Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I then cover the three highest players in Usage% (assuming the season has those numbers), the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's nothing fancy; it's literally just me feeding the player's regular season numbers into Stathead and looking for player-seasons in the recent past (the more recent the better) that are reasonably comparable. This is *not* intended to be anything other than fun. I find it to be a neat way to re-conceive what a roster truly was when translated out of the trappings of their laundry and era. The method suffers when translating man defense, as steals/blocks/defensive rating are very approximate estimates of a player's defensive contributions. When I say something like:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I then cover the three highest players in Usage% (assuming the season has those numbers), the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's nothing fancy; it's literally just me feeding the player's regular season numbers into Stathead and looking for player-seasons in the recent past (the more recent the better) that are reasonably comparable. This is *not* intended to be anything other than fun. I find it to be a neat way to re-conceive what a roster truly was when translated out of the trappings of their laundry and era. The method suffers when translating man defense, as steals/blocks/defensive rating are very approximate estimates of a player's defensive contributions. When I say something like:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#70. The 1959 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.16, Standard Deviations: +1.63, Won the NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 52-20, Regular Season SRS: +5.84 (72nd), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -0.7 (93rd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -5.7 (20th)
PG: Bob Cousy (30), 0.174 / 0.107
SG: Bill Sharman (32), 0.154 / 0.194
SF: Jim Loscutoff (28), 0.025 / 0.011
PF: Tom Heinsohn (24), 0.150 / 0.130
C: Bill Russell (24), 0.208 / 0.184
6th: Frank Ramsey (27), 0.142 / +0.322
Scoring/100: Bill Sharman (23.0 / +1.9%), Tom Heinsohn (22.1 / -0.2%), Bob Cousy (20.2 / -0.3%),
Assists/100: Bob Cousy (8.7), Tom Heinsohn (2.9), Bill Russell (2.8)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +7.13 (29th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -0.73 (92nd)
Playoff SRS: +10.33 (56th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.32 (54th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.68 (65th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.02 (91st)
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3: Syracuse Nationals (+5.0), won 4-3, by +6.2 points per game (+11.2 SRS eq)
Round 4: Minneapolis Lakers (-1.5), won 4-0, by +10.3 points per game (+8.5 SRS eq)
The Boston Celtics won the championship in 1957, Bill Russell’s first year, over the St. Louis Hawks (led by Bob Pettit). In the next year the Celtics were the clear best team in the league (of eight teams), posting the best record by 8 wins and the best SRS by almost three points. But in the NBA Finals the unthinkable happened: Russell sprained his ankle and Pettit and the Hawks upset the heavily favored Celtics four games to two. You could argue that this was the Celtics choking; they certainly did lose to a worse team. However, the MoV numbers paint a different picture. The Celtics averaged a +4.5 advantage over the series: their two wins were by 24 and 9 points, the Hawks’ wins were by 2, 3, 2 and 1 point. In other words, the Hawks totally won, and it totally counts, but they probably shouldn’t have.
So in 1959 the Celtics were out for some payback. Their offense scored the second most points per game in the league, but that’s because they played at (by far) the fastest pace in the league. In terms of points per possession, the Celtics actually had a slightly below average offense. Their defense, however, was exceptional. Their defense was 5.2 points per 100 possessions better than league average. The gap between #2 and #8 (the worst in the league)? 5.7 points. As per usual, the Celtics’ defense was light-years ahead of everyone. In fact, the gap between the best offense in the league and the worst? 5.2 points per 100. I understand that Wilt’s scoring in the early 60s *sounds* like the most impressive stat from that era, but until you’ve looked at how much better than the norm those Celtics’ defenses were . . . you don’t really know what a dominant outlier looks like. And this isn’t even one of their better defenses.
It’s hard to give good profiles of the lineup with the stats available back then, but I’ll try. Bob Cousy was probably the best pre-Oscar Robertson point guard, leading the league in assists ten seasons in a row. Don’t overrate that; passing in the pre-spacing era was of reduced value, but 8.7 assists per 100 is actually a respectable (but not dominant) rate in modern times. At this point Cousy was reaching the end of his career (at age 30), but he still rebounded well for a 1 and could be counted on for decent shooting volume at average efficiency. Bill Sharman (oh he of the sweet shooting touch and 93.2% from the line) was a consistently efficient scorer (for the time), though at the age of 32 he was slowing up (and would be soon replaced with Sam Jones, who had joined the team in ‘58). Jim Loscutoff was the ostensible 3, though he had fewer minutes than “6th man” Frank Ramsey. Loscutoff was a tenacious defender (and noted enforcer), but weak on offense; he averaged 12.1 points per 100 on -7.9% along with less than an assist per game. Tom Heinsohn was the second best rebounder on the team, which is to say, he averaged about 60% the rebounds per possession that Russell did. He combined reliable shooting with capable passing, being a stable axis for the offense to operate through. And Russell? His passing didn’t yet have the impact that it eventually would (though it was good enough) and his shooting was traditional dunker stuff: 14.7 points per 100 on +3.6% (basically think young Rudy Gobert or young Tyson Chandler). He also led the league in rebounds (with half again the amount of the 3rd best rebounder). And rumor had it he was a pretty good defender.
So anyhow. The Celtics stomp their way through the season, get the bye (in the eight team league, six teams made the playoffs) and end up facing the Syracuse Nationals in the Conference Finals (ah, the good ol’ days when men were men and the one seed automatically put you in the Conference Finals). The Nationals were the second best team in the league (+5.0) and had just whipped the Knicks by 11 points a game. They would be a tough opponent. And to their considerable credit, they outshot the Celtics. Dolph Shayes put up 28/13 on +5.2% (take the per game numbers with a grain of salt, they played at an insane rate in these series) and the Nationals overall shot at +0.6%, which took some doing against a defense as good as the Celtics’. For the Celtics, Frank Ramsey put up a 24/6 on +10.6% (wow!), while Russell and Sharman combined for 38 points a game on +3.1% shooting or better, but the entire rest of the lineup shot worse than league average, some a lot worse. We don’t have offensive rebounding numbers or any turnover/steals numbers. But I can tell you that the Celtics averaged 11 more shooting possessions per game, and the Celtics got 13 more boards a game than the Nationals, despite shooting worse. So I’m gonna go out on a limb and say that the Celtics dominated the glass on both sides (Russell averaged 27 rebounds per game, twice what the best Nationals’ player did) and it led to way more shots. In the end, the Celtics outscored the Nationals by 6.2 points per game, a very solid showing against a very good team.
In the Finals they would have expected to face the Hawks, but it didn’t happen. Instead, the Hawks were upset by the upstart Minneapolis (not yet in Los Angeles) Lakers. The Lakers (or as they might more accurately have been called, the Elgin Baylors) were not a good team. They went 33-39 in the regular season with an SRS of -1.42. Elgin Baylor led them in the following: assists per 100 (around 4), rebounds per game (15; the next highest was 8.7), points per game (24.9, the next highest was 13.8), Shots per game (21, next was 12.6) and True shooting percentage (+3.1%). So, out of the gate, we may reasonably infer that the non-Baylor Lakers were really, really, really bad. Like “Call mid 2000s LeBron and ask him if we can switch teammates” bad. And did I mention that Baylor was a rookie? Wowza. I don’t want to imply that Baylor was a world-beater yet, only that he was really good (probably top 5 in the 8-team league) and his teammates were atrocious. I’d love to say that the courageous Baylor led the Lakers over the Hawks (he did average 28 points a game on +8.6% shooting), but the Lakers were outscored by 7.2 points per game. Just as the Hawks had done to the Celtics the year before, the Lakers had been outplayed, but managed to win anyways. And that’s how you can get a -1.5 SRS team in the Finals.
It went exactly how you’d expect. The Celtics’s defense smothered Baylor (23/12 on -6.9%), Russell grabbed 30 boards a game (not a misprint), Cousy dished 13 assists a game and Heinsohn, Ramsey and Sharman all averaged 20+ points a game. The Celtics won by 10.3 points a game. It wasn’t close. None of this was unexpected; the Lakers were completely outclassed. And the Celtics had won their second title in three years. As for the future . . . Maybe the talking heads of the day were concerned that Cousy and Sharman were both 30+ and the Celtics couldn’t possibly keep this up. Maybe they bloviated about how now that rookie superstar Elgin Baylor had willed his team to the Finals there was a new sheriff in town. And with impending rookie Wilt Chamberlain hitting the league next year, I can easily imagine the talking heads stroking their mustaches (in my imagination, there were a lot of mustaches in the 1959 offseason) and opining that the Celtics dominance couldn’t continue.
Maybe those things didn’t happen. But if the Celtics were considered a bit of an underdog going forward that’d make the 60s a lot more satisfying than if the talking heads just threw up their hands and said, “Well heck, we’re out of here, call us when Russell retires.”
Regular Season Record: 52-20, Regular Season SRS: +5.84 (72nd), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -0.7 (93rd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -5.7 (20th)
PG: Bob Cousy (30), 0.174 / 0.107
SG: Bill Sharman (32), 0.154 / 0.194
SF: Jim Loscutoff (28), 0.025 / 0.011
PF: Tom Heinsohn (24), 0.150 / 0.130
C: Bill Russell (24), 0.208 / 0.184
6th: Frank Ramsey (27), 0.142 / +0.322
Scoring/100: Bill Sharman (23.0 / +1.9%), Tom Heinsohn (22.1 / -0.2%), Bob Cousy (20.2 / -0.3%),
Assists/100: Bob Cousy (8.7), Tom Heinsohn (2.9), Bill Russell (2.8)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +7.13 (29th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -0.73 (92nd)
Playoff SRS: +10.33 (56th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.32 (54th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.68 (65th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.02 (91st)
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3: Syracuse Nationals (+5.0), won 4-3, by +6.2 points per game (+11.2 SRS eq)
Round 4: Minneapolis Lakers (-1.5), won 4-0, by +10.3 points per game (+8.5 SRS eq)
The Boston Celtics won the championship in 1957, Bill Russell’s first year, over the St. Louis Hawks (led by Bob Pettit). In the next year the Celtics were the clear best team in the league (of eight teams), posting the best record by 8 wins and the best SRS by almost three points. But in the NBA Finals the unthinkable happened: Russell sprained his ankle and Pettit and the Hawks upset the heavily favored Celtics four games to two. You could argue that this was the Celtics choking; they certainly did lose to a worse team. However, the MoV numbers paint a different picture. The Celtics averaged a +4.5 advantage over the series: their two wins were by 24 and 9 points, the Hawks’ wins were by 2, 3, 2 and 1 point. In other words, the Hawks totally won, and it totally counts, but they probably shouldn’t have.
So in 1959 the Celtics were out for some payback. Their offense scored the second most points per game in the league, but that’s because they played at (by far) the fastest pace in the league. In terms of points per possession, the Celtics actually had a slightly below average offense. Their defense, however, was exceptional. Their defense was 5.2 points per 100 possessions better than league average. The gap between #2 and #8 (the worst in the league)? 5.7 points. As per usual, the Celtics’ defense was light-years ahead of everyone. In fact, the gap between the best offense in the league and the worst? 5.2 points per 100. I understand that Wilt’s scoring in the early 60s *sounds* like the most impressive stat from that era, but until you’ve looked at how much better than the norm those Celtics’ defenses were . . . you don’t really know what a dominant outlier looks like. And this isn’t even one of their better defenses.
It’s hard to give good profiles of the lineup with the stats available back then, but I’ll try. Bob Cousy was probably the best pre-Oscar Robertson point guard, leading the league in assists ten seasons in a row. Don’t overrate that; passing in the pre-spacing era was of reduced value, but 8.7 assists per 100 is actually a respectable (but not dominant) rate in modern times. At this point Cousy was reaching the end of his career (at age 30), but he still rebounded well for a 1 and could be counted on for decent shooting volume at average efficiency. Bill Sharman (oh he of the sweet shooting touch and 93.2% from the line) was a consistently efficient scorer (for the time), though at the age of 32 he was slowing up (and would be soon replaced with Sam Jones, who had joined the team in ‘58). Jim Loscutoff was the ostensible 3, though he had fewer minutes than “6th man” Frank Ramsey. Loscutoff was a tenacious defender (and noted enforcer), but weak on offense; he averaged 12.1 points per 100 on -7.9% along with less than an assist per game. Tom Heinsohn was the second best rebounder on the team, which is to say, he averaged about 60% the rebounds per possession that Russell did. He combined reliable shooting with capable passing, being a stable axis for the offense to operate through. And Russell? His passing didn’t yet have the impact that it eventually would (though it was good enough) and his shooting was traditional dunker stuff: 14.7 points per 100 on +3.6% (basically think young Rudy Gobert or young Tyson Chandler). He also led the league in rebounds (with half again the amount of the 3rd best rebounder). And rumor had it he was a pretty good defender.
So anyhow. The Celtics stomp their way through the season, get the bye (in the eight team league, six teams made the playoffs) and end up facing the Syracuse Nationals in the Conference Finals (ah, the good ol’ days when men were men and the one seed automatically put you in the Conference Finals). The Nationals were the second best team in the league (+5.0) and had just whipped the Knicks by 11 points a game. They would be a tough opponent. And to their considerable credit, they outshot the Celtics. Dolph Shayes put up 28/13 on +5.2% (take the per game numbers with a grain of salt, they played at an insane rate in these series) and the Nationals overall shot at +0.6%, which took some doing against a defense as good as the Celtics’. For the Celtics, Frank Ramsey put up a 24/6 on +10.6% (wow!), while Russell and Sharman combined for 38 points a game on +3.1% shooting or better, but the entire rest of the lineup shot worse than league average, some a lot worse. We don’t have offensive rebounding numbers or any turnover/steals numbers. But I can tell you that the Celtics averaged 11 more shooting possessions per game, and the Celtics got 13 more boards a game than the Nationals, despite shooting worse. So I’m gonna go out on a limb and say that the Celtics dominated the glass on both sides (Russell averaged 27 rebounds per game, twice what the best Nationals’ player did) and it led to way more shots. In the end, the Celtics outscored the Nationals by 6.2 points per game, a very solid showing against a very good team.
In the Finals they would have expected to face the Hawks, but it didn’t happen. Instead, the Hawks were upset by the upstart Minneapolis (not yet in Los Angeles) Lakers. The Lakers (or as they might more accurately have been called, the Elgin Baylors) were not a good team. They went 33-39 in the regular season with an SRS of -1.42. Elgin Baylor led them in the following: assists per 100 (around 4), rebounds per game (15; the next highest was 8.7), points per game (24.9, the next highest was 13.8), Shots per game (21, next was 12.6) and True shooting percentage (+3.1%). So, out of the gate, we may reasonably infer that the non-Baylor Lakers were really, really, really bad. Like “Call mid 2000s LeBron and ask him if we can switch teammates” bad. And did I mention that Baylor was a rookie? Wowza. I don’t want to imply that Baylor was a world-beater yet, only that he was really good (probably top 5 in the 8-team league) and his teammates were atrocious. I’d love to say that the courageous Baylor led the Lakers over the Hawks (he did average 28 points a game on +8.6% shooting), but the Lakers were outscored by 7.2 points per game. Just as the Hawks had done to the Celtics the year before, the Lakers had been outplayed, but managed to win anyways. And that’s how you can get a -1.5 SRS team in the Finals.
It went exactly how you’d expect. The Celtics’s defense smothered Baylor (23/12 on -6.9%), Russell grabbed 30 boards a game (not a misprint), Cousy dished 13 assists a game and Heinsohn, Ramsey and Sharman all averaged 20+ points a game. The Celtics won by 10.3 points a game. It wasn’t close. None of this was unexpected; the Lakers were completely outclassed. And the Celtics had won their second title in three years. As for the future . . . Maybe the talking heads of the day were concerned that Cousy and Sharman were both 30+ and the Celtics couldn’t possibly keep this up. Maybe they bloviated about how now that rookie superstar Elgin Baylor had willed his team to the Finals there was a new sheriff in town. And with impending rookie Wilt Chamberlain hitting the league next year, I can easily imagine the talking heads stroking their mustaches (in my imagination, there were a lot of mustaches in the 1959 offseason) and opining that the Celtics dominance couldn’t continue.
Maybe those things didn’t happen. But if the Celtics were considered a bit of an underdog going forward that’d make the 60s a lot more satisfying than if the talking heads just threw up their hands and said, “Well heck, we’re out of here, call us when Russell retires.”
#69. The 1957 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +6.70, Standard Deviations: +2.16, Won the NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 44-28, Regular Season SRS: +4.78 (87th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -0.4 (91st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.9 (28th)
PG: Bob Cousy (28), 0.178 / 0.134
SG: Bill Sharman (30), 0.207 / 0.164
SF: Jim Loscutoff (26), 0.046 / -0.009
PF: Tom Heinsohn (22), 0.160 / 0.157
C: Bill Russell (22), 0.176 / 0.162
6th: Frank Ramsey (25), 0.194 / +0.290
Scoring/100: Bill Sharman (23.9 / +4.6%), Bob Cousy (22.7 / +0.3%), Tom Heinsohn (22.0 / +0.7%)
Assists/100: Bob Cousy (8.3), Bill Sharman (4.0), Frank Ramsey (3.3)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +8.33 (16th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.47 (99th)
Playoff SRS: +8.67 (86th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.92 (61st)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: -0.11 (98th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: +0.32 (94th)
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3: Syracuse Nationals (+0.9), won 3-0, by +12.0 points per game (+12.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: St. Louis Hawks (+1.8), won 4-3, by +5.1 points per game (+6.9 SRS eq)
Due to a strange confluence of fate I just wrote about literally this exact same roster two years later, so I won’t go into quite as much detail. But the ‘57 Celtics, roster-wise, are pretty much the ‘59 Celtics, just two years younger. In fact, the team had two rookies in Tom Heinsohn and Bill Russell. Heinsohn was a capable scorer (above average volume at slightly above average league efficiency) and a good rebounder (though small forward Jim Loscutoff averaged more per game). But Russell was, well, Russell. In what was a great surprise to me, Heinsohn won the Rookie of the Year award. Was there any justification for this? This was 1957; the decision being racially biased wouldn’t be an enormous shock. Stats?
Heinsohn: 16 / 10 / 2 on +0.7%
Russell: 15 / 20 / 2 on +0.1%
And that’s without defense (which I suspect would have favored Russell). Anything else worth considering? How about that Russell only played 44 games that year? Russell led the United States to a Gold Medal over the USSR in basketball in the 1956 Summer Olympics, and that competition kept Russell from playing in the NBA until a third of the way into the year. Interestingly, had he not been able to play basketball, he would have competed as a High Jumper. In the Olympics. Did anyone ever mention that Russell had some hops?
So that changes things, doesn’t it? Heinsohn for the whole season, Russell for only ⅔ of it? How do the games break down? I’ll be honest, I was extremely surprised with the results:
Without Russell: 16-8, 105.2 Pts per game, 100.6 Pts Allowed per game
With Russell: 28-20, 105.7 Pts per game, 100.0 Pts Allowed per game
Look. I’m not reading too much into the records; the two pythags look very comparable. Still. I went into this expecting to find obvious evidence that Russell transformed the team. The evidence isn’t there. In terms of overall impact, is it possible that giving the award to Heinsohn (especially given that Russell missed a third of the season) isn’t as crazy as it looks at first blush? But seriously, to what can we attribute this strange fact pattern? Maybe the Celtics struggled to integrate a second rookie mid-season? Maybe Russell, having just played Olympic basketball with college kids, struggled to adjust to the NBA? Or is it possible that an extremely competitive, proud and occasionally surly black man didn’t integrate well mid-season with an all-white team (which the Celtics were)? Wow. That quick look turned into quite a rabbit-hole. Let’s just end with the assertion that the Rookie of the Year thing was a lot more complicated than it looked.
So. The Celtics finished 44-28 with a +4.78 SRS. Doesn’t sound particularly good, right? Well the second best team in the league (Philadelphia) was 37-35 with a +1.54 SRS, and the worse team in the league was Rochester who was 31-41 with a -2.08 SRS. So the gap between the Celtics and the 2nd best team was comparable to the gap between the 2nd best team and the worst team in the league. So the Celtics weren’t dominant by modern standards, but for 1957, they were the obvious best team in the league. In the Conference Finals they faced the Syracuse Nationals and smothered them. Dolph Schayes played extremely well (25/18 on +6.7% shooting) but the rest of the Nationals (minus Ed Conlin) shot dreadfully. The team as a whole shot at -4.6% and the Nationals averaged only 91.7 points a game. The Celtics won by 12 points a game, sweeping them and advancing to the Finals.
In the Finals they played Bob Pettit and the St. Louis Hawks, who were slightly above average, but still with an Overall SRS five points lower than the Celtics. But the Hawks made a genuine fight of it and the series went to seven. Bob Pettit played like a champ, averaging a 30/18/2 on +2.8% shooting, while Cliff Hagan (16/12/3 on +5.6%) and Ed Macauley (15/6/2 on +7.2%) played extremely well. The Celtics, in contrast, shot only decently. Cousy (21/7/9) and Russell (13/23/3) both shot below average, Heinsohn’s 24/13/2 was on exactly league average efficiency; of the starters only Bill Sharman shot above average on a 22/4/3 with +1.9% efficiency (shout out to Frank Ramsey’s 12 points a game on +9.1% efficiency off the bench). But the Celtics obliterated the Hawks on the glass. The Celtics gained an extra 12 shooting possessions a game over the Hawks, and much of it came from 9 more rebounds a game (despite shooting worse than the Hawks). In the end, the Hawks’ shooting advantage was no match for the Celtics superiority possession superiority, and the Celtics outscored the Hawks by 5.1 points per game. Game 7 for the series was absolutely bonkers. It went to double overtime. Pettit put up a virtuoso 39/19/3 on +4.2% efficiency, while Tom Heinsohn went off for a 37/23/2 (+4.0%). The Celtics got a ridiculous *twenty-two* more shooting possessions that game, and rebounding doesn’t explain all of it; there had to have been a ton of steals going on.
I remember a really interesting study from Baseball Prospectus that I read almost two decades ago about clutch hitting that basically said, “We’re not saying that clutch hitting doesn’t exist, but by and large the best hitters in the clutch are the best hitters period. And that you’re far better off with a choke-artist great hitter than a particularly clutch weak hitter.” The Russell Celtics often get praised for being super-clutch for excelling in the playoffs. There are some years where, perhaps, such a characterization is merited. But much of the time, the Celtics just won because they were the better team. In 1957 is one such example. They were the best team by a *lot*. By overall SRS the top 4 teams of that year look like this: +6.7, +1.7, +0.1, -0.3. Not close. Their SRS numbers don’t look great, but once you adjust for their era, they look plenty good.
Regular Season Record: 44-28, Regular Season SRS: +4.78 (87th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -0.4 (91st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.9 (28th)
PG: Bob Cousy (28), 0.178 / 0.134
SG: Bill Sharman (30), 0.207 / 0.164
SF: Jim Loscutoff (26), 0.046 / -0.009
PF: Tom Heinsohn (22), 0.160 / 0.157
C: Bill Russell (22), 0.176 / 0.162
6th: Frank Ramsey (25), 0.194 / +0.290
Scoring/100: Bill Sharman (23.9 / +4.6%), Bob Cousy (22.7 / +0.3%), Tom Heinsohn (22.0 / +0.7%)
Assists/100: Bob Cousy (8.3), Bill Sharman (4.0), Frank Ramsey (3.3)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +8.33 (16th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.47 (99th)
Playoff SRS: +8.67 (86th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.92 (61st)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: -0.11 (98th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: +0.32 (94th)
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3: Syracuse Nationals (+0.9), won 3-0, by +12.0 points per game (+12.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: St. Louis Hawks (+1.8), won 4-3, by +5.1 points per game (+6.9 SRS eq)
Due to a strange confluence of fate I just wrote about literally this exact same roster two years later, so I won’t go into quite as much detail. But the ‘57 Celtics, roster-wise, are pretty much the ‘59 Celtics, just two years younger. In fact, the team had two rookies in Tom Heinsohn and Bill Russell. Heinsohn was a capable scorer (above average volume at slightly above average league efficiency) and a good rebounder (though small forward Jim Loscutoff averaged more per game). But Russell was, well, Russell. In what was a great surprise to me, Heinsohn won the Rookie of the Year award. Was there any justification for this? This was 1957; the decision being racially biased wouldn’t be an enormous shock. Stats?
Heinsohn: 16 / 10 / 2 on +0.7%
Russell: 15 / 20 / 2 on +0.1%
And that’s without defense (which I suspect would have favored Russell). Anything else worth considering? How about that Russell only played 44 games that year? Russell led the United States to a Gold Medal over the USSR in basketball in the 1956 Summer Olympics, and that competition kept Russell from playing in the NBA until a third of the way into the year. Interestingly, had he not been able to play basketball, he would have competed as a High Jumper. In the Olympics. Did anyone ever mention that Russell had some hops?
So that changes things, doesn’t it? Heinsohn for the whole season, Russell for only ⅔ of it? How do the games break down? I’ll be honest, I was extremely surprised with the results:
Without Russell: 16-8, 105.2 Pts per game, 100.6 Pts Allowed per game
With Russell: 28-20, 105.7 Pts per game, 100.0 Pts Allowed per game
Look. I’m not reading too much into the records; the two pythags look very comparable. Still. I went into this expecting to find obvious evidence that Russell transformed the team. The evidence isn’t there. In terms of overall impact, is it possible that giving the award to Heinsohn (especially given that Russell missed a third of the season) isn’t as crazy as it looks at first blush? But seriously, to what can we attribute this strange fact pattern? Maybe the Celtics struggled to integrate a second rookie mid-season? Maybe Russell, having just played Olympic basketball with college kids, struggled to adjust to the NBA? Or is it possible that an extremely competitive, proud and occasionally surly black man didn’t integrate well mid-season with an all-white team (which the Celtics were)? Wow. That quick look turned into quite a rabbit-hole. Let’s just end with the assertion that the Rookie of the Year thing was a lot more complicated than it looked.
So. The Celtics finished 44-28 with a +4.78 SRS. Doesn’t sound particularly good, right? Well the second best team in the league (Philadelphia) was 37-35 with a +1.54 SRS, and the worse team in the league was Rochester who was 31-41 with a -2.08 SRS. So the gap between the Celtics and the 2nd best team was comparable to the gap between the 2nd best team and the worst team in the league. So the Celtics weren’t dominant by modern standards, but for 1957, they were the obvious best team in the league. In the Conference Finals they faced the Syracuse Nationals and smothered them. Dolph Schayes played extremely well (25/18 on +6.7% shooting) but the rest of the Nationals (minus Ed Conlin) shot dreadfully. The team as a whole shot at -4.6% and the Nationals averaged only 91.7 points a game. The Celtics won by 12 points a game, sweeping them and advancing to the Finals.
In the Finals they played Bob Pettit and the St. Louis Hawks, who were slightly above average, but still with an Overall SRS five points lower than the Celtics. But the Hawks made a genuine fight of it and the series went to seven. Bob Pettit played like a champ, averaging a 30/18/2 on +2.8% shooting, while Cliff Hagan (16/12/3 on +5.6%) and Ed Macauley (15/6/2 on +7.2%) played extremely well. The Celtics, in contrast, shot only decently. Cousy (21/7/9) and Russell (13/23/3) both shot below average, Heinsohn’s 24/13/2 was on exactly league average efficiency; of the starters only Bill Sharman shot above average on a 22/4/3 with +1.9% efficiency (shout out to Frank Ramsey’s 12 points a game on +9.1% efficiency off the bench). But the Celtics obliterated the Hawks on the glass. The Celtics gained an extra 12 shooting possessions a game over the Hawks, and much of it came from 9 more rebounds a game (despite shooting worse than the Hawks). In the end, the Hawks’ shooting advantage was no match for the Celtics superiority possession superiority, and the Celtics outscored the Hawks by 5.1 points per game. Game 7 for the series was absolutely bonkers. It went to double overtime. Pettit put up a virtuoso 39/19/3 on +4.2% efficiency, while Tom Heinsohn went off for a 37/23/2 (+4.0%). The Celtics got a ridiculous *twenty-two* more shooting possessions that game, and rebounding doesn’t explain all of it; there had to have been a ton of steals going on.
I remember a really interesting study from Baseball Prospectus that I read almost two decades ago about clutch hitting that basically said, “We’re not saying that clutch hitting doesn’t exist, but by and large the best hitters in the clutch are the best hitters period. And that you’re far better off with a choke-artist great hitter than a particularly clutch weak hitter.” The Russell Celtics often get praised for being super-clutch for excelling in the playoffs. There are some years where, perhaps, such a characterization is merited. But much of the time, the Celtics just won because they were the better team. In 1957 is one such example. They were the best team by a *lot*. By overall SRS the top 4 teams of that year look like this: +6.7, +1.7, +0.1, -0.3. Not close. Their SRS numbers don’t look great, but once you adjust for their era, they look plenty good.
#68. The 2000 Los Angeles Lakers
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.00, Standard Deviations: +1.70, Won in NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 67-15, Regular Season SRS: +8.41 (17th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.2 (57th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -5.9 (18th)
PG: Ron Harper (36), +1.3 / +1.3
SG: Kobe Bryant (21), +4.5 / +4.2
SF: Glen Rice (32), +1.8 / -0.8
PF: Robert Horry (29), +2.2 / +1.8
C: Shaquille O’Neal (27), +9.3 / +8.1
Usage Rate: Shaquille O’Neal (31.2%), Kobe Bryant (26.8%), Glen Rice (22.0%)
Scoring/100: Shaquille O’Neal (38.1 / +5.5%), Kobe Bryant (30.3 / +2.3%), Glen Rice (25.9 / +2.8%)
Assists/100: Ron Harper (6.8), Kobe Bryant (6.6), Shaquille O’Neal (4.9)
Heliocentrism: 45.2% (15th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 33.7% (60th)
Depth: 21.1% (57th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +8.68 (14th), Playoff Defensive Rating: +0.79 (97th)
Playoff SRS: +7.79 (96th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: -0.41 (99th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.61 (38th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.68 (32nd)
Round 1: Sacramento Kings (+3.0), won 3-2, by +8.0 points per game (+11.0 SRS eq)
Round 2: Phoenix Suns (+5.7), won 4-1, by +7.6 points per game (+13.3 SRS eq)
Round 3: Portland Trail Blazers (+8.1), won 4-3, by -1.9 points per game (+6.2 SRS eq)
Round 4: Indiana Pacers (+4.4), won 4-2, by -2.1 points per game (+2.3 SRS eq)
So. Shaquille O’Neal had left the Orlando Magic for greener pastures in LA. Around him the Lakers had constructed several strong teams, but each playoff run they fell to a monster: the Jazz in ‘97 and ‘98 (by 3.6 and 13.5 points per game respectively) and in ‘99 to the Spurs (by 8 points a game). However, despite the Spurs’ dominance in ‘99, the Lakers were tabbed as the #2 team in the league in the preseason polls (behind the Blazers). Was there any reason for this confidence from the market? There were two. First, Phil Jackson was coming in to coach in place of the revolving door in ‘99. And second, the Lakers had a burgeoning talent in 21 year-old Kobe Bryant, who had yet to make a big splash, but whom everyone (correctly) expected great things of.
The ‘00 Lakers had a weird offense by modern standards. First, their offense was only good, not great. This may be surprising, on account of both Shaq and Kobe being on the team, but remember, Kobe was only 21. The Lakers did a great job on the offensive glass (5th in the league, led by Shaq) and did a great job avoiding turnovers (Kobe’s ball control ability has long been noted, but I don’t think people realize how low-turnover Shaq was for a big man). Their two point percentage was the best in the league (not surprising with Shaq and Kobe) but their ranged shooting was quite weak. Aside from Glen Rice (36.7%), nobody on the team who took more than a three a game shot better than 33%. On defense, however, the team shone, leading the league in both 2P% allowed *and* 3P% allowed. Shaq was obviously a formidable presence in the paint, but he was hardly the sole reason. Ron Harper and Glen Rice were capable defenders but Robert Horry was an extremely strong defender and Kobe Bryant (whose defensive reputation would come to outrun his actual value on that end) in his early years was extremely good. The Lakers ripped through the (excellent) West en route to a 67-15 season, with a +8.41 SRS, the 17th best on this list.
In the first round they tangled with the Sacramento Kings (+3.0). It wasn’t a dominant performance from the Lakers, but it was enough. While Shaq’s scoring was limited (29 ppg on +1.1% efficiency) he averaged 17 boards (6 offensive), single-handedly giving the Lakers a considerable advantage in shooting possessions. The Lakers themselves shot below average as a team (Kobe averaged a 28/4/4 on +3.4%) but the rebound advantage was enough, even as the Kings’ bigs were shut down (Webber and Divac shooting -3.5% or worse). The series went to five, but the Lakers won by 8 points a game.
In the second round the Lakers would face a strong Phoenix team (+5.7), led by Jason Kidd and Penny Hardaway. The Lakers again did not shoot very well: Shaq with his 30/16/3 on +3.5% shooting was the lone bright spot (Kobe scored 21 a game on +0.1%). But again, Shaq grabbed six offensive boards a game and that was a big deal. And again, the Lakers kept the Suns from shooting well. Hardaway and Clifford Robinson both shot at +4.3% or better, but everyone else struggled hard. It was a strong defensive performance, and the Lakers won in five, by 7.6 points per game. Two strong series in the books.
But in the Conference Finals were the +8.1 Portland Trail Blazers, the preseason favorites. Led by veteran Scottie Pippen (34 years old) but boasting a tough front-court in Rasheed Wallace and Arvydas Sabonis, the Blazers promised to be a serious challenge. And they managed to do what nobody had been able to do to that point: keep Shaq off the boards. Don’t get me wrong, he got some, but he averaged less than 4 offensive rebounds per game (Pippen averaged almost eight defensive boards a game). Shaq’s line of 26/12/4 on +2.7% was good, but it was a far cry from the dominant performances from the prior two rounds. The Lakers made up some ground with improved shooting (Kobe with a 20/5/6 on +2.9%); the end result was a solid offensive outing against a strong defense.
But the Blazers offense? Worked surprisingly well. They outrebounded the Lakers (slightly) and didn’t turn the ball over. Rasheed Wallace put up a 23/7/2 on +5.9% and Steve Smith put up an 18/3/3 on +8.5% shooting, while Pippen averaged a 15/9/4 on +1.8% (with 2.6 steals a game). It wasn’t a dominant performance, but against the Lakers’ defense it was a considerable achievement. It came down to Game 7. Going into the final quarter the Blazers were up by 13. In that quarter the Lakers’ defense clamped down: Wallace, Pippen and Smith shot a combined 4 of 17 from the field while the Lakers went 9 of 15 to surge ahead, winning the game by 5. It was a tough win against a great team. But the Blazers actually outscored them by 1.9 points per game. There’s no shame in that per se; again, the Blazers were really good. But it’s still a disappointing result from a team that, on paper, could have been one of the best ever.
So the Lakers advance into the Finals against the +4.4 Indiana Pacers. On paper it should have been a cakewalk. It didn’t end up that way, but for reasons that weren’t really the Lakers’ fault. At first glance it looks pretty bad. The Lakers won that series 4-2, but were outscored by 1.9 points per game. But against the +4.4 SRS Pacers, that’s a very bad result. Shaq played his butt off (38/17/2 on +5.3%) but Kobe really struggled on 16/5/4 at -11.2%. So is that what happened? That Kobe choked hard and the Pacers outplayed the Lakers? Not exactly. In Game 1 the Lakers win by 17. In Game 2 Jalen Rose deliberately injures Kobe Bryant by having Kobe come down from a jumper on Jalen’s foot. The Lakers win Game 2 by 7, but Kobe misses Game 3 with a sprained ankle, and the Pacers win by 9. Kobe came back and played the remaining three games (though the injury clearly compromised his performance): the Lakers won two of the remaining three, but were outscored by almost 9 points a game in those. So the result looks bad, but Kobe being out/hobbled for two thirds of the series isn’t a really fair comparison. So my formula (which doesn’t know about Jalen’s foot) really penalizes the Lakers for two fairly weak showings in the final two series. Is it underrating them? Probably by some. But look - they probably shouldn’t have made it past the Blazers. And the Pacers outscored them by 1.9 points per game with Kobe hobbled. For it to be a good result for the Lakers, they’d need to win by maybe 6+ points per game. Would having a healthy Kobe for those games be worth an 8 point swing? I’m not sold. They should be higher, but not a lot higher. I’m having a hard time getting past that Blazers series.
The 2000 Lakers destroyed the regular season, but kind of struggled in the playoffs (at least more than you’d guess). In 2001 they would do the complete opposite.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2013 Gerald Wallace
SG: 2019 Paul George (better passing, worse scoring)
SF: 2013 Danilo Gallinari (worse passing)
PF: 2015 Tony Allen (more spacing)
C: 2019 Anthony Davis (but better on offense)
Interesting. Gerald Wallace is a weird comp for Harper, but when you’re aiming for a no-shoot good defender with decent passing, Wallace isn’t a bad comp. Gallinari is a reasonable comp for Rice in the sense of being a capable defender but solid scorer. Tony Allen may not have been a 4, but as far as a no-shoot ace defender, Tony Allen fits the bill. Paul George . . . he’s not what I expected, but at 21 years old, Kobe was such a strong defender that he precludes a lot of scoring comps. And Shaq . . . it shouldn’t surprise you that there aren’t good modern comps for him. But AD in New Orleans was deceptively close; Shaq’s obviously better in almost every way (except for passing and spacing) but as far as a big who’s dominant at everything (except only decent at passing) 2019 Anthony Davis is probably pretty close.
There is a ton of defense on this roster. All the starters range from “solid” to “destructive” on that end. On offense, Gallinari is a nice piece but they’re clearly only going as far as George and AD can carry them.
Regular Season Record: 67-15, Regular Season SRS: +8.41 (17th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.2 (57th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -5.9 (18th)
PG: Ron Harper (36), +1.3 / +1.3
SG: Kobe Bryant (21), +4.5 / +4.2
SF: Glen Rice (32), +1.8 / -0.8
PF: Robert Horry (29), +2.2 / +1.8
C: Shaquille O’Neal (27), +9.3 / +8.1
Usage Rate: Shaquille O’Neal (31.2%), Kobe Bryant (26.8%), Glen Rice (22.0%)
Scoring/100: Shaquille O’Neal (38.1 / +5.5%), Kobe Bryant (30.3 / +2.3%), Glen Rice (25.9 / +2.8%)
Assists/100: Ron Harper (6.8), Kobe Bryant (6.6), Shaquille O’Neal (4.9)
Heliocentrism: 45.2% (15th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 33.7% (60th)
Depth: 21.1% (57th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +8.68 (14th), Playoff Defensive Rating: +0.79 (97th)
Playoff SRS: +7.79 (96th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: -0.41 (99th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.61 (38th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.68 (32nd)
Round 1: Sacramento Kings (+3.0), won 3-2, by +8.0 points per game (+11.0 SRS eq)
Round 2: Phoenix Suns (+5.7), won 4-1, by +7.6 points per game (+13.3 SRS eq)
Round 3: Portland Trail Blazers (+8.1), won 4-3, by -1.9 points per game (+6.2 SRS eq)
Round 4: Indiana Pacers (+4.4), won 4-2, by -2.1 points per game (+2.3 SRS eq)
So. Shaquille O’Neal had left the Orlando Magic for greener pastures in LA. Around him the Lakers had constructed several strong teams, but each playoff run they fell to a monster: the Jazz in ‘97 and ‘98 (by 3.6 and 13.5 points per game respectively) and in ‘99 to the Spurs (by 8 points a game). However, despite the Spurs’ dominance in ‘99, the Lakers were tabbed as the #2 team in the league in the preseason polls (behind the Blazers). Was there any reason for this confidence from the market? There were two. First, Phil Jackson was coming in to coach in place of the revolving door in ‘99. And second, the Lakers had a burgeoning talent in 21 year-old Kobe Bryant, who had yet to make a big splash, but whom everyone (correctly) expected great things of.
The ‘00 Lakers had a weird offense by modern standards. First, their offense was only good, not great. This may be surprising, on account of both Shaq and Kobe being on the team, but remember, Kobe was only 21. The Lakers did a great job on the offensive glass (5th in the league, led by Shaq) and did a great job avoiding turnovers (Kobe’s ball control ability has long been noted, but I don’t think people realize how low-turnover Shaq was for a big man). Their two point percentage was the best in the league (not surprising with Shaq and Kobe) but their ranged shooting was quite weak. Aside from Glen Rice (36.7%), nobody on the team who took more than a three a game shot better than 33%. On defense, however, the team shone, leading the league in both 2P% allowed *and* 3P% allowed. Shaq was obviously a formidable presence in the paint, but he was hardly the sole reason. Ron Harper and Glen Rice were capable defenders but Robert Horry was an extremely strong defender and Kobe Bryant (whose defensive reputation would come to outrun his actual value on that end) in his early years was extremely good. The Lakers ripped through the (excellent) West en route to a 67-15 season, with a +8.41 SRS, the 17th best on this list.
In the first round they tangled with the Sacramento Kings (+3.0). It wasn’t a dominant performance from the Lakers, but it was enough. While Shaq’s scoring was limited (29 ppg on +1.1% efficiency) he averaged 17 boards (6 offensive), single-handedly giving the Lakers a considerable advantage in shooting possessions. The Lakers themselves shot below average as a team (Kobe averaged a 28/4/4 on +3.4%) but the rebound advantage was enough, even as the Kings’ bigs were shut down (Webber and Divac shooting -3.5% or worse). The series went to five, but the Lakers won by 8 points a game.
In the second round the Lakers would face a strong Phoenix team (+5.7), led by Jason Kidd and Penny Hardaway. The Lakers again did not shoot very well: Shaq with his 30/16/3 on +3.5% shooting was the lone bright spot (Kobe scored 21 a game on +0.1%). But again, Shaq grabbed six offensive boards a game and that was a big deal. And again, the Lakers kept the Suns from shooting well. Hardaway and Clifford Robinson both shot at +4.3% or better, but everyone else struggled hard. It was a strong defensive performance, and the Lakers won in five, by 7.6 points per game. Two strong series in the books.
But in the Conference Finals were the +8.1 Portland Trail Blazers, the preseason favorites. Led by veteran Scottie Pippen (34 years old) but boasting a tough front-court in Rasheed Wallace and Arvydas Sabonis, the Blazers promised to be a serious challenge. And they managed to do what nobody had been able to do to that point: keep Shaq off the boards. Don’t get me wrong, he got some, but he averaged less than 4 offensive rebounds per game (Pippen averaged almost eight defensive boards a game). Shaq’s line of 26/12/4 on +2.7% was good, but it was a far cry from the dominant performances from the prior two rounds. The Lakers made up some ground with improved shooting (Kobe with a 20/5/6 on +2.9%); the end result was a solid offensive outing against a strong defense.
But the Blazers offense? Worked surprisingly well. They outrebounded the Lakers (slightly) and didn’t turn the ball over. Rasheed Wallace put up a 23/7/2 on +5.9% and Steve Smith put up an 18/3/3 on +8.5% shooting, while Pippen averaged a 15/9/4 on +1.8% (with 2.6 steals a game). It wasn’t a dominant performance, but against the Lakers’ defense it was a considerable achievement. It came down to Game 7. Going into the final quarter the Blazers were up by 13. In that quarter the Lakers’ defense clamped down: Wallace, Pippen and Smith shot a combined 4 of 17 from the field while the Lakers went 9 of 15 to surge ahead, winning the game by 5. It was a tough win against a great team. But the Blazers actually outscored them by 1.9 points per game. There’s no shame in that per se; again, the Blazers were really good. But it’s still a disappointing result from a team that, on paper, could have been one of the best ever.
So the Lakers advance into the Finals against the +4.4 Indiana Pacers. On paper it should have been a cakewalk. It didn’t end up that way, but for reasons that weren’t really the Lakers’ fault. At first glance it looks pretty bad. The Lakers won that series 4-2, but were outscored by 1.9 points per game. But against the +4.4 SRS Pacers, that’s a very bad result. Shaq played his butt off (38/17/2 on +5.3%) but Kobe really struggled on 16/5/4 at -11.2%. So is that what happened? That Kobe choked hard and the Pacers outplayed the Lakers? Not exactly. In Game 1 the Lakers win by 17. In Game 2 Jalen Rose deliberately injures Kobe Bryant by having Kobe come down from a jumper on Jalen’s foot. The Lakers win Game 2 by 7, but Kobe misses Game 3 with a sprained ankle, and the Pacers win by 9. Kobe came back and played the remaining three games (though the injury clearly compromised his performance): the Lakers won two of the remaining three, but were outscored by almost 9 points a game in those. So the result looks bad, but Kobe being out/hobbled for two thirds of the series isn’t a really fair comparison. So my formula (which doesn’t know about Jalen’s foot) really penalizes the Lakers for two fairly weak showings in the final two series. Is it underrating them? Probably by some. But look - they probably shouldn’t have made it past the Blazers. And the Pacers outscored them by 1.9 points per game with Kobe hobbled. For it to be a good result for the Lakers, they’d need to win by maybe 6+ points per game. Would having a healthy Kobe for those games be worth an 8 point swing? I’m not sold. They should be higher, but not a lot higher. I’m having a hard time getting past that Blazers series.
The 2000 Lakers destroyed the regular season, but kind of struggled in the playoffs (at least more than you’d guess). In 2001 they would do the complete opposite.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2013 Gerald Wallace
SG: 2019 Paul George (better passing, worse scoring)
SF: 2013 Danilo Gallinari (worse passing)
PF: 2015 Tony Allen (more spacing)
C: 2019 Anthony Davis (but better on offense)
Interesting. Gerald Wallace is a weird comp for Harper, but when you’re aiming for a no-shoot good defender with decent passing, Wallace isn’t a bad comp. Gallinari is a reasonable comp for Rice in the sense of being a capable defender but solid scorer. Tony Allen may not have been a 4, but as far as a no-shoot ace defender, Tony Allen fits the bill. Paul George . . . he’s not what I expected, but at 21 years old, Kobe was such a strong defender that he precludes a lot of scoring comps. And Shaq . . . it shouldn’t surprise you that there aren’t good modern comps for him. But AD in New Orleans was deceptively close; Shaq’s obviously better in almost every way (except for passing and spacing) but as far as a big who’s dominant at everything (except only decent at passing) 2019 Anthony Davis is probably pretty close.
There is a ton of defense on this roster. All the starters range from “solid” to “destructive” on that end. On offense, Gallinari is a nice piece but they’re clearly only going as far as George and AD can carry them.
#67. The 1974 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +7.54, Standard Deviations: +1.88, Won in NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 56-26, Regular Season SRS: +3.42 (94th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +0.9 (87th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.6 (67th)
PG: Jo Jo White (27), +0.0 / -0.6
SG: Don Chaney (27), +1.0 / +2.4
SF: John Havlicek (33), +2.0 / +5.8
PF: Paul Silas (30), +0.4 / +2.4
C: Dave Cowens (25), +1.9 / +2.3
6th: Don Nelson (33), +0.8 / +2.0
Scoring/100: John Havlicek (24.2 / +0.6%), Don Nelson (23.5 / +6.0%), Jo Jo White (20.1 / -2.1%)
Assists/100: John Havlicek (6.3), Jo Jo White (6.0), Dave Cowens (4.6)
Heliocentrism: 24.6% (72nd of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 35.8% (49th)
Depth: 39.6% (12th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +2.36 (76th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -6.71 (32nd)
Playoff SRS: +10.22 (59th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.12 (20th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.81 (62nd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.86 (53rd)
Round 1:
Round 2: Buffalo Braves (-0.2), won 4-2, by +2.7 points per game (+2.5 SRS eq)
Round 3: New York Knicks (+1.6), won 4-1, by +10.4 points per game (+12.0 SRS eq)
Round 4: Milwaukee Bucks (+10.9), won 4-3, by +4.7 points per game (+15.6 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2014 Randy Foye (worse shooter)
SG: 2013 Jimmy Butler (worse scorer)
SF: 2016 Goran Dragic (better scorer, worse passer)
PF: 2015 Gorgui Dieng
C: 2011 Marc Gasol
6th: 2015 Paul Pierce
What an interesting roster (I know I always say that, but it’s always true). I’m gonna open by saying that I love the ‘11 Marc Gasol -> ‘74 Dave Cowens comp. Both didn’t really fill up the box score, neither were great scorers (but capable, with good midrange games), both rebounded well (especially defensive) and both were defensive cornerstones without a ton of blocks to show for it. The rest of the roster is a little more . . . curious. Don Nelson as really old-man Paul Pierce is interesting - at that age Pierce was still a capable scorer but no longer much of a creator. Paul Silas as Gorgui Dieng is fair; both were decent defenders, strong rebounders, efficient scorers (with small loads) but not creators at all. Don Chaney as Jimmy Butler may sound crazy, but it’s not. Twenty-three year-old Jimmy Butler wasn’t the player he is today, he was merely athletic and raw like Monday Night. He was a very low usage, low creation, slightly efficient scorer who was an unusually good offensive rebounder. And Chaney, somehow, racked up a ton of offensive boards for a 2. Jo Jo White as ‘14 Randy Foye is basically the comp engine’s way of saying “had the ball a fair amount, added little as a scorer, was slightly above average as a passer and added nothing on defense”. I know that Jo Jo made Bill Simmons top 75 (or whatever), but looking at the numbers I don’t remotely see it. Except that Simmons loves to reward point guards of great Boston teams (Dennis Johnson, for example). And as for Hondo . . . seeing Havlicek matched with Dragic is a little disappointing, but Havlicek at this point was 33. He was basically a decent usage, decent efficiency, decent distributor who played decent defense. Good, sure. So how does this roster fit together? Honestly? It’ll dominate the glass (at the intersection of Gasol, Dieng and Butler), it’ll play solid defense (led by Gasol) and on offense . . . it’ll do well enough. This isn’t an obviously dominant roster.
But then, the ‘74 Celtics were not an obviously dominant team. They had been extremely good the year before, only to lose to the Knicks in the Conference Finals (Havlicek went down with a nasty injury that may have swung things). In 1974 they may have gone 56-26, but that was only good for a +3.42 SRS. Now, in ‘74, that was still the 3rd best regular season SRS (of 17, and four points behind the Kareem’s Milwaukee Bucks) but it’s the 94th best regular season SRS on this list. The ‘74 Celtics’ offense wasn’t a lot to brag about (+0.9); they didn’t shoot particularly well, but they got offensive boards better than anyone. Their defense was better (-2.6), driven by defensive rebounding and good shot defense (but forcing few turnovers). The moral of the story is, the Celtics were a good team, but in the regular season nothing to suggest making this list. And in the first round (which was still technically the semis because again, 17 team league) they didn’t do much to impress either. Matched up with the Buffalo Braves (the pre-Clippers) who were “led” by twenty-two year-old Bob McAdoo, the Braves were a league average team. But they took the series to six games. McAdoo scored well, averaging a 32/14/2 on +2.6 shooting, though the Braves as a whole shot below league average. The Celtics struggled to score too. Cowens shot at -7% and White at -7.5%; Hondo averaged a 26/7/8 on +0.4% shooting. And the Celtics’ advantage on the boards didn’t translate into many more shot attempts (only 2 more per game or so). In the end the Celtics won in 6, (winning the final game by 2), and outscoring the Braves by only 2.7 points a game. It was a middling performance against an average team. To this date, the Celtics did *not* look like a team with any shot of making this list.
In the Conference Finals they faced the ‘74 New York Knicks, the defending champions who old age had reduced to a shell of their former selves the prior year (finishing with a +9.5 in ‘73 vs +1.6 at the time of meeting the Celtics in ‘74). Walt Frazier scored at will (25/7/4 on +8.8%) but the rest of the Knicks struggled and the team overall shot at -3%. The Celtics, in contrast, shot with uncommon accuracy. Havlicek (no doubt pleased to be able to revenge himself for the prior year) averaged a 30/4/6 on +9.3% and Cowens averaged a +19/15/3 on +0.3%. The Celtics’ role players shot well (especially Don Chaney at +13.5% for 11 points a game) and the Celtics blew the Knicks out by 10.4 points a game. It was a dominant win, and no doubt validation after their struggles the year before. Still, that win only lifted them to an SRS of +5.1. And they were advancing to face the Milwaukee Bucks (+10.9 SRS) in the Finals.
The Bucks were the best team in the league (by far) and had the best player in the league (by far). Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (still at the height of his powers) had averaged a 27/15/5 (+6.3%) along with 1.4 steals and 3.5 blocks for the regular season. That year he was 2nd in points, 3rd in rebounds, 17th in assists, 2nd in blocks, 7th in efficiency . . . he had the most Win Shares that year by a fair bit. There have only been two players ever that were head and shoulders above everyone else in their primes: Kareem and Jordan. Russell was the best (but Wilt was close), Bird and Magic had each other, LeBron had Kobe, Durant and Curry, but there were no challengers to Kareem’s dominance at all. The Bucks had by far the best SRS in the regular season, and their playoffs had been murderous. They’d beaten the Lakers (+0.9) by 13 points a game and the Bulls (+2.7) by 14.2 points per game. What I’m trying to say is this: the Celtics were good but the Bucks were way better. Picture the 76ers against the Lakers in ‘01, picture the Sonics against the Bulls in ‘96, picture the Cavs against the Warriors in ‘17 . . . The Bucks were great and the Celtics weren’t.
But. There were little wrinkles that suggested that it might be close. The Bucks’ supporting cast wasn’t what it had been. Oscar Robertson was 35 and no longer terribly good; Bob Dandridge and Lucius Allen were both good but after that it got thin pretty quick. And Lucius Allen had been injured at the end of the regular season. Clearly losing him hadn’t hurt in the playoffs, but then, the Bucks hadn’t actually played anyone terribly good. The Celtics would be far better, play tougher defense and were unusually deep. And Dave Cowens, matched up on Kareem, could rely more on his midrange game and force Kareem away from the basket. I don’t want to say that the Celtics were favored, they weren’t. But there was reason to think that the Celtics would at least be able to make the Bucks work for it.
In Game 1 Celtics coach Tommy Heinsohn rolled out two tactics: he started full-court pressing Oscar to disrupt his flow running the offense, and he refused to double Kareem. His strategy was to have Cowens do his best on Kareem alone, and figure that smothering the Bucks’ supporting cast would outweigh the damage Kareem could do. And Game 1 definitely supported that position. Kareem went off for a 35/14/5 (on +4.5% shooting) but no other Buck was able to score more than 12 points. The Celtics controlled the boards, Havlicek put up a 26/8/4 on +6.8% and the Celtics ran away with it by 15 points. In Game 2 things swung back against the Celtics with the Bucks dominating the glass (Kareem alone grabbed six offensive rebounds). Kareem put up a 36/15/6 on +1.2% and Bob Dandridge contributed a 24/5/4 on +10.4%. For the Celtics, the entire starting lineup (besides, somehow, Jo Jo White) shot far below league average. The Bucks won by 9, and if the Celtics hadn’t out-stolen the Bucks 11 to 3 the score would have been a lot worse. The Bucks had won, balance had been restored.
Except that the Celtics won Game 3 by 12. Again, Kareem had a strong game (26/10/5 on +0.2% shooting) but the Bucks were mauled by turnovers. The Celtics generated 12 steals to the Bucks’ 2 (Havlicek got 6 of them) - we don’t have a record of who on the Bucks turned the ball over, but it swung the game. The Celtics had 9 extra shooting possessions purely from turnovers and it swung the game (Havlicek scored 28 on -8.9% but Cowens put up a stellar 30/6/2 on +22.4%). It was looking more and more like the Celtics weren’t going to go away. The Bucks took Game 4 on Kareem’s outstanding 34/14/6 on +12.5% shooting, winning by 8. The series was tied up 2-2. Game 5 repeated a familiar pattern: Kareem put up fantastic numbers (37/11/6 on +8.8%) but his teammates struggled, while the four of the Celtics’ starters shot at +5% or above. Havlicek specifically had a 28/9/5 on +12.1% and the Celtics won Game 5 by nine points.
The unthinkable had happened: the Bucks were down 3-2 in the Finals. One more loss would send them home. Game 6 was must-win for them, and it produced one of the better games in playoff history. The Bucks led for most of the game, but it tightened up into the fourth quarter. With the clock ticking down and down by two, Havlicek drilled a long jumper to tie the game and send it to overtime. In the first overtime the Bucks led by two until, very late in the period, Chaney stole the ball passed it to Havlicek who ran the court, pulled up at the free throw line, missed but then snagged the offensive rebound and put in a shot to tie the game. With five seconds to go Oscar Robertson J.R. Smithed the remaining possession, letting the clock expire without putting up a shot and we headed to a second overtime. The second overtime went back and forth, with great shots on both sides. With twenty seconds left in the game the Bucks led by one. The Celtics moved into the half-court, sprang Havlicek with an off-ball pick and he drilled a baseline jumper to take the Celtics up by one (Havlicek’s off-ball game really stood out in the footage I watched). Seven seconds left. The Bucks call timeout, inbound to Kareem who moved baseline, away from the double, and put up a long skyhook with four seconds to go. Swish. The Celtics missed their final shot and the Bucks had pulled it off. Kareem put up a 34/8/6 on +14%, but the Bucks shot really well as a whole (four of their starters shot at +10% or better). The Celtics shot terribly (besides Havlicek who put up a 36/9/4 on +11%), but they generated 7 steals to the Bucks’ one, and that was enough to keep it close.
Game 7 was anticlimactic. The Celtics generated a ton of steals (11 to 2), dominated the glass (Cowens got 5 offensive boards) and had a whopping 15 extra shooting possessions. The Celtics didn’t shoot particularly well (Cowens had a very nice 28/14/4 on +4.7%) but with 15 extra possessions they didn’t really need to. Kareem put up a 26/13/4 on +10.9% in the loss. The Celtics won by 15.
The Celtics had defeated the ‘74 Bucks, David had defeated Goliath. And more to the point, it wasn’t a fluky win. The Celtics won by 4.7 points per game. That is an outstanding margin of victory against a +10.9 SRS team. And that series will stand for a long time as a great example of the on paper weaker team executing better and coming out on top. Was it slightly cheaty, given that the Bucks didn’t have Lucius Allen? Sure, but let’s not forget that the Allen-less Bucks still cremated their Western Conference opponents by 13+ points a game on their way to the Finals. Would having Allen have given the Bucks the series? Maybe. But it doesn’t take away the fact that the ‘74 Celtics played a juggernaut toe to toe. And it was a team effort; the Celtics’ relentless pressure to generate all those steals, and their success in shutting down all non-Kareem Bucks won them the series. That series, almost single-handedly, puts the ‘74 Celtics on this list. I’m not saying it’s the basketball Miracle on Ice . . . but was a hell of a series.
And seriously, check out the end of that Game 6 on youtube. Some great moments.
Regular Season Record: 56-26, Regular Season SRS: +3.42 (94th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +0.9 (87th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.6 (67th)
PG: Jo Jo White (27), +0.0 / -0.6
SG: Don Chaney (27), +1.0 / +2.4
SF: John Havlicek (33), +2.0 / +5.8
PF: Paul Silas (30), +0.4 / +2.4
C: Dave Cowens (25), +1.9 / +2.3
6th: Don Nelson (33), +0.8 / +2.0
Scoring/100: John Havlicek (24.2 / +0.6%), Don Nelson (23.5 / +6.0%), Jo Jo White (20.1 / -2.1%)
Assists/100: John Havlicek (6.3), Jo Jo White (6.0), Dave Cowens (4.6)
Heliocentrism: 24.6% (72nd of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 35.8% (49th)
Depth: 39.6% (12th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +2.36 (76th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -6.71 (32nd)
Playoff SRS: +10.22 (59th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.12 (20th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.81 (62nd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.86 (53rd)
Round 1:
Round 2: Buffalo Braves (-0.2), won 4-2, by +2.7 points per game (+2.5 SRS eq)
Round 3: New York Knicks (+1.6), won 4-1, by +10.4 points per game (+12.0 SRS eq)
Round 4: Milwaukee Bucks (+10.9), won 4-3, by +4.7 points per game (+15.6 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2014 Randy Foye (worse shooter)
SG: 2013 Jimmy Butler (worse scorer)
SF: 2016 Goran Dragic (better scorer, worse passer)
PF: 2015 Gorgui Dieng
C: 2011 Marc Gasol
6th: 2015 Paul Pierce
What an interesting roster (I know I always say that, but it’s always true). I’m gonna open by saying that I love the ‘11 Marc Gasol -> ‘74 Dave Cowens comp. Both didn’t really fill up the box score, neither were great scorers (but capable, with good midrange games), both rebounded well (especially defensive) and both were defensive cornerstones without a ton of blocks to show for it. The rest of the roster is a little more . . . curious. Don Nelson as really old-man Paul Pierce is interesting - at that age Pierce was still a capable scorer but no longer much of a creator. Paul Silas as Gorgui Dieng is fair; both were decent defenders, strong rebounders, efficient scorers (with small loads) but not creators at all. Don Chaney as Jimmy Butler may sound crazy, but it’s not. Twenty-three year-old Jimmy Butler wasn’t the player he is today, he was merely athletic and raw like Monday Night. He was a very low usage, low creation, slightly efficient scorer who was an unusually good offensive rebounder. And Chaney, somehow, racked up a ton of offensive boards for a 2. Jo Jo White as ‘14 Randy Foye is basically the comp engine’s way of saying “had the ball a fair amount, added little as a scorer, was slightly above average as a passer and added nothing on defense”. I know that Jo Jo made Bill Simmons top 75 (or whatever), but looking at the numbers I don’t remotely see it. Except that Simmons loves to reward point guards of great Boston teams (Dennis Johnson, for example). And as for Hondo . . . seeing Havlicek matched with Dragic is a little disappointing, but Havlicek at this point was 33. He was basically a decent usage, decent efficiency, decent distributor who played decent defense. Good, sure. So how does this roster fit together? Honestly? It’ll dominate the glass (at the intersection of Gasol, Dieng and Butler), it’ll play solid defense (led by Gasol) and on offense . . . it’ll do well enough. This isn’t an obviously dominant roster.
But then, the ‘74 Celtics were not an obviously dominant team. They had been extremely good the year before, only to lose to the Knicks in the Conference Finals (Havlicek went down with a nasty injury that may have swung things). In 1974 they may have gone 56-26, but that was only good for a +3.42 SRS. Now, in ‘74, that was still the 3rd best regular season SRS (of 17, and four points behind the Kareem’s Milwaukee Bucks) but it’s the 94th best regular season SRS on this list. The ‘74 Celtics’ offense wasn’t a lot to brag about (+0.9); they didn’t shoot particularly well, but they got offensive boards better than anyone. Their defense was better (-2.6), driven by defensive rebounding and good shot defense (but forcing few turnovers). The moral of the story is, the Celtics were a good team, but in the regular season nothing to suggest making this list. And in the first round (which was still technically the semis because again, 17 team league) they didn’t do much to impress either. Matched up with the Buffalo Braves (the pre-Clippers) who were “led” by twenty-two year-old Bob McAdoo, the Braves were a league average team. But they took the series to six games. McAdoo scored well, averaging a 32/14/2 on +2.6 shooting, though the Braves as a whole shot below league average. The Celtics struggled to score too. Cowens shot at -7% and White at -7.5%; Hondo averaged a 26/7/8 on +0.4% shooting. And the Celtics’ advantage on the boards didn’t translate into many more shot attempts (only 2 more per game or so). In the end the Celtics won in 6, (winning the final game by 2), and outscoring the Braves by only 2.7 points a game. It was a middling performance against an average team. To this date, the Celtics did *not* look like a team with any shot of making this list.
In the Conference Finals they faced the ‘74 New York Knicks, the defending champions who old age had reduced to a shell of their former selves the prior year (finishing with a +9.5 in ‘73 vs +1.6 at the time of meeting the Celtics in ‘74). Walt Frazier scored at will (25/7/4 on +8.8%) but the rest of the Knicks struggled and the team overall shot at -3%. The Celtics, in contrast, shot with uncommon accuracy. Havlicek (no doubt pleased to be able to revenge himself for the prior year) averaged a 30/4/6 on +9.3% and Cowens averaged a +19/15/3 on +0.3%. The Celtics’ role players shot well (especially Don Chaney at +13.5% for 11 points a game) and the Celtics blew the Knicks out by 10.4 points a game. It was a dominant win, and no doubt validation after their struggles the year before. Still, that win only lifted them to an SRS of +5.1. And they were advancing to face the Milwaukee Bucks (+10.9 SRS) in the Finals.
The Bucks were the best team in the league (by far) and had the best player in the league (by far). Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (still at the height of his powers) had averaged a 27/15/5 (+6.3%) along with 1.4 steals and 3.5 blocks for the regular season. That year he was 2nd in points, 3rd in rebounds, 17th in assists, 2nd in blocks, 7th in efficiency . . . he had the most Win Shares that year by a fair bit. There have only been two players ever that were head and shoulders above everyone else in their primes: Kareem and Jordan. Russell was the best (but Wilt was close), Bird and Magic had each other, LeBron had Kobe, Durant and Curry, but there were no challengers to Kareem’s dominance at all. The Bucks had by far the best SRS in the regular season, and their playoffs had been murderous. They’d beaten the Lakers (+0.9) by 13 points a game and the Bulls (+2.7) by 14.2 points per game. What I’m trying to say is this: the Celtics were good but the Bucks were way better. Picture the 76ers against the Lakers in ‘01, picture the Sonics against the Bulls in ‘96, picture the Cavs against the Warriors in ‘17 . . . The Bucks were great and the Celtics weren’t.
But. There were little wrinkles that suggested that it might be close. The Bucks’ supporting cast wasn’t what it had been. Oscar Robertson was 35 and no longer terribly good; Bob Dandridge and Lucius Allen were both good but after that it got thin pretty quick. And Lucius Allen had been injured at the end of the regular season. Clearly losing him hadn’t hurt in the playoffs, but then, the Bucks hadn’t actually played anyone terribly good. The Celtics would be far better, play tougher defense and were unusually deep. And Dave Cowens, matched up on Kareem, could rely more on his midrange game and force Kareem away from the basket. I don’t want to say that the Celtics were favored, they weren’t. But there was reason to think that the Celtics would at least be able to make the Bucks work for it.
In Game 1 Celtics coach Tommy Heinsohn rolled out two tactics: he started full-court pressing Oscar to disrupt his flow running the offense, and he refused to double Kareem. His strategy was to have Cowens do his best on Kareem alone, and figure that smothering the Bucks’ supporting cast would outweigh the damage Kareem could do. And Game 1 definitely supported that position. Kareem went off for a 35/14/5 (on +4.5% shooting) but no other Buck was able to score more than 12 points. The Celtics controlled the boards, Havlicek put up a 26/8/4 on +6.8% and the Celtics ran away with it by 15 points. In Game 2 things swung back against the Celtics with the Bucks dominating the glass (Kareem alone grabbed six offensive rebounds). Kareem put up a 36/15/6 on +1.2% and Bob Dandridge contributed a 24/5/4 on +10.4%. For the Celtics, the entire starting lineup (besides, somehow, Jo Jo White) shot far below league average. The Bucks won by 9, and if the Celtics hadn’t out-stolen the Bucks 11 to 3 the score would have been a lot worse. The Bucks had won, balance had been restored.
Except that the Celtics won Game 3 by 12. Again, Kareem had a strong game (26/10/5 on +0.2% shooting) but the Bucks were mauled by turnovers. The Celtics generated 12 steals to the Bucks’ 2 (Havlicek got 6 of them) - we don’t have a record of who on the Bucks turned the ball over, but it swung the game. The Celtics had 9 extra shooting possessions purely from turnovers and it swung the game (Havlicek scored 28 on -8.9% but Cowens put up a stellar 30/6/2 on +22.4%). It was looking more and more like the Celtics weren’t going to go away. The Bucks took Game 4 on Kareem’s outstanding 34/14/6 on +12.5% shooting, winning by 8. The series was tied up 2-2. Game 5 repeated a familiar pattern: Kareem put up fantastic numbers (37/11/6 on +8.8%) but his teammates struggled, while the four of the Celtics’ starters shot at +5% or above. Havlicek specifically had a 28/9/5 on +12.1% and the Celtics won Game 5 by nine points.
The unthinkable had happened: the Bucks were down 3-2 in the Finals. One more loss would send them home. Game 6 was must-win for them, and it produced one of the better games in playoff history. The Bucks led for most of the game, but it tightened up into the fourth quarter. With the clock ticking down and down by two, Havlicek drilled a long jumper to tie the game and send it to overtime. In the first overtime the Bucks led by two until, very late in the period, Chaney stole the ball passed it to Havlicek who ran the court, pulled up at the free throw line, missed but then snagged the offensive rebound and put in a shot to tie the game. With five seconds to go Oscar Robertson J.R. Smithed the remaining possession, letting the clock expire without putting up a shot and we headed to a second overtime. The second overtime went back and forth, with great shots on both sides. With twenty seconds left in the game the Bucks led by one. The Celtics moved into the half-court, sprang Havlicek with an off-ball pick and he drilled a baseline jumper to take the Celtics up by one (Havlicek’s off-ball game really stood out in the footage I watched). Seven seconds left. The Bucks call timeout, inbound to Kareem who moved baseline, away from the double, and put up a long skyhook with four seconds to go. Swish. The Celtics missed their final shot and the Bucks had pulled it off. Kareem put up a 34/8/6 on +14%, but the Bucks shot really well as a whole (four of their starters shot at +10% or better). The Celtics shot terribly (besides Havlicek who put up a 36/9/4 on +11%), but they generated 7 steals to the Bucks’ one, and that was enough to keep it close.
Game 7 was anticlimactic. The Celtics generated a ton of steals (11 to 2), dominated the glass (Cowens got 5 offensive boards) and had a whopping 15 extra shooting possessions. The Celtics didn’t shoot particularly well (Cowens had a very nice 28/14/4 on +4.7%) but with 15 extra possessions they didn’t really need to. Kareem put up a 26/13/4 on +10.9% in the loss. The Celtics won by 15.
The Celtics had defeated the ‘74 Bucks, David had defeated Goliath. And more to the point, it wasn’t a fluky win. The Celtics won by 4.7 points per game. That is an outstanding margin of victory against a +10.9 SRS team. And that series will stand for a long time as a great example of the on paper weaker team executing better and coming out on top. Was it slightly cheaty, given that the Bucks didn’t have Lucius Allen? Sure, but let’s not forget that the Allen-less Bucks still cremated their Western Conference opponents by 13+ points a game on their way to the Finals. Would having Allen have given the Bucks the series? Maybe. But it doesn’t take away the fact that the ‘74 Celtics played a juggernaut toe to toe. And it was a team effort; the Celtics’ relentless pressure to generate all those steals, and their success in shutting down all non-Kareem Bucks won them the series. That series, almost single-handedly, puts the ‘74 Celtics on this list. I’m not saying it’s the basketball Miracle on Ice . . . but was a hell of a series.
And seriously, check out the end of that Game 6 on youtube. Some great moments.
#66. The 1980 Los Angeles Lakers
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +7.79, Standard Deviations: +1.81, Won in NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 60-22, Regular Season SRS: +5.40 (81st), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.2 (43rd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.4 (86th)
PG: Norm Nixon (24), -0.7 / +0.6
SG: Magic Johnson (20), +4.8 / +8.0
SF: Jamaal Wilkes (26), +1.3 / +1.0
PF: Jim Chones (30), -2.4 / -3.8
C: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (32), +7.2 / +8.9
6th: Michael Cooper (23), -0.1 / +0.6
Usage: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (24.1%), Magic Johnson (20.9%), Jamaal Wilkes (20.8%)
Scoring/100: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (29.8 / ), Jamaal Wilkes (24.2 / ), Magic Johnson (22.9 / )
Assists/100: Magic Johnson (9.3), Norm Nixon (9.2), Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (5.4)
Heliocentrism: 46.5% (13th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 47.1% (9th)
Depth: 6.4% (78th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.16 (43rd), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.04 (85th)
Playoff SRS: +9.54 (71st), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.39 (51st)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.14 (95th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.86 (11th)
Round 1:
Round 2: Phoenix Suns (+3.7), won 4-1, by +2.8 points per game (+6.5 SRS eq)
Round 3: Seattle SuperSonics (+3.8), won 4-1, by +4.6 points per game (+8.4 SRS eq)
Round 4: Philadelphia 76ers (+7.7), won 4-2, by +5.3 points per game (+13.0 SRS eq)
Some background. In 1970 the expansion Milwaukee Bucks drafted Kareem Abdul-Jabbar. They put together some really good teams (winning a championship) but by 1974 the roster seemed to be running out of steam. Kareem was obviously still amazing, but Oscar Robertson was over the hill. And when the Bucks dropped the ‘74 Finals to an obviously worse Celtics team (obvious to everyone besides the Celtics) ownership became less convinced of their core. Oscar retired, they traded away Lucius Allen and the team fell into mediocrity. This did not please Kareem, who was also struggling with being a black intellectual Muslim in Milwaukee. In October of ‘74 Kareem asked to be traded either to the Knicks or the Lakers. The Lakers agreed to the trade (in June of ‘75), but had to give up practically every good player they had. In 1976 the Lakers went 40-42, with Kareem posting a Heliocentrism rating of 87%. It was him and few others. But over the next several years the Lakers rebuilt their roster around Kareem; by 1979 they were 47-35 and made it to the second round.
The Lakers had the first overall pick in the 1979 Draft. How did they end up picking first overall when they were a solid playoff team? It involves some nonsense with compensation for the loss in free agency of veteran Gail Goodrich, but either way they had it. The last several drafts had been disappointments at the #1: John Lucas, Kent Benson and Mychal Thompson were all fine players, but not superstars by a long shot. But in the ‘79 draft Magic Johnson was coming out of Michigan State, fresh off an NCAA championship. The Lakers already had a point guard in Norm Nixon, but they took the best player on the board anyways, figuring that with his height Magic could play shooting guard. Rookie Magic ended up being a bit of a strange fit as a second point guard, but scored extremely well, rebounded extremely well, passed well (if not at the levels he would grow into) and was a strong defensive presence. And with his addition the Lakers went from a good team (+2.2 OSRS in ‘79) to a strong +5.4 SRS team in the 1980 regular season. They were led by their offense, and their offense was all about shooting well. They were actually below average in everything else (turnovers, offensive rebounding and drawing free throws), but they shot so well (at the intersection of Kareem, Magic and all the passing) that their offense was really good.
They got a bye, and in the second round they faced the Phoenix Suns (+3.7). It was a tough series. In spite of Kareem’s 32-11-2 (on +13.2%) the Lakers only won by 2.8 points a game. Not an auspicious start. In the Conference Finals they faced the Sonics (+3.8) and did slightly better. Kareem averaged a 31-12-4 (+6.8%) and Magic averaged a 17-9-9 (+2.5%), but the rest of the Lakers shot at -5% or worse. The Lakers prevailed by 4.6 points a game, a decent margin over a decent team, but not really the stuff legends are made of.
Waiting for them in the NBA Finals were the Philadelphia 76ers, fresh from defeating the ‘80 Boston Celtics. This matchup was going to be tough; the 76ers interior promised to challenge the Lakers’ dependence on two-pointers. By OSRS, the 76ers were the favorite by 1.6 points. The series went differently from expected; the Lakers shot only decently, but they unexpectedly dominated the boards. They would grab almost twice the offense boards of the Sixers, with Jamaal Wilkes averaging 4 a game. The series went back and forth. The Lakers won Game 5 in LA, taking a 3-2 series lead. But Kareem had sprained his ankle, and wouldn’t be available for Game 6 in Philly. In a bind, Lakers’ coach Paul Westhead asked Magic if he’d be willing to start at center. Magic agreed.
****.
Magic would go on to play every position in the game, putting up a 42-15-7 on +18.9% shooting (Jamaal Wilkes would have his own strong performance with a 37-10-2 on +4.3%). The Lakers won in a rout by 16 points. The Lakers had won the championship by 5.3 points a game against a strong team. Objectively this team wasn’t super dominant. A +5.4 regular season SRS and a +9.54 playoff SRS aren’t amazing. But it was a fairly competitive year and the Lakers did, after all, win the championship. And if nothing else, this win put the NBA on notice. When you already have Kareem, and your rookie shows up, plays amazingly and carries the team to a win in the NBA Finals . . . it definitely suggests that there’s more to come.
Which there was.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2012 Jeff Teague (more minutes)
SG: 2006 Andrei Kirilenko (much better scoring)
SF: 2011 Luol Deng
PF: 2010 Matt Barnes (worse on offense)
C: 2008 Kevin Garnett (more minutes)
6th: 2016 Patrick Beverly (but worse)
It’s a weird set of comps. Kareem compares to 2008 Garnett (except that Kareem played significantly more minutes). Which, on the face of it, seems strange. And yet. They were both strong offensive players (Kareem more with his scoring and Garnett more with his spacing and passing) but neither used a ton of possessions (Kareem with 24% usage, Garnett at 25.5%). Both were decent offensive rebounders, outstanding defensive rebounders and both were strong defenders (Garnett more for his intelligence, quickness and positioning, Kareem more for his height and shot-blocking). So both of them were extremely important to their team, but neither was a particularly ball-dominant superstar. The more I look at it the more I like it, even if I have to blink a little first. And rookie Magic as a better-scoring young Andrei Kirilenko . . . Both were very good (but not great) passers, neither were ball-dominant, both were very athletic and rebounded very well for their position and both were very strong defenders. Magic was simply a better scorer. So you basically have an athletic do-everything 2, a solid all-around 3, an outstanding all-around center . . . none of it screams “NBA champions” but ‘06 Kirilenko and ‘11 Deng are probably upgrades on ‘08 Pierce and ‘08 Allen, so . . .
You know what’s interesting? On some level it’s easy to conflate Magic + Kareem with Kobe + Shaq (both superstars, both Lakers), but there are significant differences. Kareem and Magic never seemed to combine for more than 45% Usage, while Kobe and Shaq were often closer to 60%. So Magic + Kareem always (if they could) had a capable scoring 3 (Wilkes or Worthy) and eventually a decent scoring 2 (Byron Scott) while Shaq + Kobe never had that (because they couldn’t have used it even if they did, they each used so many possessions that their teammates had to be more defensive/rebounding specialists).
Regular Season Record: 60-22, Regular Season SRS: +5.40 (81st), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.2 (43rd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.4 (86th)
PG: Norm Nixon (24), -0.7 / +0.6
SG: Magic Johnson (20), +4.8 / +8.0
SF: Jamaal Wilkes (26), +1.3 / +1.0
PF: Jim Chones (30), -2.4 / -3.8
C: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (32), +7.2 / +8.9
6th: Michael Cooper (23), -0.1 / +0.6
Usage: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (24.1%), Magic Johnson (20.9%), Jamaal Wilkes (20.8%)
Scoring/100: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (29.8 / ), Jamaal Wilkes (24.2 / ), Magic Johnson (22.9 / )
Assists/100: Magic Johnson (9.3), Norm Nixon (9.2), Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (5.4)
Heliocentrism: 46.5% (13th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 47.1% (9th)
Depth: 6.4% (78th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.16 (43rd), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.04 (85th)
Playoff SRS: +9.54 (71st), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.39 (51st)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.14 (95th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.86 (11th)
Round 1:
Round 2: Phoenix Suns (+3.7), won 4-1, by +2.8 points per game (+6.5 SRS eq)
Round 3: Seattle SuperSonics (+3.8), won 4-1, by +4.6 points per game (+8.4 SRS eq)
Round 4: Philadelphia 76ers (+7.7), won 4-2, by +5.3 points per game (+13.0 SRS eq)
Some background. In 1970 the expansion Milwaukee Bucks drafted Kareem Abdul-Jabbar. They put together some really good teams (winning a championship) but by 1974 the roster seemed to be running out of steam. Kareem was obviously still amazing, but Oscar Robertson was over the hill. And when the Bucks dropped the ‘74 Finals to an obviously worse Celtics team (obvious to everyone besides the Celtics) ownership became less convinced of their core. Oscar retired, they traded away Lucius Allen and the team fell into mediocrity. This did not please Kareem, who was also struggling with being a black intellectual Muslim in Milwaukee. In October of ‘74 Kareem asked to be traded either to the Knicks or the Lakers. The Lakers agreed to the trade (in June of ‘75), but had to give up practically every good player they had. In 1976 the Lakers went 40-42, with Kareem posting a Heliocentrism rating of 87%. It was him and few others. But over the next several years the Lakers rebuilt their roster around Kareem; by 1979 they were 47-35 and made it to the second round.
The Lakers had the first overall pick in the 1979 Draft. How did they end up picking first overall when they were a solid playoff team? It involves some nonsense with compensation for the loss in free agency of veteran Gail Goodrich, but either way they had it. The last several drafts had been disappointments at the #1: John Lucas, Kent Benson and Mychal Thompson were all fine players, but not superstars by a long shot. But in the ‘79 draft Magic Johnson was coming out of Michigan State, fresh off an NCAA championship. The Lakers already had a point guard in Norm Nixon, but they took the best player on the board anyways, figuring that with his height Magic could play shooting guard. Rookie Magic ended up being a bit of a strange fit as a second point guard, but scored extremely well, rebounded extremely well, passed well (if not at the levels he would grow into) and was a strong defensive presence. And with his addition the Lakers went from a good team (+2.2 OSRS in ‘79) to a strong +5.4 SRS team in the 1980 regular season. They were led by their offense, and their offense was all about shooting well. They were actually below average in everything else (turnovers, offensive rebounding and drawing free throws), but they shot so well (at the intersection of Kareem, Magic and all the passing) that their offense was really good.
They got a bye, and in the second round they faced the Phoenix Suns (+3.7). It was a tough series. In spite of Kareem’s 32-11-2 (on +13.2%) the Lakers only won by 2.8 points a game. Not an auspicious start. In the Conference Finals they faced the Sonics (+3.8) and did slightly better. Kareem averaged a 31-12-4 (+6.8%) and Magic averaged a 17-9-9 (+2.5%), but the rest of the Lakers shot at -5% or worse. The Lakers prevailed by 4.6 points a game, a decent margin over a decent team, but not really the stuff legends are made of.
Waiting for them in the NBA Finals were the Philadelphia 76ers, fresh from defeating the ‘80 Boston Celtics. This matchup was going to be tough; the 76ers interior promised to challenge the Lakers’ dependence on two-pointers. By OSRS, the 76ers were the favorite by 1.6 points. The series went differently from expected; the Lakers shot only decently, but they unexpectedly dominated the boards. They would grab almost twice the offense boards of the Sixers, with Jamaal Wilkes averaging 4 a game. The series went back and forth. The Lakers won Game 5 in LA, taking a 3-2 series lead. But Kareem had sprained his ankle, and wouldn’t be available for Game 6 in Philly. In a bind, Lakers’ coach Paul Westhead asked Magic if he’d be willing to start at center. Magic agreed.
****.
Magic would go on to play every position in the game, putting up a 42-15-7 on +18.9% shooting (Jamaal Wilkes would have his own strong performance with a 37-10-2 on +4.3%). The Lakers won in a rout by 16 points. The Lakers had won the championship by 5.3 points a game against a strong team. Objectively this team wasn’t super dominant. A +5.4 regular season SRS and a +9.54 playoff SRS aren’t amazing. But it was a fairly competitive year and the Lakers did, after all, win the championship. And if nothing else, this win put the NBA on notice. When you already have Kareem, and your rookie shows up, plays amazingly and carries the team to a win in the NBA Finals . . . it definitely suggests that there’s more to come.
Which there was.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2012 Jeff Teague (more minutes)
SG: 2006 Andrei Kirilenko (much better scoring)
SF: 2011 Luol Deng
PF: 2010 Matt Barnes (worse on offense)
C: 2008 Kevin Garnett (more minutes)
6th: 2016 Patrick Beverly (but worse)
It’s a weird set of comps. Kareem compares to 2008 Garnett (except that Kareem played significantly more minutes). Which, on the face of it, seems strange. And yet. They were both strong offensive players (Kareem more with his scoring and Garnett more with his spacing and passing) but neither used a ton of possessions (Kareem with 24% usage, Garnett at 25.5%). Both were decent offensive rebounders, outstanding defensive rebounders and both were strong defenders (Garnett more for his intelligence, quickness and positioning, Kareem more for his height and shot-blocking). So both of them were extremely important to their team, but neither was a particularly ball-dominant superstar. The more I look at it the more I like it, even if I have to blink a little first. And rookie Magic as a better-scoring young Andrei Kirilenko . . . Both were very good (but not great) passers, neither were ball-dominant, both were very athletic and rebounded very well for their position and both were very strong defenders. Magic was simply a better scorer. So you basically have an athletic do-everything 2, a solid all-around 3, an outstanding all-around center . . . none of it screams “NBA champions” but ‘06 Kirilenko and ‘11 Deng are probably upgrades on ‘08 Pierce and ‘08 Allen, so . . .
You know what’s interesting? On some level it’s easy to conflate Magic + Kareem with Kobe + Shaq (both superstars, both Lakers), but there are significant differences. Kareem and Magic never seemed to combine for more than 45% Usage, while Kobe and Shaq were often closer to 60%. So Magic + Kareem always (if they could) had a capable scoring 3 (Wilkes or Worthy) and eventually a decent scoring 2 (Byron Scott) while Shaq + Kobe never had that (because they couldn’t have used it even if they did, they each used so many possessions that their teammates had to be more defensive/rebounding specialists).
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