Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#37. The 1996 Utah Jazz
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +10.86, Standard Deviations: +1.94, Lost in Conference Finals (Preseason 8th)
Regular Season Record: 55-27, Regular Season SRS: +6.25 (65th), Earned the 3 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +5.7 (20th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.5 (80th)
PG: John Stockton, +6.8 / +3.9
SG: Jeff Hornacek, +4.4 / +6.1
SF: Bryon Russell, -1.6 / +6.6
PF: Karl Malone, +7.0 / +6.0
C: Felton Spencer, -4.5 / -5.9
Karl Malone (PF, 32): 42 MPPG, 29% OLoad, 29 / 11 / 5 / 3 on +3.3%
John Stockton (PG, 33): 40 MPPG, 24% OLoad, 16 / 3 / 12 / 2 on +10.0%
Jeff Hornacek (SG, 32): 35 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 17 / 3 / 5 / 2 on +7.7%
Bryon Russell (SF, 25): 11 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 3 / 2 / 1 / 1 on -3.5%
Felton Spencer (C, 28): 20 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 6 / 5 / 0 / 1 on +2.8%
Scoring/100: Karl Malone (36.1 / +3.3%), Jeff Hornacek (25.7 / +7.7%), John Stockton (22.1 / +10.0%)
Assists/100: John Stockton (16.8), Jeff Hornacek (7.0), Karl Malone (5.9)
Heliocentrism: 40.3% (32nd of 84 teams) - Malone
Wingmen: 60.2% (1st) - Stockton & Hornacek
Depth: -0.5% (84th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.74 (34th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -8.27 (16th)
Playoff SRS: +13.87 (17th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.61 (11th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.47 (71st), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -4.64 (3rd)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 27.5% (73rd of 84 teams) - Malone
Playoff Wingmen: 45.1% (21st) - Hornacek & Stockton
Playoff Depth: 27.4% (33rd)
Round 1: Portland Trail Blazers (+2.2), won 3-2, by +10.0 points a game (+12.2 SRS eq)
Round 2: San Antonio Spurs (+7.3), won 4-2, by +11.7 points a game (+19.0 SRS eq)
Round 3: Seattle SuperSonics (+8.0), lost 3-4, by +2.6 points a game (+10.6 SRS eq)
Round 4:
In the 1984 draft, with the 16th pick overall, the Utah Jazz picked John Stockton. By 1988 he was arguably the second best point guard in the league (that’s what you’re competing for when Magic is still healthy). In the 1985 draft, with the 13th overall pick the Utah Jazz selected Karl Malone. Malone took a few years to get going, but by 1989 he was one of the better players in the league. So with mid-first rounders, the Jazz selected Top 25 players with back to back picks. This may be the best back-to-back pair of mid-first round picks that have ever been made by any team ever. There’s an obvious conclusion here:
They must be freakin’ geniuses.
And the Utah Jazz’ management would work as hard as possible to undo that reputation for the next decade.
It is impossible to overemphasize how little help Stockton and Malone had. First, they weren’t given a third option until 1994. And second, their bench was legitimately awful. From 1990 to 1993 the Jazz averaged 99% of their VORP coming from those two players. That is a serious problem. You may have divined from this list that not that many teams can be really good when 50% or more of their VORP is coming from one player. The average Helio score for their best player for teams on this list is 35%. Of the 6 Jordan Bulls teams, only one has a Helio score of higher than 42%. And Jordan was the freaking man. There is *one* team in the Top 17 with a Helio score above 50% (and two in the Top 37). So I hope you can appreciate that having two players combining for 100% of your VORP means that the rest of the roster is a barren wasteland. And look, BBR’s BPM is an imperfect tool. But I’m trying to make clear that if the Jazz had been able to add even one decent #3 and a tolerable bench they’d have owned the decade. In the West anyways . . .
Compounding the problem was that Malone and Stockton seemed to get worse in the playoffs. From ‘90 to ‘97:
Malone (RS): 30.2% Usage, 59.4% shooting, 16.8% Reb, 17.1% Ast, 11.3% TO, 3.5% Stk, 6.4 BPM
Malone (PS): 31.4% Usage, 53.2% shooting, 16.6% Reb, 15.2% Ast, 9.4% TO, 3.4% Stk, 5.2 BPM
Stockton (RS): 19.6% Usage, 61.6% shooting, 4.8% Reb, 52.5% Ast, 20.7% TO, 3.9% Stk, 7.9 BPM
Stockton (PS): 19.6% Usage, 56.6% shooting, 5.4% Reb, 49.0% Ast, 19.3% TO, 3.1% Stk, 6.1 BPM
Everything stayed basically the same except that their shooting imploded. Was this the result of inherent limitations in their skills? Was this the result of having almost no help from the rest of their team for most of this timeframe? Was this the result of Jerry Sloan’s fairly predictable style of offense being easier to defend in the playoffs? Probably some of all of the above.
Anyhow. Here’s the list of those years, with the percent of VORP those two players were in the regular season / playoffs, and their regular season SRS and how far they got:
1990: 94% / 50% (+4.82, 1st round)
1991: 104% / 90% (+3.18, 2nd round)
1992: 85% / 83% (+5.7, Conf Finals)
1993: 113% / 86% (+1.74 / 1st round)
1994: 92% / 79% (+4.1 / Conf Finals)
1995: 72% / 58% (+7.76 / 1st Round)
1996: 78% / 47% (+6.25 / Conf Finals)
1997: 71% / 55% (+7.97 / NBA Finals)
Notice anything big happening in 1995? Their regular season scores never go above 80% after that, and their playoff scores are considerably lower. What happened? They picked up Jeff Hornacek late in 1994, and suddenly the Jazz had help. Suddenly the team jumped in quality. Here are the averages:
1990-93 (pre-Hornacek): 99% / +3.86
1995-97 (with Hornacek): 74% / +7.33
Basically, as soon as the Jazz added Hornacek (who was an ideal complement to the team) they jumped from a pretty good team to an outstanding team. We know it wasn’t because Stockton and Malone were getting better; Stockton actually got worse (if not by a ton) as the decade progressed. And Hornacek was *not* worth a 3.5 point SRS jump in the abstract. For the mid-90s Jazz he was like water in the desert. Do you know what it kind of reminds me of? The late aughts Cavs. LeBron (or Malone and Stockton in this case) were good enough to keep the team relevant and management basically either a) did nothing to help or b) tried to help and mostly failed. So I don’t want to gloss over Stockton and Malone’s playoff struggles . . . but I do want to say that the amount of dominance they were capable of with even moderate help was considerable. That the Jazz’ management couldn’t get them that moderate help until both players were well into their 30s shouldn’t be held against them.
Anyhow. 1996. Stockton and Malone are awesome. Jeff Hornacek has integrated into the offense and is doing great (yay!!). The rest of the roster . . . you may note that the ‘96 Jazz have the lowest “Depth” rating, at -0.5%. It’s because the rest of their roster was garbage. Their starting small forward, David Benoit, was a 16% usage below average scorer with a 1:1 assist/turnover ratio who rebounded alright. Adam Keefe was their center; he was a decent scorer on 17% usage and rebounded well, but turned the ball over a ton and passed little. Bryon Russell and Greg Ostertag were on the roster but both were not yet at the point of contributing seriously.
It was a decidedly imperfect roster, but the Jazz managed to win 55 games, get the three-seed and post a +6.25 SRS, the 4th highest in the league. In the East were the fully re-Jordaned Bulls, but the West had its own tough teams (if not at that level), with the +7.4 Sonics getting the one-seed and the +6.0 Spurs getting the two-seed. So the ‘96 Jazz had had a good regular season, but there was no reason to expect them to be contenders.
In the first round the Jazz faced the +2.2 Blazers. The Jazz shut down the Blazers’ scoring (-4.7% as a team) and the Jazz shot well (+1.7%). Malone did his usual volume-but-no-efficiency thing (28/10/3 on -3.3% with 2.2 steals a game) but Hornacek and Stockton combined for 33.8 points on +9.3% or better, and the role players (Ostertag and Bryon Russell specifically) shot well. The Jazz won by 10 points a game, but it was a weird series, with the Blazers’ wins by 3 and 8 points, and the Jazz winning their home games by 8, 15 and 38 (they were up by 32 after three quarters). It was a pretty dominant first round.
In the semis they faced the Spurs (+7.3) who had just whipped through the Suns by eleven points a game. The Spurs were led by David Robinson, who had his own history of carrying a weak cast and struggling to score in the playoffs. This series would be no exception. Robinson would average a 19/9/2 on -0.9% shooting (1.7 steals and 2.5 blocks) while Malone averaged a 25/9/5 on -4.2%. But the rest of the Jazz shot extremely well (+2.5% as a team), with Bryon Russell and Chris Morris both shooting well, where the Spurs’ entire cast couldn’t shoot. The Jazz dominated by 11.7 points a game. Again, their home court advantage was bizarrely strong; they went 1-2 on the road (-0.7 MoV) but 3-0 at home (+24 MoV). They had absolutely crushed a really good team; that +19 SRS eq is one of the most impressive series results we’ve seen so far. Was David Robinson (and by derivation, teams where he was clearly the best player) a weaker playoff player than regular season player? Definitely. So does that mean that the Spurs probably aren’t quite as good as their OSRS here? Probably. I’m not moved. Crushing a +5 OSRS (instead of a +7.3) team by 11 a game is still damn impressive.
They advanced to the Conference Finals, suddenly looking like the team to beat (in the West anyways). And there they faced the ‘96 Sonics, who had just crushed the ‘96 Rockets by 11.7 points a game in a clean sweep. It was to be a strange series. The Home/Away split continued: at home their MoV was +17.7; away it was -8.8. But, unfortunately, the Jazz were not the higher seed and so more games were in Seattle. The Jazz had an advantage on the boards (Malone posted an insane DReb% to keep Shawn Kemp at bay) and forced the Sonics to turn the ball over frequently (combining for about ten shots a game). Jeff Hornacek shot well (20/4/4 on +10.4%) but Malone averaged a 27/12/5 on -3.4% (2 steals a game) and Stockton struggled against Payton with a 10/3/8 on -8.3%. The Jazz as a team shot -0.7%, which shouldn’t have been too much of a problem if they’d been able to stop the Sonics. That said, the Sonics scored well (+4.4% as a team) and Shawn Kemp ran amok with a 20/10/1 on +20.4%. When the smoke cleared the Jazz had outscored the Sonics by 2.6 points a game, but had lost in seven.
14 | Bulls
13 |
12 |
11 |
10 | Jazz
9 |
8 | Sonics
7 |
6 | Magic
5 | Knicks
4 | Spurs
3 | Lakers
2 | Pacers
1 | Hawks, Rockets
0 | Cavs, Pistons, Blazers, Bullets
-0 | Hornets
-1 | Heat, Suns, Kings, Warriors
-2 | Nuggets
-3 | Celtics, Clippers
-4 | Nets, Bucks, Mavericks
-5 | TWolves
-6 |
-7 | Raptors
-8 |
-9 | 76ers, Grizzlies
-10|
What to make of this season? Well, first, I was quite surprised to see it this high. But it’s kind of obvious why they made it. Every series was a +10 SRS eq performance. They crushed a decent team, crushed a good-to-very-good team and then seemingly outperformed the extremely good Sonics. That their home court advantage (or away disadvantage) was so extreme leads to lots of longer series, but their margins of victory speak for themselves. Do I think that they were better than the Sonics? . . . probably. You can’t really attack their playoff opponents; those were strong teams (even if the Spurs probably weren’t as good as they looked).
So look at that league breakdown. This is a pretty lopsided league. We’ve got two teams worse than -9, two teams at +10 or higher with a surprisingly low number of teams grouped around zero. I don’t think it’s a really hard sell to think that the Jazz were the 2nd best team that year (and being 2nd to the ‘96 Bulls is forgivable). The ‘96 Jazz really stand out from the rest of the teams here, and the formula is giving them credit for it.
Do I think that they’re ranked too high? Yes. Much of their ranking comes from their PSRS, and much of that comes from them blowing out teams. Of their 18 playoff games they had six wins by more than 20 points, three by more than 30 and two by 35 or more. They deserve credit for proving their dominance so convincingly . . . but probably not as much as they got. I’d feel more comfortable with this team in the 50s.
Still. One of the underrated subplots of ‘96 was that the Jazz’ role-players really stepped up in the playoffs (particularly Bryon Russell), which was to set up the Jazz’ excellent ‘97 run.
Regular Season Record: 55-27, Regular Season SRS: +6.25 (65th), Earned the 3 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +5.7 (20th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.5 (80th)
PG: John Stockton, +6.8 / +3.9
SG: Jeff Hornacek, +4.4 / +6.1
SF: Bryon Russell, -1.6 / +6.6
PF: Karl Malone, +7.0 / +6.0
C: Felton Spencer, -4.5 / -5.9
Karl Malone (PF, 32): 42 MPPG, 29% OLoad, 29 / 11 / 5 / 3 on +3.3%
John Stockton (PG, 33): 40 MPPG, 24% OLoad, 16 / 3 / 12 / 2 on +10.0%
Jeff Hornacek (SG, 32): 35 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 17 / 3 / 5 / 2 on +7.7%
Bryon Russell (SF, 25): 11 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 3 / 2 / 1 / 1 on -3.5%
Felton Spencer (C, 28): 20 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 6 / 5 / 0 / 1 on +2.8%
Scoring/100: Karl Malone (36.1 / +3.3%), Jeff Hornacek (25.7 / +7.7%), John Stockton (22.1 / +10.0%)
Assists/100: John Stockton (16.8), Jeff Hornacek (7.0), Karl Malone (5.9)
Heliocentrism: 40.3% (32nd of 84 teams) - Malone
Wingmen: 60.2% (1st) - Stockton & Hornacek
Depth: -0.5% (84th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.74 (34th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -8.27 (16th)
Playoff SRS: +13.87 (17th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.61 (11th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.47 (71st), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -4.64 (3rd)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 27.5% (73rd of 84 teams) - Malone
Playoff Wingmen: 45.1% (21st) - Hornacek & Stockton
Playoff Depth: 27.4% (33rd)
Round 1: Portland Trail Blazers (+2.2), won 3-2, by +10.0 points a game (+12.2 SRS eq)
Round 2: San Antonio Spurs (+7.3), won 4-2, by +11.7 points a game (+19.0 SRS eq)
Round 3: Seattle SuperSonics (+8.0), lost 3-4, by +2.6 points a game (+10.6 SRS eq)
Round 4:
In the 1984 draft, with the 16th pick overall, the Utah Jazz picked John Stockton. By 1988 he was arguably the second best point guard in the league (that’s what you’re competing for when Magic is still healthy). In the 1985 draft, with the 13th overall pick the Utah Jazz selected Karl Malone. Malone took a few years to get going, but by 1989 he was one of the better players in the league. So with mid-first rounders, the Jazz selected Top 25 players with back to back picks. This may be the best back-to-back pair of mid-first round picks that have ever been made by any team ever. There’s an obvious conclusion here:
They must be freakin’ geniuses.
And the Utah Jazz’ management would work as hard as possible to undo that reputation for the next decade.
It is impossible to overemphasize how little help Stockton and Malone had. First, they weren’t given a third option until 1994. And second, their bench was legitimately awful. From 1990 to 1993 the Jazz averaged 99% of their VORP coming from those two players. That is a serious problem. You may have divined from this list that not that many teams can be really good when 50% or more of their VORP is coming from one player. The average Helio score for their best player for teams on this list is 35%. Of the 6 Jordan Bulls teams, only one has a Helio score of higher than 42%. And Jordan was the freaking man. There is *one* team in the Top 17 with a Helio score above 50% (and two in the Top 37). So I hope you can appreciate that having two players combining for 100% of your VORP means that the rest of the roster is a barren wasteland. And look, BBR’s BPM is an imperfect tool. But I’m trying to make clear that if the Jazz had been able to add even one decent #3 and a tolerable bench they’d have owned the decade. In the West anyways . . .
Compounding the problem was that Malone and Stockton seemed to get worse in the playoffs. From ‘90 to ‘97:
Malone (RS): 30.2% Usage, 59.4% shooting, 16.8% Reb, 17.1% Ast, 11.3% TO, 3.5% Stk, 6.4 BPM
Malone (PS): 31.4% Usage, 53.2% shooting, 16.6% Reb, 15.2% Ast, 9.4% TO, 3.4% Stk, 5.2 BPM
Stockton (RS): 19.6% Usage, 61.6% shooting, 4.8% Reb, 52.5% Ast, 20.7% TO, 3.9% Stk, 7.9 BPM
Stockton (PS): 19.6% Usage, 56.6% shooting, 5.4% Reb, 49.0% Ast, 19.3% TO, 3.1% Stk, 6.1 BPM
Everything stayed basically the same except that their shooting imploded. Was this the result of inherent limitations in their skills? Was this the result of having almost no help from the rest of their team for most of this timeframe? Was this the result of Jerry Sloan’s fairly predictable style of offense being easier to defend in the playoffs? Probably some of all of the above.
Anyhow. Here’s the list of those years, with the percent of VORP those two players were in the regular season / playoffs, and their regular season SRS and how far they got:
1990: 94% / 50% (+4.82, 1st round)
1991: 104% / 90% (+3.18, 2nd round)
1992: 85% / 83% (+5.7, Conf Finals)
1993: 113% / 86% (+1.74 / 1st round)
1994: 92% / 79% (+4.1 / Conf Finals)
1995: 72% / 58% (+7.76 / 1st Round)
1996: 78% / 47% (+6.25 / Conf Finals)
1997: 71% / 55% (+7.97 / NBA Finals)
Notice anything big happening in 1995? Their regular season scores never go above 80% after that, and their playoff scores are considerably lower. What happened? They picked up Jeff Hornacek late in 1994, and suddenly the Jazz had help. Suddenly the team jumped in quality. Here are the averages:
1990-93 (pre-Hornacek): 99% / +3.86
1995-97 (with Hornacek): 74% / +7.33
Basically, as soon as the Jazz added Hornacek (who was an ideal complement to the team) they jumped from a pretty good team to an outstanding team. We know it wasn’t because Stockton and Malone were getting better; Stockton actually got worse (if not by a ton) as the decade progressed. And Hornacek was *not* worth a 3.5 point SRS jump in the abstract. For the mid-90s Jazz he was like water in the desert. Do you know what it kind of reminds me of? The late aughts Cavs. LeBron (or Malone and Stockton in this case) were good enough to keep the team relevant and management basically either a) did nothing to help or b) tried to help and mostly failed. So I don’t want to gloss over Stockton and Malone’s playoff struggles . . . but I do want to say that the amount of dominance they were capable of with even moderate help was considerable. That the Jazz’ management couldn’t get them that moderate help until both players were well into their 30s shouldn’t be held against them.
Anyhow. 1996. Stockton and Malone are awesome. Jeff Hornacek has integrated into the offense and is doing great (yay!!). The rest of the roster . . . you may note that the ‘96 Jazz have the lowest “Depth” rating, at -0.5%. It’s because the rest of their roster was garbage. Their starting small forward, David Benoit, was a 16% usage below average scorer with a 1:1 assist/turnover ratio who rebounded alright. Adam Keefe was their center; he was a decent scorer on 17% usage and rebounded well, but turned the ball over a ton and passed little. Bryon Russell and Greg Ostertag were on the roster but both were not yet at the point of contributing seriously.
It was a decidedly imperfect roster, but the Jazz managed to win 55 games, get the three-seed and post a +6.25 SRS, the 4th highest in the league. In the East were the fully re-Jordaned Bulls, but the West had its own tough teams (if not at that level), with the +7.4 Sonics getting the one-seed and the +6.0 Spurs getting the two-seed. So the ‘96 Jazz had had a good regular season, but there was no reason to expect them to be contenders.
In the first round the Jazz faced the +2.2 Blazers. The Jazz shut down the Blazers’ scoring (-4.7% as a team) and the Jazz shot well (+1.7%). Malone did his usual volume-but-no-efficiency thing (28/10/3 on -3.3% with 2.2 steals a game) but Hornacek and Stockton combined for 33.8 points on +9.3% or better, and the role players (Ostertag and Bryon Russell specifically) shot well. The Jazz won by 10 points a game, but it was a weird series, with the Blazers’ wins by 3 and 8 points, and the Jazz winning their home games by 8, 15 and 38 (they were up by 32 after three quarters). It was a pretty dominant first round.
In the semis they faced the Spurs (+7.3) who had just whipped through the Suns by eleven points a game. The Spurs were led by David Robinson, who had his own history of carrying a weak cast and struggling to score in the playoffs. This series would be no exception. Robinson would average a 19/9/2 on -0.9% shooting (1.7 steals and 2.5 blocks) while Malone averaged a 25/9/5 on -4.2%. But the rest of the Jazz shot extremely well (+2.5% as a team), with Bryon Russell and Chris Morris both shooting well, where the Spurs’ entire cast couldn’t shoot. The Jazz dominated by 11.7 points a game. Again, their home court advantage was bizarrely strong; they went 1-2 on the road (-0.7 MoV) but 3-0 at home (+24 MoV). They had absolutely crushed a really good team; that +19 SRS eq is one of the most impressive series results we’ve seen so far. Was David Robinson (and by derivation, teams where he was clearly the best player) a weaker playoff player than regular season player? Definitely. So does that mean that the Spurs probably aren’t quite as good as their OSRS here? Probably. I’m not moved. Crushing a +5 OSRS (instead of a +7.3) team by 11 a game is still damn impressive.
They advanced to the Conference Finals, suddenly looking like the team to beat (in the West anyways). And there they faced the ‘96 Sonics, who had just crushed the ‘96 Rockets by 11.7 points a game in a clean sweep. It was to be a strange series. The Home/Away split continued: at home their MoV was +17.7; away it was -8.8. But, unfortunately, the Jazz were not the higher seed and so more games were in Seattle. The Jazz had an advantage on the boards (Malone posted an insane DReb% to keep Shawn Kemp at bay) and forced the Sonics to turn the ball over frequently (combining for about ten shots a game). Jeff Hornacek shot well (20/4/4 on +10.4%) but Malone averaged a 27/12/5 on -3.4% (2 steals a game) and Stockton struggled against Payton with a 10/3/8 on -8.3%. The Jazz as a team shot -0.7%, which shouldn’t have been too much of a problem if they’d been able to stop the Sonics. That said, the Sonics scored well (+4.4% as a team) and Shawn Kemp ran amok with a 20/10/1 on +20.4%. When the smoke cleared the Jazz had outscored the Sonics by 2.6 points a game, but had lost in seven.
14 | Bulls
13 |
12 |
11 |
10 | Jazz
9 |
8 | Sonics
7 |
6 | Magic
5 | Knicks
4 | Spurs
3 | Lakers
2 | Pacers
1 | Hawks, Rockets
0 | Cavs, Pistons, Blazers, Bullets
-0 | Hornets
-1 | Heat, Suns, Kings, Warriors
-2 | Nuggets
-3 | Celtics, Clippers
-4 | Nets, Bucks, Mavericks
-5 | TWolves
-6 |
-7 | Raptors
-8 |
-9 | 76ers, Grizzlies
-10|
What to make of this season? Well, first, I was quite surprised to see it this high. But it’s kind of obvious why they made it. Every series was a +10 SRS eq performance. They crushed a decent team, crushed a good-to-very-good team and then seemingly outperformed the extremely good Sonics. That their home court advantage (or away disadvantage) was so extreme leads to lots of longer series, but their margins of victory speak for themselves. Do I think that they were better than the Sonics? . . . probably. You can’t really attack their playoff opponents; those were strong teams (even if the Spurs probably weren’t as good as they looked).
So look at that league breakdown. This is a pretty lopsided league. We’ve got two teams worse than -9, two teams at +10 or higher with a surprisingly low number of teams grouped around zero. I don’t think it’s a really hard sell to think that the Jazz were the 2nd best team that year (and being 2nd to the ‘96 Bulls is forgivable). The ‘96 Jazz really stand out from the rest of the teams here, and the formula is giving them credit for it.
Do I think that they’re ranked too high? Yes. Much of their ranking comes from their PSRS, and much of that comes from them blowing out teams. Of their 18 playoff games they had six wins by more than 20 points, three by more than 30 and two by 35 or more. They deserve credit for proving their dominance so convincingly . . . but probably not as much as they got. I’d feel more comfortable with this team in the 50s.
Still. One of the underrated subplots of ‘96 was that the Jazz’ role-players really stepped up in the playoffs (particularly Bryon Russell), which was to set up the Jazz’ excellent ‘97 run.
#36. The 2002 Los Angeles Lakers
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +9.06, Standard Deviations: +2.11, Won NBA Finals (Preseason 1st)
Regular Season Record: 58-24, Regular Season SRS: +7.15 (38th), Earned the 3 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.9 (32nd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.8 (62nd)
PG: Derek Fisher, +1.1 / -0.1
SG: Kobe Bryant, +4.6 / +4.3
SF: Rick Fox, -0.7 / +1.4
PF: Robert Horry, +3.5 / +4.8
C: Shaquille O’Neal, +8.0 / +7.5
Kobe Bryant (SG, 23): 42 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 27 / 6 / 6 / 2 on +2.4%
Shaquille O’Neal (C, 29): 39 MPPG, 30% OLoad, 30 / 12 / 3 / 3 on +7.0%
Derek Fisher (PG, 27): 31 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 12 / 2 / 3 / 1 on +3.0%
Rick Fox (SF, 32): 30 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 9 / 5 / 4 / 1 on -1.8%
Robert Horry (PF, 31): 29 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 7 / 6 / 3 / 2 on +0.8%
Scoring/100: Shaquille O’Neal (39.2 / +7.0%), Kobe Bryant (34.4 / +2.4%), Derek Fisher (20.8 / +3.0%)
Assists/100: Kobe Bryant (7.5), Rick Fox (6.4), Robert Horry (5.7)
Heliocentrism: 32.8% (44th of 84 teams) - Shaq
Wingmen: 44.1% (17th) - Kobe & Horry
Depth: 23.1% (54th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +5.55 (51st), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.74 (56th)
Playoff SRS: +10.23 (58th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.91 (11th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.54 (41st), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.65 (14th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 35.2% (44th of 84 teams) - Shaq
Playoff Wingmen: 46.3% (17th) - Kobe & Horry
Playoff Depth: 18.5% (58th)
Round 1: Portland Trail Blazers (+3.2), won 3-0, by +5.4 points a game (+8.6 SRS eq)
Round 2: San Antonio Spurs (+8.4), won 4-1, by +4.2 points a game (+12.6 SRS eq)
Round 3: Sacramento Kings (+7.7), won 4-3, outscored by -0.3 points per game (+7.4 SRS eq)
Round 4: New Jersey Nets (+4.2), won 4-0, by +9.2 points a game (+13.4 SRS eq)
That Shaq was only in the low-mid 30s of Heliocentrism makes an important point about the stat. This isn’t saying that ‘02 Shaq was worse than, say ‘96 Malone, it’s saying that he made up a lower amount of his team’s VORP. The ‘02 Lakers were a pretty strong roster. Here are the comps:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2011 Kyle Korver (but slightly better in every way)
SG: 2013 Dwyane Wade (more minutes in reg season)
SF: 2015 Nick Batum
PF: 2002 Robert Horry
C: 2002 Shaquille O’Neal
Derek Fisher as Korver isn’t crazy. Fisher, despite being the point guard, didn’t remotely run the offense; the guy didn’t make the top 3 in Assists per 100 for the team for crap’s sake. He was more of a floor-spacer who provided a little passing on the side. ‘02 Kobe as ‘13 Wade may seem nuts . . . but their profiles actually line up pretty well. They’re both high usage, low efficiency, high passing, solid rebounding and quality (but not great) defensive presence. And they were both handicaps of a sort to their teams in the playoffs, albeit for different reasons. Rick Fox as Batum is fine; a pure 3&D guy (more D than 3). Horry was one of those underrated gems, something of a stretch 4 who played good defense who also passed well at the rim. And ‘02 Shaq . . . 30/12/3 on +7% is a really impressive pace-adjusted per game average. Did he miss a lot of games in the regular season? Yeah. Still.
The ‘02 Lakers put together an extremely strong regular season, posting the 2nd highest SRS and record in the league, but happened to have the first place team in their own division. The Sacramento Kings had often been challengers to the Lakers (rarely successful), but in 2002 they were at their very best. Shaq missing time may have suggested that the Lakers were the stronger team, but that question would likely be decided in the Conference Finals.
In the first round the Lakers drew the +3.2 Blazers, the carryover of the extremely dominant ‘00 edition. Shaq tore through the Blazers’ front court, averaging a 26/11/4 on +8.7% shooting, while Kobe was less efficient with a 26/6/5 on -3.7%. The Lakers didn’t score terribly well but the Lakers shut the Blazers’ shooters down hard, holding them to -3.5% shooting as a team. It wasn’t an overwhelming victory, but the Lakers won by 5.4 points a game. It was respectable but not a dominant showing given the opposition.
In the second round the Lakers faced the +8.4 San Antonio Spurs. This was the same general roster that had won the title in ‘99; Robinson was one year from retiring and Duncan was one year from submitting probably his best single year. The Spurs were really, really good. And it wasn’t an easy series. Kobe averaged a 26/5/5 on -3.4%, but even Shaq was slowed with a 21/12/3 on -3.3%. Comparatively Duncan averaged a 29/17/5 on -0.3% with 3 blocks a game. But the Lakers’ held the Spurs scoring to only -3.3% as a team, while the Lakers managed a slightly better -1.5% (role players like Rick Fox, Horry and Samaki Walker shot well). In the end the Lakers managed to prevail in six by 2.5 points a game. It wasn’t a massive win, but it was against an outstanding team. And delivered them into a matchup in the Conference Finals against the Kings. And to the Lakers’ advantage, Peja Stojakovic would be out for most of the series, and the 22 year-old Hedo Turkoglu would start in his place.
So the Lakers faced the +7.7 Kings. The first game was a struggle; the Kings controlled possession and managed five extra shots. Neither Kobe nor Shaq were particularly effective, but the Lakers as a whole outshot the Kings +3.4% to -2.7% and that was enough to secure a 7 point win. In Game 2 Shaq had a strong game (35/12/1 on +3%) but the Lakers’ overall really struggled to score (the bench shot -13% or worse and Kobe shot at -4.6%) and the Kings evened the series with a six point win. The series headed to LA all tied up. In Game 3 the Kings managed to shut down Shaq (20/19/4 on -7.8% with 5 turnovers) and Kobe (22/2/3 on -7.8%). The Lakers as a team shot -10.2% and only their incredible possession advantage (15 shots) kept them from being blown out. As it is, the Kings took the series lead by 13 points.
Game 4 was tense. Going into the 4th quarter the Kings were up by 7. The Lakers slowly closed the gap and, with the clock winding down, the Lakers pushed down the floor for the final shot. Kobe Bryant got past Doug Christie and took an off-balance shot against Divac just outside of the charge circle. The ball glanced off the rim, Shaq got the rebound but missed the putback, and somehow the ball got kicked out to a wide open Robert Horry at the top of the arc who released it with 0.7 seconds left on the clock. Nothing but net.
Game 5 also went down to the wire, with the Kings down by 1 in the final minute. Mike Bibby made the go-ahead bucket with 8 seconds left. The Lakers inbounded, passed to Kobe who couldn’t get past Bobby Jackson, tried a turnaround three and clanked it off the front of the rim. The Kings won, going up 3-2 in the series. Game 6, the last game in LA was another close one. The Kings managed another considerable possession lead (11 shots) but Shaq and Kobe ran amok with a 41/17/1 on +11.1% and 31/11/5 on +10.4% (respectively) and the Lakers managed to squeak out a win by 4. Game 7 went to overtime. In the story of the series the Kings got three extra shots but simply couldn’t connect, shooting at -27% for the period while the Lakers simply fed Shaq who shot around league average to lead the Lakers to a series win.
Was it a dominant win? Not remotely. The Lakers were outscored by 0.3 points a game, they’d needed an extremely fortunate buzzer-beater to win Game 4 and Stojakovic had been out for the series. The Lakers won, and it counted, but they had barely gotten out of that series alive. Not unlike the 2000 series against the Pippen/Smith/Sabonis Blazers, the Lakers barely made it out of the Conference Finals.
Fortunately, they were to face the +4.2 New Jersey Nets in the Finals, their easiest opponent since the first round. And the Lakers predictably ripped through the Nets, sweeping them by 9.2 points a game. Shaq averaged a 36/12/4 on +11.6% with 3 blocks a game while Kobe averaged a 27/6/5 on +10.3%. It hadn’t been an easy journey but the Lakers had won their third title in a row.
10 |
9 | Lakers
8 | Kings
7 | Spurs
6 |
5 |
4 | Mavericks
3 | Nets, Celtics
2 | Jazz, Blazers
1 | Pistons, Hornets, Pacers, TWolves, Sonics
0 |
-0 | Magic, Raptors, Bucks, Clippers, Suns
-1 | 76ers, Wizards, Heat
-2 |
-3 | Cavs
-4 | Knicks, Hawks, Rockets, Warriors
-5 | Nuggets
-6 | Grizzlies
-7 |
-8 | Bulls
-9 |
-10|
2002 is a classic example of a very competitive year. Only 20% of the teams were above +5 or below -5, and 43% of the teams were between +2 and -2. There were three teams that stood far above the rest of the league, and the Lakers were the best of them, having beaten the other two. So the ‘02 Lakers are mostly benefitting from their excellent regular season (36th); their playoff SRS was 58th. But at the intersection of these numbers, the extremely competitive league and winning the championship, the ‘02 Lakers are ranked fairly high. I think in the 30s is appropriate for this team.
Further thoughts? Kobe really struggled in these playoffs. Granted that the Lakers played a really tough slate of defenses, but Kobe’s postseason average of 27/6/5 looks a lot worse when you realize he did it shooting at -0.9%. I know that Kobe has a reputation for being resistant to good defenses, and I don’t doubt that there’s evidence for that position (we saw some of it in ‘10 as I recall). But at the intersection of weak efficiency and missing two game-winners against the Kings (game-winners aren’t easy to make of course) . . . I certainly wouldn’t say that the Lakers won in spite of Kobe, they definitely relied on his usage to free up everyone else. But Shaq was clearly the best player on this team beginning to end.
Regular Season Record: 58-24, Regular Season SRS: +7.15 (38th), Earned the 3 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.9 (32nd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.8 (62nd)
PG: Derek Fisher, +1.1 / -0.1
SG: Kobe Bryant, +4.6 / +4.3
SF: Rick Fox, -0.7 / +1.4
PF: Robert Horry, +3.5 / +4.8
C: Shaquille O’Neal, +8.0 / +7.5
Kobe Bryant (SG, 23): 42 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 27 / 6 / 6 / 2 on +2.4%
Shaquille O’Neal (C, 29): 39 MPPG, 30% OLoad, 30 / 12 / 3 / 3 on +7.0%
Derek Fisher (PG, 27): 31 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 12 / 2 / 3 / 1 on +3.0%
Rick Fox (SF, 32): 30 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 9 / 5 / 4 / 1 on -1.8%
Robert Horry (PF, 31): 29 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 7 / 6 / 3 / 2 on +0.8%
Scoring/100: Shaquille O’Neal (39.2 / +7.0%), Kobe Bryant (34.4 / +2.4%), Derek Fisher (20.8 / +3.0%)
Assists/100: Kobe Bryant (7.5), Rick Fox (6.4), Robert Horry (5.7)
Heliocentrism: 32.8% (44th of 84 teams) - Shaq
Wingmen: 44.1% (17th) - Kobe & Horry
Depth: 23.1% (54th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +5.55 (51st), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.74 (56th)
Playoff SRS: +10.23 (58th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.91 (11th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.54 (41st), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.65 (14th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 35.2% (44th of 84 teams) - Shaq
Playoff Wingmen: 46.3% (17th) - Kobe & Horry
Playoff Depth: 18.5% (58th)
Round 1: Portland Trail Blazers (+3.2), won 3-0, by +5.4 points a game (+8.6 SRS eq)
Round 2: San Antonio Spurs (+8.4), won 4-1, by +4.2 points a game (+12.6 SRS eq)
Round 3: Sacramento Kings (+7.7), won 4-3, outscored by -0.3 points per game (+7.4 SRS eq)
Round 4: New Jersey Nets (+4.2), won 4-0, by +9.2 points a game (+13.4 SRS eq)
That Shaq was only in the low-mid 30s of Heliocentrism makes an important point about the stat. This isn’t saying that ‘02 Shaq was worse than, say ‘96 Malone, it’s saying that he made up a lower amount of his team’s VORP. The ‘02 Lakers were a pretty strong roster. Here are the comps:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2011 Kyle Korver (but slightly better in every way)
SG: 2013 Dwyane Wade (more minutes in reg season)
SF: 2015 Nick Batum
PF: 2002 Robert Horry
C: 2002 Shaquille O’Neal
Derek Fisher as Korver isn’t crazy. Fisher, despite being the point guard, didn’t remotely run the offense; the guy didn’t make the top 3 in Assists per 100 for the team for crap’s sake. He was more of a floor-spacer who provided a little passing on the side. ‘02 Kobe as ‘13 Wade may seem nuts . . . but their profiles actually line up pretty well. They’re both high usage, low efficiency, high passing, solid rebounding and quality (but not great) defensive presence. And they were both handicaps of a sort to their teams in the playoffs, albeit for different reasons. Rick Fox as Batum is fine; a pure 3&D guy (more D than 3). Horry was one of those underrated gems, something of a stretch 4 who played good defense who also passed well at the rim. And ‘02 Shaq . . . 30/12/3 on +7% is a really impressive pace-adjusted per game average. Did he miss a lot of games in the regular season? Yeah. Still.
The ‘02 Lakers put together an extremely strong regular season, posting the 2nd highest SRS and record in the league, but happened to have the first place team in their own division. The Sacramento Kings had often been challengers to the Lakers (rarely successful), but in 2002 they were at their very best. Shaq missing time may have suggested that the Lakers were the stronger team, but that question would likely be decided in the Conference Finals.
In the first round the Lakers drew the +3.2 Blazers, the carryover of the extremely dominant ‘00 edition. Shaq tore through the Blazers’ front court, averaging a 26/11/4 on +8.7% shooting, while Kobe was less efficient with a 26/6/5 on -3.7%. The Lakers didn’t score terribly well but the Lakers shut the Blazers’ shooters down hard, holding them to -3.5% shooting as a team. It wasn’t an overwhelming victory, but the Lakers won by 5.4 points a game. It was respectable but not a dominant showing given the opposition.
In the second round the Lakers faced the +8.4 San Antonio Spurs. This was the same general roster that had won the title in ‘99; Robinson was one year from retiring and Duncan was one year from submitting probably his best single year. The Spurs were really, really good. And it wasn’t an easy series. Kobe averaged a 26/5/5 on -3.4%, but even Shaq was slowed with a 21/12/3 on -3.3%. Comparatively Duncan averaged a 29/17/5 on -0.3% with 3 blocks a game. But the Lakers’ held the Spurs scoring to only -3.3% as a team, while the Lakers managed a slightly better -1.5% (role players like Rick Fox, Horry and Samaki Walker shot well). In the end the Lakers managed to prevail in six by 2.5 points a game. It wasn’t a massive win, but it was against an outstanding team. And delivered them into a matchup in the Conference Finals against the Kings. And to the Lakers’ advantage, Peja Stojakovic would be out for most of the series, and the 22 year-old Hedo Turkoglu would start in his place.
So the Lakers faced the +7.7 Kings. The first game was a struggle; the Kings controlled possession and managed five extra shots. Neither Kobe nor Shaq were particularly effective, but the Lakers as a whole outshot the Kings +3.4% to -2.7% and that was enough to secure a 7 point win. In Game 2 Shaq had a strong game (35/12/1 on +3%) but the Lakers’ overall really struggled to score (the bench shot -13% or worse and Kobe shot at -4.6%) and the Kings evened the series with a six point win. The series headed to LA all tied up. In Game 3 the Kings managed to shut down Shaq (20/19/4 on -7.8% with 5 turnovers) and Kobe (22/2/3 on -7.8%). The Lakers as a team shot -10.2% and only their incredible possession advantage (15 shots) kept them from being blown out. As it is, the Kings took the series lead by 13 points.
Game 4 was tense. Going into the 4th quarter the Kings were up by 7. The Lakers slowly closed the gap and, with the clock winding down, the Lakers pushed down the floor for the final shot. Kobe Bryant got past Doug Christie and took an off-balance shot against Divac just outside of the charge circle. The ball glanced off the rim, Shaq got the rebound but missed the putback, and somehow the ball got kicked out to a wide open Robert Horry at the top of the arc who released it with 0.7 seconds left on the clock. Nothing but net.
Game 5 also went down to the wire, with the Kings down by 1 in the final minute. Mike Bibby made the go-ahead bucket with 8 seconds left. The Lakers inbounded, passed to Kobe who couldn’t get past Bobby Jackson, tried a turnaround three and clanked it off the front of the rim. The Kings won, going up 3-2 in the series. Game 6, the last game in LA was another close one. The Kings managed another considerable possession lead (11 shots) but Shaq and Kobe ran amok with a 41/17/1 on +11.1% and 31/11/5 on +10.4% (respectively) and the Lakers managed to squeak out a win by 4. Game 7 went to overtime. In the story of the series the Kings got three extra shots but simply couldn’t connect, shooting at -27% for the period while the Lakers simply fed Shaq who shot around league average to lead the Lakers to a series win.
Was it a dominant win? Not remotely. The Lakers were outscored by 0.3 points a game, they’d needed an extremely fortunate buzzer-beater to win Game 4 and Stojakovic had been out for the series. The Lakers won, and it counted, but they had barely gotten out of that series alive. Not unlike the 2000 series against the Pippen/Smith/Sabonis Blazers, the Lakers barely made it out of the Conference Finals.
Fortunately, they were to face the +4.2 New Jersey Nets in the Finals, their easiest opponent since the first round. And the Lakers predictably ripped through the Nets, sweeping them by 9.2 points a game. Shaq averaged a 36/12/4 on +11.6% with 3 blocks a game while Kobe averaged a 27/6/5 on +10.3%. It hadn’t been an easy journey but the Lakers had won their third title in a row.
10 |
9 | Lakers
8 | Kings
7 | Spurs
6 |
5 |
4 | Mavericks
3 | Nets, Celtics
2 | Jazz, Blazers
1 | Pistons, Hornets, Pacers, TWolves, Sonics
0 |
-0 | Magic, Raptors, Bucks, Clippers, Suns
-1 | 76ers, Wizards, Heat
-2 |
-3 | Cavs
-4 | Knicks, Hawks, Rockets, Warriors
-5 | Nuggets
-6 | Grizzlies
-7 |
-8 | Bulls
-9 |
-10|
2002 is a classic example of a very competitive year. Only 20% of the teams were above +5 or below -5, and 43% of the teams were between +2 and -2. There were three teams that stood far above the rest of the league, and the Lakers were the best of them, having beaten the other two. So the ‘02 Lakers are mostly benefitting from their excellent regular season (36th); their playoff SRS was 58th. But at the intersection of these numbers, the extremely competitive league and winning the championship, the ‘02 Lakers are ranked fairly high. I think in the 30s is appropriate for this team.
Further thoughts? Kobe really struggled in these playoffs. Granted that the Lakers played a really tough slate of defenses, but Kobe’s postseason average of 27/6/5 looks a lot worse when you realize he did it shooting at -0.9%. I know that Kobe has a reputation for being resistant to good defenses, and I don’t doubt that there’s evidence for that position (we saw some of it in ‘10 as I recall). But at the intersection of weak efficiency and missing two game-winners against the Kings (game-winners aren’t easy to make of course) . . . I certainly wouldn’t say that the Lakers won in spite of Kobe, they definitely relied on his usage to free up everyone else. But Shaq was clearly the best player on this team beginning to end.
#35. The 1961 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +9.17, Standard Deviations: +2.08, Won NBA Finals (Preseason X)
Regular Season Record: 57-22, Regular Season SRS: +4.94 (85th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -3.4 (99th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -7.6 (5th)
PG: Bob Cousy, 0.140 / 0.166
SG: Bill Sharman, 0.169 / 0.257
SF: Frank Ramsey, 0.155 / 0.196
PF: Tom Heinsohn, 0.141 / 0.135
C: Bill Russell, 0.181 / 0.201
6th: Sam Jones, 0.191 / 0.194
7th: Tom Sanders, 0.132 / 0.192
Tom Heinsohn (PF, 26): 23 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 16 / 7 / 1 on -1.9%
Bob Cousy (PG, 32): 24 MPPG, 26% OLoad, 14 / 3 / 6 on -3.3%
Bill Sharman (SG, 34): 19 MPPG, 23% OLoad, 12 / 3 / 2 on +1.5%
Frank Ramsey (SF, 29): 19 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 11 / 4 / 1 on +0.5%
Sam Jones (SG, 27): 19 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 11 / 4 / 2 on +2.4%
Bill Russell (C, 26): 33 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 13 / 18 / 3 on -1.5%
Tom Sanders (PF, 22): 12 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 4 / 4 / 1 on -1.1%
Scoring/100: Tom Heinsohn (25.0 / -1.9%), Bill Sharman (22.7 / +1.8%), Frank Ramsey (21.1 / +1.4%)
Assists/100: Bob Cousy (5.7), Bill Russell (2.6), Sam Jones (2.1)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +0.05 (95th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -10.83 (5th)
Playoff SRS: +13.94 (16th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.23 (18th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.40 (92ndt), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.42 (66th)
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3: Syracuse Nationals (+2.6), won 4-1, by +10.8 points a game (+13.4 SRS eq)
Round 4: St. Louis Hawks (+2.1), won 4-1, by +12.4 points a game (+14.5 SRS eq)
1961. The Celtics had only won two straight at this point (how weird is it that this puts ‘61 as one of the weaker timeframes for the decade?) In 1960 the Celtics had ripped apart the league with a +7.62 RSRS, but had faltered slightly in the playoffs, being held to +9 SRS eqs for both series (and being taken to 7 by the +1.8 St. Louis Hawks). This seemed to be a tolerably consistent trend; dominating the regular season but in the playoffs struggling to finish teams off who seemed clearly inferior.
The Celtics had seven primary players in ‘61, bridging between their earlier teams (Cousy, Sharman and Heinsohn) and their later teams (K.C. Jones, Sam Jones and Tom Sanders). Their offense was primarily run by Cousy and Heinsohn. Neither was a particularly strong scorer, though Cousy was a decent enough distributor for the era. The strongest scorers were the shooting guards of the past and future, Bill Sharman and Sam Jones. And, of course, Bill Russell remained at the heart of it all, providing sufficient scoring and passing, excellent rebounding and all-time great defense. This roster blended into a below average offense, but one of the better defenses ever.
In the 1961 regular season the Celtics’ SRS was only +4.94 (85th on this list) but that still put them far ahead of the rest of their league. Wilt’s Warriors were a +0.89 and Pettit’s Hawks had a +2.99. And, surprising everyone, the Warriors were swept in the semis by the Syracuse Nationals. The Celtics’ route to the championship would not run through Wilt.
So you know how the Celtics never seemed to really dominate the postseason, despite always winning? 1961 was the exception.
The Nationals (+2.6) really struggled to score; Dick Barnett shooting a +0.2% was the best mark on the team. As a unit they shot -4.6%. The Celtics in contrast had great success, with Russell averaging a 21/31/5 on -0.8%, Sharman averaging 20 points on +12.3% and Sam Jones averaging 14 points a game on +13.3%. The Celtics took the series in five by 10.8 points a game.
The Finals put them up against the Hawks (+2.1) again. Bob Pettit averaged a strong 28/16/3 on +1.9% and Cliff Hagan averaged an outstanding 29/12/4 on +11.4%, but the rest of the team really struggled to score, as a whole shooting at -3.1%. Furthermore the Celtics controlled possession by 7 shots a game and shooting above league average, at +0.4%. Heinsohn had a 22/9/1 on +4.1%, Russell an 18/29/4 on -2.3%, Cousy a 20/5/11 on -1.0% and Sharman a 14/2/1 on +5.9%. The Celtics took the series in five by 12.4 points per game. This actually gives them an extremely high PSRS (16th on the sheet).
10 |
9 | Celtics
8 |
7 |
6 |
5 |
4 |
3 |
2 |
1 | Lakers
0 | Warriors, Nationals, Hawks
-0 |
-1 |
-2 | Pistons
-3 | Royals
-4 |
-5 | Knicks
-6 |
-7 |
-8 |
-9 |
-10|
So their regular season was only pretty good, but their playoffs were exceptional. And their league was fairly competitive (if not as much as the ‘02 NBA). The gap between them and the next closest team is crazy. All of the Celtics’ teams were good. I don’t mind that this is ranked as the best of them. Which this is; the highest ranked Russell Celtics team on this list.
But is this a reasonable place to put the best of the Russell Celtics (if indeed this is)? I’ve put a lot of thought into this and I feel like the Celtics have a lot of advantages and disadvantages as far as a listing like this goes:
Advantage: Seeding. By winning the one-seed the Celtics guaranteed themselves making it as far as the Conference Finals automatically. Don’t you think the ‘07 Suns or ‘81 Bucks would have appreciated such a guarantee? To make the Finals the one-seed need but win one series. To win a Championship they need win only two. This is a massive advantage to such a list, as winning the one seed dramatically increases the odds of getting deep in the playoffs. Nightmares like the ‘06 Mavs faced (playing the best team in the league in the semis) simply couldn’t happen to the Celtics. And it doesn't hurt that their conference was only 4-5 teams large.
Disadvantage: Short Playoffs. OSRS is built around mixing RSRS with PSRS, and PSRS is weighted based on the number of playoff games you played. So only playing two series means that your PSRS is weighted only half as much as if you’d played four series. So while the ‘61 Celtics dominated their postseason, it only counts half as much as if they’d played four series at that level. If the ‘61 Celtics had put up a +13.94 PSRS over four series they’d be ranked in the Top 25 easily. So while starting closer to the championship gives you a better chance of winning one, it gives you fewer series to distinguish yourself with playoff performance (which is where most teams on this list distinguish themselves most notably).
Advantage: Lack of competition. To get that one seed they only needed beat *3* other teams until 1967. Obviously that’s considerably easier than beating out 14 teams in the modern game. And while we’re at it, given that their playoff opponents were the best of *7-8* other teams, the pool of opposition was limited. Here are the OSRSs of their playoff opponents from ‘57 to ‘69:
Between +9 and +10: 1
Between +8 and +9: 0
Between +7 and +8: 2
Between +6 and +7: 0
Between +5 and +6: 4
Between +4 and +5: 4
Between +3 and +4: 5
Between +2 and +3: 2
Between +1 and +2: 6
Between +0 and +1: 1
Between -0 and -1: 0
Between -1 and -2: 2
Between -2 and -3: 1
So they faced 28 teams. 3 of those were at -1 or worse. 10 of them were at +2 or worse. Only 3 were at +7 or better. Their median opponent? In the +3 range. That’s pretty underwhelming, right? ‘61 was their most dominant playoff run, but it came at the expense of two teams in the +2 OSRS range. Nothing particularly intimidating. So not only did seeding mean they got a head start on the playoffs, but the lack of competition meant that their roads to the championships were some of the weakest ever. It’s not their fault, it’s simply a product of their era.
Disadvantage: Lack of Motivation. What exactly was there to push the Celtics to try harder to dominate more? Whipping up on decent teams by lackluster margins was giving them rings every year. When they played the Sixers in 1967 was the first time they’d *ever* played a team with an OSRS higher than +6. And they got crushed by ten points a game. But of course they bounced back, playing two different teams in the +7 range over the next two years and beating them both. So the Celtics didn’t really have a reason to dominate more than they did. So while the lack of competition gives them more rings, it perhaps made the motivation to dominate more completely less.
In short? A situation like the Celtics were in (consistent excellence in a very small league) kind of made rankings like this somewhat inescapable. They were going to get a lot of teams in the Top 100, purely by virtue of winning 11 titles. Given that they were routinely the best in their (small) league they were likely to generate a lot of list-worthy entries. But the thing that really distinguishes teams on a list like this, a deep and dominant playoff run against tough opposition, is something that these Celtics were pretty unlikely to generate.
They were the best team in a mostly nine-team league for more than a decade. So upside, they won a ton of championships. Downside, it was a nine-team league. It’s really difficult to treat such a scenario fairly. As it is, Bill Russell has led more teams to this list than any other player. And if this list serves as a loosely accurate representation of the historical teams that deserved the most note for dominance, that the Russell Celtics are the most represented perhaps says it all.
Regular Season Record: 57-22, Regular Season SRS: +4.94 (85th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -3.4 (99th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -7.6 (5th)
PG: Bob Cousy, 0.140 / 0.166
SG: Bill Sharman, 0.169 / 0.257
SF: Frank Ramsey, 0.155 / 0.196
PF: Tom Heinsohn, 0.141 / 0.135
C: Bill Russell, 0.181 / 0.201
6th: Sam Jones, 0.191 / 0.194
7th: Tom Sanders, 0.132 / 0.192
Tom Heinsohn (PF, 26): 23 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 16 / 7 / 1 on -1.9%
Bob Cousy (PG, 32): 24 MPPG, 26% OLoad, 14 / 3 / 6 on -3.3%
Bill Sharman (SG, 34): 19 MPPG, 23% OLoad, 12 / 3 / 2 on +1.5%
Frank Ramsey (SF, 29): 19 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 11 / 4 / 1 on +0.5%
Sam Jones (SG, 27): 19 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 11 / 4 / 2 on +2.4%
Bill Russell (C, 26): 33 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 13 / 18 / 3 on -1.5%
Tom Sanders (PF, 22): 12 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 4 / 4 / 1 on -1.1%
Scoring/100: Tom Heinsohn (25.0 / -1.9%), Bill Sharman (22.7 / +1.8%), Frank Ramsey (21.1 / +1.4%)
Assists/100: Bob Cousy (5.7), Bill Russell (2.6), Sam Jones (2.1)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +0.05 (95th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -10.83 (5th)
Playoff SRS: +13.94 (16th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.23 (18th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.40 (92ndt), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.42 (66th)
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3: Syracuse Nationals (+2.6), won 4-1, by +10.8 points a game (+13.4 SRS eq)
Round 4: St. Louis Hawks (+2.1), won 4-1, by +12.4 points a game (+14.5 SRS eq)
1961. The Celtics had only won two straight at this point (how weird is it that this puts ‘61 as one of the weaker timeframes for the decade?) In 1960 the Celtics had ripped apart the league with a +7.62 RSRS, but had faltered slightly in the playoffs, being held to +9 SRS eqs for both series (and being taken to 7 by the +1.8 St. Louis Hawks). This seemed to be a tolerably consistent trend; dominating the regular season but in the playoffs struggling to finish teams off who seemed clearly inferior.
The Celtics had seven primary players in ‘61, bridging between their earlier teams (Cousy, Sharman and Heinsohn) and their later teams (K.C. Jones, Sam Jones and Tom Sanders). Their offense was primarily run by Cousy and Heinsohn. Neither was a particularly strong scorer, though Cousy was a decent enough distributor for the era. The strongest scorers were the shooting guards of the past and future, Bill Sharman and Sam Jones. And, of course, Bill Russell remained at the heart of it all, providing sufficient scoring and passing, excellent rebounding and all-time great defense. This roster blended into a below average offense, but one of the better defenses ever.
In the 1961 regular season the Celtics’ SRS was only +4.94 (85th on this list) but that still put them far ahead of the rest of their league. Wilt’s Warriors were a +0.89 and Pettit’s Hawks had a +2.99. And, surprising everyone, the Warriors were swept in the semis by the Syracuse Nationals. The Celtics’ route to the championship would not run through Wilt.
So you know how the Celtics never seemed to really dominate the postseason, despite always winning? 1961 was the exception.
The Nationals (+2.6) really struggled to score; Dick Barnett shooting a +0.2% was the best mark on the team. As a unit they shot -4.6%. The Celtics in contrast had great success, with Russell averaging a 21/31/5 on -0.8%, Sharman averaging 20 points on +12.3% and Sam Jones averaging 14 points a game on +13.3%. The Celtics took the series in five by 10.8 points a game.
The Finals put them up against the Hawks (+2.1) again. Bob Pettit averaged a strong 28/16/3 on +1.9% and Cliff Hagan averaged an outstanding 29/12/4 on +11.4%, but the rest of the team really struggled to score, as a whole shooting at -3.1%. Furthermore the Celtics controlled possession by 7 shots a game and shooting above league average, at +0.4%. Heinsohn had a 22/9/1 on +4.1%, Russell an 18/29/4 on -2.3%, Cousy a 20/5/11 on -1.0% and Sharman a 14/2/1 on +5.9%. The Celtics took the series in five by 12.4 points per game. This actually gives them an extremely high PSRS (16th on the sheet).
10 |
9 | Celtics
8 |
7 |
6 |
5 |
4 |
3 |
2 |
1 | Lakers
0 | Warriors, Nationals, Hawks
-0 |
-1 |
-2 | Pistons
-3 | Royals
-4 |
-5 | Knicks
-6 |
-7 |
-8 |
-9 |
-10|
So their regular season was only pretty good, but their playoffs were exceptional. And their league was fairly competitive (if not as much as the ‘02 NBA). The gap between them and the next closest team is crazy. All of the Celtics’ teams were good. I don’t mind that this is ranked as the best of them. Which this is; the highest ranked Russell Celtics team on this list.
But is this a reasonable place to put the best of the Russell Celtics (if indeed this is)? I’ve put a lot of thought into this and I feel like the Celtics have a lot of advantages and disadvantages as far as a listing like this goes:
Advantage: Seeding. By winning the one-seed the Celtics guaranteed themselves making it as far as the Conference Finals automatically. Don’t you think the ‘07 Suns or ‘81 Bucks would have appreciated such a guarantee? To make the Finals the one-seed need but win one series. To win a Championship they need win only two. This is a massive advantage to such a list, as winning the one seed dramatically increases the odds of getting deep in the playoffs. Nightmares like the ‘06 Mavs faced (playing the best team in the league in the semis) simply couldn’t happen to the Celtics. And it doesn't hurt that their conference was only 4-5 teams large.
Disadvantage: Short Playoffs. OSRS is built around mixing RSRS with PSRS, and PSRS is weighted based on the number of playoff games you played. So only playing two series means that your PSRS is weighted only half as much as if you’d played four series. So while the ‘61 Celtics dominated their postseason, it only counts half as much as if they’d played four series at that level. If the ‘61 Celtics had put up a +13.94 PSRS over four series they’d be ranked in the Top 25 easily. So while starting closer to the championship gives you a better chance of winning one, it gives you fewer series to distinguish yourself with playoff performance (which is where most teams on this list distinguish themselves most notably).
Advantage: Lack of competition. To get that one seed they only needed beat *3* other teams until 1967. Obviously that’s considerably easier than beating out 14 teams in the modern game. And while we’re at it, given that their playoff opponents were the best of *7-8* other teams, the pool of opposition was limited. Here are the OSRSs of their playoff opponents from ‘57 to ‘69:
Between +9 and +10: 1
Between +8 and +9: 0
Between +7 and +8: 2
Between +6 and +7: 0
Between +5 and +6: 4
Between +4 and +5: 4
Between +3 and +4: 5
Between +2 and +3: 2
Between +1 and +2: 6
Between +0 and +1: 1
Between -0 and -1: 0
Between -1 and -2: 2
Between -2 and -3: 1
So they faced 28 teams. 3 of those were at -1 or worse. 10 of them were at +2 or worse. Only 3 were at +7 or better. Their median opponent? In the +3 range. That’s pretty underwhelming, right? ‘61 was their most dominant playoff run, but it came at the expense of two teams in the +2 OSRS range. Nothing particularly intimidating. So not only did seeding mean they got a head start on the playoffs, but the lack of competition meant that their roads to the championships were some of the weakest ever. It’s not their fault, it’s simply a product of their era.
Disadvantage: Lack of Motivation. What exactly was there to push the Celtics to try harder to dominate more? Whipping up on decent teams by lackluster margins was giving them rings every year. When they played the Sixers in 1967 was the first time they’d *ever* played a team with an OSRS higher than +6. And they got crushed by ten points a game. But of course they bounced back, playing two different teams in the +7 range over the next two years and beating them both. So the Celtics didn’t really have a reason to dominate more than they did. So while the lack of competition gives them more rings, it perhaps made the motivation to dominate more completely less.
In short? A situation like the Celtics were in (consistent excellence in a very small league) kind of made rankings like this somewhat inescapable. They were going to get a lot of teams in the Top 100, purely by virtue of winning 11 titles. Given that they were routinely the best in their (small) league they were likely to generate a lot of list-worthy entries. But the thing that really distinguishes teams on a list like this, a deep and dominant playoff run against tough opposition, is something that these Celtics were pretty unlikely to generate.
They were the best team in a mostly nine-team league for more than a decade. So upside, they won a ton of championships. Downside, it was a nine-team league. It’s really difficult to treat such a scenario fairly. As it is, Bill Russell has led more teams to this list than any other player. And if this list serves as a loosely accurate representation of the historical teams that deserved the most note for dominance, that the Russell Celtics are the most represented perhaps says it all.
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