Boston were OLDER and MORE INJURED. the reason why they lost is because Wilt couldn't dominate Wayne freakin Embry.
Wayne Embry's ability to keep Wilt off the offensive boards, clearing Russell (the GOAT defensive rebounder) to get the rebound and outlet to start the break was basically the reason the Sixers didn't close Boston out in Gm. 5 of the '68 EDF, despite an injured Wilt (partial tear of calf muscle in his right leg, a strain in his right thigh, partial tear of right knee tendon, and an injured right toe) coming out strong with a 28/30/7 effort. To quote Russell during the series,
"A lesser man wouldn't be out there." Hell, the reason they won G4 was big Luke making Russell pay for sagging back on Wilt by hitting 4 big outside shots (3 consecutive) in the 4th quarter to open up a 10 pt. lead. Final score = 110-105. Chamberlain's G5 effort (28/30/7) exceeded his regular season statistical averages in both points & rebounds.
While it is noted that Russell switched himself onto Chet to cool him off, it appears he killed two birds with one stone. Of course the Sixers exceptionally poor outside shooting (below 25% FG in the 4th) when it counted along with Billy C's glaring absence didn't hurt either.
Article prior to Gm. 1 vs. Boston:
Christian Science Monitor - Apr 5, 1968
For example, Philadelphia lost Billy Cunningham for the season in the New York series with a broken right wrist. This is like Boston having to play without John Havlicek or St. Louis minus Joe Caldwell. Cunningham is a shooter' in all that the term implies. He played almost as many minutes during the season as the 76ers' two starting forwards, Luke Jackson and Chet Walker. Bill is an expert at driving the middle, drawing fouls, and then cashing them in at the free throw line. There is no one on the Celtics who really plays him well. Havlicek probably comes closest. But John's quickness is generally wasted against Cunningham, mostly because Bill gives no indication of when he is going to shoot.
The 76ers run what they call a C-pattern for Cunningham. It allows Billy to come across the top of the key from either side, pull up for a quick jumper whenever he feels like it, and then clears out the middle so that he can follow his own shot to the basket.Article prior to Gm. 7:
Gettysburg Times - May 9, 1968According to Vince Miller after the game Chamberlain got five touches in the 4th quarter of G7. Whether it two touches or five in the final period, all accounts agree that he got 7 touches in the 2nd half. This after 23 touches in the 1st half.
"What would I have looked like if I had said, 'Hey, we lost because my teammates didn't get the ball into me? If Alex Hannum didn't have guts enough to lay it on the line and accept a certain amount of responsibility for the loss and name the reasons why, then I've lost a lot of respect for him, which I have and I will tell him that when I see him. You can't shoot the ball if you don't have the ball. But you know something, after the game, not one writer came up to me and said 'Hey, how come the ball didn't come into you?' Not one. But all of them did ask me, 'How come you didn't shoot more?'Bill Russell interview from 2008:
http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/prin ... /rus0int-1Before we leave 1968 altogether, can we talk about game seven for a minute? In 1968 you limited your friend Wilt Chamberlain to two shot attempts in the entire second half of game seven.
That's not true at all. That was a coach's decision. There was a forward on their team named Chet Walker, and he was hurting us badly, okay? So I had my backup center, it was a guy named Wayne Embry. Now Embry had been in the league seven or eight years, and he played against Wilt all those years. So at half time I said to him, "Wayne, I'm going to try something. It's not new. I want you to guard Wilt. Okay? I have to take care of Chet Walker." And see, when I made that substitution everybody thought it was trying to stay out of foul trouble, something like that, which was to me the best part of that because I made adjustments that they didn't know what I was doing. So they couldn't make a counter adjustment. You see if you make an adjustment, and they know what you're doing, well they can just counter it. But I made an adjustment, they thought it was to get off of Wilt. They didn't know it was to get on Chet. Now Wilt had a game plan, but his game plan was counting on me trying to guard him. When we put Wayne on him, he guarded him a completely different way.
He was used to you guarding him.
Yes. To me, the pretty part of it was -- I hate to use the word beauty -- is that Wayne had enormous experience guarding him. So it wasn't like you took some guy out of the stands and put him on Wilt. Here's a guy who's been guarding him for years. That adjustment was for Chet Walker, it wasn't for Wilt.
Can you talk us through the last minute of the 1968 Eastern Finals?
It was a close game, but we were in charge. So they got to the place where they've got to foul us. So they fouled, and we make free throws and they go down, and they score and make three fouls. So they get down to 12 seconds to go. That's when the thing with Sam came up. It was going to that series. After we got down three to one...
I'm the coach, okay, and so I'm talking to my guys before the fifth game. And I says, "We're going to beat these guys, and this is how we're going to do it." And we had a rookie on the team who's now a judge in Boston, because he had an ailment, he had to retire, but he told me a few years ago, he said, "You know, I was in the locker room when you said that. That's the most disciplined situation I've ever been in my life, because I had to discipline myself from falling out on the floor laughing, when you said we're going to beat these guys." He says, "They're going to kill us!" And he says, "We haven't got a chance!" And he sat there and watched the whole thing happen. And he says that's one of the wonders of his life, because I said it with complete confidence. And then I said, like I said earlier, "We don't have to win three games in a row. We've just got to win one." You see, after we won two of them, the pressure completely shifts. The pressure is on them. You're up three to one, and how do you lose three straight?
So it was basically routine.
I think that that move that I made at half time was the most important move I made as a coach in that series, because it worked, and we got accomplished what we wanted to get accomplished without them knowing what we were trying to accomplish. See everybody still talks about the fact that Wilt only took two shots. They still almost won the game, right? And the key was that Chet Walker had been killing us. And I knew that I could guard him. And the reason I knew I could guard him is his moves were very deliberate. As part of my teaching myself, I learned -- we had six plays and nowadays they number those positions. One is point guard, two is shooting guard, three is a small forward, four is a power forward, five is a center. Well, I made a point to learn how to play all those positions on all six plays. Now not that I ever wanted to or hoped to play in those other positions, but in knowing those positions I know the problems that go with that position. So that if my teammate needed help I can help. And on defense I watched these guys, how they play defense, and I know how to guard almost any position. And I physically took over Chet.The inside game: race, power, and politics in the NBA - Wayne Embry
Two years earlier in '66 he outplayed Russell clearly in Games 3 & 5, and a wash in G4. But to no avail they lost.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cEdiptkyYsY#t=48sIt seems they also took the Celtics too lightly. Above we can see them celebrating the win vs Bullets to clinch the Division Championship on the last day of the season. They finished with 55 wins to Boston's 54.
The two week layoff killed them. There is no way you can say Chamberlain played poorly in the series. Looking at the recaps, it appears G2 was easily his (and the Sixers) worst showing of the series. In G3 he grabbed 27 of the Sixers 69 rebounds and they won because Greer got hot down the stretch and Wilt finally got some help on the boards from Luke Jackson (15 rebounds). It may sound funny that a player averaging 30 boards needs help on the glass until you note how exceptionally poor the Sixers outside shooting was.
G1 - 25 points, 32 rebounds, 9/17 FG
G2 - 23 points, 25 rebounds, 9/23 FG
G3 - 31 points, 27 rebounds, 12/22 FG
G4 - 15 points, 33 rebounds, 7/14 FG
G5 - 46 points, 34 rebounds, 19/34 FG
Averages in G1 & G4 - 20 ppg, 32.5 rpg, 52% FG (16/31)
Averages in G3 & G5 - 38.5 ppg, 30.5 rpg, 55% FG (31/56)
Beyond the statistics, Chamberlain by all accounts did increase his level of play defensively & on the boards. Considering how few touches he received in the games due to the sagging defense, we must assume a number of his missed FG's were tip-in attempts in the congested paint. He averaged 30 boards for the series and a good chunk of them must have come on the offensive end.
Here is an example below (Chamberlain off. rebound + dunk) showing just how poor the Sixers shooting was. Wali barely hits the backboard on a 15 foot jumper.
18:33 mark
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cEdiptkyYsYAlso note another Chamberlain rebound & dunk at the 18:51 mark in the same video above from the '66 series. We can also note how the Celtics pressed full court to keep the ball out of his hands as much as possible and at the 17:20 mark off the opening jump ball how the defense was shifted to Wilt's (left) side of the floor, leaving Wali unguarded for a shot. We can also see a Bill Russell
"intangible" quality off the inbounds.
"When I feel he is relaxed, I burst down on the break, and we murder him. But this works just once and two points do not win a ball game."Some have stated that Wilt was the main reason for the loss in '66, that the Sixers would have won had he statistically performed up to par. In the 1st half of G5, Coach Schayes noted that Chamberlain was the only player to shoot
25% or better from the field on his way to a 46 point night.
Apr 13, 1966
Game 1:Sixers hit with the flu + 2 week layoff = 19 turnovers in a 19 point loss.
Wilt Chamberlain did his work under the boards, taking 32 rebounds for the 76ers. But his mates couldn't get the ball into him often and he made only nine field goals in scoring 25 points.
Game 2:
Game 3:Their defense was the barbed wire. Every time they needed a key basket, Wilt Chamberlain poured through the lane and got it for them. That was how the Philadelphia 76ers got back into contention in the Eastern Division playoffs with a 111-105 victory over the Boston Celtics Thursday night at Convention Hall.
Game 4: Chamberlain with the block at the end of regulation to force OT.
Game 5:Christian Science Monitor - Apr 14, 1966
Wilt took 34 shots, hitting on 19. But he was only eight for 25 with his free throws. Chamberlain scored 46 points, no small since Russell played him tight and with a maximum amount of contact. But Wilt could have gone to 63 with Bill Sharman's touch at the foul line. Boston's cornermen excelled, not only, but also on offense. John Havlicek played the full 48 minutes and scored 32 points. Tom Sanders probably had his best game of the series with 11 points and 16 rebounds. Apr 18, 1966
Schenectady Gazette - Aug 24, 1966
just because you overrate Jerry Lucas' empty stats doesn't mean he was any good. Royals played better without him for a reason. GSW regressed on defense despite adding Thurmond's half season for a reason. Troy Murphy is 6th worst defensive player on the decade according to RAPM 02-11 for a reason as well. you know Troy actually posted several 10-11 reb seasons ? I guess the point is you're blatantly wrong about Royals talent, they were a horrible team outside of Oscar which team record proves exactly. when Oscar was playing on a talented team, they posted on average 9-10 SRS with him in the lineup.
