Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I then cover the three highest players in Usage% (assuming the season has those numbers), the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's nothing fancy; it's literally just me feeding the player's regular season numbers into Stathead and looking for player-seasons in the recent past (the more recent the better) that are reasonably comparable. This is *not* intended to be anything other than fun. I find it to be a neat way to re-conceive what a roster truly was when translated out of the trappings of their laundry and era. The method suffers when translating man defense, as steals/blocks/defensive rating are very approximate estimates of a player's defensive contributions. When I say something like:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I then cover the three highest players in Usage% (assuming the season has those numbers), the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's nothing fancy; it's literally just me feeding the player's regular season numbers into Stathead and looking for player-seasons in the recent past (the more recent the better) that are reasonably comparable. This is *not* intended to be anything other than fun. I find it to be a neat way to re-conceive what a roster truly was when translated out of the trappings of their laundry and era. The method suffers when translating man defense, as steals/blocks/defensive rating are very approximate estimates of a player's defensive contributions. When I say something like:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#90. The 2010 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Final SRS: +7.93, Standard Deviations: +1.59, Lost in NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 50-32, Regular Season SRS: +3.37 (95th), Earned the 4 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +0.1 (88th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.8 (49th)
PG: Rajon Rondo (23), +3.6 / +3.9
SG: Ray Allen (32), +1.2 / +1.9
SF: Paul Pierce (32), +3.0 / +3.0
PF: Kevin Garnett (33), +3.5 / +3.8
C: Kendrick Perkins (25), -0.7 / -2.0
6th: Glen Davis (24), -4.5 / +0.5
Usage: Paul Pierce (23.8%), Kevin Garnett (22.1%), Rajon Rondo (20.2%)
Scoring/100: Paul Pierce (28.2 / +7.0%), Kevin Garnett (25.2 / +2.6%), Ray Allen (24.2 / +5.8%)
Assists/100: Rajon Rondo (14.0), Paul Pierce (4.7), Kevin Garnett (4.7)
Heliocentrism: 29.2% (53rd of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 41.0% (29th)
Depth: 29.8% (32nd)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +1.02 (88th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -7.89 (19th)
Playoff SRS: +10.16 (60th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.56 (13th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.99 (57th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.82 (12th)
Round 1: Miami Heat (+2.0), won 4-1 by +8.2 points per game (+10.2 SRS eq)
Round 2: Cleveland Cavs (+6.6), won 4-2 by +5.3 points per game (+11.9 SRS eq)
Round 3: Orlando Magic (+12.5), won 4-2 by +2.8 points per game (+15.3 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+7.8), lost 4-3 by -3.5 points per game (+4.3 SRS eq)
In 2008, when the original Big Three were assembled (when Kevin Garnett and Ray Allen were added to the Celtics to join with Paul Pierce) Boston stomped through the regular season and won Boston their first title since 1986. In 2009 their chance at a repeat was denied by Kevin Garnett’s leg injury (and the Orlando Magic), which left the door open for the team they beat in 2008, the Los Angeles Lakers, who went on to win their own championship. In 2010 the stage was set for the rematch of the 2008 Finals.
The Celtics coasted through most of the regular season, posting one of the lowest pre-playoff SRSs on this list. Throughout they showed an offense little better than league average, but an excellent defense. In the playoffs their offense barely budged, but their defense got even better, showing at a top 20 level for this list. And yea, the basketball gods did smile upon them by lining up the exact set of playoff foes that they might wish to face for retribution. In the first round they faced a decent Heat team and dispatched it easily by 8 points per game. But in the second round they faced LeBron’s Cavs, in what would be the last year of the first edition of that pairing.
They won handily, by 5 points a game (which is a solid margin of victory against a strong team). LeBron gets a lot of flack for his performance this series, despite averaging a BPM of almost +9 throughout. LeBron did, after all, average a 27/9/7 with 2.2 steals and 1.3 blocks on +1.3% shooting, which is a pretty impressive stat-line. Rajon Rondo got a lot of credit for his role in the victory, and rightly so, given that he averaged a 21/6/12 with 1.8 steals on +5.1% shooting. That said, anyone asserting that Rondo “outplayed” LeBron is exhibiting blatant winning bias. Here’s the stat-line of Boston vs Cleveland, with LeBron and Rondo taken out:
eFG%: Boston 49.1%, Cleveland 48.1%
Turnovers: Boston 54, Cleveland 66
OReb%: Boston 26.5%, Cleveland 21.1%
FTA/FGA: Cleveland 44.3%, Boston 33.7%
True Shooting: Cleveland 54.3%, Boston 53.6%
Cleveland shot slightly better, but turned the ball over way more and was notably outrebounded. Boston featured noted ball-hawks like Nate Robinson, Tony Allen and Rajon Rondo who combined for 20 steals over the series; Delonte West turned the ball over 14 times on 22 minutes per game, for a dazzling 28.7% turnover percentage. LeBron played really well and the Cavs were still outscored by 5 points per game. Boston was simply the better team; to win LeBron had to play out of his mind and it simply didn’t happen. In fact, I'm not sur that series was winnable if the only variable changed was LeBron’s performance - if LeBron was truly playing at a +9 BPM level, I don’t think a +15 BPM was possible for the series. Boston ended LeBron’s time in Cleveland the simple way; by being better.
In the next round they faced the Magic who had knocked them out the prior year, and who were fresh off beating the 53-win, +4 SRS Atlanta Hawks by 25 points a game (not a misprint). I’d love to say that the Celtics valiantly dispatched them, but it was a tough series. The Celtics won by a narrow 2.8 points per game over 6. The Magic got ice-cold from 3 (33.8% on the series - Rashard Lewis shot 4 of 23) while the Celtics shot 40.6% from behind the line. Shooting and rebounding were almost even between the teams and the difference, again, was turnovers; the Celtics’ put together 10 more steals and 18 fewer turnovers and that was the difference. Paul Pierce played notably, with a 24/8/4 on +13% shooting. But it’s notable how these Celtics so rarely ran usages over 25%; this was a real team effort.
In the Finals they faced the defending champion Lakers, in a rematch of the 2008 Finals. And this one simply didn’t go the way the Celtics would have wanted. On the upside, they really limited Kobe’s scoring, whose 28.6 points per game were bought dear on shooting that was several points below league average. On the downside . . . everything else. Pau Gasol and Andrew Bynum couldn’t be kept off the boards, both putting up offensive rebound percentages in the double-digits (which the Celtics had kept Dwight Howard from doing); the Lakers posted an OReb% 6.5 points higher. And turnovers, the Celtics’ ace in the hole to date, went the Lakers’ way, with Kobe and the artist formerly known as Ron Artest combining for 25 steals over the series. It was a brutal series with neither team able to score much on the other, but in the end the Lakers’ advantages in rebounding and turnovers turned the tide, allowing them to squeak out a 3.5 point per game victory over seven games.
How good were the 2010 Celtics? Pretty good. My formula holds their weak regular season against them, but their playoff SRS was above +10, which puts them 60th in this list. An excellent team with several years of high-end competition still in the tank. Unfortunately, in 2011 LeBron upgraded his teammates and this Celtics’ roster was relegated to the role of spoiler for the rest of their time together.
Regular Season Record: 50-32, Regular Season SRS: +3.37 (95th), Earned the 4 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +0.1 (88th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.8 (49th)
PG: Rajon Rondo (23), +3.6 / +3.9
SG: Ray Allen (32), +1.2 / +1.9
SF: Paul Pierce (32), +3.0 / +3.0
PF: Kevin Garnett (33), +3.5 / +3.8
C: Kendrick Perkins (25), -0.7 / -2.0
6th: Glen Davis (24), -4.5 / +0.5
Usage: Paul Pierce (23.8%), Kevin Garnett (22.1%), Rajon Rondo (20.2%)
Scoring/100: Paul Pierce (28.2 / +7.0%), Kevin Garnett (25.2 / +2.6%), Ray Allen (24.2 / +5.8%)
Assists/100: Rajon Rondo (14.0), Paul Pierce (4.7), Kevin Garnett (4.7)
Heliocentrism: 29.2% (53rd of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 41.0% (29th)
Depth: 29.8% (32nd)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +1.02 (88th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -7.89 (19th)
Playoff SRS: +10.16 (60th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.56 (13th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.99 (57th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.82 (12th)
Round 1: Miami Heat (+2.0), won 4-1 by +8.2 points per game (+10.2 SRS eq)
Round 2: Cleveland Cavs (+6.6), won 4-2 by +5.3 points per game (+11.9 SRS eq)
Round 3: Orlando Magic (+12.5), won 4-2 by +2.8 points per game (+15.3 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+7.8), lost 4-3 by -3.5 points per game (+4.3 SRS eq)
In 2008, when the original Big Three were assembled (when Kevin Garnett and Ray Allen were added to the Celtics to join with Paul Pierce) Boston stomped through the regular season and won Boston their first title since 1986. In 2009 their chance at a repeat was denied by Kevin Garnett’s leg injury (and the Orlando Magic), which left the door open for the team they beat in 2008, the Los Angeles Lakers, who went on to win their own championship. In 2010 the stage was set for the rematch of the 2008 Finals.
The Celtics coasted through most of the regular season, posting one of the lowest pre-playoff SRSs on this list. Throughout they showed an offense little better than league average, but an excellent defense. In the playoffs their offense barely budged, but their defense got even better, showing at a top 20 level for this list. And yea, the basketball gods did smile upon them by lining up the exact set of playoff foes that they might wish to face for retribution. In the first round they faced a decent Heat team and dispatched it easily by 8 points per game. But in the second round they faced LeBron’s Cavs, in what would be the last year of the first edition of that pairing.
They won handily, by 5 points a game (which is a solid margin of victory against a strong team). LeBron gets a lot of flack for his performance this series, despite averaging a BPM of almost +9 throughout. LeBron did, after all, average a 27/9/7 with 2.2 steals and 1.3 blocks on +1.3% shooting, which is a pretty impressive stat-line. Rajon Rondo got a lot of credit for his role in the victory, and rightly so, given that he averaged a 21/6/12 with 1.8 steals on +5.1% shooting. That said, anyone asserting that Rondo “outplayed” LeBron is exhibiting blatant winning bias. Here’s the stat-line of Boston vs Cleveland, with LeBron and Rondo taken out:
eFG%: Boston 49.1%, Cleveland 48.1%
Turnovers: Boston 54, Cleveland 66
OReb%: Boston 26.5%, Cleveland 21.1%
FTA/FGA: Cleveland 44.3%, Boston 33.7%
True Shooting: Cleveland 54.3%, Boston 53.6%
Cleveland shot slightly better, but turned the ball over way more and was notably outrebounded. Boston featured noted ball-hawks like Nate Robinson, Tony Allen and Rajon Rondo who combined for 20 steals over the series; Delonte West turned the ball over 14 times on 22 minutes per game, for a dazzling 28.7% turnover percentage. LeBron played really well and the Cavs were still outscored by 5 points per game. Boston was simply the better team; to win LeBron had to play out of his mind and it simply didn’t happen. In fact, I'm not sur that series was winnable if the only variable changed was LeBron’s performance - if LeBron was truly playing at a +9 BPM level, I don’t think a +15 BPM was possible for the series. Boston ended LeBron’s time in Cleveland the simple way; by being better.
In the next round they faced the Magic who had knocked them out the prior year, and who were fresh off beating the 53-win, +4 SRS Atlanta Hawks by 25 points a game (not a misprint). I’d love to say that the Celtics valiantly dispatched them, but it was a tough series. The Celtics won by a narrow 2.8 points per game over 6. The Magic got ice-cold from 3 (33.8% on the series - Rashard Lewis shot 4 of 23) while the Celtics shot 40.6% from behind the line. Shooting and rebounding were almost even between the teams and the difference, again, was turnovers; the Celtics’ put together 10 more steals and 18 fewer turnovers and that was the difference. Paul Pierce played notably, with a 24/8/4 on +13% shooting. But it’s notable how these Celtics so rarely ran usages over 25%; this was a real team effort.
In the Finals they faced the defending champion Lakers, in a rematch of the 2008 Finals. And this one simply didn’t go the way the Celtics would have wanted. On the upside, they really limited Kobe’s scoring, whose 28.6 points per game were bought dear on shooting that was several points below league average. On the downside . . . everything else. Pau Gasol and Andrew Bynum couldn’t be kept off the boards, both putting up offensive rebound percentages in the double-digits (which the Celtics had kept Dwight Howard from doing); the Lakers posted an OReb% 6.5 points higher. And turnovers, the Celtics’ ace in the hole to date, went the Lakers’ way, with Kobe and the artist formerly known as Ron Artest combining for 25 steals over the series. It was a brutal series with neither team able to score much on the other, but in the end the Lakers’ advantages in rebounding and turnovers turned the tide, allowing them to squeak out a 3.5 point per game victory over seven games.
How good were the 2010 Celtics? Pretty good. My formula holds their weak regular season against them, but their playoff SRS was above +10, which puts them 60th in this list. An excellent team with several years of high-end competition still in the tank. Unfortunately, in 2011 LeBron upgraded his teammates and this Celtics’ roster was relegated to the role of spoiler for the rest of their time together.
#89. The 2005 Detroit Pistons
Spoiler:
Final SRS: +7.65, Standard Deviations: +1.72, Lost in NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 54-28, Regular Season SRS: +3.31 (97th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -0.5 (91st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.9 (30th)
PG: Chauncey Billups (28), +4.2 / +6.3
SG: Richard Hamilton (26), +0.3 / -0.4
SF: Tayshaun Prince (24), +2.1 / +2.2
PF: Rasheed Wallace (30), +1.5 / +2.5
C: Ben Wallace (30), +2.8 / +3.0
6th: Antonio McDyess (30), -0.5 / +1.1
Usage: Richard Hamilton (26.1%), Rasheed Wallace (22.3%), Chauncey Billups (20.7%)
Scoring/100: Richard Hamilton (26.8 / -0.1%), Chauncey Billups (25.3 / +8.0%), Rasheed Wallace (23.5 / -3.0%)
Assists/100: Chauncey Billups (8.9), Richard Hamilton (7.0), Tayshaun Prince (4.5)
Heliocentrism: 30.4% (48th of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 42.6% (21st)
Depth: 27.0% (39th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +2.50 (74th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -7.48 (25th)
Playoff SRS: +9.69 (69th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.34 (14th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.88 (83rd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.60 (17th)
Round 1: Philadelphia 76ers (-1.1), won 4-1 by +8.0 points per game (+6.9 SRS eq)
Round 2: Indiana Pacers (+0.7), won 4-2 by +7.0 points per game (+7.7 SRS eq)
Round 3: Miami Heat (+7.5), won 4-3 by +3.3 points per game (+10.8 SRS eq)
Round 4: San Antonio Spurs (+10.4), lost 4-3 by +1.8 points per game (+12.2 SRS eq)
In the late 80s, early 90s, the Pistons built a contending team out of outstanding defense and strong chemistry. In the early-mid 2000s the Pistons did it again, except they went even farther. The Ben Wallace/Chauncey Billups Pistons were worse on offense, but even better on defense. Their biggest strength on offense was offensive rebounding - the team as a whole didn’t shoot well but they cleaned up their own misses (of which there were many) extremely well. But on defense these Pistons were brutal; they controlled the boards (5th in the league), they didn’t foul (2nd in opposing FTA), they didn’t give up 3s (4th in the league), opponents couldn’t make 3s (4th in 3P% allowed) and the Pistons were 5th in 2P% allowed. So . . . their defense was awesome. They didn’t force turnovers a ton, and beyond that, they were fantastic. In the prior year they had upset oddsmakers (who gave them 1 in 16 odds of winning the title, 7th in the league) and defeated the Lakers in 5 to win the Pistons’ third championship ever. Coming off that win they were given a 1 in 10 chance to repeat, 6th in the league. Who was first in the odds? Tim Duncan and the San Antonio Spurs.
Let me set the scene. The East in 2005 was made of cake-shaped cake. The number of teams with an SRS over +1 was . . . two. The Pistons’ very low (for this list) regular season SRS of +3.31 was second in the league, with the Heat (and newly added Shaquille O’Neal) getting the one-seed with an SRS of +5.77. In the first two rounds of the playoffs the Pistons stomped the 76ers and Pacers fairly convincingly, though 7-8 points a game for average teams (which they were) isn’t impressive on this list. But in the Eastern Conference Finals they faced off against the Heat.
In the 2004 Finals the Pistons had actually struggled to contain Shaq; it was Kobe that they had huge success against. In the 2005 Eastern Conference Finals they still couldn’t stop Shaq; his 21 points per game on +5% shooting was a normal series for Shaq at that time. The Pistons had two massive wins: holding Dwyane Wade to -1% shooting and controlling the boards/ball. Even with the excellent defense they played on Wade the Heat still outshot the Pistons, but thanks to their advantages in rebounding and turnovers the Pistons gained an extra 8-9 shooting possessions a game, which was enough to buy them a 3.3 point a game victory.
But waiting for them in the Finals were the San Antonio Spurs who had the best SRS in the regular season and at every round of the playoffs (+10.4 SRS by the Finals). Could the Pistons’ defense stop Tim Duncan at the height of his powers? Sort of. Duncan’s scoring was stifled; 20.6 points a game at -5.8% was one of the worst scoring series of Duncan’s peak. However, the Pistons were unable to stop Duncan’s rebounding. Duncan put up almost 5 offensive boards a game against the Wallaces, and throughout the series the Pistons were unable to secure a rebounding advantage against the Spurs. As per usual, the Pistons were outshot by their competition, and we already know they didn’t have an advantage on the boards. However, the Pistons doubled the number of steals the Spurs had (63 to 32) - three Pistons boasted 10+ steals and both Parker and Ginobli had uncharacteristically high turnover percentages (17.5+%). The Pistons were able to get an extra 7-8 shooting possessions per game. It came down to Game 7.
The Pistons lost by 7. Did superstar Tim Duncan carry his team to the promised land? Nah, Duncan shot -10.7% for 25 points and turned the ball over five times. But he did grab five offensive boards as the Spurs actually out-rebounded the Pistons for the game. The Pistons only got 3-4 possessions out of their turnover advantage. And that wasn’t enough to balance out Manu Ginobli and Robert Horry having extremely efficient games (38 points combined at +22% and +24% respectively). No Pistons starter shot above +4%. But you know what? The Pistons still outscored the Spurs by 1.8 points a game on the series. The Spurs may have won, but the Pistons may have deserved to win. Either way, a weak regular season combined with a pretty good playoffs (solid performances, but nothing dominant) in a very competitive year is enough to put these Pistons at #89 overall.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2017 Kyle Lowry, if he played the full year and shot better (but less)
SG: 2014 DeMar DeRozan, shooting less, passing more
SF: 2011 Luol Deng, shooting fewer threes with better man defense
PF: 2017 Nikola Mirotic, but playing full minutes, better defense (and shooting worse)
C: 2016 Clint Capela, better defense, rebounding and passing, way worse shooter
6th: 2015 Kenneth Faried
How confident would I be winning a championship with this roster? It’s not impressive in any obvious way. Their rebounding is clearly excellent, their man defense has a lot of nice options on the wings . . . really, it’s about how their defense plays. It’s hard to look at this and see a very good offense; 2014 DeRozan was a pretty inefficient shooter and Lowry, though very capable, isn’t much of a floor raiser by historical standards. With Capela and Mirotic’s scoring neutered hard, and Faried not much of a scorer himself, you’re pretty much down to Lowry, DeRozan and Deng carrying the offense and hoping that the bigs grab enough offensive boards to keep things competitive. But on defense? They’re going to own the glass, and if they play good enough man defense they could be really good.
The 2005 Pistons were definitely more than the sum of their parts.
Regular Season Record: 54-28, Regular Season SRS: +3.31 (97th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -0.5 (91st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.9 (30th)
PG: Chauncey Billups (28), +4.2 / +6.3
SG: Richard Hamilton (26), +0.3 / -0.4
SF: Tayshaun Prince (24), +2.1 / +2.2
PF: Rasheed Wallace (30), +1.5 / +2.5
C: Ben Wallace (30), +2.8 / +3.0
6th: Antonio McDyess (30), -0.5 / +1.1
Usage: Richard Hamilton (26.1%), Rasheed Wallace (22.3%), Chauncey Billups (20.7%)
Scoring/100: Richard Hamilton (26.8 / -0.1%), Chauncey Billups (25.3 / +8.0%), Rasheed Wallace (23.5 / -3.0%)
Assists/100: Chauncey Billups (8.9), Richard Hamilton (7.0), Tayshaun Prince (4.5)
Heliocentrism: 30.4% (48th of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 42.6% (21st)
Depth: 27.0% (39th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +2.50 (74th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -7.48 (25th)
Playoff SRS: +9.69 (69th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.34 (14th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.88 (83rd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.60 (17th)
Round 1: Philadelphia 76ers (-1.1), won 4-1 by +8.0 points per game (+6.9 SRS eq)
Round 2: Indiana Pacers (+0.7), won 4-2 by +7.0 points per game (+7.7 SRS eq)
Round 3: Miami Heat (+7.5), won 4-3 by +3.3 points per game (+10.8 SRS eq)
Round 4: San Antonio Spurs (+10.4), lost 4-3 by +1.8 points per game (+12.2 SRS eq)
In the late 80s, early 90s, the Pistons built a contending team out of outstanding defense and strong chemistry. In the early-mid 2000s the Pistons did it again, except they went even farther. The Ben Wallace/Chauncey Billups Pistons were worse on offense, but even better on defense. Their biggest strength on offense was offensive rebounding - the team as a whole didn’t shoot well but they cleaned up their own misses (of which there were many) extremely well. But on defense these Pistons were brutal; they controlled the boards (5th in the league), they didn’t foul (2nd in opposing FTA), they didn’t give up 3s (4th in the league), opponents couldn’t make 3s (4th in 3P% allowed) and the Pistons were 5th in 2P% allowed. So . . . their defense was awesome. They didn’t force turnovers a ton, and beyond that, they were fantastic. In the prior year they had upset oddsmakers (who gave them 1 in 16 odds of winning the title, 7th in the league) and defeated the Lakers in 5 to win the Pistons’ third championship ever. Coming off that win they were given a 1 in 10 chance to repeat, 6th in the league. Who was first in the odds? Tim Duncan and the San Antonio Spurs.
Let me set the scene. The East in 2005 was made of cake-shaped cake. The number of teams with an SRS over +1 was . . . two. The Pistons’ very low (for this list) regular season SRS of +3.31 was second in the league, with the Heat (and newly added Shaquille O’Neal) getting the one-seed with an SRS of +5.77. In the first two rounds of the playoffs the Pistons stomped the 76ers and Pacers fairly convincingly, though 7-8 points a game for average teams (which they were) isn’t impressive on this list. But in the Eastern Conference Finals they faced off against the Heat.
In the 2004 Finals the Pistons had actually struggled to contain Shaq; it was Kobe that they had huge success against. In the 2005 Eastern Conference Finals they still couldn’t stop Shaq; his 21 points per game on +5% shooting was a normal series for Shaq at that time. The Pistons had two massive wins: holding Dwyane Wade to -1% shooting and controlling the boards/ball. Even with the excellent defense they played on Wade the Heat still outshot the Pistons, but thanks to their advantages in rebounding and turnovers the Pistons gained an extra 8-9 shooting possessions a game, which was enough to buy them a 3.3 point a game victory.
But waiting for them in the Finals were the San Antonio Spurs who had the best SRS in the regular season and at every round of the playoffs (+10.4 SRS by the Finals). Could the Pistons’ defense stop Tim Duncan at the height of his powers? Sort of. Duncan’s scoring was stifled; 20.6 points a game at -5.8% was one of the worst scoring series of Duncan’s peak. However, the Pistons were unable to stop Duncan’s rebounding. Duncan put up almost 5 offensive boards a game against the Wallaces, and throughout the series the Pistons were unable to secure a rebounding advantage against the Spurs. As per usual, the Pistons were outshot by their competition, and we already know they didn’t have an advantage on the boards. However, the Pistons doubled the number of steals the Spurs had (63 to 32) - three Pistons boasted 10+ steals and both Parker and Ginobli had uncharacteristically high turnover percentages (17.5+%). The Pistons were able to get an extra 7-8 shooting possessions per game. It came down to Game 7.
The Pistons lost by 7. Did superstar Tim Duncan carry his team to the promised land? Nah, Duncan shot -10.7% for 25 points and turned the ball over five times. But he did grab five offensive boards as the Spurs actually out-rebounded the Pistons for the game. The Pistons only got 3-4 possessions out of their turnover advantage. And that wasn’t enough to balance out Manu Ginobli and Robert Horry having extremely efficient games (38 points combined at +22% and +24% respectively). No Pistons starter shot above +4%. But you know what? The Pistons still outscored the Spurs by 1.8 points a game on the series. The Spurs may have won, but the Pistons may have deserved to win. Either way, a weak regular season combined with a pretty good playoffs (solid performances, but nothing dominant) in a very competitive year is enough to put these Pistons at #89 overall.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2017 Kyle Lowry, if he played the full year and shot better (but less)
SG: 2014 DeMar DeRozan, shooting less, passing more
SF: 2011 Luol Deng, shooting fewer threes with better man defense
PF: 2017 Nikola Mirotic, but playing full minutes, better defense (and shooting worse)
C: 2016 Clint Capela, better defense, rebounding and passing, way worse shooter
6th: 2015 Kenneth Faried
How confident would I be winning a championship with this roster? It’s not impressive in any obvious way. Their rebounding is clearly excellent, their man defense has a lot of nice options on the wings . . . really, it’s about how their defense plays. It’s hard to look at this and see a very good offense; 2014 DeRozan was a pretty inefficient shooter and Lowry, though very capable, isn’t much of a floor raiser by historical standards. With Capela and Mirotic’s scoring neutered hard, and Faried not much of a scorer himself, you’re pretty much down to Lowry, DeRozan and Deng carrying the offense and hoping that the bigs grab enough offensive boards to keep things competitive. But on defense? They’re going to own the glass, and if they play good enough man defense they could be really good.
The 2005 Pistons were definitely more than the sum of their parts.
#88. The 1976 Golden State Warriors
Spoiler:
Final SRS: +7.65, Standard Deviations: +1.72, Lost in NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 59-23, Regular Season SRS: +6.23 (66th), Earned the 1 Seed (by 16 games)
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.3 (73rd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.8 (48th)
PG: Charles Johnson (26), +0.1 / -2.1
SG: Phil Smith (23), +2.0 / +4.1
SF: Rick Barry (31), +2.6 / +4.3
PF: Jamaal WIlkes (22), +0.8 / -1.0
C: Clifford Ray (27), +1.6 / +3.2
6th: George Johnson (27), +1.2 / +3.2
Scoring/100: Phil Smith (26.0 / +2.1%), Rick Barry (24.2 / -2.1%), Jamaal Wilkes (23.9 / -0.5%)
Assists/100: Rick Barry (7.0), Phil Smith (5.7), Charles Johnson (3.5)
Heliocentrism: 22.2% (75th of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 29.6% (71st)
Depth: 48.2% (4th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +5.85 (46th), Playoff Defensive Rating: +0.65 (96th)
Playoff SRS: +6.59 (100th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.19 (94th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.55 (86rd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: +0.75 (96th)
Round 1: bye
Round 2: Detroit Pistons (-1.1), won 4-2 by +7.7 points per game (+6.6 SRS eq)
Round 3: Phoenix Suns (+2.3), lost 4-3 by +4.2 points per game (+6.5 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Here is by far the dumbest part of the list. I can hear the razzing; heck, I am the razzing. “Wait. So they put up the worst playoff SRS on this list? And they lost in the Conference Finals? To a 2 SRS team? Spreadsheet, are you punking me right now?” Alas. I don’t finesse the numbers once they’re there - the formula is applied evenly to every team. And it says that the ‘76 Warriors are the 88th best team on this list. So what gives?
Honestly? It’s that 1976 was incredibly competitive. Or boring. Take your pick. The worst team in the league? -2.89 SRS. The 2nd best team in the league? +3.43 SRS (adjusted for playoffs). So the span between the worst and 2nd best team in the league is a little over 6. That is ridiculously tight. And then you have Golden State who, despite an underwhelming playoffs, posts an overall SRS of +6.42. +6.42 is *not* good for this list; it is easily the lowest adjusted SRS I have. But being 3 SRS better than the 2nd best team in the league (18 teams)? That’s actually really, really good. So the Warriors were both underwhelming *and* the best team in the league by a significant margin. Either way, they merit discussion.
These stats don’t give Barry the credit he deserves. As a scorer he was overrated, but film study (courtesy of Ben Taylor) suggests that his assists were unusually valuable and point-creating. He had led the 1975 Warriors to a championship (over the #98 Bullets), and now the team was back but, on paper, better thanks to development from Phil Smith and Jamaal Wilkes. They dominated the regular season and they defeated Detroit pretty handily. So what happened with Phoenix?
To be clear, they outscored Phoenix by 4.2 points per game that series. Their wins were by 35, 8 and 16 points, their losses were by 7, 4, 1 and 8 points. The Warriors were up 3 games to 2; what happened? Well, in game 6 the Suns murdered them on the boards; Curtis Perry grabbed 5 offensive rebounds and Keith Erickson grabbed 4; the Warriors as a team grabbed 7. Golden State shot better (Barry shot for 30 points at +12%), but the Suns took an astounding 16-17 more shooting possessions thanks to their rebounding and turnover advantage. Even with that edge, the Suns only pulled off the victory by one point. We don’t have good stats from game 7, save that Phoenix shot better and won by 8. The Warriors outplayed them for the series overall, but ended up losing. It happens. I guess I’d like to remember this team as the best team of the year, the champion that should have been. I don’t know that they belong here on this list, but what are you gonna do?
Modern Comps:
PG: 2015 Trevor Ariza, but shooting more
SG: 2016 Gordon Hayward
SF: 2013 Mike Conley
PF: 2010 LaMarcus Aldridge, but with a little less scoring volume
C: 2001 Ben Wallace, more efficient at scoring (doesn’t take much), worse at rebounding
6th: 2005 Rasho Nesterovic
What a weird roster. Two bruising low-scoring bigs, one decent scoring big, a weird defense-first point-guard and Hayward and Conley pairing with Aldridge to run the offense. I really have no idea how this combination of players puts up a +6 offensive rating through the playoffs, but I guess it was a different era. And I think Assist% underrates how effective Barry’s passing was. And there are, of course, limits to how accurate these comps are. I can certainly see this group dominating the glass and playing good defense, which (in the regular season) they did.
Regular Season Record: 59-23, Regular Season SRS: +6.23 (66th), Earned the 1 Seed (by 16 games)
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.3 (73rd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.8 (48th)
PG: Charles Johnson (26), +0.1 / -2.1
SG: Phil Smith (23), +2.0 / +4.1
SF: Rick Barry (31), +2.6 / +4.3
PF: Jamaal WIlkes (22), +0.8 / -1.0
C: Clifford Ray (27), +1.6 / +3.2
6th: George Johnson (27), +1.2 / +3.2
Scoring/100: Phil Smith (26.0 / +2.1%), Rick Barry (24.2 / -2.1%), Jamaal Wilkes (23.9 / -0.5%)
Assists/100: Rick Barry (7.0), Phil Smith (5.7), Charles Johnson (3.5)
Heliocentrism: 22.2% (75th of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 29.6% (71st)
Depth: 48.2% (4th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +5.85 (46th), Playoff Defensive Rating: +0.65 (96th)
Playoff SRS: +6.59 (100th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.19 (94th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.55 (86rd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: +0.75 (96th)
Round 1: bye
Round 2: Detroit Pistons (-1.1), won 4-2 by +7.7 points per game (+6.6 SRS eq)
Round 3: Phoenix Suns (+2.3), lost 4-3 by +4.2 points per game (+6.5 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Here is by far the dumbest part of the list. I can hear the razzing; heck, I am the razzing. “Wait. So they put up the worst playoff SRS on this list? And they lost in the Conference Finals? To a 2 SRS team? Spreadsheet, are you punking me right now?” Alas. I don’t finesse the numbers once they’re there - the formula is applied evenly to every team. And it says that the ‘76 Warriors are the 88th best team on this list. So what gives?
Honestly? It’s that 1976 was incredibly competitive. Or boring. Take your pick. The worst team in the league? -2.89 SRS. The 2nd best team in the league? +3.43 SRS (adjusted for playoffs). So the span between the worst and 2nd best team in the league is a little over 6. That is ridiculously tight. And then you have Golden State who, despite an underwhelming playoffs, posts an overall SRS of +6.42. +6.42 is *not* good for this list; it is easily the lowest adjusted SRS I have. But being 3 SRS better than the 2nd best team in the league (18 teams)? That’s actually really, really good. So the Warriors were both underwhelming *and* the best team in the league by a significant margin. Either way, they merit discussion.
These stats don’t give Barry the credit he deserves. As a scorer he was overrated, but film study (courtesy of Ben Taylor) suggests that his assists were unusually valuable and point-creating. He had led the 1975 Warriors to a championship (over the #98 Bullets), and now the team was back but, on paper, better thanks to development from Phil Smith and Jamaal Wilkes. They dominated the regular season and they defeated Detroit pretty handily. So what happened with Phoenix?
To be clear, they outscored Phoenix by 4.2 points per game that series. Their wins were by 35, 8 and 16 points, their losses were by 7, 4, 1 and 8 points. The Warriors were up 3 games to 2; what happened? Well, in game 6 the Suns murdered them on the boards; Curtis Perry grabbed 5 offensive rebounds and Keith Erickson grabbed 4; the Warriors as a team grabbed 7. Golden State shot better (Barry shot for 30 points at +12%), but the Suns took an astounding 16-17 more shooting possessions thanks to their rebounding and turnover advantage. Even with that edge, the Suns only pulled off the victory by one point. We don’t have good stats from game 7, save that Phoenix shot better and won by 8. The Warriors outplayed them for the series overall, but ended up losing. It happens. I guess I’d like to remember this team as the best team of the year, the champion that should have been. I don’t know that they belong here on this list, but what are you gonna do?
Modern Comps:
PG: 2015 Trevor Ariza, but shooting more
SG: 2016 Gordon Hayward
SF: 2013 Mike Conley
PF: 2010 LaMarcus Aldridge, but with a little less scoring volume
C: 2001 Ben Wallace, more efficient at scoring (doesn’t take much), worse at rebounding
6th: 2005 Rasho Nesterovic
What a weird roster. Two bruising low-scoring bigs, one decent scoring big, a weird defense-first point-guard and Hayward and Conley pairing with Aldridge to run the offense. I really have no idea how this combination of players puts up a +6 offensive rating through the playoffs, but I guess it was a different era. And I think Assist% underrates how effective Barry’s passing was. And there are, of course, limits to how accurate these comps are. I can certainly see this group dominating the glass and playing good defense, which (in the regular season) they did.
#87. The 2006 Miami Heat
Spoiler:
Final SRS: +7.05, Standard Deviations: +1.71, Won the NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 52-30, Regular Season SRS: +3.59 (93rd), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.5 (71st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.7 (78th)
PG: Jason Williams (30), +1.1 / -0.7
SG: Dwyane Wade (24), +7.7 / +9.3
SF: James Posey (29), +0.1 / +2.9
PF: Antoine Walker (29), +0.4 / +0.7
C: Shaquille O’Neal (33), +2.7 / +1.0
6th: Udonis Haslem (25), +0.9 / -0.9
Usage Rate: Dwyane Wade (32.5%), Shaquille O’Neal (30.0%), Antoine Walker (23.2%)
Scoring/100: Dwyane Wade (37.0 / +4.1%), Shaquille O’Neal (34.3 / +5.3%), Antoine Walker (23.8 / -1.2%)
Assists/100: Dwyane Wade (9.1), Jason Williams (8.0), Antoine Walker (4.0)
Heliocentrism: 48.9% (8th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 42.1% (22nd)
Depth: 9.0% (75th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +2.68 (74th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.79 (39th)
Playoff SRS: +8.82 (81st), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +3.46 (31st)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.59 (67th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.68 (33rd)
Round 1: Chicago Bulls (+0.5), won 4-2 by +3.0 points per game (+3.5 SRS eq)
Semis: New Jersey Nets (+2.5), won 4-1 by 6.4 points per game (+8.9 SRS eq)
ECF: Detroit Pistons (+7.1), won 4-2 by 5.1 points per game (+12.2 SRS eq)
Finals: Dallas Mavericks (+9.6), won 4-2 by +1.0 point per game (+10.6 SRS eq)
Hot damn, I forgot how freaking good Dwyane Wade was. Maybe part of it is that I *really* started following basketball in 2012, right as Wade was suffering from both slowdown from injuries and being compared to LeBron in the middle of his 13+-year prime. But prime Wade was basically out of the Kobe / Harden mould. The major difference was stylistic; Wade had no three-point range and was one of the best rim-attackers ever, with an excellent midrange game to use as a counter when opponents played off him too much. Wade was a crazy-high usage shooting guard that led his offenses in scoring while posting decent (but not great) efficiency. His incredible ball-dominance obviated the need for a distributing point guard, and he was a good enough passer that he could parlay the incredible threat of his scoring into lots and lots of shot creation for his teammates. It takes a very specific kind of player to lead his team in Usage, Points per 100 and Assists per 100. Wade obviously did it, and we’ve already seen LeBron, Harden and Kobe do it. I wouldn’t be totally surprised if we see a few Jordans do it, but I’m curious as to who else will. I’m not at all surprised to see this squad post the 8th highest heliocentrism rating - this team’s success was seriously dependent on Wade. You may be curious to know that, of all the teams on this list, only three players are the #1 on teams with higher heliocentrism ratings than this: LeBron James, Michael Jordan and Larry Bird. Not bad company. Especially given that this was only Wade’s third year in the league.
I don’t want to undersell Shaq here; even at 33 he was posting high scoring at good efficiency with some nice offensive rebounding thrown in. He was very valuable, but the Heat were -7 when Wade sat and +8 when Wade played. That’s a pretty insane swing (though also a testament to how deep the Heat’s frontcourt was (O’Neal, Walker, Haslem and Mourning make a pretty deep set of bigs) and how thin the Heat’s backcourt was (not that there are legitimate replacements for Wade, but still).
The year before the Heat had gone into the playoffs as the one-seed, but fell in the Eastern Conference Finals to the Pistons, with Wade shooting -1.0% for the series. This year the Heat hadn’t looked quite so good in the regular season. They struggled to put away an average Bulls team (3 points a game on an average team is no bueno, and Wade’s +0.4% shooting didn’t help). The second round against the Nets went a little better, with Wade shooting +6.2% and averaging a 28/6/7 with 2 steals to help lead the Heat to a 6.6 point margin of victory (a good series for the team, but well below average for this list).
The Heat advanced to face their nemesis, the +7.1 SRS Detroit Pistons, who had looked good but not great so far. It was not particularly close; the Heat stomped them to the tune of +5.1 points a game. I realize that +5 isn’t “stomping” per se, but a +12.2 SRS series is quite impressive. The big story? Dwyane Wade shooting an offensive (heh heh) +14.8% through the series, averaging a 27/5/6 (the game’s pace was 83.8 which is the pace at which water boils when you’re waiting for it, so it’s a better line than it looks like).
What was the difference? Last year the Pistons shut Wade down, this year Wade shut them down. I’ve read that the ‘06 Pistons featured a lot more zone while the prior year’s Pistons stayed in man. I don’t know if that’s true but in between years Larry Brown was replaced by Flip Saunders and the team’s defensive rating definitely regressed. So let’s meet somewhere in the middle of “The Pistons defense was worse” and “Wade played great”.
In the Finals they faced the Mavericks, a scary team in their own right (only +6 SRS in the regular season but with series of: +17.7, +12.2 and +8.3 they were playing quite well). So it was the high-flying Heat led by Dwyane Wade and the high-flying Mavericks led by Dirk Nowitzki so predictably the series was . . . a defensive battle. The Heat shot 30.5% from three (they weren’t a great range shooting team, but come on) and the Mavs, not to be outdone, shot 28.9%. The Heat continued their trend of playing exceptional shot-defense, as the Mavs really struggled to score. Dirk was held to -0.6% shooting, the incomparable Jason Terry shot +1.6% while Josh Howard, Jerry Stackhouse and Devin Harris all shot at -5% or worse.
But of course, Miami struggled just as hard. Shaq shot at -0.4%, but it may have been more self-inflicted (his free throw percentage was a “blink-blink” 29.2%), while Haslem, Walker and Williams all shot at -5% or worse. In fact, Shaq was almost phased out of the series, his role reduced from 30% usage to 21.5% usage (unusually low for Shaq). To pick up the slack Wade posted a usage rate of 37% (wowza!) and dragged Miami’s offense to tolerability, shooting +3.4% (if not passing a ton). Some guff was given over the foul calls; Wade’s ‘06 regular season FTA/FGA percentage was 57%, but in this series it was 69% and in the deciding game it was 117%. On one hand, getting to the rim was kind of Wade’s thing. On the other hand, ‘06 was the only season where his FTr in the playoffs was comparable to his FTr in the regular season. I’m not saying that there were shenanigans, but there’s more evidence to suggest it than there usually is for this sort of thing.
Either way, the Heat won the title. Only by a +1 margin of victory, but the Mavs were a really good team. Their playoff offense had never been particularly good, but they played excellent defense through the playoffs. Their regular season SRS was fairly low (93rd on this list) and their playoff SRS was fairly low (81st on this list). Accordingly, despite them winning the title, my formula thinks that they’re the weakest championship team we’ve seen since the ‘96 Rockets. If you want to remember them fondly, dwell on how impressive they were for those series against the Pistons and Mavericks. And if you want to see why they’re rated low look at . . . anything else.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2018 Fred VanVleet (worse rebounding and defense)
SG: 2015 James Harden (but getting better in the playoffs, not worse)
SF: 2015 Matt Barnes (better rebounding, better defense)
PF: 2014 Kelly Olynyk (better defense, worse rebounding)
C: 2018 Joel Embiid (worse defense and passing)
6th: 2017 Michael Kidd-Gilchrist (with better shooting)
Well that’s a pretty curious roster. Obviously clutch 2015 Harden is a prize, and 2018 Embiid is a very nice #2 to have. After that you’ve got a stable set of nice role players, erring on the side of defense. I think this is a nice roster but not crazy. To win a championship without getting really lucky you’d need Harden to play very well and you’d need the rest of the team to execute defensively at a high level. Or maybe I’m just saying that because that’s what happened with the Heat.
Regular Season Record: 52-30, Regular Season SRS: +3.59 (93rd), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.5 (71st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.7 (78th)
PG: Jason Williams (30), +1.1 / -0.7
SG: Dwyane Wade (24), +7.7 / +9.3
SF: James Posey (29), +0.1 / +2.9
PF: Antoine Walker (29), +0.4 / +0.7
C: Shaquille O’Neal (33), +2.7 / +1.0
6th: Udonis Haslem (25), +0.9 / -0.9
Usage Rate: Dwyane Wade (32.5%), Shaquille O’Neal (30.0%), Antoine Walker (23.2%)
Scoring/100: Dwyane Wade (37.0 / +4.1%), Shaquille O’Neal (34.3 / +5.3%), Antoine Walker (23.8 / -1.2%)
Assists/100: Dwyane Wade (9.1), Jason Williams (8.0), Antoine Walker (4.0)
Heliocentrism: 48.9% (8th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 42.1% (22nd)
Depth: 9.0% (75th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +2.68 (74th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.79 (39th)
Playoff SRS: +8.82 (81st), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +3.46 (31st)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.59 (67th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.68 (33rd)
Round 1: Chicago Bulls (+0.5), won 4-2 by +3.0 points per game (+3.5 SRS eq)
Semis: New Jersey Nets (+2.5), won 4-1 by 6.4 points per game (+8.9 SRS eq)
ECF: Detroit Pistons (+7.1), won 4-2 by 5.1 points per game (+12.2 SRS eq)
Finals: Dallas Mavericks (+9.6), won 4-2 by +1.0 point per game (+10.6 SRS eq)
Hot damn, I forgot how freaking good Dwyane Wade was. Maybe part of it is that I *really* started following basketball in 2012, right as Wade was suffering from both slowdown from injuries and being compared to LeBron in the middle of his 13+-year prime. But prime Wade was basically out of the Kobe / Harden mould. The major difference was stylistic; Wade had no three-point range and was one of the best rim-attackers ever, with an excellent midrange game to use as a counter when opponents played off him too much. Wade was a crazy-high usage shooting guard that led his offenses in scoring while posting decent (but not great) efficiency. His incredible ball-dominance obviated the need for a distributing point guard, and he was a good enough passer that he could parlay the incredible threat of his scoring into lots and lots of shot creation for his teammates. It takes a very specific kind of player to lead his team in Usage, Points per 100 and Assists per 100. Wade obviously did it, and we’ve already seen LeBron, Harden and Kobe do it. I wouldn’t be totally surprised if we see a few Jordans do it, but I’m curious as to who else will. I’m not at all surprised to see this squad post the 8th highest heliocentrism rating - this team’s success was seriously dependent on Wade. You may be curious to know that, of all the teams on this list, only three players are the #1 on teams with higher heliocentrism ratings than this: LeBron James, Michael Jordan and Larry Bird. Not bad company. Especially given that this was only Wade’s third year in the league.
I don’t want to undersell Shaq here; even at 33 he was posting high scoring at good efficiency with some nice offensive rebounding thrown in. He was very valuable, but the Heat were -7 when Wade sat and +8 when Wade played. That’s a pretty insane swing (though also a testament to how deep the Heat’s frontcourt was (O’Neal, Walker, Haslem and Mourning make a pretty deep set of bigs) and how thin the Heat’s backcourt was (not that there are legitimate replacements for Wade, but still).
The year before the Heat had gone into the playoffs as the one-seed, but fell in the Eastern Conference Finals to the Pistons, with Wade shooting -1.0% for the series. This year the Heat hadn’t looked quite so good in the regular season. They struggled to put away an average Bulls team (3 points a game on an average team is no bueno, and Wade’s +0.4% shooting didn’t help). The second round against the Nets went a little better, with Wade shooting +6.2% and averaging a 28/6/7 with 2 steals to help lead the Heat to a 6.6 point margin of victory (a good series for the team, but well below average for this list).
The Heat advanced to face their nemesis, the +7.1 SRS Detroit Pistons, who had looked good but not great so far. It was not particularly close; the Heat stomped them to the tune of +5.1 points a game. I realize that +5 isn’t “stomping” per se, but a +12.2 SRS series is quite impressive. The big story? Dwyane Wade shooting an offensive (heh heh) +14.8% through the series, averaging a 27/5/6 (the game’s pace was 83.8 which is the pace at which water boils when you’re waiting for it, so it’s a better line than it looks like).
What was the difference? Last year the Pistons shut Wade down, this year Wade shut them down. I’ve read that the ‘06 Pistons featured a lot more zone while the prior year’s Pistons stayed in man. I don’t know if that’s true but in between years Larry Brown was replaced by Flip Saunders and the team’s defensive rating definitely regressed. So let’s meet somewhere in the middle of “The Pistons defense was worse” and “Wade played great”.
In the Finals they faced the Mavericks, a scary team in their own right (only +6 SRS in the regular season but with series of: +17.7, +12.2 and +8.3 they were playing quite well). So it was the high-flying Heat led by Dwyane Wade and the high-flying Mavericks led by Dirk Nowitzki so predictably the series was . . . a defensive battle. The Heat shot 30.5% from three (they weren’t a great range shooting team, but come on) and the Mavs, not to be outdone, shot 28.9%. The Heat continued their trend of playing exceptional shot-defense, as the Mavs really struggled to score. Dirk was held to -0.6% shooting, the incomparable Jason Terry shot +1.6% while Josh Howard, Jerry Stackhouse and Devin Harris all shot at -5% or worse.
But of course, Miami struggled just as hard. Shaq shot at -0.4%, but it may have been more self-inflicted (his free throw percentage was a “blink-blink” 29.2%), while Haslem, Walker and Williams all shot at -5% or worse. In fact, Shaq was almost phased out of the series, his role reduced from 30% usage to 21.5% usage (unusually low for Shaq). To pick up the slack Wade posted a usage rate of 37% (wowza!) and dragged Miami’s offense to tolerability, shooting +3.4% (if not passing a ton). Some guff was given over the foul calls; Wade’s ‘06 regular season FTA/FGA percentage was 57%, but in this series it was 69% and in the deciding game it was 117%. On one hand, getting to the rim was kind of Wade’s thing. On the other hand, ‘06 was the only season where his FTr in the playoffs was comparable to his FTr in the regular season. I’m not saying that there were shenanigans, but there’s more evidence to suggest it than there usually is for this sort of thing.
Either way, the Heat won the title. Only by a +1 margin of victory, but the Mavs were a really good team. Their playoff offense had never been particularly good, but they played excellent defense through the playoffs. Their regular season SRS was fairly low (93rd on this list) and their playoff SRS was fairly low (81st on this list). Accordingly, despite them winning the title, my formula thinks that they’re the weakest championship team we’ve seen since the ‘96 Rockets. If you want to remember them fondly, dwell on how impressive they were for those series against the Pistons and Mavericks. And if you want to see why they’re rated low look at . . . anything else.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2018 Fred VanVleet (worse rebounding and defense)
SG: 2015 James Harden (but getting better in the playoffs, not worse)
SF: 2015 Matt Barnes (better rebounding, better defense)
PF: 2014 Kelly Olynyk (better defense, worse rebounding)
C: 2018 Joel Embiid (worse defense and passing)
6th: 2017 Michael Kidd-Gilchrist (with better shooting)
Well that’s a pretty curious roster. Obviously clutch 2015 Harden is a prize, and 2018 Embiid is a very nice #2 to have. After that you’ve got a stable set of nice role players, erring on the side of defense. I think this is a nice roster but not crazy. To win a championship without getting really lucky you’d need Harden to play very well and you’d need the rest of the team to execute defensively at a high level. Or maybe I’m just saying that because that’s what happened with the Heat.
#86. The 1985 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Final SRS: +7.72, Standard Deviations: +1.72, Lost in the Finals
Regular Season Record: 63-19, Regular Season SRS: +6.47 (57th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.9 (33rd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.6 (79th)
PG: Dennis Johnson (30), +0.3 / +0.2
SG: Danny Ainge (25), +0.7 / +0.7
SF: Larry Bird (28), +8.8 / +6.0
PF: Kevin McHale (27), +2.5 / +2.9
C: Robert Parish (31), +0.8 / +0.7
6th: Scott Wedman (32), -1.2 / +3.9
Usage Rate: Larry Bird (28.5%), Kevin McHale (21.9%), Robert Parish (19.7%)
Scoring/100: Larry Bird (34.3 / +4.2%), Kevin McHale (27.9 / +7.4%), Robert Parish (23.1 / +4.3%)
Assists/100: Dennis Johnson (9.3), Larry Bird (7.9), Danny Ainge (7.4)
Heliocentrism: 50.6% (6th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 29.1% (74th)
Depth: 20.3% (61st)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +3.85 (65th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -1.90 (87th)
Playoff SRS: +8.42 (92nd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.25 (75th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.70 (35th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.45 (82nd)
Round 1: Cleveland Cavaliers (-2.3), won 3-1 by 0 points per game (-2.3 SRS eq)
Semis: Detroit Pistons (+4.4), won 4-2 by +7.8 points per game (+12.2 SRS eq)
ECF: Philadelphia 76ers (+6.6), won 4-1 by +5.0 points per game (+11.6 SRS eq)
Finals: Los Angeles Lakers (+11.7), won 4-2 by -2.6 points per game (+9.1 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2010 Andre Iguodala (lower steals)
SG: 2018 Josh Richardson (more efficient, fewer shots)
SF: 2008 LeBron James (better shooting, fewer shots, fewer assists, better rebounding)
PF: 2019 Clint Capela (but way more iso-driven)
C: 2017 Jonas Valanciunas
6th: 2020 Bobby Portis
I’ll grant you that LeBron is not an intuitive comp for Bird. Really, the problem is that when you say that you need high usage, strong scoring, strong passing, decent steals and, oh yeah, rebounding, the list isn’t very big. And Capela is right in every way except how wrong he is. The problem is, if you say “I want solid rebounding, good defense, slightly high usage, no passing and high efficiency” Capela is who comes out. The problem is that McHale was an iso-artist, one of the best post-scorers ever. And Capela’s scoring primarily arose from synergistic creation off the pick and roll. So similar footprints statistically, even if we agreed that McHale’s skillset is probably more valuable against playoff defenses.
What about the rest of the roster? I have to say, I was surprised to see this team (and Larry Bird) as the 6th most Heliocentric team on the list. I don’t really think of Bird as carrying his team; I’ve always thought of Bird as an extremely good player on a talented lineup. And maybe this was just an off-year for the roster; the ‘86 Celtics score 25th on Heliocentrism. But looking at these comps, it’s hard to maintain that story. 2010 Iguodala was an average scoring jack of all-trades; good but not great. Iso-Capela is certainly very good. And Valanciunas is a very solid big, but not amazing. And then you have bizarro LeBron, who clearly makes the whole thing run. Except that bizarro LeBron is much more off-ball so Iguodala does a lot of the passing. It’s really hard not to see Bird carrying the roster when I see it in this light; would this lineup have made the playoffs without Bird? . . . maybe?
It’s the fascinating chicken and egg problem of supporting players known to be good. Players on winning teams get a lot of attention and credit for being part of that winning. But it gets weird; Bill Russell shows up in Boston, the franchise jumps 4 points in SRS immediately, wins a ton of titles, and then he retires and the team goes 34-48. And all this time, the supporting players come and go and the Celtics keep on winning, with Russell as the only constant. But, of course, because the Celtics won a billion championships all of those other players (many of whom were quite good) get a lot of attention, because they can all be seen contributing to winning championships. And many of them get into the hall of fame, because it’s hard to keep out somebody who’s won a ton of rings. But, weirdly, the whole thing (Russell leading these rosters to titles (and eventually, the Hall)) becomes a slam on him, because he played with tons of Hall of Famers. This is a long way of saying that the reputations of these Celtics’ supporting players are enhanced by playing with Bird. And without Bird this team would not sniff the Finals. It’s one of my favorite things about the Comps; it’s easier to get a reputation-free take on the roster when it’s Iguodala, Richardson, Capela and Valanciunas.
Anyhow . . . The Celtics had won the championship in ‘84 and were looking to repeat. They had the second highest regular season SRS in the league (0.01 points behind the Lakers, definitely not foreshadowing . . .) But in the first round they really struggled against the 8-seed Cavaliers, playing four tight games (Celtics won by 3, 2 and 2, the Cavs won by 7) and somehow getting out alive. The Cavs bench shot really well and the Celtics (aside from Bird and McHale) really struggled to score; getting to the line a lot ended up being their saving grace. The Cavs were a -2.2 SRS team; barely getting by them wasn’t a good look. The Celtics bounced back against the much better Pistons (+4.4). Bird struggled to score (-2.3%) but the entire rest of the starting lineup shot lights out (+6% or better) and the Celtics won by 7.8 points per game, a very nice showing. In the Conference Finals they played perpetual foe Philadelphia, a +6.6 SRS team that promised to be tough. They weren’t; both Dr. J and Moses Malone shot at -6.3% or worse while McHale shot a cool +7%. But Bird struggled to score (-4.7%), and there was a curious story behind it. Allegedly, Bird being Bird, went out to a bar in the middle of the series and ended up hurting his fist on somebody else’s face (how is it that this never happened to Jordan or Kobe? There are so many amazing narratives here. You could go “Bird was the only guy who punched hard enough to injure himself”, or “This was back when MVPs could go out to regular bars and get in fights without a twitterpocalypse occurring” or “the only thing that could stop Bird was Bird” or even “against the 85 Lakers the Celtics didn’t have a puncher’s chance . . . too soon?”)
Either way, they advanced to the Finals to face the Lakers (big surprise). And the 85 Lakers had been ripping through the Western Conference. I won’t say they played anyone really good, they didn’t. But listen to this: beating the Suns (-2.3) by 20.3 points per game (now *that’s* how you beat a -2 SRS team in the playoffs), beating the Blazers (+3.2) by 11 points per game and beating the Nuggets (+5.4) by 12.2 points per game. Get upstairs Aunt Minnie and raise the window! Those were some serious shellackings! And now the Celtics, who had been playing pretty well (but not that well) were going into the series with Bird hurt (allegedly).
Game 1 was a massacre . . . but in the Celtics’ favor. Big Game James couldn’t Big Game Shoot (-8.1%), the Lakers couldn’t rebound, Bird, Ainge and McHale all shot +6% or better . . . the final damages were a 34-point horse-whipping. Things were looking up.
It went downhill from there. The Lakers ended up winning in six by 2.6 points per game. Bird shot badly (for Bird, at -1.6%), Magic dished 14 assists a game, Kareem scored at +8.6%, Worthy shot at +5.6% and only McHale provided a bright spot for the Celtic’s offense (+10.1% shooting). Losing by 2.6 points a game to the 85 Lakers wasn’t anything to be ashamed of. But it was disappointing, especially since this was one of Bird’s worse playoff showings (some of it may have been fist-related, but he struggled against the Pistons before the alleged injury occurred).
At the end of the day they were a very good team that went a little flat in the playoffs. It happens. And they came back the next year and wrecked *everybody* (I don’t like to tease rankings too much, but I’ll definitely go so far as to say that the ‘86 Celtics are in the top ten. Not that that’s a huge reveal).
Regular Season Record: 63-19, Regular Season SRS: +6.47 (57th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.9 (33rd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.6 (79th)
PG: Dennis Johnson (30), +0.3 / +0.2
SG: Danny Ainge (25), +0.7 / +0.7
SF: Larry Bird (28), +8.8 / +6.0
PF: Kevin McHale (27), +2.5 / +2.9
C: Robert Parish (31), +0.8 / +0.7
6th: Scott Wedman (32), -1.2 / +3.9
Usage Rate: Larry Bird (28.5%), Kevin McHale (21.9%), Robert Parish (19.7%)
Scoring/100: Larry Bird (34.3 / +4.2%), Kevin McHale (27.9 / +7.4%), Robert Parish (23.1 / +4.3%)
Assists/100: Dennis Johnson (9.3), Larry Bird (7.9), Danny Ainge (7.4)
Heliocentrism: 50.6% (6th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 29.1% (74th)
Depth: 20.3% (61st)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +3.85 (65th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -1.90 (87th)
Playoff SRS: +8.42 (92nd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.25 (75th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.70 (35th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.45 (82nd)
Round 1: Cleveland Cavaliers (-2.3), won 3-1 by 0 points per game (-2.3 SRS eq)
Semis: Detroit Pistons (+4.4), won 4-2 by +7.8 points per game (+12.2 SRS eq)
ECF: Philadelphia 76ers (+6.6), won 4-1 by +5.0 points per game (+11.6 SRS eq)
Finals: Los Angeles Lakers (+11.7), won 4-2 by -2.6 points per game (+9.1 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2010 Andre Iguodala (lower steals)
SG: 2018 Josh Richardson (more efficient, fewer shots)
SF: 2008 LeBron James (better shooting, fewer shots, fewer assists, better rebounding)
PF: 2019 Clint Capela (but way more iso-driven)
C: 2017 Jonas Valanciunas
6th: 2020 Bobby Portis
I’ll grant you that LeBron is not an intuitive comp for Bird. Really, the problem is that when you say that you need high usage, strong scoring, strong passing, decent steals and, oh yeah, rebounding, the list isn’t very big. And Capela is right in every way except how wrong he is. The problem is, if you say “I want solid rebounding, good defense, slightly high usage, no passing and high efficiency” Capela is who comes out. The problem is that McHale was an iso-artist, one of the best post-scorers ever. And Capela’s scoring primarily arose from synergistic creation off the pick and roll. So similar footprints statistically, even if we agreed that McHale’s skillset is probably more valuable against playoff defenses.
What about the rest of the roster? I have to say, I was surprised to see this team (and Larry Bird) as the 6th most Heliocentric team on the list. I don’t really think of Bird as carrying his team; I’ve always thought of Bird as an extremely good player on a talented lineup. And maybe this was just an off-year for the roster; the ‘86 Celtics score 25th on Heliocentrism. But looking at these comps, it’s hard to maintain that story. 2010 Iguodala was an average scoring jack of all-trades; good but not great. Iso-Capela is certainly very good. And Valanciunas is a very solid big, but not amazing. And then you have bizarro LeBron, who clearly makes the whole thing run. Except that bizarro LeBron is much more off-ball so Iguodala does a lot of the passing. It’s really hard not to see Bird carrying the roster when I see it in this light; would this lineup have made the playoffs without Bird? . . . maybe?
It’s the fascinating chicken and egg problem of supporting players known to be good. Players on winning teams get a lot of attention and credit for being part of that winning. But it gets weird; Bill Russell shows up in Boston, the franchise jumps 4 points in SRS immediately, wins a ton of titles, and then he retires and the team goes 34-48. And all this time, the supporting players come and go and the Celtics keep on winning, with Russell as the only constant. But, of course, because the Celtics won a billion championships all of those other players (many of whom were quite good) get a lot of attention, because they can all be seen contributing to winning championships. And many of them get into the hall of fame, because it’s hard to keep out somebody who’s won a ton of rings. But, weirdly, the whole thing (Russell leading these rosters to titles (and eventually, the Hall)) becomes a slam on him, because he played with tons of Hall of Famers. This is a long way of saying that the reputations of these Celtics’ supporting players are enhanced by playing with Bird. And without Bird this team would not sniff the Finals. It’s one of my favorite things about the Comps; it’s easier to get a reputation-free take on the roster when it’s Iguodala, Richardson, Capela and Valanciunas.
Anyhow . . . The Celtics had won the championship in ‘84 and were looking to repeat. They had the second highest regular season SRS in the league (0.01 points behind the Lakers, definitely not foreshadowing . . .) But in the first round they really struggled against the 8-seed Cavaliers, playing four tight games (Celtics won by 3, 2 and 2, the Cavs won by 7) and somehow getting out alive. The Cavs bench shot really well and the Celtics (aside from Bird and McHale) really struggled to score; getting to the line a lot ended up being their saving grace. The Cavs were a -2.2 SRS team; barely getting by them wasn’t a good look. The Celtics bounced back against the much better Pistons (+4.4). Bird struggled to score (-2.3%) but the entire rest of the starting lineup shot lights out (+6% or better) and the Celtics won by 7.8 points per game, a very nice showing. In the Conference Finals they played perpetual foe Philadelphia, a +6.6 SRS team that promised to be tough. They weren’t; both Dr. J and Moses Malone shot at -6.3% or worse while McHale shot a cool +7%. But Bird struggled to score (-4.7%), and there was a curious story behind it. Allegedly, Bird being Bird, went out to a bar in the middle of the series and ended up hurting his fist on somebody else’s face (how is it that this never happened to Jordan or Kobe? There are so many amazing narratives here. You could go “Bird was the only guy who punched hard enough to injure himself”, or “This was back when MVPs could go out to regular bars and get in fights without a twitterpocalypse occurring” or “the only thing that could stop Bird was Bird” or even “against the 85 Lakers the Celtics didn’t have a puncher’s chance . . . too soon?”)
Either way, they advanced to the Finals to face the Lakers (big surprise). And the 85 Lakers had been ripping through the Western Conference. I won’t say they played anyone really good, they didn’t. But listen to this: beating the Suns (-2.3) by 20.3 points per game (now *that’s* how you beat a -2 SRS team in the playoffs), beating the Blazers (+3.2) by 11 points per game and beating the Nuggets (+5.4) by 12.2 points per game. Get upstairs Aunt Minnie and raise the window! Those were some serious shellackings! And now the Celtics, who had been playing pretty well (but not that well) were going into the series with Bird hurt (allegedly).
Game 1 was a massacre . . . but in the Celtics’ favor. Big Game James couldn’t Big Game Shoot (-8.1%), the Lakers couldn’t rebound, Bird, Ainge and McHale all shot +6% or better . . . the final damages were a 34-point horse-whipping. Things were looking up.
It went downhill from there. The Lakers ended up winning in six by 2.6 points per game. Bird shot badly (for Bird, at -1.6%), Magic dished 14 assists a game, Kareem scored at +8.6%, Worthy shot at +5.6% and only McHale provided a bright spot for the Celtic’s offense (+10.1% shooting). Losing by 2.6 points a game to the 85 Lakers wasn’t anything to be ashamed of. But it was disappointing, especially since this was one of Bird’s worse playoff showings (some of it may have been fist-related, but he struggled against the Pistons before the alleged injury occurred).
At the end of the day they were a very good team that went a little flat in the playoffs. It happens. And they came back the next year and wrecked *everybody* (I don’t like to tease rankings too much, but I’ll definitely go so far as to say that the ‘86 Celtics are in the top ten. Not that that’s a huge reveal).
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