively beaten anyone in the playoffs (they had a strong win over the Pistons, a narrow win over the Mavs, a good win against the Nets but a really weak win over the Bulls). The Heat’s average OSRS opponent to get to the Finals was +3.39 while the Mavs’ was +5.88. Yet their margins of victory were identical. The Mavs made their way through a really tough string of opponents (4 seed remember?) and acquitted themselves very well; they just happened to narrowly lose in the Finals. The Mavs, based on their body of work, were the better team.
Stem Plot with OSRS:
10 |
9 |
8 | Mavericks
7 | Heat, Spurs
6 | Suns
5 | Pistons
4 | Clippers
3 |
2 |
1 | Nets, Cavs, Wizards, Lakers
0 | Pacers, Bulls, Kings, Grizzlies
-0 |
-1 | Bucks, Nuggets, Celtics, Magic, TWolves, Warriors, Rockets
-2 | 76ers, Jazz, Sonics, Hornets
-3 | Raptors, Bobcats
-4 | Hawks
-5 |
-6 | Knicks
-7 |
-8 | Blazers
-9 |
-10|
Don’t read too much into that plot; the Mavs are a very high 8 (8.87) and the Heat are a very low 7 (7.05).
Their SRSs aren’t amazing, 71st for regular and 53rd for postseason. But 2006 was very competitive. Of the 30 teams, only two were worse than -5. 19 of the 30 teams were between +3 and -3. It was far more comparable to 1963 than, say, 2016. And the Mavs get a lot of credit for being the best team in the league (by a respectable bit) in such a tight league. The ‘06 Dallas Mavericks were really good in a really tough year, and Dirk deserves a lot of credit for that. That they narrowly lost in the Finals stinks, but that doesn’t diminish the rest of their accomplishments.
Regular Season Record: 60-22, Regular Season SRS: +5.96 (71st), Earned the 4 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +5.6 (21st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.2 (88th)
PG: Jason Terry, +3.3 / +2.4
SG: Devin Harris, +1.4 / -1.6
SF: Josh Howard, +2.2 / +2.5
PF: Dirk Nowitzki, +8.1 / +9.2
C: Erick Dampier, -1.7 / +1.9
6th: Jerry Stackhouse, -1.5 / +0.1
Dirk Nowitzki (PF, 27): 43 MPPG, 29% OLoad, 30 / 10 / 3 / 2 on +5.3%
Jerry Stackhouse (SF, 31): 32 MPPG, 26% OLoad, 15 / 3 / 3 / 1 on -2.5%
Devin Harris (SG, 22): 26 MPPG, 23% OLoad, 11 / 3 / 4 / 1 on +0.8%
Jason Terry (PG, 28): 40 MPPG, 23% OLoad, 20 / 2 / 4 / 2 on +3.9%
Josh Howard (SF, 25): 37 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 18 / 7 / 2 / 2 on +0.0%
Erick Dampier (C, 30): 27 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 7 / 9 / 1 / 2 on -0.5%
Scoring/100: Dirk Nowitzki (38.1 / +5.3%), Jason Terry (26.8 / +3.9%), Josh Howard (26.4 / +0.0%)
Assists/100: Devin Harris (7.6), Jason Terry (6.0), Jerry Stackhouse (5.7)
Heliocentrism: 44.0% (18th of 84 teams) - Nowitzki
Wingmen: 32.0% (67th) - Terry & Howard
Depth: 23.6% (60th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +7.36 (26th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.91 (77th)
Playoff SRS: +10.35 (53rd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.91 (41st)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.41 (50th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.36 (20th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 44.4% (13th of 84 teams) - Nowitzki
Playoff Wingmen: 28.6% (78th) - Terry & Howard
Playoff Depth: 27.0% (27th)
Round 1: Memphis Grizzlies (+3.7), won 4-0, by +14.0 points per game (+17.7 SRS eq)
Round 2: San Antonio Spurs (+8.2), won 4-3, by +4.0 points per game (+12.2 SRS eq)
Round 3: Phoenix Suns (+5.7), won 4-2, by +2.6 points per game (+8.3 SRS eq)
Round 4: Miami Heat (+6.3), lost 2-4, outscored by -1.0 point per game (+5.3 SRS eq)
In Wurzburg, West Germany, on June 19th, 1978, a tiny baby was born to extremely athletic parents (a professional basketball player and an international handball player). He didn’t stay tiny for long. Dirk Nowitzki was taller than children of his age by a foot for most of his life. He competed in sports with great success, becoming a ranked junior tennis player but eventually gravitated toward basketball. A former international basketball player discovered him and offered to coach him for two or three days a week. Eventually it became clear that Dirk was on the path to become the best basketball player in Germany, but his coach asked him if he wanted to play in the NBA. He believed that Dirk had the ability, but that it would take far more work. After days of consideration, Dirk accepted the challenge. His game kept improving until he began to gain international notice. At nineteen he competed at the Nike Hoop Summit, turning eyes with a 33/14 performance. Nowitzki chose to pass on college and go straight to the pros. He was drafted #9 by the Milwaukee Bucks but then immediately traded to the Mavericks for pieces of inconsequential value. While Dirk struggled as a rookie (he compared going from Second Bundesliga to the NBA to jumping out of an airplane and hoping the parachute would somehow open) he eventually played into form.
The early-aughts Mavericks boasted young Dirk and young Nash (well, pre-Suns Nash) and had moderate success. In ‘01 they made the semis before being demolished by the Spurs. In ‘02 they made the semis before being beaten soundly by the excellent ‘02 Kings. In ‘03 the Mavericks posted the highest RSRS in the league but ended up being beaten by the ‘03 Spurs in the Conference Finals. In ‘04 they were matched up with the +5.4 Kings in the first round and lost in five, despite outscoring them by 1.4 points per game. Basically, the Mavs for that four-year stretch were very good (OSRS has them as the 7th, 4th, 3rd and 6th in the league in those years) but short of the top. And because the West in the early aughts was extremely loaded, Dallas was often fielding strong teams and not even sniffing the NBA Finals. Owner Mark Cuban became frustrated and the roster was blown up and reassembled - Dirk was only 24 at that time which meant that a long-term team built around him had a lot of upside. Steve Nash departed in free agency, Antoine Walker was traded for Jason Terry and Antawn Jamison was traded for Devin Harris and Jerry Stackhouse. Josh Howard moved into the starting lineup and Erick Dampier was acquired from the Warriors to be the defense-first center that Dirk seemed to need. This new roster did well enough in 2005, getting knocked out in the semis (to Nash’s Suns and finishing 5th in OSRS).
It’s really interesting to note Nowitzki’s changed statline upon Nash leaving. Here are his rTS%, 3PAr, FTr, USG%, OBPM and 2P Assisted% for the two years before losing Nash and the two years after:
2003: +6.2% shooting, 0.262 3PAr, 0.368 FTr, 27.4% Usage, +5.8 OBPM, 58.7% 2PAstd
2004: +4.7% shooting, 0.221 3PAr, 0.323 FTr, 24.5% Usage, +3.8 OBPM, 67.0% 2PAstd
2005: +4.9% shooting, 0.158 3PAr, 0.490 FTr, 28.7% Usage, +5.8 OBPM, 49.1% 2PAstd
2006: +5.3% shooting, 0.173 3PAr, 0.382 FTr, 30.0% Usage, +7.8 OBPM, 43.8% 2PAstd
In 2003 he’s more of a three-point gunner, taking lots of threes, shooting efficiently and using a lot of shots. In 2004 (the year he played center) his usage drops as does his shooting efficiency. After losing Nash his three pointers drop, his free throws go up, his usage goes up and his efficiency, while not reaching the heights of 2003, steadily improves. It’s easy to paint a picture here: with Nash, Dirk was more of a stretch 4 (or stretch 5 in 2004, which doesn’t seem to have helped his numbers at all). When Nash left they built the offense around Dirk more, letting him gun from distance and attack the interior. The tradeoff from more efficient threes to less efficient twos was balanced out by the increased free throws (which Nowitzki converted with incredible success). And the more mixed attack allowed Dirk to increase his usage while also increasing his efficiency. Dirk went from being a really good finisher with Nash to being able to create his own offense. I don’t want the above to be read as “Nash was holding Dirk back”; let’s not forget that Dirk was still young and peaking, so these changes (at least in the sense of getting better) were likely inevitable. Let us instead simply say that Cuban let Nash walk, successfully betting that Dirk’s incredible skill and upside made the retention of a wizard like Nash less optimal than it would be for more limited rosters. The new-look Mavs flanked Dirk with a lot of shooting, some passing, and a defense-first center to have his back. It was all built on the idea that peak Dirk plus strong role players could win a title. It appears to have been a good bet. Let’s talk comps quick:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2018 J.J. Reddick
SG: 2014 Jeremy Lin
SF: 2014 Markieff Morris
PF: 2012 Kevin Durant (but better on offense)
C: 2015 Steven Adams (remember, 21 years old)
6th: 2016 Zach LaVine
Jason Terry was nominally the point guard, but in practice he supplied a lot of shooting. And Devin Harris, in contrast, was basically a slashing passer who wasn’t terribly successful but could certainly disrupt defenses. Josh Howard was a solid 3 and Erick Dampier was an extremely limited but still capable rebounding defender. Jerry Stackhouse being compared to young Zach LaVine suggests the considerable amounts of sizzle but only modest amounts of steak that Stackhouse brought to the table. And Dirk as Durant . . . it’s not as crazy as it sounds. They’re both limited passers, both high usage, both good floor spacers, both good rebounders (on defense), both not as good defenders as you’d think and both efficient scorers.
You know what jumps out? How Dirk really didn’t have a strong #2. The Mavs’ Wingmen rating is 67th (RS) and 78th (PS) out of 84 teams. In contrast, Dirk posts extremely respectable Heliocentrism scores. The list of players with higher postseason Heliocentrism than his, with teams ranked #60 or higher? Kareem, Jordan (x2), Bird, LeBron (x4) and Duncan. That’s a really good list to be part of. Obviously it’s subject to the limitations of BBR’s BPM (which are going to implicitly favor scorers like Nowitzki) . . . still. The ‘06 Mavs were an unusually weak supporting cast for a 21st century NBA contender; Dirk made it work.
In 2006 the Mavericks stormed out of the gate, posting the third highest record and SRS in the NBA. However, they happened to be in the same division as the San Antonio Spurs (who were second and first in those metrics). So Dallas finished 2nd in their division, and due to a defunct playoff seeding rule, the Mavs had to be seeded #4 so that the other two division winners (the +5.5 Phoenix Suns and the +0.36 Denver Nuggets) could be seeded above them. Fairly dumb; it was cancelled for a reason. The Mavs had the #1 offense in the NBA that year, but it wasn’t as much through shooting. Instead it was driven by getting to the line a lot, grabbing offensive boards (which was Dampier’s explicit responsibility on offense) and doing decently enough on floor shooting and not turning it over. It wasn’t sexy, but it worked. And Nowitzki should get a bit of credit for the offensive rebounding, not because he was good at it but because his spacing forced his defender away from the hoop.
In the first round the Mavericks vaporized the poor five-seed Memphis Grizzlies (+3.7). Dirk posted a 31/8/3 on +9.1% shooting (this is on a 82.5 pace game; this would be more like a 38/10/3 in a 100 pace era. Tell me that this doesn’t look like a Kevin Durant line). The Mavericks won by 14 points a game, an extremely dominant performance against a pretty decent team.
In the semis they faced the San Antonio Spurs (who by OSRS were the other best team in the league). And they faced each other in the semis because, again, the Mavericks were seeded fourth. Which weirdly punished not only the Mavericks but also the one-seeded Spurs by forcing them to play each other so early. Let’s not forget that the Spurs had been responsible for knocking the Mavericks out of the playoffs several times in the past few years. This was to be an epic matchup, considered by many to be one of the best playoff series ever. It featured the #1 offense Mavs against the #1 defense Spurs. It pitted all-time great power forward Dirk Nowitzki early in his prime against all-time great power forward Tim Duncan late in his prime. Underdog Mavericks against old guard dynasty Spurs. The two best teams in the league meeting in the semifinals.
SPURS! MAVERICKS! NEXT!
Game One would be a tight defensive battle. Dirk struggled to score with a 20/14/0 on -9.4% while Duncan carried his team with a 31/13/4 on -0.7%. The game went down to the wire (a lot of games from this series did). Jerry Stackhouse got the ball with 15 seconds to go with an open path to the hoop. Instead of scoring to tie it, he dribbled back to the three point line and launched what may have been the most contested jumper in history (no joke, he and his defender were pretty much groin to groin), missing the shot and giving the Spurs the win.
In Game 2 the Mavericks stole the series back. Tim Duncan played an extraordinary game (28/9/3 on +33% with 4 blocks) but the Mavs controlled possession, getting a ridiculous 15 extra shooting possessions on a combination of rebounds and turnovers. Dirk had a 21/9/1 on +21% (with 3 steals) and Josh Howard had a 27/9/2 on +8.2%. The Mavericks ran away with it by 21. The series headed to Dallas, where the Mavericks hoped to put their home court advantage to good use. Duncan had another mammoth game (35/12/2 on +12.4%) but fouled out late in the 4th, as the Mavs got to the line over and over again (50 times in total). Dirk put up a 27/15/3 on +15.4%. The Spurs led the game by 1 going into the final 15 seconds. The Mavs inbounded and Jerry Stackhouse put up a three. As the ball went up, Nowitzki swooped past Bruce Bowen and boxed him out. When the ball missed Nowitzki grabbed it and was fouled on the putback. Dirk, being Dirk, sank both free throws, giving the Mavs the lead and (shortly thereafter) the win. Game 4 was another tight one, going into overtime. In that extra period the Mavs crashed the boards hard, nabbing 4 of the 6 possible offensive rebounds and giving themselves 3 extra shots, which was enough to give them a five point win. The series went back to San Antonio with the Mavericks in the driver’s seat, up 3-1.
In Game 5 again the Mavs owned the glass but the Spurs shot better. Dirk had a 31/10/4 (with 2 steals) on +11.6% but Duncan had a 36/12/4 on +16.7% with 3 blocks. The game was tied at 97 when Manu Ginobili made one of two free throws with two minutes out. The remaining two minutes was a defensive struggle, where neither side could score. With the clock winding down Jason Terry missed a long two and Dirk, grabbing the miss, was unable to convert the putback. And the Spurs managed to win by 1. In Game 6 the Spurs’ defense re-asserted itself; while Dirk put up a 26/21/5 on +13%, no other Mavericks’ scorers shot even close to league average. The teams were tied going into the fourth but Dirk shot 2 of 5 and Stackhouse and Devin Harris combined to go 4 of 12 from the floor for the quarter, while Ginobili scored 8 on 7 and Duncan scored 7 on 7.5. The Spurs win the quarter, and the game, by 5. Game 7 in San Antonio went to overtime. Dirk had a 37/15/3 on +14.8% and Duncan had a 41/15/6 on +6.5%. In the overtime period Duncan went a demoralizing 1 of 7 from the floor and the Mavericks pulled the game out by 8.
The Mavericks had prevailed. Their offense had trounced the Spurs’ defense, posting a relative ORating of +8.5 (relative to league average, so basically they made the best defense in the league allow points like the worst defense in the league). Perhaps Duncan had outplayed Dirk (of course, Dirk was playing against the best defense in the league), but Duncan had been unable to protect the defensive glass from the Mavs’ attack and the Mavs’ shooters did just enough to win. The Mavs won by four points a game, a very respectable achievement against a team as good as the Spurs. The Mavs were past the other best team in the league.
In the Conference Finals they dispatched the Nash Suns that had knocked them out the year before. It wasn’t an overwhelming victory but it counted, at 2.6 points per game with Dirk averaging a 28/13/4 on +4.1%. As per usual the Mavs were outshot (normal for the Suns) but controlled possession so much that it didn’t matter (7 extra shots a game). And the Mavs advanced into the Finals to face the surprise underdog Miami Heat.
Enough has been written about that series that I won’t go into it too much. It was surprising in several ways. First, the Mavs weren’t able to control the boards. Shaq deserves the lion’s share of the credit, but Wade, Antoine Walker and James Posey all posted extremely high DReb% numbers. The Mavs controlled turnovers (enough to get an extra 1.5 shots a game) but that was a far narrower edge than they’d enjoyed in any prior series. And the Mavericks really struggled to shoot. Dirk was held to a 23/11/3 on -0.6%, but Howard, Stackhouse and Harris all shot at -5% or worse. The Heat outshot the Mavs -0.9% to -2.3%, and that was more than enough to give the Heat the edge. Did Wade get a ton of free throw calls? Definitely. But the Mavs weren’t a particularly good defense, they did tend to foul a lot (19th in the league at FT/FGA allowed) and Wade at that time had one of the best first steps ever. The Heat won the series by a point a game. If some of Wade’s calls were taken away, could the Mavs have prevailed? Definitely. But that doesn’t have anything to do with Miami’s defense smothering the Mavs’ offense in a way that the Spurs’ defense failed to do (which, frankly, is the biggest, if least salacious, factor in the outcome of the series). The Mavs were held to 6.3 points per 100 below league average, a massive shutdown. If the Mavs had scored even at league average they would have won the series handily. They didn’t.
Here’s the thing. You don’t need to take away from the Heat’s victory to credit the Mavs with being the best team in the league that year. They totally were. The Heat had been an average regular season team, and hadn’t decisively beaten anyone in the playoffs (they had a strong win over the Pistons, a narrow win over the Mavs, a good win against the Nets but a really weak win over the Bulls). The Heat’s average OSRS opponent to get to the Finals was +3.39 while the Mavs’ was +5.88. Yet their margins of victory were identical. The Mavs made their way through a really tough string of opponents (4 seed remember?) and acquitted themselves very well; they just happened to narrowly lose in the Finals. The Mavs, based on their body of work, were the better team.
Stem Plot with OSRS:
10 |
9 |
8 | Mavericks
7 | Heat, Spurs
6 | Suns
5 | Pistons
4 | Clippers
3 |
2 |
1 | Nets, Cavs, Wizards, Lakers
0 | Pacers, Bulls, Kings, Grizzlies
-0 |
-1 | Bucks, Nuggets, Celtics, Magic, TWolves, Warriors, Rockets
-2 | 76ers, Jazz, Sonics, Hornets
-3 | Raptors, Bobcats
-4 | Hawks
-5 |
-6 | Knicks
-7 |
-8 | Blazers
-9 |
-10|
Don’t read too much into that plot; the Mavs are a very high 8 (8.87) and the Heat are a very low 7 (7.05).
Their SRSs aren’t amazing, 71st for regular and 53rd for postseason. But 2006 was very competitive. Of the 30 teams, only two were worse than -5. 19 of the 30 teams were between +3 and -3. It was far more comparable to 1963 than, say, 2016. And the Mavs get a lot of credit for being the best team in the league (by a respectable bit) in such a tight league. The ‘06 Dallas Mavericks were really good in a really tough year, and Dirk deserves a lot of credit for that. That they narrowly lost in the Finals stinks, but that doesn’t diminish the rest of their accomplishments.
#41. The 2004 Detroit Pistons
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +9.04, Standard Deviations: +1.98, Won in NBA Finals (Preseason 7th)
Regular Season Record: 54-28, Regular Season SRS: +5.04 (84th), Earned the 3 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -0.9 (94th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -7.5 (6th)
PG: Chauncey Billups, +3.6 / +4.6
SG: Richard Hamilton, +1.2 / +3.6
SF: Tayshaun Prince, +1.8 / +4.0
PF: Rasheed Wallace, +4.6 / +1.9
C: Ben Wallace, +3.5 / +5.3
Richard Hamilton (SG, 25): 40 MPPG, 26% OLoad, 20 / 4 / 5 / 2 on +0.6%
Chauncey Billups (PG, 27): 40 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 19 / 4 / 7 / 1 on +3.4%
Rasheed Wallace (PF, 29): 35 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 16 / 8 / 2 / 4 on -2.1%
Tayshaun Prince (SF, 23): 38 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 12 / 5 / 3 / 2 on +2.0%
Ben Wallace (C, 29): 43 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 11 / 14 / 2 / 6 on -7.5%
Scoring/100: Richard Hamilton (27.1 / +0.6%), Chauncey Billups (26.1 / +3.4%), Rasheed Wallace (24.5 / -2.1%)
Assists/100: Chauncey Billups (8.8), Richard Hamilton (6.1), Tayshaun Prince (3.9)
Heliocentrism: 25.7% (72nd of 84 teams) - Ben Wallace
Wingmen: 38.9% (39th) - Billups & Prince
Depth: 35.4% (21st)
Playoff Offensive Rating: -0.82 (97th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -11.84 (2nd)
Playoff SRS: +11.08 (43rd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.00 (24th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.94 (83rd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.78 (30th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 26.6% (77th of 84 teams) - Ben Wallace
Playoff Wingmen: 42.2% (33rd) - Billups & Hamilton
Playoff Bench: 31.2% (16th)
Round 1: Milwaukee Bucks (+0.4), won 4-1, by +12.6 points per game (+13.0 SRS eq)
Round 2: New Jersey Nets (+4.2), won 4-3, by +3.4 points per game (+7.6 SRS eq)
Round 3: Indiana Pacers (+6.5), won 4-2, by +2.5 points per game (+9.0 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+7.6), won 4-1, by +9.0 points per game (+16.6 SRS eq)
Gambles. They’re a part of running a team. Most of them fail. Daryl Morey picking up Chris Paul, the 76ers signing Andrew Bynum, the Celtics acquiring Kyrie Irving, the Thunder acquiring Paul George (didn’t lead to success, though it did lead to a haul of assets) . . . But some work out. Pau Gasol for the Lakers in ‘08, Garnett and Allen for the Celtics (also in ‘08), bringing in LeBron (every team that has) . . . and so on. This story is about one of the gambles that worked. Among other things.
The 2000 Pistons had one of those rosters that sounds really good to the casual fan, where you look for the two biggest names on the team and evaluate them based on name recognition. Jerry Stackhouse and Grant Hill. It may have sounded good, but really it was Grant Hill being really good (not superstar good, but definitely above all-star level) and carrying a weak roster an average season (42-40, +1.13, first round). In the offseason they sign-and-traded Hill to the Orlando Magic for Chucky Atkins and Ben Wallace. Ben Wallace was a diamond in the rough . . . the rough was the fact that the guy couldn’t score, couldn’t pass and turned the ball over a lot. The diamond was the extraordinary rebounding on both ends and exceptional defense. He was short for a center (6’9” if you didn’t count his afro) but he defended the rim well (10th or so in block percentage pretty consistently) and was quick enough to generate a surprising amount of steals for a big man. He had come into the NBA at 22 with Washington, but had struggled to get on the court (as a 6’9” center that couldn’t shoot at all, he didn’t get a lot of love). He’d actually posted by far the best +/- on the team with the Wizards, but struggled a bit in Orlando (Doc Rivers made him play power forward). In other words, to the casual observer Ben Wallace wasn’t that good, but his strengths were considerable if you were willing to look.
In 2001 the Grant Hill-less Pistons struggled, going 32-50 with a -2.08 SRS. Their defense was good (8th) but their offense was terrible (25th). In 2002 they upgraded their coaching by adding Rick Carlisle and what was basically the same roster went 50-32 (+1.69, second round). Much of the improvement was from Wallace; he grew into shooting almost league average (a 5% improvement), his assist rate jumped (to 6.8%) and his steal% and block% both jumped. Going into 2003 the Pistons made a number of moves. They signed Chauncey Billups as a free agent, they traded Jerry Stackhouse for Richard Hamilton and drafted Tayshaun Prince out of Kentucky. The new-look Pistons were slightly better (50-32, +2.97) and made it to the Conference Finals before being swept by the Nets (not a great endorsement, but it did suggest that they were close to competing for the top of the conference). In 2004 their roster looked even better, with both Prince and Mehmet Okur developing well). Through 60 games they’d gone 37-23 (same pace as last year) with a +3.4 MoV. And GM Joe Dumars swung for the fences, trading Chucky Atkins and two firsts (who would become Josh Smith and Tony Allen) for Rasheed Wallace. This is the gamble I was speaking of.
Rasheed Wallace . . . Box score metrics don’t really like him. He scored decently (before Detroit) at decent volume, he rebounded decently, he passed well enough not to be a liability and his steals/blocks were respectable. Box score-driven metrics generally rated him as around all-star level. But two firsts and Chucky Atkins was a generous package for only an All-Star. The thing was, Rasheed was considerably better than he looked. AuRPM consistently thought he was one of the best players in the league. 17th in 2001, 13th in 2002, 7th in 2003 and 5th in 2004. AuRPM measures on-court impact with adjusted on-off numbers, so it’s really good at catching the little things that box scores don’t (AuRPM always likes “little things” players like Shane Battier more than BPM or WS). This is a long way of saying that based on the things that the box score tracked, Rasheed Wallace was a pretty good player. But based on his on-court impact, he was perhaps one of the top ten players in the league. So Detroit traded a good bit to add him to their roster, gambling that it would push them over the edge.
Games without Rasheed: 37-23, 90.2 PF, 86.8 PA, +3.4 MoV
Games with Rasheed: 17-5, 90.0 PF, 77.3 PA, +12.7 MoV
So, to be clear, this isn’t opponent-adjusted. And, to be clear, they’d been alternating between Mehmet Okur (not a bad defender but not great either) and a 35 year-old Elden Campbell starting at the 4, so ‘Sheed had a fairly low bar to clear here. But a 9.5 point a game reduction in points allowed (onto a defense that already had Ben Wallace)? Those numbers suggest that the Pistons were a good team before the trade, but a +12.7 MoV is championship-level. It’s only a 22-game sample. But the addition of Rasheed Wallace seemed to jump the roster several tiers up. Their offense still wasn’t even average. They didn’t shoot well and they turned the ball over a little more than they should have; their only strengths were offensive rebounding and being at the rim a lot. But their regular season defense was extraordinary, the 7th best on this list, and that’s without ‘Sheed for most of the season. But with him there was a suggestion that in the playoffs their defense might be even better.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2014 Kyle Lowry
SG: 2018 Jrue Holiday
SF: 2014 Matt Barnes
PF: 2011 Rudy Gay
C: 2004 Ben Wallace
I like the BIllups / Lowry comp. Billups is like what you’d design in 2k if you only had so many points. Good enough on defense to be useful on that end, good enough passer, didn’t turn the ball over, got to the line a lot and shot threes well. He wasn’t really good at any one thing, but the total package was quite good. Hamilton as Jrue Holiday is fine, Prince as Matt Barnes works (since both were sufficient offensive players who were mostly defensive stoppers). There is no modern comp for ‘04 Ben Wallace; he’s way too weird. Not kidding, one of his top 5 comps was a Bill Russell season (it wasn’t a good comp, but still top 5). Do you know how rare it is to get modern players whose best comps played in the 60s? It’s freaking rare. And that Rasheed is compared to Rudy Gay only shows that box score metrics really underestimated him.
Anyhow. The ‘04 Pistons. They finished 54-28 with a +5.04 SRS (low for this list, but most of that was pre-’Sheed). They had the second best record in the East, but because they were behind a team in their own division (the Pacers) they were seeded third. In the first round they faced the Milwaukee Bucks (+0.4). The Pistons chewed them up and spit them out, dominating all four factors and winning by 12.6 points per game.
In the second round they faced the Nets (+4.2), the team that had swept them the year before. This was a tougher contest, as the Pistons struggled to shoot effectively (in fact, not a single person on their team shot at league average though many were close), combining at -3.8% as a team. But they controlled possession by 6 shots a game (Ben Wallace grabbed almost five offensive boards a game) and they held the Nets’ shooters in check. They shot at -3.2%, better than the Pistons but not enough to make up for having fewer shots. The Pistons won in seven by 3.4 points a game. They had won, but hadn’t looked good doing it.
In the Conference Finals they played the one-seeded Indiana Pacers (+6.5). The Pacers were a tough defensive team led by Jermaine O’Neal and Ron Artest, so the series promised to be brutal. It was. The Pistons were held to shooting -6.5% as a team (which is amazingly low); only Richard Hamilton shot above league average (24/5/4 on +2.9%). But the Pistons’ defense made sure that the Pacers shot even worse (-8%). The 38 year-old Reggie Miller shot at +2.8%; the next best starter shot at -4.3%. Between them the teams averaged 74 points a game and the Pistons prevailed by 2.5 points a game. Another tight win, but now the Pistons were in the NBA Finals.
They faced the Los Angeles Lakers (+7.6). They featured slightly post-prime Shaq and early-prime Kobe, but had also added the 40 year-old (not a misprint) Karl Malone and 35 year-old Gary Payton. They’d been very good during the season, but Malone had injured his knee which made him miss a lot of time and he wasn’t at his best when he came back. Still. The Lakers had won 3 titles in the last four years, which made them a formidable foe against the upstart Pistons. Game 1 was in Los Angeles, a game the Pistons were surely expected to lose. Instead they turned the tables, absolutely smothering the Lakers’ shooting (Shaq had an excellent 34/11/1 on +18.3% but with 6 turnovers, while Kobe shot -8.1%). The Pistons in contrast actually shot well (it did happen on occasion) with Billups posting a 22/3/4 on +18.2% with 3 steals. The Pistons won decisively by 12, holding the Lakers to 75 points (the game was slow, but it was still an impressive result). In Game 2, the Lakers bounced back, with Kobe posting a 33/4/7 on +4.9% and Shaq having a 29/7/3 on +3.8% and the Pistons shot at -3.5%. The Lakers prevailed by 8.
Game 3 was in Detroit. The Pistons’ defense was in top form. Kobe was held to an 11/3/5 on -13.2% and Shaq only managed a 14/8/1 on -4.6%. Look at those lines again; Shaq and Kobe combining for 25 points in a Finals game? What the heck!? The Pistons didn’t shoot well (-2.3%) but they won the possession battle by 9-10 shots, and again, they smothered the Lakers offense completely. The Pistons beat the Shaq/Kobe Lakers by 20. Some will point out that Karl Malone went down with a knee injury midway through the game, and that that compromised the quality of the Pistons’ win. So riddle me this. The Pistons quarter point differentials were the following: +8, +1, +5 and +8. Malone played all of Q1, almost none of Q2, half of Q3 and none of Q4. It’s a hard sell that the 20 point loss was purely Malone’s injury.
In Game 4 Shaq broke out (an amazing 36/20/2 on +18.1%) but Kobe again was shut down (20/0/2 on -13%). The non-Shaq Lakers struggled, with the team shooting -6% while the Pistons shot well at -0.5%, led by Billups with a 23/4/4 on +20.5% and Hamilton with a 17/2/6 on +8.8% (but 5 turnovers). It wasn’t dominant, but the Pistons had won by 8 points.
Suddenly, the Pistons led the three-peat Lakers 3-1, with an average +8 MoV. But now the Lakers’ back was to the wall and the Pistons needed to try to close the game out in the last Detroit game, Game 5. And they did. Kobe posted a 24/3/4 on -5.2% and Shaq a 20/8/1 on -1.7%. The Lakers shot well below league average while the Pistons again shot well, led by Billups with a 14/3/6 on +30.6%. Ben Wallace grabbed an astounding ten offensive boards against Shaq and the Pistons won going away by 13.
The Pistons had won the championship. They’d shot well (Billups seemed to have little problem scoring on the older Gary Payton, averaging 21 a game on +18% shooting), and they owned all four factors. Shaq had still had success but every other Laker had been shut down (including Kobe, who averaged a 23/3/4 on -6% on the series).
10 |
9 | Pistons
8 |
7 | Spurs
6 | Pacers, Lakers
5 | TWolves, Mavericks, Kings
4 | Nets
3 |
2 |
1 | Heat, Rockets, Nuggets
0 | Grizzlies, Sonics
-0 | Jazz, Blazers, Warriors
-1 | Hornets, Bucks
-2 | 76ers, Suns
-3 | Cavs, Raptors, Clippers
-4 | Knicks, Celtics
-5 | Hawks
-6 | Wizards, Bulls
-7 | Magic
-8 |
-9 |
-10|
So where do the Pistons stack up? This was a reasonably competitive year; there were no truly awful teams, and 8 teams stood clearly separated from the rest of the league. Did the Pistons struggle a bit against the Nets and Pacers? Yeah. They won but they didn’t look good doing it. And dominating the Bucks was a really nice win, but the Bucks weren’t a particularly good team. But the Finals? The Pistons dominated those Finals. In many ways it was an ideal matchup. Not the Shaq part; he was fairly unstoppable even against the Wallaces. But Payton really couldn’t score in the playoffs (against anyone), Malone didn’t really shoot well against anyone . . . really, that offense was Shaq and Kobe carrying everything with Payton and Malone being mostly defensive stoppers. The Pistons threw a variety of zone looks at Kobe and made denying him easy shots their priority. And they succeeded. This wasn’t even really young Kobe; he was 25 at this point, in the fullness of his peak, and he got shut down pretty hard. The Pistons crushed the Lakers hard, one of the higher SRS eq Finals performances we’ve seen. Did Karl Malone’s injury cheapen the victory? I don’t think so. Malone in the playoffs was only a shadow of his former self: low usage, low efficiency, great defensive rebounding and strong man defense. The box score stats don’t see his man defense, and put him at +0.1 BPM. And injuries happen, especially to 40 year-olds. Malone’s presence probably would have been worth an extra . . . point a game? Let’s not get it twisted. The Pistons whipped the Lakers and shut down peak Kobe Bryant.
And let the record show that this is the 2004 Pistons have the 2nd best playoff defense on this list. Their offense? Was below average in the regular season and below average in the playoffs. There is generally a cap on how good you can be if your offense is only average. If you’re going to be an all-time great team, but you only have an average offense, your defense had better be phenomenal. The ‘04 Pistons had one of the very best defenses ever, and certainly the best in the modern game.
Regular Season Record: 54-28, Regular Season SRS: +5.04 (84th), Earned the 3 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -0.9 (94th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -7.5 (6th)
PG: Chauncey Billups, +3.6 / +4.6
SG: Richard Hamilton, +1.2 / +3.6
SF: Tayshaun Prince, +1.8 / +4.0
PF: Rasheed Wallace, +4.6 / +1.9
C: Ben Wallace, +3.5 / +5.3
Richard Hamilton (SG, 25): 40 MPPG, 26% OLoad, 20 / 4 / 5 / 2 on +0.6%
Chauncey Billups (PG, 27): 40 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 19 / 4 / 7 / 1 on +3.4%
Rasheed Wallace (PF, 29): 35 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 16 / 8 / 2 / 4 on -2.1%
Tayshaun Prince (SF, 23): 38 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 12 / 5 / 3 / 2 on +2.0%
Ben Wallace (C, 29): 43 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 11 / 14 / 2 / 6 on -7.5%
Scoring/100: Richard Hamilton (27.1 / +0.6%), Chauncey Billups (26.1 / +3.4%), Rasheed Wallace (24.5 / -2.1%)
Assists/100: Chauncey Billups (8.8), Richard Hamilton (6.1), Tayshaun Prince (3.9)
Heliocentrism: 25.7% (72nd of 84 teams) - Ben Wallace
Wingmen: 38.9% (39th) - Billups & Prince
Depth: 35.4% (21st)
Playoff Offensive Rating: -0.82 (97th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -11.84 (2nd)
Playoff SRS: +11.08 (43rd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.00 (24th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.94 (83rd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.78 (30th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 26.6% (77th of 84 teams) - Ben Wallace
Playoff Wingmen: 42.2% (33rd) - Billups & Hamilton
Playoff Bench: 31.2% (16th)
Round 1: Milwaukee Bucks (+0.4), won 4-1, by +12.6 points per game (+13.0 SRS eq)
Round 2: New Jersey Nets (+4.2), won 4-3, by +3.4 points per game (+7.6 SRS eq)
Round 3: Indiana Pacers (+6.5), won 4-2, by +2.5 points per game (+9.0 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+7.6), won 4-1, by +9.0 points per game (+16.6 SRS eq)
Gambles. They’re a part of running a team. Most of them fail. Daryl Morey picking up Chris Paul, the 76ers signing Andrew Bynum, the Celtics acquiring Kyrie Irving, the Thunder acquiring Paul George (didn’t lead to success, though it did lead to a haul of assets) . . . But some work out. Pau Gasol for the Lakers in ‘08, Garnett and Allen for the Celtics (also in ‘08), bringing in LeBron (every team that has) . . . and so on. This story is about one of the gambles that worked. Among other things.
The 2000 Pistons had one of those rosters that sounds really good to the casual fan, where you look for the two biggest names on the team and evaluate them based on name recognition. Jerry Stackhouse and Grant Hill. It may have sounded good, but really it was Grant Hill being really good (not superstar good, but definitely above all-star level) and carrying a weak roster an average season (42-40, +1.13, first round). In the offseason they sign-and-traded Hill to the Orlando Magic for Chucky Atkins and Ben Wallace. Ben Wallace was a diamond in the rough . . . the rough was the fact that the guy couldn’t score, couldn’t pass and turned the ball over a lot. The diamond was the extraordinary rebounding on both ends and exceptional defense. He was short for a center (6’9” if you didn’t count his afro) but he defended the rim well (10th or so in block percentage pretty consistently) and was quick enough to generate a surprising amount of steals for a big man. He had come into the NBA at 22 with Washington, but had struggled to get on the court (as a 6’9” center that couldn’t shoot at all, he didn’t get a lot of love). He’d actually posted by far the best +/- on the team with the Wizards, but struggled a bit in Orlando (Doc Rivers made him play power forward). In other words, to the casual observer Ben Wallace wasn’t that good, but his strengths were considerable if you were willing to look.
In 2001 the Grant Hill-less Pistons struggled, going 32-50 with a -2.08 SRS. Their defense was good (8th) but their offense was terrible (25th). In 2002 they upgraded their coaching by adding Rick Carlisle and what was basically the same roster went 50-32 (+1.69, second round). Much of the improvement was from Wallace; he grew into shooting almost league average (a 5% improvement), his assist rate jumped (to 6.8%) and his steal% and block% both jumped. Going into 2003 the Pistons made a number of moves. They signed Chauncey Billups as a free agent, they traded Jerry Stackhouse for Richard Hamilton and drafted Tayshaun Prince out of Kentucky. The new-look Pistons were slightly better (50-32, +2.97) and made it to the Conference Finals before being swept by the Nets (not a great endorsement, but it did suggest that they were close to competing for the top of the conference). In 2004 their roster looked even better, with both Prince and Mehmet Okur developing well). Through 60 games they’d gone 37-23 (same pace as last year) with a +3.4 MoV. And GM Joe Dumars swung for the fences, trading Chucky Atkins and two firsts (who would become Josh Smith and Tony Allen) for Rasheed Wallace. This is the gamble I was speaking of.
Rasheed Wallace . . . Box score metrics don’t really like him. He scored decently (before Detroit) at decent volume, he rebounded decently, he passed well enough not to be a liability and his steals/blocks were respectable. Box score-driven metrics generally rated him as around all-star level. But two firsts and Chucky Atkins was a generous package for only an All-Star. The thing was, Rasheed was considerably better than he looked. AuRPM consistently thought he was one of the best players in the league. 17th in 2001, 13th in 2002, 7th in 2003 and 5th in 2004. AuRPM measures on-court impact with adjusted on-off numbers, so it’s really good at catching the little things that box scores don’t (AuRPM always likes “little things” players like Shane Battier more than BPM or WS). This is a long way of saying that based on the things that the box score tracked, Rasheed Wallace was a pretty good player. But based on his on-court impact, he was perhaps one of the top ten players in the league. So Detroit traded a good bit to add him to their roster, gambling that it would push them over the edge.
Games without Rasheed: 37-23, 90.2 PF, 86.8 PA, +3.4 MoV
Games with Rasheed: 17-5, 90.0 PF, 77.3 PA, +12.7 MoV
So, to be clear, this isn’t opponent-adjusted. And, to be clear, they’d been alternating between Mehmet Okur (not a bad defender but not great either) and a 35 year-old Elden Campbell starting at the 4, so ‘Sheed had a fairly low bar to clear here. But a 9.5 point a game reduction in points allowed (onto a defense that already had Ben Wallace)? Those numbers suggest that the Pistons were a good team before the trade, but a +12.7 MoV is championship-level. It’s only a 22-game sample. But the addition of Rasheed Wallace seemed to jump the roster several tiers up. Their offense still wasn’t even average. They didn’t shoot well and they turned the ball over a little more than they should have; their only strengths were offensive rebounding and being at the rim a lot. But their regular season defense was extraordinary, the 7th best on this list, and that’s without ‘Sheed for most of the season. But with him there was a suggestion that in the playoffs their defense might be even better.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2014 Kyle Lowry
SG: 2018 Jrue Holiday
SF: 2014 Matt Barnes
PF: 2011 Rudy Gay
C: 2004 Ben Wallace
I like the BIllups / Lowry comp. Billups is like what you’d design in 2k if you only had so many points. Good enough on defense to be useful on that end, good enough passer, didn’t turn the ball over, got to the line a lot and shot threes well. He wasn’t really good at any one thing, but the total package was quite good. Hamilton as Jrue Holiday is fine, Prince as Matt Barnes works (since both were sufficient offensive players who were mostly defensive stoppers). There is no modern comp for ‘04 Ben Wallace; he’s way too weird. Not kidding, one of his top 5 comps was a Bill Russell season (it wasn’t a good comp, but still top 5). Do you know how rare it is to get modern players whose best comps played in the 60s? It’s freaking rare. And that Rasheed is compared to Rudy Gay only shows that box score metrics really underestimated him.
Anyhow. The ‘04 Pistons. They finished 54-28 with a +5.04 SRS (low for this list, but most of that was pre-’Sheed). They had the second best record in the East, but because they were behind a team in their own division (the Pacers) they were seeded third. In the first round they faced the Milwaukee Bucks (+0.4). The Pistons chewed them up and spit them out, dominating all four factors and winning by 12.6 points per game.
In the second round they faced the Nets (+4.2), the team that had swept them the year before. This was a tougher contest, as the Pistons struggled to shoot effectively (in fact, not a single person on their team shot at league average though many were close), combining at -3.8% as a team. But they controlled possession by 6 shots a game (Ben Wallace grabbed almost five offensive boards a game) and they held the Nets’ shooters in check. They shot at -3.2%, better than the Pistons but not enough to make up for having fewer shots. The Pistons won in seven by 3.4 points a game. They had won, but hadn’t looked good doing it.
In the Conference Finals they played the one-seeded Indiana Pacers (+6.5). The Pacers were a tough defensive team led by Jermaine O’Neal and Ron Artest, so the series promised to be brutal. It was. The Pistons were held to shooting -6.5% as a team (which is amazingly low); only Richard Hamilton shot above league average (24/5/4 on +2.9%). But the Pistons’ defense made sure that the Pacers shot even worse (-8%). The 38 year-old Reggie Miller shot at +2.8%; the next best starter shot at -4.3%. Between them the teams averaged 74 points a game and the Pistons prevailed by 2.5 points a game. Another tight win, but now the Pistons were in the NBA Finals.
They faced the Los Angeles Lakers (+7.6). They featured slightly post-prime Shaq and early-prime Kobe, but had also added the 40 year-old (not a misprint) Karl Malone and 35 year-old Gary Payton. They’d been very good during the season, but Malone had injured his knee which made him miss a lot of time and he wasn’t at his best when he came back. Still. The Lakers had won 3 titles in the last four years, which made them a formidable foe against the upstart Pistons. Game 1 was in Los Angeles, a game the Pistons were surely expected to lose. Instead they turned the tables, absolutely smothering the Lakers’ shooting (Shaq had an excellent 34/11/1 on +18.3% but with 6 turnovers, while Kobe shot -8.1%). The Pistons in contrast actually shot well (it did happen on occasion) with Billups posting a 22/3/4 on +18.2% with 3 steals. The Pistons won decisively by 12, holding the Lakers to 75 points (the game was slow, but it was still an impressive result). In Game 2, the Lakers bounced back, with Kobe posting a 33/4/7 on +4.9% and Shaq having a 29/7/3 on +3.8% and the Pistons shot at -3.5%. The Lakers prevailed by 8.
Game 3 was in Detroit. The Pistons’ defense was in top form. Kobe was held to an 11/3/5 on -13.2% and Shaq only managed a 14/8/1 on -4.6%. Look at those lines again; Shaq and Kobe combining for 25 points in a Finals game? What the heck!? The Pistons didn’t shoot well (-2.3%) but they won the possession battle by 9-10 shots, and again, they smothered the Lakers offense completely. The Pistons beat the Shaq/Kobe Lakers by 20. Some will point out that Karl Malone went down with a knee injury midway through the game, and that that compromised the quality of the Pistons’ win. So riddle me this. The Pistons quarter point differentials were the following: +8, +1, +5 and +8. Malone played all of Q1, almost none of Q2, half of Q3 and none of Q4. It’s a hard sell that the 20 point loss was purely Malone’s injury.
In Game 4 Shaq broke out (an amazing 36/20/2 on +18.1%) but Kobe again was shut down (20/0/2 on -13%). The non-Shaq Lakers struggled, with the team shooting -6% while the Pistons shot well at -0.5%, led by Billups with a 23/4/4 on +20.5% and Hamilton with a 17/2/6 on +8.8% (but 5 turnovers). It wasn’t dominant, but the Pistons had won by 8 points.
Suddenly, the Pistons led the three-peat Lakers 3-1, with an average +8 MoV. But now the Lakers’ back was to the wall and the Pistons needed to try to close the game out in the last Detroit game, Game 5. And they did. Kobe posted a 24/3/4 on -5.2% and Shaq a 20/8/1 on -1.7%. The Lakers shot well below league average while the Pistons again shot well, led by Billups with a 14/3/6 on +30.6%. Ben Wallace grabbed an astounding ten offensive boards against Shaq and the Pistons won going away by 13.
The Pistons had won the championship. They’d shot well (Billups seemed to have little problem scoring on the older Gary Payton, averaging 21 a game on +18% shooting), and they owned all four factors. Shaq had still had success but every other Laker had been shut down (including Kobe, who averaged a 23/3/4 on -6% on the series).
10 |
9 | Pistons
8 |
7 | Spurs
6 | Pacers, Lakers
5 | TWolves, Mavericks, Kings
4 | Nets
3 |
2 |
1 | Heat, Rockets, Nuggets
0 | Grizzlies, Sonics
-0 | Jazz, Blazers, Warriors
-1 | Hornets, Bucks
-2 | 76ers, Suns
-3 | Cavs, Raptors, Clippers
-4 | Knicks, Celtics
-5 | Hawks
-6 | Wizards, Bulls
-7 | Magic
-8 |
-9 |
-10|
So where do the Pistons stack up? This was a reasonably competitive year; there were no truly awful teams, and 8 teams stood clearly separated from the rest of the league. Did the Pistons struggle a bit against the Nets and Pacers? Yeah. They won but they didn’t look good doing it. And dominating the Bucks was a really nice win, but the Bucks weren’t a particularly good team. But the Finals? The Pistons dominated those Finals. In many ways it was an ideal matchup. Not the Shaq part; he was fairly unstoppable even against the Wallaces. But Payton really couldn’t score in the playoffs (against anyone), Malone didn’t really shoot well against anyone . . . really, that offense was Shaq and Kobe carrying everything with Payton and Malone being mostly defensive stoppers. The Pistons threw a variety of zone looks at Kobe and made denying him easy shots their priority. And they succeeded. This wasn’t even really young Kobe; he was 25 at this point, in the fullness of his peak, and he got shut down pretty hard. The Pistons crushed the Lakers hard, one of the higher SRS eq Finals performances we’ve seen. Did Karl Malone’s injury cheapen the victory? I don’t think so. Malone in the playoffs was only a shadow of his former self: low usage, low efficiency, great defensive rebounding and strong man defense. The box score stats don’t see his man defense, and put him at +0.1 BPM. And injuries happen, especially to 40 year-olds. Malone’s presence probably would have been worth an extra . . . point a game? Let’s not get it twisted. The Pistons whipped the Lakers and shut down peak Kobe Bryant.
And let the record show that this is the 2004 Pistons have the 2nd best playoff defense on this list. Their offense? Was below average in the regular season and below average in the playoffs. There is generally a cap on how good you can be if your offense is only average. If you’re going to be an all-time great team, but you only have an average offense, your defense had better be phenomenal. The ‘04 Pistons had one of the very best defenses ever, and certainly the best in the modern game.
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