Sansterre's Top 100 Teams, #29-31, 2011 DAL, 2005 SAS, 2016 OKC

[sansterre]

Glossary:

Spoiler:

Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.

When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).

So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.

I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.

I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.

I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.

Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.

Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.

I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).

In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.

I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:

PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)

What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).

Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!

#31*. The 2011 Dallas Mavericks

Spoiler:

Overall SRS: +8.93, Standard Deviations: +1.93, Won NBA Finals (Preseason 5th)

Regular Season Record: 57-25, Regular Season SRS: +4.41 (88th), Earned the 3 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.4 (73rd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.3 (69th)

PG: Jason Kidd, +2.8 / +4.8
SG: Jason Terry, +0.9 / +4.6
SF: Shawn Marion, +0.3 / +0.9
PF: Dirk Nowitzki, +5.1 / +5.5
C: Tyson Chandler, +1.5 / +0.6

Dirk Nowitzki (PF, 32): 38 MPPG, 26% OLoad, 25 / 8 / 3 / 1 on +7.1%
Jason Terry (SG, 33): 34 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 17 / 2 / 5 / 1 on +0.4%
Shawn Marion (SF, 32): 31 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 14 / 8 / 2 / 2 on +1.0%
Jason Kidd (PG, 37): 36 MPPG, 19% OLoad, 9 / 5 / 9 / 2 on -4.1%
Tyson Chandler (C, 28): 31 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 11 / 10 / 1 / 2 on +15.6%

Scoring/100: Dirk Nowitzki (35.3 / +7.1%), Jason Terry (26.5 / +0.4%), Shawn Marion (23.3 / +1.0%)
Assists/100: Jason Kidd (13.0), Jason Terry (6.8), Dirk Nowitzki (4.0)

Heliocentrism: 30.0% (52nd of 84 teams) - Dirk
Wingmen: 34.7% (53rd) - Kidd & Terry
Depth: 35.3% (22nd)

Playoff Offensive Rating: +7.34 (27th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.32 (62nd)
Playoff SRS: +11.45 (39th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +3.59 (29th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +3.32 (18th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.74 (56th)

Playoff Heliocentrism: 29.6% (65th of 84 teams) - Dirk
Playoff Wingmen: 44.4% (25th) - Kidd & Terry
Playoff Depth: 26.0% (40th)

Round 1: Portland Trail Blazers (+1.9), won 4-2, by +5.1 points a game (+7.0 SRS eq)
Round 2: Los Angeles Lakers (+7.9), won 4-0, by +14.0 points a game (+21.9 SRS eq)
Round 3: Oklahoma City Thunder (+5.6), won 4-1, by +4.0 points a game (+9.6 SRS eq)
Round 4: Miami Heat (+8.1), won 4-2, by +2.4 points a game (+10.5 SRS eq)

Human minds are weird things. It is in our nature to take complex patterns and reduce them, thought effort, to a simple pattern that is more easily understood. Basketball has many examples of this. The complexity of an entire season is consistently boiled down to two teams and one series. In any given game, ten or so players from each team get on the court, with most of the minutes going to only five players. Not terribly complicated. And yet, our brains time and time again truncate this pattern into its simplest form, this star against that star.

A different pattern emerges with teams we focus on. I first saw this with my father. When watching any of his favored teams play, he always experienced them as games that his team won rightly, or games that his team gave away. It would be extremely rare for him to say “They just outplayed us”; he would much more often say “We gave the game away by playing badly” (the only time I can remember the former was when Davidson played Wisconsin in the NCAA tournament and Steph Curry went nuts; I remember my dad shaking his head and saying “That guy is simply unguardable”). This happens with favorites. If we have one team that we know, in our heart, is the better team and they lose, it’s much more instinctive to characterize the series as lost by our favored team than won by the victorious team.

Humans are weird.

There wasn’t much to suggest that 2011 would be the Mavericks’ year. Most of their starters (Dirk, Shawn Marion, and the Jasons (Kidd and Terry)) were carried over. There was one big difference; veteran center Erick Dampier had been traded for Tyson Chandler. On the surface the difference was marginal; both rebounded well and neither could pass. Of the two, Dampier blocked more shots. But Chandler turned the ball over less, scored more efficiently (and more often), was more mobile on the perimeter and was generally accounted the tougher player. It seemed an innocuous upgrade. But then, the Mavericks were already plenty good. The year before in 2010 the Mavs had won 55 games, even if their SRS and finish were underwhelming (+2.66 and a first round exit to the Spurs). Nevertheless, the Mavericks hadnt finished below 50 wins in ten years. Any year could be their year (as we saw almost happen in 2006). But the Lakers had won the Western Conference three years in a row (and the championship the last two years). Phil Jackson was in his final year as coach, and he and Kobe hoped for a repeat threepeat. For the Mavericks to compete for a ring, they’d likely need to get past the Lakers.

The 2011 Mavericks roster was, on its face, underwhelming for a contender. Chandler was the youngest of the starters at 28. Dirk Nowitzki at 32 was still excellent, consistently the best scoring power forward in the game (and probably ever). The 37 year-old Jason Kidd was still chugging along, still not a shooter but a strong passer and a tough defender. Jason Terry was the secondary scorer behind Dirk, not lacking confidence but not a particularly strong shooter (in the regular season). And Shawn Marion . . . he was the kind of guy every contender ought to want; smart, team-first, could do some of everything and played strong defense. But the Mavs’ bench was also solid, with J.J. Barea slashing to spell Kidd, and Peja Stojakovic picked up off waivers to provide some shooting. Perhaps the most notable difference between this team and the ‘06 edition was how much of the shooting burden fell to Nowitzki. In 2006 it was more of a three-headed attack with Terry, Josh Howard and Nowitzki being the best of the three. But in 2011 all of Kidd, Marion and Chandler were specialists, designed to add value but not a lot of scoring. It slowed their offense (which had been outstanding in ‘06) but gave them a lot of tactical flexibility, which coach Rick Carlisle was all too skilled at implementing. And Dirk even in his early 30s, showed no signs of having the increased scoring responsibility compromise his effectiveness.

The regular season was solid but not overwhelming. Another 57-win campaign and a respectable (but low for this list) +4.41 RSRS. It qualified them for the three seed, with the Spurs and Lakers above them. In the first round they faced a solid Blazers team (+1.9). They won but gathered no glory in doing so; it was a 5.1 point a game win over six. Dirk averaged a 27/8/3 on +3.4%, but it was still a lackluster result against a mediocre team. And waiting for them in the second round were the defending champion Lakers (+7.4).

Game 1 was hard fought. Kobe put up a 36/5/0 with +3.6% on a stupendous 45% usage, while Dirk had a 28/14/3 on +3.8%. But the Lakers as a whole were held to a really low -3.5% shooting (Kobe’s zero assists can’t have helped). Nevertheless, the Lakers controlled the boards enough to gain an advantage in possession (9 extra shots). It came down to the wire, with the Mavericks up by 2 with three seconds to go. Kobe came off a screen, the Lakers inbounded to him and he took the shot with his momentum carrying him toward the baseline. He missed, and the Mavs had taken Game 1 in LA. Game 2 was more of the same. The Lakers controlled possession but not by much (2 shots) and the Lakers’ shooting struggled even more. Kobe had a 23/0/3 on -2.3% with 5 steals, and the Lakers as a team shot -10%. Minus ten. Holy cow. The Lakers’ bench (Odom, Steve Blake, Shannon Brown and Matt Barnes) shot 6 of 23 from the floor. Dirk put up a 24/7/2 on +11.8%, and while the rest of the Mavs didn’t shoot too well, it was enough for a 12 point win. Two games in and the Mavs were up 2-0 on the defending champions.

The Lakers came back swinging in Dallas, earning a six-point lead going into the fourth quarter. And in the fourth quarter the Mavericks went into high gear, with Dirk, Terry and Stojakovic combining for 27 points on 15 shots, while the Lakers’ offense sputtered, with the starting lineup combining for 16 points on 19 shots (Kobe went 2 for 5). The Mavericks were now up 3-0 on the Lakers. None of the wins had been by a lot, but it still counted. But the defending champs had their backs to the wall; it was still anybody’s series.

The Mavs won Game 4 by 36, leading by 24 going into the 4th. Kobe had a 17/3/1 on -11.1% with 5 turnovers and the Lakers shot -8.1% as a team, while the Mavericks shot 63% from three, with Stojakovic going 6 for 6 and Jason Terry shooting 9 of 10. And just like that the Lakers’ threepeat hopes were over. The Mavericks had swept them by 14 points a game. The talking heads tried hard to understand what had happened, and most of the narrative, of course, spun around how the Lakers *lost* the series, and not how the Mavericks won it. “The Lakers were tired after making three straight Finals runs”, “There was tension between Kobe and the rest of the team over how his recovering knee kept him from being on the practice floor”, “Phil Jackson lost control of the team because they knew it was his last year” and so on. And I”m not saying that any of those is false. But it really acts like the series was really the Lakers’ to win, and the Mavs only won because the Lakers choked. Here’s the problem with that.

THEY WERE SWEPT BY 14 POINTS A GAME.

Some of it was tactics; Rick Carlisle deliberately limited Kobe to single-coverage, working instead to shut down Kobe’s teammates. You wouldn’t have guessed it from his numbers; Kobe averaged a 23/3/3 on -2.3% (looks like a Reggie Miller line, minus the efficiency). The rest of the team shot -7.1%. The Lakers dominated the boards, but their shooting completely ground to a halt. But some of the Mavs’ advantage was matchup. The Lakers had two strengths: Kobe’s dominance and their incredibly stacked front line (Bynum, Gasol and Odom). Well, Kobe wasn’t remotely dominant in that series (besides the first game maybe) and the Mavs offense was, frankly, indifferent to the Lakers’ front line. Do you think Dirk Nowitzki, lord of the threes and master of the post fadeaway, was going to be slowed down by a big frontcourt? Dirk averaged 25 a game on +13.2% efficiency. Where Dwight Howard couldn’t go through the Lakers’ bigs, Dirk simply shot over them. And the Mavs spaced the floor aggressively, bombing from three with Dirk, Kidd, Terry and Stojakovic, taking 26.5 a game (which would have led the league). The Mavs shot an astounding +6.9% for the series. And Tyson Chandler did a formidable enough job defensively that the Lakers’ bigs weren’t able to take advantage. Look. The Lakers were old (though, interestingly, younger than the Mavericks) and they no doubt were tired. You could say that this was simply the Lakers lacking the stamina to go the distance. You could say this was a great team built for the prior decade running into a great team with the sensibilities of the next decade. You could even be hilariously reductionist and say that Kobe choked and Dirk “just wanted it more”. Whichever interpretation you like, one thing is true:

The Lakers dynasty had ended. And the Dallas Mavericks had ended it. Hard. People hear 2011 and they think “Mavs beating the Heat because LeBron choked” but I think the Mavs’ complete domination of the defending champs is the real feather in their cap. It’s just that nobody remembers it because it didn’t happen in the Finals.

In the Conference Finals the Mavs found themselves up against a surprise foe, the Oklahoma City Thunder (+5.6) whose core was probably a decade younger than the Mavs. And they’d provide a more textured challenge than the Lakers had. But it wouldn’t matter too much. The Mavs defense was able to limit Durant (28/9/4 on +1.2%) and shut down Westbrook (24/5/5 on -6.3%). Jason Kidd absolutely owned Westbrook defensively (Kidd generated 3.4 steals a game, and Westbrook *averaged* five turnovers a game). And the Thunder had no answer for Dirk Nowitzki, who soard to a 32/6/3 on +16% shooting. The Mavericks won in five by 4 points a game. It wasn’t dominant but it counted. And as their reward they got to advance to the Finals to face the +8.1 Miami Heat.

The Heat hadn’t dominated the playoffs quite as much as you’d have expected but they were plenty good. That said, OSRS actually had the Mavericks as small favorites. The Heat’s playoff series SRS eqs were +8.5, +10.3 and +8.8; solid, but not dominant. And the Mavericks hoped to counter the Heat’s star-centric attack with excellent defense, putting Shawn Marion on LeBron, Jason Kidd on Dwyane Wade and switching their picks. It wasn’t clear how it would work, but the Mavericks promised to make it a game.

The Heat rolled in Game 1. LeBron had a 24/9/5 on +17% and Wade a more voluminous 22/10/6 on -2.2%. The Heat owned the boards (10 extra shots) and it was enough to buy them an 8 point win. Game 2 looked well in hand, with the Heat up by 15 with 7 minutes to go. The Mavs then went on a 22-5 run to close the game out. Here’s the last minute, with the Heat up by 2:

0:57 - The Heat turn the ball over and Dirk scores on a 3 on 1 fast break, tie game
0:39 - LeBron has the ball, he gets a pick, the Mavs trap and instead of destroying them he hands it to Wade jetting around the side. Wade streaks to the three point line where, with 9 seconds on the shot clock he takes a three (what?) and misses it, tie game still
0:29 - The Mavs run an off-ball pick with Chandler screening Haslem and freeing up Dirk, Bosh doesn’t react in time and Dirk gets the ball for a wide open three. Swish. 3 point Mavs lead.
0:27 - The Heat call a timeout, and Jason Terry loses track of Mario Chalmers. LeBron inbounds it crosscourt to a wide open Chalmers in the corner (had to have had 15 feet of space) and Chalmers drains it. Tie game.
0:04 - The Mavs run the clock down, Dirk gets the ball in isolation against Chris Bosh. Dirk using what can only be described as some sort of jedi-level post move, blows past Bosh and nails the layup to give the Mavs the lead.
0:00 - Wade takes a 30 foot three pointer as the clock runs out and misses it, Mavs win.

The Mavs took a tied series to Dallas. Game 3 was tight and this time the Mavs couldn’t pull off the comeback, with Dallas’ last two possessions being a Nowitzki turnover and a Nowitzki miss. Aside from the last 30 seconds Dirk had played very well, with a 34/11/1 on +14.4% shooting, but it wasn’t enough, and the Heat won by 2. Game 4 went down to the wire again. Here’s the play by play with Dallas up by 2:

1:12 - LeBron passes to Haslem who takes a long two and misses it, Dallas still up by 2
1:00 - The Heat trap Jason Terry who passes awkwardly to an open, but badly positioned, Dirk. The Heat turn and swarm Dirk but he passes right back to Terry who takes the open three. He misses, but Tyson Chandler gets the offensive board. Kidd gets the ball and immediately slows things down to kill the clock.
0:39 - Weird possession. With 9 seconds left on the shot clock Haslem is defending Dirk and LeBron is defending Terry. Dirk fights through Haslem to get to the top of the key and, instead of following him, Haslem tries to trap Terry (but LeBron doesn’t join the trap, instead waiting behind him). Terry passes easily to Dirk, but LeBron doesn’t engage so Chalmers jumps to Dirk, who then passes to the now-open Kidd, so Wade rotates to Kidd so he passes to the now-open DeShawn Stevenson who takes the three. He misses, Chalmers gets the rebound, Dallas up by 2.
0:30 - LeBron sees Wade streaking down the floor and nails him with the pass. Wade goes up for the dunk but the 39 year-old Jason Kidd (!!) blocks him hard, fouling him in the process. Wade hits the first but misses the second, Mavs up by one. The Mavs get the rebound and call timeout.
0:22 - Dirk gets free on an off-ball screen, he gets the ball wide open from 17 feet but sees that there’s still 20 seconds on the shot clock and holds the ball.
0:14 - Dirk basically waits for the clock to go down with his back to the basket, and with 16 still on the clock he magicks his way past Haslem for a diving layup, Mavs by 3.
0:09 - Wade gets the ball at the top of the key, he maneuvers, sees an open lane and cuts to the basket for a dunk (...?), Mavs by one.
0:07 - Terry is intentionally fouled. He hits both, Mavs by 3. Heat call timeout.
0:02 - Miller inbounds to Wade who flubbs the reception. Wade lunges, passing the ball wildly to Miller (pretty impressive honestly) who takes an off-balance deep three with Chandler all over him. Airball, Mavs win by 3.

It was a close thing. Dirk had played the game with a 102 fever and had posted a 21/11/1 on -9.2%. So it was an amazing thing that the Mavs had played through that. Game 5 was a scorefest. The Heat shot +9.1% as a team (which is insane) and Wade posted a 23/2/8 on +12.5%. But the Mavs shot even better at +15.1%, with Dirk posting a 29/6/3 on +10.6%, and the Mavs prevailed by 9 points. Suddenly the Mavs were leading 3-2 with the series going back to Miami. Game 6 went all Mavs, as they shot +4.7%, with Jason Terry posting a 27/3/2 on +21.9% and Dallas won by 10. The championship was finally theirs.

It had been a near thing. They only won by 2.4 points a game.

The Heat had Wade and LeBron, but the Mavericks had Dirk and a slew of extremely mobile, smart defenders that executed everything at a high level. And that was enough.

10 |
9 |
8 | Mavericks
7 | Heat
6 | Bulls
5 | Celtics, Thunder
4 |
3 | Magic, Nuggets, Spurs, Grizzlies, Lakers
2 | Rockets
1 | Blazers
0 | 76ers, Hawks, Hornets
-0 | Knicks, Suns
-1 | Pacers, Bucks, Jazz
-2 | Warriors, Clippers
-3 | Pistons
-4 | Bobcats, Kings
-5 | TWolves
-6 | Nets, Raptors
-7 | Wizards
-8 | Cavs
-9 |
-10|

2011 was reasonably competitive. While there wasn’t much bunching at the middle, there weren’t a lot of outliers. And the Mavs definitely demonstrated that they were the best team in the year. Where to put this team? Their playoffs were pretty good (39th on the list), mostly on the weight of their destruction of the Lakers. But their regular season was quite weak, only 88th on this list. And at the intersection of these things, we get something that's good . . . but not great. It’s a curious coincidence that the two Dallas teams on this list should end up next to each other.

*Sorry, don’t shoot me. Somehow I mis-entered the RSRSs for the last four playoff teams in the West, so Dallas got credited with San Antonio’s RSRS. Adjusted for their actual, and lower, number they should get dropped to just behind the new place for the 2020 Lakers. So #31 through #40 should be:

41. 2011 Dallas Mavericks
40. 2020 Los Angeles Lakers
39. 2004 Detroit Pistons
38. 2009 Cleveland Cavs
37. 2003 San Antonio Spurs
36. 2013 Miami Heat
35. 1996 Utah Jazz
34. 2002 Los Angeles Lakers
33. 1961 Boston Celtics
32. 2010 Orlando Magic
31. 2019 Toronto Raptors

#30. The 2005 San Antonio Spurs

Spoiler:

Overall SRS: +9.30, Standard Deviations: +2.10, Won NBA Finals (Preseason 1st)

Regular Season Record: 59-23, Regular Season SRS: +7.84 (26th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +1.4 (81st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -7.3 (8th)

PG: Tony Parker, +2.0 / -2.7
SG: Manu Ginobili, +6.9 / +9.2
SF: Bruce Bowen, -0.1 / -0.8
PF: Tim Duncan, +7.6 / +5.5
C: Nazr Mohammed, -4.7 / +1.3
6th: Robert Horry, +3.0 / +7.6
7th: Brent Barry, +2.4 / +1.6

Tim Duncan (PF, 28): 38 MPPG, 28% OLoad, 23 / 13 / 3 / 4 on +1.1%
Tony Parker (PG, 22): 39 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 19 / 4 / 7 / 1 on -0.1%
Manu Ginobili (SG, 27): 33 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 18 / 5 / 4 / 2 on +8.0%
Nazr Mohammed (C, 27): 20 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 7 / 7 / 0 / 2 on -10.3%
Brent Barry (SG, 33): 24 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 8 / 3 / 3 / 1 on +5.1%
Robert Horry (PF, 34): 21 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 7 / 4 / 1 / 2 on +0.4%
Bruce Bowen (SF, 33): 36 MPPG, 12% OLoad, 9 / 4 / 2 / 1 on -0.8%

Scoring/100: Tim Duncan (32.9 / +1.1%), Manu Ginobili (29.2 / +8.0%), Tony Parker (26.3 / -0.1%)
Assists/100: Tony Parker (9.7), Manu Ginobili (7.1), Brent Barry (5.5)

Heliocentrism: 27.3% (67th of 84 teams) - Duncan
Wingmen: 38.9% (38th) - Ginobili & Parker
Depth: 33.8% (26th)

Playoff Offensive Rating: +4.74 (57th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.24 (65th)
Playoff SRS: +10.04 (64th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.46 (73rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +3.24 (20th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.84 (75th)

Playoff Heliocentrism: 36.1% (40th of 84 teams) - Ginobili
Playoff Wingmen: 50.8% (7th) - Duncan & Horry
Playoff Depth: 13.1% (75th)

Round 1: Denver Nuggets (+2.2), won 4-1, by +10.2 points a game (+12.4 SRS eq)
Round 2: Seattle SuperSonics (+3.9), won 4-2, by +6.9 points a game (+10.8 SRS eq)
Round 3: Phoenix Suns (+9.9), won 4-1, by +4.2 points a game (+14.1 SRS eq)
Round 4: Detroit Pistons (+6.6), won 4-3, outscored by 1.8 points a game (+4.8 SRS eq)

In 1999 the Spurs had won the NBA Finals, combining young Tim Duncan with veteran David Robinson and rampaging through the league. But in 2000, despite the continuation of that pairing, the Spurs were pushed to the side by the ascension of the Shaq/Kobe Lakers. Only in 2003 did the Spurs defeat the Lakers, which cleared the way to their first title of the new decade (and let the record show that between 2000 and 2004, the '03 Spurs were the only team from the West to beat the Lakers in a playoff series). In 2004 the Spurs put together another strong season, but fell to the Lakers in the playoffs, who in turn were handily defeated by the upstart Detroit Pistons. After that year Shaq left the Lakers to join the Miami Heat, and suddenly the West was, well, I can’t say wide open because it was still crazy tough, but it had one less championship-level team.

So in 2005 the Spurs went into the season as the #1 ranked team, favored to both win the West and beat the Pistons. It wasn’t a terribly creative prediction; the Spurs had won in ‘03, had lost to the Lakers in ‘04, and now there were no Lakers and Duncan’s teammates (Ginobili and Parker specifically) were older and better. Here’s their roster:

Modern Comps:

PG: 2013 Paul Pierce
SG: 2019 Paul George (but way better at scoring)
SF: 2017 Trevor Ariza (worse at scoring)
PF: 2005 Tim Duncan
C: 2016 Trevor Booker
6th: 2016 Tony Allen (but better)
7th: 2014 Marco Belinelli

That’s a pretty nice roster. ‘13 Pierce isn’t an efficient scorer, but a strong playmaker and high usage player. ‘19 Paul George (but better at scoring) is certainly one of the best players in the league. ‘17 Ariza and ‘16 Tony Allen are strong defensive players (even if ‘16 Tony Allen is pretty old) and ‘14 Belinelli is a nice player to have off the bench. There isn’t a ton of scoring (minus ‘19 George), so Duncan needed to power a lot of the scoring, but not the playmaking the way he had to in ‘03. Defensively this is clearly a very strong group.

In the regular season the Spurs won 59 games (behind the 62-win Suns) and had the highest SRS in the league (+7.84, 26th on this list). Their offense was decent, built around strong shooting from the floor. But their defense was excellent as you might have guessed from their comps (their DRating was 8th on this list, which is incredible). In the first round they drew the +2.2 Denver Nuggets and the Spurs rolled, winning the series in five by 10.2 points a game. The Nuggets shot at -3.9% while the Spurs shot at +1.6%. Manu averaged a 32/6/4 on +12.6% while Duncan averaged a 22/11/3 on -1.6% with 2.6 blocks per game. A strong win.

In the second round they faced a high-powered offense in the +3.9 Seattle SuperSonics (led by Ray Allen). Once again the Spurs outshot the opposition (+3.5% to -0.5%) and took the series in six by 6.9 points a game. Duncan averaged a 25/10/3 on +1.3% with 2.5 blocks a game, while Manu averaged a 21/5/4 on +19.5%. Another solid win.

But in the Conference Finals they faced the Phoenix Suns, whose high-flying offense had been vaporizing opposing defenses. And the Spurs excellent defense couldn’t contain the Suns’ shooting. The Suns shot at +4.1%, and posted an offensive rating within a point of their regular season average. For all of the Spurs’ excellent defenders, Nash’s wizardry proved the stronger. But. The Spurs made their small lineup pay on the other end. The Spurs won the possession battle (5-6 shots a game) on the offensive glass, with Duncan, Horry and Mohammed combining for almost 12 offensive boards a game between them, while Duncan pulled down 9 defensive rebounds a game. Duncan pounded the Suns inside by averaging a 27/14/3 on +6.2% and Ginobili averaged a 22/6/5 on +7.2% with 2 steals a game. The Spurs won in five but it was tighter than that, only winning by 4.2 points a game. But even that was a big achievement. The Suns were clearly one of the top two teams in the league. Getting past them and out of the West meant that the Spurs could face the champion of the weaker conference, the +6.6 Detroit Pistons.

The series did not go as well as one might have expected. Game 1 started well enough, with the Spurs smothering the Pistons’ offense, holding them to a revolting -11.4% shooting. While the Spurs didn’t score well, they did enough, with Duncan posting a 24/17/2 on -3.3% and Manu having a 26/9/2 on +20.3%. It was a decisive 15 point win. Game 2 went even better, with Manu running amok with a 27/3/7 on +45.5% with 3 steals, and the Spurs won by 21. After the two games in San Antonio, the series seemed well in hand.

Games 3 and 4 in Detroit went the complete opposite way. In Game 3 Ben Wallace posted a good but weird stat-line with a 15/11/1 on +16% shooting with 3 steals and 5 blocks while Manu turned the ball over 6 times and Duncan had a decent 14/10/4 on -13.1% with 3 steals. The Pistons ran away with it by 17. In Game 4 the Pistons crushed the Spurs by 31. The Pistons turned the ball over twice all game (not a misprint), generating a 20 shot advantage (also not a misprint). Again the Spurs struggled to score. The series went to Game 5 in Detroit tied at 2-2, with the Pistons giving at least as good as they got.

Game 5 was hard-fought and went down to the wire. Here’s the last minute of the 4th quarter (Spurs are up by 1):

0:51 - Chauncey Billups (who was having an amazing game), in isolation against Bruce Bowen, drove past his man and laid it in for the bucket. Pistons up by 1.
0:38 - Ginobili has the ball, Duncan runs a pick for him and the Pistons switch so that Ben Wallace has Ginobili. Ginobili darts into the paint with Wallace all over him. Ginobili tries to put it up but Wallace blocks the shot. Manu recovers the ball, underhands the ball to Duncan in the paint who goes up with it but Rasheed Wallace fouls him hard from behind, sending him to the line. Duncan (who was 0-5 from the line in the quarter to that point) misses the first and makes the second. Tie game.
0:18 - Billups is again ISOd against Bowen. Billups somewhat gets past Bowen, moves into the paint, Duncan moves up to stop him, Billups manages to get the ball up under Duncan’s arms but misses the shot. Bowen gets the rebound and Spurs call timeout. Still tie game.
0:03 - The Spurs inbound to Ginobili who winds the clock down, defended by Prince. Ginobili gets a head of steam, gets past Prince by maybe half a step and attempts a tough lefty layup. Wallace comes in from the side to help. It isn’t clear if Wallace tips it or not, but the shot misses and bounces off the rim. Duncan tries to tip it in and misses. We go to overtime.

Here’s what happened, starting with a minute left (Pistons up by 2):

0:55 - Horry gets the ball and passes entry to Duncan who loses the ball, Pistons take possession still up by 2.
0:35 - Billups has the ball and lets the shot clock tick down. He passes to Hamilton who’s coming hard off a screen. Hamilton gets the pass off the curl, shoots, missing the shot, but Ben Wallace (who had position on Horry) kicks the ball back out and Billups corrals it, still Pistons ball, up by 2.
0:12 - Billups has the ball, lets the clock get low. They run a pick, the Spurs switch so it’s Duncan on Billups. Billups crosses him over but Duncan stays with him and Billups puts up a tight layup with Duncan and Horry all over him. It bounces out, Duncan gets the rebound and calls timeout. Pistons still up by 2.
0:09 - Horry is set to inbound. There are no Pistons defending him to stop the inbound pass, though Rasheed Wallace is standing about halfway between Rasheed and the basket. Ginobili springs free on a screen under the hoop and catches the pass in the corner. Given that Ginobili catches it with some room, Rasheed comes off his zone spot and moves to trap Manu. Ginobili simply passes it back to the now wide-open Horry who cans the three. Spurs by one.
0:03 - the Pistons try and inbound but the Spurs are all over Billups and everybody. Hamilton eventually fights a little free from Parker and gets the pass in what is basically is a post up from just inside the free throw line. Hamilton spins to put up the shot but Parker is all over him and the shot misses. Spurs win.

It was a tough position for Rasheed on that Horry shot. Either he stays on Horry and Ginobili might put up a three, or he traps and might force a turnover. But Horry had shot 3 of 4 from three in the fourth and had it one or two (thousand) clutch shots in his time. Either way, Rasheed went for the turnover and Horry canned a wide open look to win the game. The Spurs took a 3-2 lead back to San Antonio.

The Pistons take Game 6 despite Duncan’s strong 21/15/1 on +4.2%. The Pistons outshot the Spurs (+1.5% to -2.2%, Parker and Ginobili both struggled) and took the win by 9. We go to Game 7. The game is tied going into the fourth quarter. But in that fourth quarter the Pistons’ offense slows, with only Billups and ‘Sheed making their shots (14 points on 11 possessions, compared with 3 points on 9 from the rest of the team). Meanwhile the Spurs, in spite of Duncan’s 3 turnovers, shoot magnificently, led by Ginobili (11 points on 6 possessions) but everyone else combined for 13 points on 11 shots. The Spurs surged ahead, winning the quarter and the game by 7 points. This was now their second title in three years, and their third in seven. And with Duncan and Ginobili in their primes and Parker still in his early 20s, there would be reason to think that these would not be the last. It hadn’t been easy; the Pistons had actually outscored them by 1.8 points a game, and Duncan’s dominance had been considerably mitigated by the Pistons’ exceptional defense.

It was a curious postseason, and curious year. The Spurs’ outstanding defense actually regressed to merely being very good in the playoffs. They weren’t able to contain the Suns much, and the Pistons, while not successful offensively in the Finals, were able to maintain their regular season average. But the Spurs’ offense picked up the slack, particularly Ginobili and Horry. Manu would average 21 points (better than it looks given the pace) on +12.2% for the playoffs, and Horry would play strong defense, rebound well and shoot at +6.2%. Am I saying that this wasn’t Duncan’s team? No. But this wasn’t 2003, when Duncan clearly carried the roster to the championship. This year he carried a massive load (he jumped to 31% usage in the playoffs) at the expense of his efficiency (-0.3%). This was more of a year where he carried the offense in usage (trusting that Manu and others would supply the efficiency) while Duncan rebounded like a boss (12.2% OReb, 26.6% DReb) and played fantastic defense. Duncan was still the best player on the team (probably, AuRPM has Manu and Duncan as #1 and 2 in the league for 2005). But he was probably no longer the best player on the offense, at least not in the playoffs. The era of Duncan carrying the Spurs was passing; the era where Duncan was merely the best and leader of a strong cast had begun (he was still one of the top five players in the league easily, it’s just that in Manu he had somebody else near that level).


10 |
9 | Suns, Spurs
8 |
7 | Pistons
6 | Heat
5 | Mavericks
4 |
3 | Sonics, Rockets
2 |
1 | Kings, TWolves
0 | Celtics, Nuggets, Grizzlies, Cavs
-0 | Bulls, Pacers, Wizards, Clippers
-1 | Raptors, Warriors
-2 | 76ers, Knicks, Magic, Lakers
-3 | Nets, Bucks, Blazers, Jazz
-4 |
-5 |
-6 | Bobcats, Hornets
-7 |
-8 |
-9 | Hawks
-10|

2005 was a pretty competitive year. Two thirds of the league was between +2 and -4, which is a pretty significant clustering. There were a few extremes (the Hawks for example) but the Spurs (and to a lesser extent, the Suns) really stood out in their year. Their regular season was excellent (26th) and while their playoffs may have been only really good (64th on this list), when you consider their competitive league and championship victory, I think #30 is a pretty solid spot for them.

#29. The 2016 Oklahoma City Thunder

Spoiler:

Overall SRS: +11.25, Standard Deviations: +1.95, Lost in Conference Finals (Preseason 4th)

Regular Season Record: 55-27, Regular Season SRS: +7.09 (43rd), Earned the 3 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +6.7 (12th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -0.8 (94th)

PG: Russell Westbrook, +7.8 / +9.1
SG: Andre Roberson, +0.5 / +2.7
SF: Kevin Durant, +9.9 / +4.0
PF: Serge Ibaka, -0.6 / +3.6
C: Steven Adams, +0.2 / +1.8
6th: Dion Waiters, -2.8 / -1.1

Russell Westbrook (PG, 27): 36 MPPG, 35% OLoad, 24 / 8 / 11 / 2 on +1.3%
Kevin Durant (SF, 27): 37 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 29 / 9 / 5 / 2 on +9.3%
Dion Waiters (SG, 24): 29 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 10 / 3 / 2 / 1 on -4.9%
Serge Ibaka (PF, 26): 33 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 13 / 7 / 1 / 3 on -0.8%
Steven Adams (C, 22): 26 MPPG, 12% OLoad, 8 / 7 / 1 / 2 on +8.0%
Andre Roberson (SG, 24): 23 MPPG, 9% OLoad, 5 / 4 / 1 / 1 on +2.5%

Scoring/100: Kevin Durant (39.1 / +9.3%), Russell Westbrook (33.9 / +1.3%), Serge Ibaka (19.5 / -0.8%)
Assists/100: Russell Westbrook (15.1), Kevin Durant (7.0), Dion Waiters (3.6)

Heliocentrism: 42.9% (21st of 84 teams) - Durant
Wingmen: 45.1% (13th) - Westbrook & Adams
Depth: 12.0% (73rd)

Playoff Offensive Rating: +8.71 (13th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.73 (57th)
Playoff SRS: +13.95 (15th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.16 (19th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +4.53 (3rd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.31 (23rd)

Playoff Heliocentrism: 35.2% (45th of 84 teams) - Westbrook
Playoff Wingmen: 37.0% (53rd) - Durant & Ibaka
Playoff Depth: 27.8% (32nd)

Round 1: Dallas Mavericks (0.0), won 4-1, by +18.2 points a game (+18.2 SRS eq)
Round 2: San Antonio Spurs (+12.7), won 4-2, outscored by 0.5 points a game (+12.2 SRS eq)
Round 3: Golden State Warriors (+11.4), lost 3-4, by +1.0 points per game (+12.4 SRS eq)
Round 4:

The 2005 SuperSonics were the last winning Seattle team. The next two years they were quite bad. In the 2007 draft they ended up with the #2 overall pick. The choice of the team above them (Portland) was between two players: Greg Oden (the stud big for Ohio State that had played fantastically in the NCAA title game) or Kevin Durant (a super-skilled, super-tall, super-long string bean from Texas). The Blazers went with Oden (who was the consensus best pick) and the Sonics settled for Durant. In the 2008 draft they had the #4 pick (the Sonics were awful again) and the #24 pick. With the #4 they took a fireball point guard from UCLA (Russell Westbrook) and with the #24 they took a flier on a Congolese big, Serge Ibaka. At this time the Sonics were up and moved to Oklahoma City to become the Thunder. And in the next draft they had the #3 pick (because they were awful again) and got a one-man offense shooting guard from Arizona, James Harden.

Over several years these prospects developed as well as could have been hoped. By 2011 they had surprised everyone by getting to the Western Conference Finals, falling to the eventual champion Mavericks in five. In 2012 the Thunder actually won the Western Conference, but fell to the Miami Heat in the Finals. In the offseason the Thunder dealt James Harden for reasons that became more inexplicable as time passed, but it did acquire them a number of draft picks. In 2013 Durant and Westbrook grew even better, leading the Thunder to a +9.15 RSRS, by far the highest mark in the league. However, in the first round Russell Westbrook was injured, and Durant alone wasn’t able to get the Thunder out of the semifinals. In 2014 the Thunder posted another very strong year, finishing with a +6.66 RSRS despite missing Westbrook for almost half the year. They made it as far as the Western Conference Finals before being demolished by the Spurs, to the tune of 10.5 points per game. In 2015 Durant was injured a third of the way through the season, and the team actually missed the playoffs, despite going 45-37.

This is a long way of saying that the Thunder had been something of a disappointment. They had incredibly auspicious beginnings in ‘11 and ‘12, had lost two years to injury (‘13 and ‘15) and been obliterated by the secret juggernaut Spurs in ‘14. 2016 was the last year for which Kevin Durant was under contract. But there was reason to hope. Durant and Westbrook were both 27 and both (arguably) MVP candidates. The rest of the roster was a little thin. Steven Adams was a developing solid center, Serge Ibaka had somewhat stalled in development as a decent offensive player and solid defender, Dion Waiters was a shot-creator 6th man who had a lot of flaws and Andre Roberson was a defense first SG who was light on shooting. But Westbrook had grown into an epic floor-raiser who had an incredible first step, rebounded extremely well and could generate tons of shots for himself and others. And Durant had evolved into arguably the best all-around regular season scorer ever. The Warriors had won the West (and the title) in 2015, but it wasn’t clear just how good they’d be in ‘16. And either way, there was reason to think that a healthy Thunder could seriously challenge them.

In the regular season the Thunder were healthy, going 55-27 and posting a +7.09 RSRS (43rd on this list). Durant and Westbrook combined for 80.2% of the team’s VORP, comparable to shares from prior giant duos (Shaq/Kobe in ‘01 and LeBron/AD in ‘20). Despite what, in any other season would be quite notable, the Thunder finished a distant third in the West. Ahead of them were the 67-15, +10.28 RSRS San Antonio Spurs, having one of the best regular seasons ever. The same core that had existed in ‘14 was still there, and while Duncan had gotten worse, Kawhi Leonard had grown into a superstar in his own right. I’m not exaggerating about how good that regular season was. Here are the teams that had ever posted both 65+ wins and 10+ RSRS:

1971 Bucks
1972 Lakers
1992 Bulls
1996 Bulls
1997 Bulls
2015 Warriors

Every single one of those teams had won the championship. The 2016 Spurs were the real deal.

They were also the second best team in the West.

The 2016 Warriors had gone 73-9 (breaking the ‘96 Bulls single-season wins record) and an even better +10.38 RSRS. It seemed like it was to be 2014 all over again, where the Thunder were great but other teams were to be even greater. Nevertheless, regular season results only mean so much. In the first round the Thunder played the +0 Dallas Mavericks and obliterated them in five by 18.2 points a game. The Mavericks were held to -3.0% shooting, while the Thunder hit on all cylinders, shooting at +4.4%. Westbrook averaged a 26/7/11 on +3.4% while Durant curiously struggled with a 26/6/3 on -5.7%. Either way, the Thunder had wrecked their first round opponent, and moved on to face the Spurs (+12.7).

And the Spurs, let it be known, had destroyed their opponent by 22 points a game. It was an incredibly tight contest. The Thunder dominated the boards (Westbrook, Adams and Enes Kanter combined to average 9 offensive rebounds a game), but the Thunder struggled with turnovers (Westbrook and Durant combined for over 8 a game). In the aggregate the Spurs gained an extra three shots a game on the exchange. But the Spurs’ shooting was held in check (-0.8%) and the Thunder did slightly better (+0.6%). Durant had averaged a 29/7/4 on +6% while Westbrook had averaged a 25/7/11 on -6.2%. The Spurs actually outscored the Thunder by 0.5 points a game, but the Thunder managed to prevail in six games. Was it a decisive win? Not even close. But even if we look at it as something akin to a draw (where somebody had to win, and the Thunder basically won the coin flip), simply matching a team as historically good as the Spurs was quite an achievement. And, of course, in the Conference Finals, they faced the Golden State Warriors (+11.4).

Game 1 was tight, with the Warriors leading by 3 going into the 4th quarter. But in the 4th the Thunder defense really put the clamps on the Warriors, holding them to 1 of 10 shooting from three and only 14 points on 24 possessions (Draymond was the only Warrior to shoot as high as -4.1% on four shots). The Thunder didn’t do a lot better, but it was certainly enough to give the Thunder a six point win. In Game 2 the Warriors roared back, dominating all four factors. The Warriors held down the boards and got an additional 11 shots. The Thunder shot decently (Durant put up a 29/6/1 on +17.7% shooting, but with *8* turnovers) but as a team they shot -1.4%. But the Warriors shot lights out (+6.5% shooting as a team) and blew the Thunder out by 27. So the series went to OKC tied, but the Warriors had definitely played better overall.

Game 3 was the exact same but reversed, where the Thunder won all four factors and blew the Warriors apart. Curry was the only Warrior that shot well (24/5/3 on +4.4%) while Durant had a 33/8/2 on +27.3% with 3 blocks and Westbrook posted a 30/8/12 on +8.8% shooting with 2 steals. The Thunder blew the Warriors out by 28 points. Game 4 was more of the same, where the Thunder won all Four Factors. Durant had a 26/11/4 on -8.3% with 4 steals and 3 blocks, Westbrook posted a 36/11/11 on +4.9% with 4 steals but 6 turnovers, and the Thunder won by 24 points. Four games in and the Thunder were one win away from the NBA Finals. It was everything they could have wished for.

Game 5 was close, with the Thunder only four behind going into the 4th. But the Warriors pulled away and won by 9. The Thunder managed a two shot advantage, but the Warriors shot considerably better. The Warriors shot +5.9% (Curry had a 31/7/6 on +9.4% plus five steals) while the Thunder shot around league average (+0.5%). Durant posted a 40/7/4 on +0.4% and Westbrook had a 31/7/8 on -5.6% with 5 steals but 7 turnovers. The Thunder had lost, but they were still one game away from a series win. Game 6, the last OKC game, was going well, leading by 8 going into the fourth, and by seven points with 6 minutes left (84.8% win chance). Here are the last six minutes (with win probabilities):

5:34 - The Thunder are defending in switching man, Thompson (defended by Durant) comes around a high off-ball screen, Durant ends up behind him and Thompson lays it in, Thunder by 5 (82.0% win).
5:15 - The Thunder offense stalls, Durant takes a really hard midrange shot and nails it, Thunder by 7 (86.4%).
4:58 - The Warriors set a bunch of picks which lead to Westbrook defending Thompson. Klay takes a static deep three and nails it, Thunder by 4 (78.5%).
4:14 - A weird ISO but without the floor cleared out (Ibaka was under the hoop), so Durant drives a quarter step past Iguodala, but Ibaka’s man (Barnes) cuts Durant off, Durant takes a tough pull-up and misses, the ball goes out of bounds, Warriors’ ball, Thunder by 4 (74.6%).
4:02 - The Warriors run a Curry/Iguodala pick, but Westbrook and Adams don’t switch effectively, leaving Curry with a fairly open look from three, splash, Thunder by 1 (62.2%).
3:40 - Same problem as the last time, Ibaka camps out under the hoop, Westbrook gets past Klay but Ibaka’s man (Barnes) cuts him off and Westbrook takes an ugly shot and is credited with two free throws. He sinks them both, Thunder by 3 (69.7%).
3:20 - The Warriors use lots of movement but the Thunder execute well, staying with their men, and the possession ends with Iguodala forcing a well-defended three, which he misses, Ibaka gets the rebound, Thunder by 3 (77.8%).
3:00 - the Thunder ISO again. Durant has the ball on the right wing, with Ibaka in the corner and nobody under the basket. But at 7 seconds in the shot clock, Ibaka jogs slowly toward the other corner and Steph, not fearing Ibaka’s hussle or Durant’s passing, sees the shot clock is low and stays put to double Durant. Durant attacks anyway, stalls, and then turns the ball over, Thunder by 3 (71.9%).
2:50 - the Warriors fast break 3 on 2, nobody picks up Curry at the three point line and he takes an open three, swish, tie game (55.4%).
2:38 - The Thunder free up Westbrook with a pick, Westbrook gets a head of steam on Draymond but finishes with an awkward finger roll that he misses, Klay gets the rebound but goes out of bounds so Thunder ball again (only 13 on shot clock), tie game (55.7%).
2:30 - The Thunder ISO Durant on Iguodala, but Iggy slaps the ball free, still Thunder ball, but with only 7 seconds left on the clock, tie game (56.0%).
2:24 - Great defense on the inbound from Barnes, Durant catches it deep with six seconds to go, he blows by Barnes, Draymond cuts him off at the rim, Durant pulls up from close and misses, Westbrook goes up for the rebound, the ball is tipped, Roberson happens to be in position and dunks it, Thunder by 2 (65.9%).
2:10 - The Warriors run good movement, Curry runs a screen for Iguodala and then heads to the other side of the court, his man (Ibaka follows) and puts his back to the play, leaving Iguodala ISOd on Roberson. Iggy attacks the rim and makes the tough layup, tie game (57.0%).
1:40 - Westbrook is defended by Iguodala, Westbrook drives but loses control, he gains control and goes up for a shot but Iggy swipes the ball, turnover, tie game (42.1%).
1:36 - The Warriors push transition, getting the ball downcourt to Klay behind the three point line who isn’t well-defended, he shoots with 19 seconds left in the shot clock, swish, Warriors by 3 (19.3%).
1:23 - Westbrook with the ball, Ibaka screens for Durant but ineffectively, Durant gets the pass at the three point line but Iguodala is all over him, Durant misses the shot and the Warriors get the rebound, Warriors by 3 (10.0%).
1:00 - Curry gets past Ibaka but Durant helps, Curry takes a tough layup and misses, Thunder get the rebound, Warriors by 3 (15.2%).
0:55 - Westbrook attacks 1 on 2, but Draymond hits his arm from behind, Westbrook drops the ball and turns it over (should have been a foul), Warriors ball, Warriors by 3 (7.1%).
0:39 - The Thunder fail to execute a switch well, Klay gets a reasonably open look from three, he misses, Durant gets the rebound and passes to Westbrook but Draymond intercepts the pass and punches it free to force the turnover, Warriors ball, Warriors by 3 (4.7%).

And that was pretty much game. The Thunder botched a lot of executions, got hit with one bad call (or lack of a call) and lost a game they really should have won.

Game 7 was not as close. The Thunder shot like garbage (-8.5%) except for Durant with a 27/7/3 on +10.9%. And Steph shined with a 36/5/8 on +17% and the Warriors won by 8. The end.

The Thunder actually outscored the Warriors on the series by 1 point per game. So even if they lost, we must infer that they were really close to the Warriors in ability (and the Warriors were really good). So the Thunder posted a strong RSRS, blew out an average team, and then played a pair of +12ish OSRS teams to standstills, beating one and losing to the other. They didn’t make the Finals, and in the offseason Durant walked. But there’s every reason to think that the Thunder were a really, really good team that just happened to play two juggernauts in the same postseason. Still. Their failure to execute down the stretch of Game 6 was pretty disappointing.

And do you remember that 80.2% VORP-share between Westbrook and Durant in the regular season? It dropped to 54.1% in the playoffs. This isn’t for the same reason that the ‘01 Lakers’ split dropped (teammates stepping up), it’s because Durant had a weirdly bad postseason. He went from shooting +9.3% in the regular season to +0.1% in the playoffs.


12 | Spurs
11 | Cavs, Thunder
10 | Warriors
9 |
8 |
7 |
6 |
5 |
4 |
3 | Heat, Hawks, Pacers, Clippers, Blazers
2 |
1 | Raptors, Jazz
0 | Celtics
-0 | Pistons, Wizards
-1 | Hornets, Bulls, Magic
-2 | Rockets, Knicks, Kings, Nuggets
-3 | Mavericks, Bucks, Pelicans, TWolves
-4 | Grizzlies
-5 |
-6 | Suns
-7 | Nets
-8 | Lakers
-9 | 76ers
-10|

2016 was a . . . weird year. On one hand it was pretty close to the center, with 70% of all teams between +4 and -4. On the other hand . . . 13% of the teams were at +10 OSRS or better. So this grades out as unusually not competitive just for that, but it’s not quite as bad as the outliers make it look like (if you want to see a really not competitive year, wait ‘till we get to 1972).

So where does this shake out? The Thunder had a solid regular season (43rd) and a really good postseason (15th) where they played one of the toughest playoff schedules by any team . . . ever. But they did it in a pretty lopsided year. I am completely fine with the Thunder being here. In a year that didn’t have *three other* super-teams, the Thunder likely would have won the title without much effort. But it was 2016, and only one great team can win. I don't think there's any question that this was a better team than the '12 Thunder, even if they didn't get as far.

Back to the Main Thread

[homecourtloss]

Another great write up as per usual. That last 6+ minutes of the 4th in game 2 vs. the Heat changed everything. Heat probably win that game in 98 out of 100 simulations, but didn’t and it of course changed the series. One wonders of the Heat would have changed their offense the way they did for 2012 and 2013 had they actually won in 2011.

[sansterre]

Another great write up as per usual. That last 6+ minutes of the 4th in game 2 vs. the Heat changed everything. Heat probably win that game in 98 out of 100 simulations, but didn’t and it of course changed the series. One wonders of the Heat would have changed their offense the way they did for 2012 and 2013 had they actually won in 2011.

It was really weird to watch. With Haslem on the floor and Wade taking more of the late shots, there was really not a lot of spacing.

[Texas Chuck]

Another great write up as per usual. That last 6+ minutes of the 4th in game 2 vs. the Heat changed everything. Heat probably win that game in 98 out of 100 simulations, but didn’t and it of course changed the series. One wonders of the Heat would have changed their offense the way they did for 2012 and 2013 had they actually won in 2011.

I think you can go back and look at the last 5 minutes of game 1 against LA as well. Now Dallas went on to sweep that series so maybe if LA wins game one, Dallas still takes that series. Clearly the Lakers were at the end of the line with that core. But the Lakers held such a psychological edge on Dallas for a really long time that I wonder if that magical run could have been stopped before it started?

I'm probably putting too much weight into since that was such a mentally tough veteran team, but man the Lakers held sway over the Mavericks for so long that I've often thought about it.

[Odinn21]

Another great write up as per usual. That last 6+ minutes of the 4th in game 2 vs. the Heat changed everything. Heat probably win that game in 98 out of 100 simulations, but didn’t and it of course changed the series. One wonders of the Heat would have changed their offense the way they did for 2012 and 2013 had they actually won in 2011.

It was really weird to watch. With Haslem on the floor and Wade taking more of the late shots, there was really not a lot of spacing.

Wade getting injured in 2011-12 season was a blessing in disguise for the Heat because Wade taking a necessary step back and handing the reigns entirely to James enabled that spacing.
That 2010-11 Heat was a proper example of why two primary ball handlers wouldn't live up to the potential there is. Both became lesser parts.

Though as a fan, I always liked Wade's game more/better than James' game, so him slipping out of his prime was just sad for me. If I weren't a Duncan fan, I'd probably become a Wade/Heat fan.
(Unrelated, even though I've been a Duncan for 2 decades, I've never assumed myself as a Spurs fan. )

[homecourtloss]

Another great write up as per usual. That last 6+ minutes of the 4th in game 2 vs. the Heat changed everything. Heat probably win that game in 98 out of 100 simulations, but didn’t and it of course changed the series. One wonders of the Heat would have changed their offense the way they did for 2012 and 2013 had they actually won in 2011.

I think you can go back and look at the last 5 minutes of game 1 against LA as well. Now Dallas went on to sweep that series so maybe if LA wins game one, Dallas still takes that series. Clearly the Lakers were at the end of the line with that core. But the Lakers held such a psychological edge on Dallas for a really long time that I wonder if that magical run could have been stopped before it started?

I'm probably putting too much weight into since that was such a mentally tough veteran team, but man the Lakers held sway over the Mavericks for so long that I've often thought about it.

No, I think you’re right. In hindsight, everyone assumed the Lakers had run out of steam, but nobody saw that sweep coming. Had that 1st game turned out differently, then who knows what happens.

What’s really amazing to think about is that in every sport whether it is basketball or football or soccer or tennis or whatever, there are these little segments that had the little segment gone, differently the whole game would’ve turned out differently and then history would’ve been different. It really really makes you appreciate those players and teams that can win over and over and over again and mitigate against these little part of the game they could’ve changed everything.

[sansterre]

Another great write up as per usual. That last 6+ minutes of the 4th in game 2 vs. the Heat changed everything. Heat probably win that game in 98 out of 100 simulations, but didn’t and it of course changed the series. One wonders of the Heat would have changed their offense the way they did for 2012 and 2013 had they actually won in 2011.

I think you can go back and look at the last 5 minutes of game 1 against LA as well. Now Dallas went on to sweep that series so maybe if LA wins game one, Dallas still takes that series. Clearly the Lakers were at the end of the line with that core. But the Lakers held such a psychological edge on Dallas for a really long time that I wonder if that magical run could have been stopped before it started?

I'm probably putting too much weight into since that was such a mentally tough veteran team, but man the Lakers held sway over the Mavericks for so long that I've often thought about it.

No, I think you’re right. In hindsight, everyone assumed the Lakers had run out of steam, but nobody saw that sweep coming. Had that 1st game turned out differently, then who knows what happens.

What’s really amazing is that in every sport is basketball or football or soccer or tennis, there are these little segments that had the term differently the whole game would’ve turned out differently and then history would’ve been different. It really really makes you appreciate those players and teams that can win over and over and over again and mitigate against these little part of the game they could’ve changed everything.

The nuts thing is that, if the Lakers had somehow made it past the Mavericks, could they have beaten the Thunder? I think it's definitely possible; that team was good but a far cry from the team they'd be in 2012. And could they have beaten the 2011 Heat? I think that would have been a much tougher test, but given that the Heat were definitely not at their best, I think a victory was possible.

Do you know what's weird? If the Mavericks had beaten the Lakers in six, with one or two tight games, I think they'd have gotten more respect for having done so. It would look like they'd fought the defending champs, gone toe to toe and come out victorious. That they slaughtered the Lakers outright made it look like the Lakers simply folded, and the Mavs don't get much credit for beating on a team that folded up.

Weirdly, I think crushing the Lakers so decisively actually *hurt* the 2011 Mavericks' legacy.

[Texas Chuck]

Weirdly, I think crushing the Lakers so decisively actually *hurt* the 2011 Mavericks' legacy.

Maybe. But that Mother's Day beatdown was so glorious that I'll take the exchange.

[Homer38]

It's crazy how many big comebacks the Mavs had in the 2011 playoffs

Game 1 vs Lakers, game 2 vs Heat that you mentioned but there was also game 4 against thunder in the WCF that the mavs had also made a big comeback.Very underrated team with the way they played, especially in the clutch

[sansterre]

Bump for team #30, the 2005 San Antonio Spurs!

[70sFan]

That's a great write-up about one of my favorite teams of all-time. 2005 playoffs was so exciting to rewatch and 2005 finals is among the best finals series ever.

I'm glad that you mentioned that Duncan was still their best player and their leader, because a lot of people keep assuming that after 2003 Duncan became a "system player".

[Odinn21]

Bump for team #30, the 2005 San Antonio Spurs!

Great write-up.
I agree that the Spurs were shifting from Duncan carrying an entire offense. But it was from that to Duncan led/oriented trio offense.

It's too hard to agree with saying Ginobili was the best offensive piece the Spurs had in 2005. Duncan's offensive game, the amount of attention he got from opponent defense was the thing enabled Ginobili's performance.

4th quarter of game 7
- 11:20; Duncan scores the 1st field goal of the quarter by positioning himself greatly to Ben Wallace. Great off-ball awareness.
- 10:10; Duncan clears the path from Ben Wallace for an easy dunk by Ginobili. (It's as clear as it can get against an all-time great defense) No box score value.
- 6:35; Duncan gets doubled, passes the ball to Horry, Horry misses, Duncan gets the board, gets doubled again and kicks the ball to Bowen for a three.
- 3:05; Duncan gets tripled, passes the ball to Ginobili for a three.
- 0:40; Duncan sets a secreen that's parallel to baseline, Prince and Sheed are out of position to defend and Ginobili cruises to an easy layup again.
https://youtu.be/3ig9xiu5VOU?t=4920

There are only 3 possessions which the Spurs scored on without Duncan touching the ball. In 2 of them Duncan sets screens for Ginobili, end up as easy dunk/layup. And the other one being Ginobili assisting Horry for a three when Duncan was on the bench.

Box score doesn't cover how much attention he got from the Pistons defense.
The Spurs scored 15 points when Duncan was on the floor in that 4th quarter until tactical fouls began to happen (18 overall). 12 of them came with Duncan directly or indirectly getting involved and box score is yet to cover that indirectly part.

Ginobili didn't command or force such attention. Yes, Ginobili had better offensive metrics than Duncan in 2005 playoffs thanks to his superior scoring efficiency, but that efficiency gap was there because Duncan was the force to defend and that opened up Ginobili to be that efficient.

But he was probably no longer the best player on the offense, at least not in the playoffs.

Yes, he was the best player on offense. I don't know if it's solely about 2005 or a comment in general. But I already discussed that that wasn't the case in 2005 playoffs, also Duncan kept being their best offensive player / performer until 2009 playoffs (it was Parker in 2009 playoffs).

This is me being always bothered by some misconceptions about Duncan and the Spurs in 2005 as a fan, LOL. There's absolutely no reason to get defensive.

[Jordan Syndrome]

I'm glad that you mentioned that Duncan was still their best player and their leader, because a lot of people keep assuming that after 2003 Duncan became a "system player".

This reminds me of a Jay-Z lyric where he says "I'm not a Business Man, I'm a Business, Man"

Duncan wasn't a system player, he was a system, player.

[Jaivl]

Probably? Duncan was **clearly** not the best offensive player on the '05 Spurs. Most important, then yeah.

[trex_8063]

(and let the record show that between 2000 and 2004, the '03 Spurs were the only team to beat the Lakers In a playoff series)

Detroit?

[sansterre]

(and let the record show that between 2000 and 2004, the '03 Spurs were the only team to beat the Lakers In a playoff series)

Detroit?

Balls. I had intended to say "in the West" or "From the Western Conference". Thanks.

[sansterre]

Bump for team #30, the 2005 San Antonio Spurs!

Great write-up.
I agree that the Spurs were shifting from Duncan carrying an entire offense. But it was from that to Duncan led/oriented trio offense.

It's too hard to agree with saying Ginobili was the best offensive piece the Spurs had in 2005. Duncan's offensive game, the amount of attention he got from opponent defense was the thing enabled Ginobili's performance.

4th quarter of game 7
- 11:20; Duncan scores the 1st field goal of the quarter by positioning himself greatly to Ben Wallace. Great off-ball awareness.
- 10:10; Duncan clears the path from Ben Wallace for an easy dunk by Ginobili. (It's as clear as it can get against an all-time great defense) No box score value.
- 6:35; Duncan gets doubled, passes the ball to Horry, Horry misses, Duncan gets the board, gets doubled again and kicks the ball to Bowen for a three.
- 3:05; Duncan gets tripled, passes the ball to Ginobili for a three.
- 0:40; Duncan sets a secreen that's parallel to baseline, Prince and Sheed are out of position to defend and Ginobili cruises to an easy layup again.
https://youtu.be/3ig9xiu5VOU?t=4920

There are only 3 possessions which the Spurs scored on without Duncan touching the ball. In 2 of them Duncan sets screens for Ginobili, end up as easy dunk/layup. And the other one being Ginobili assisting Horry for a three when Duncan was on the bench.

Box score doesn't cover how much attention he got from the Pistons defense.
The Spurs scored 15 points when Duncan was on the floor in that 4th quarter until tactical fouls began to happen (18 overall). 12 of them came with Duncan directly or indirectly getting involved and box score is yet to cover that indirectly part.

Ginobili didn't command or force such attention. Yes, Ginobili had better offensive metrics than Duncan in 2005 playoffs thanks to his superior scoring efficiency, but that efficiency gap was there because Duncan was the force to defend and that opened up Ginobili to be that efficient.

But he was probably no longer the best player on the offense, at least not in the playoffs.

Yes, he was the best player on offense. I don't know if it's solely about 2005 or a comment in general. But I already discussed that that wasn't the case in 2005 playoffs, also Duncan kept being their best offensive player / performer until 2009 playoffs (it was Parker in 2009 playoffs).

This is me being always bothered by some misconceptions about Duncan and the Spurs in 2005 as a fan, LOL. There's absolutely no reason to get defensive.

Let the record show that I didn't say "Against Detroit", I said "In the playoffs". I would have been leery of using the performance of a big matched up against Ben Wallace as evidence of much of anything (besides that Ben Wallace is a very effective defender).

Player A: 31.1% Usage, 52.6% TS, 12.2% OReb, 14.8% Ast, 10.7% TO, 1.9 OWS, +4.0 OBPM
Player B: 26.3% Usage, 65.2% TS, 3.0% OReb, 23.8% Ast, 15.2% TO, 3.0 OWS, +6.1 OBPM

Obviously box score stats are imperfect. And obviously the offensive rebounding advantage of Player A is considerable. But that scoring profile looks more like playoff Karl Malone (give or take) than anything. Seriously, look at those numbers; Ginobili shot at 12.6% better than Duncan. That's bigger than the gap between '16 Durant and '16 Serge Ibaka, that's a bigger gap than the one between '16 Curry and any starter on that team with at least a thousand minutes. It's *huge*. In the meantime, do you know the list of players with at least 450 playoff minutes, 25% usage or more and 64% TS or higher?

LeBron James ('14, '17, '20)
Anthony Davis ('20)
Steph Curry ('17)
Kevin Durant ('17)

And '05 Manu Ginobili.

I'm not trying to call Duncan a schlub on offense or anything; Ginobili had one of the best scoring playoffs by any player ever.

There are only two arguments for Duncan being a better *offensive* player than Ginobili in the '05 Playoffs:

1) Ginobili simply got lucky with his shots falling while Duncan got unlucky, so even if the gap in results was big, their true talents were much closer. This might well be true, but then we get back to "if we can't use the objective results of what happened, where does that leave us?"

and

2) Ginobili may have submitted one of the better playoff scoring seasons ever, while Duncan shot high usage at league average efficiency or worse, but the sum total of all of Duncan's offensive contributions (between offensive rebounding, setting picks, drawing attention from the defense, etc.) was greater than Ginobili's.

#2 may absolutely be true. I don't know how you'd prove it, but I won't pretend that I watched all of those playoff games several times to gather evidence to support or disprove the position.

I will simply say that the objective data suggests that Ginobili was the more valuable/effective player on offense (by a solid margin), but that doesn't necessarily mean that it's true.

And arguing that Duncan was better, but he had to do more defensive work which let Ginobil do better . . . it's basically an argument of "Duncan had the *capacity* to be better than Ginobili, he just didn't use it". And again, you may be right. But my point is explicitly built around what *actually* happened, not what had the *capacity* to happen.

[Odinn21]

But my point is explicitly built around what *actually* happened, not what had the *capacity* to happen.

This is kind of ironic because I'm the one who was pointing out what and how it actually happened and you're the one going for deductions from stats.
It's really simple math to follow what I'm saying. Duncan was the enabler. The evidence is how much pressure opponent defenses put on them. Duncan got defended way harder because he was the better offensive player and the attention he drew was the thing enabled Ginobili's efficient scoring.

Saying something like "Ginobili was the best performing Spur on offense in 2005 playoffs", yes, that's easily agreeable and probably the way to put it. Sometimes, the best performing player and the best player are different though. It's not common but it happens and when that happens the better player is usually the enabling one.

I will simply say that the objective data suggests that Ginobili was the more valuable/effective player on offense (by a solid margin), but that doesn't necessarily mean that it's true.

More efficient? Definitely.
More valuable? No, it's not the same thing as I said many times by now.

Also, I didn't make a claim about "Duncan had the capacity to do better" or something like that, please do not put words into my mouth.

---

Here's some more data for you to consider, because I know you'll still want them;

2005 Spurs; Ginobili 57.9% field goals made unassisted, Duncan 49.7%
2020 Lakers; James 65.4%, Davis 38.5%
2017 Warriors; Curry 62.3%, Durant 43.6%
(2017 Cavs; James 63.6% and 2014 Heat; James 67.2%)

As you can see, Ginobili wasn't the creator that James and Curry were. (Do we really need some data to see creators in offenses?..)

And if you look at space creating bigs as Shaquille O'Neal or Dirk Nowitzki, that 49.7% unassisted fgm rate is pretty good. I'll give their numbers for reference;
O'Neal from 2000 to 2003; 39.9%, 35.6%, 40.9%, 42.1%
Nowitzki in 2003, 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2011; 39.3%, 56.3%, 60.2%, 55.7%, 45.7%

Those gaps alone between James/Ginobili and Davis/Duncan should be a clear indication.

So, Ginobili's unassisted fgm rate doesn't match creator guards/wings, his volume also doesn't match. And Duncan's unassisted fgm rate matches all time great offensive bigs.

[homecourtloss]

I'm glad that you mentioned that Duncan was still their best player and their leader, because a lot of people keep assuming that after 2003 Duncan became a "system player".

This reminds me of a Jay-Z lyric where he says "I'm not a Business Man, I'm a Business, Man"

Duncan wasn't a system player, he was a system, player.

High quality word play and syntactical analysis—only on RealGM PC board

On another note, the “system” player comments about Duncan are generally from casuals who first of all don’t even recognize defense at all in their “evaluations.” Defensively, Duncan was an anchor all the way until he retired. In his very last series, people remember game 4 where he had 4 quick fouls and played only 10-12 minutes, but even in that series, Spurs were immensely better defensively when he was on court.

And offensively, he wasn’t a “system” player, either.

[Jordan Syndrome]

I'm glad that you mentioned that Duncan was still their best player and their leader, because a lot of people keep assuming that after 2003 Duncan became a "system player".

This reminds me of a Jay-Z lyric where he says "I'm not a Business Man, I'm a Business, Man"

Duncan wasn't a system player, he was a system, player.

High quality word play and syntactical analysis—only on RealGM PC board

On another note, the “system” player comments about Duncan are generally from casuals who first of all don’t even recognize defense at all in their “evaluations.” Defensively, Duncan was an anchor all the way until he retired. In his very last series, people remember game 4 where he had 4 quick fouls and played only 10-12 minutes, but even in that series, Spurs were immensely better defensively when he was on court.

And offensively, he wasn’t a “system” player, either.

People love to throw around the terms "system player" or "role player" to quantify a players contributions but a players contributions aren't linear and using these terms is too "umbrella-ey" for me.