Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In later entries I also add the Offensive and Defensive Ratings for each playoff series. This is just how well the team did, adjusted by the opponent's regular season average (if you play a team with an average Defensive Rating of 102, and you play them with an offensive rating of 106, you get credited with a +4). Pace for teams below 1973 or so is estimated based on regular season numbers, so it could easily be wrong by some.
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In later entries I also add the Offensive and Defensive Ratings for each playoff series. This is just how well the team did, adjusted by the opponent's regular season average (if you play a team with an average Defensive Rating of 102, and you play them with an offensive rating of 106, you get credited with a +4). Pace for teams below 1973 or so is estimated based on regular season numbers, so it could easily be wrong by some.
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#13. The 1992 Chicago Bulls
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +11.16, Standard Deviations: +2.17, Won NBA Finals (Preseason 1st)
PG: John Paxson, -0.8 / +0.5
SG: Michael Jordan, +9.7 / +9.9
SF: Scottie Pippen, +6.1 / +6.6
PF: Horace Grant, +5.3 / +4.8
C: Bill Cartwright, -3.2 / -2.4
Regular Season Metrics:
Regular Season Record: 67-15, Regular Season SRS: +10.07 (9th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +7.3 (6th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.7 (49th)
Shooting Advantage: +3.6%, Possession Advantage: +3.2 shooting possessions per game
Michael Jordan (SG, 28): 41 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 32 / 7 / 7 / 3 on +4.8%
Scottie Pippen (SF, 26): 41 MPPG, 26% OLoad, 22 / 8 / 7 / 3 on +2.4%
Bill Cartwright (C, 34): 24 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 9 / 5 / 1 / 1 on -3.4%
Horace Grant (PF, 26): 37 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 15 / 11 / 3 / 3 on +8.7%
John Paxson (PG, 31): 26 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 7 / 1 / 3 / 1 on +2.0%
Scoring/100: Michael Jordan (39.4 / +4.8%), Scottie Pippen (27.6 / +2.4%), Horace Grant (20 / +8.7%)
Assists/100: Scottie Pippen (9.2), Michael Jordan (8.0), John Paxson (6.3)
Heliocentrism: 41.4% (27th of 84 teams) - Jordan
Wingmen: 52.2% (2nd) - Pippen & Grant
Depth: 6.4% (79th)
Playoff Metrics:
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.0 (44th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.15 (48th)
Playoff SRS: +11.75 (34th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.09 (80th)
Shooting Advantage: +2.3%, Possession Advantage: +1.5 shooting possessions per game
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.25 (56th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.00 (51st)
Michael Jordan (SG, 28): 44 MPPG, 36% OLoad, 37 / 7 / 6 / 3 on +4.0%
Scottie Pippen (SF, 26): 43 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 21 / 9 / 7 / 3 on +1.3%
Horace Grant (PF, 26): 41 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 12 / 9 / 3 / 3 on +4.4%
John Paxson (PG, 31): 29 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 8 / 1 / 3 / 1 on +5.9%
Bill Cartwright (C, 34): 30 MPPG, 12% OLoad, 6 / 5 / 2 / 1 on -5.7%
Scoring/100: Michael Jordan (44.5 / +4.0%), Scottie Pippen (25.7 / +1.3%), Horace Grant (15.7 / +4.4%)
Assists/100: Scottie Pippen (8.8), Michael Jordan (7.4), John Paxson (5.5)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 42.4% (21st of 84 teams) - Jordan
Playoff Wingmen: 53.0% (2nd) - Pippen & Grant
Playoff Depth: 4.6% (83rd)
Round 1: Miami Heat (-3.9), won 3-0, by +18.0 points per game (+14.1 SRS eq)
Round 2: New York Knicks (+5.5), won 4-3, by +3.8 points per game (+9.3 SRS eq)
Round 3: Cleveland Cavaliers (+6.3), won 4-2, by +1.8 points per game (+8.1 SRS eq)
Round 4: Portland Trail Blazers (+9.8), won 4-2, by +7.3 points per game (+17.1 SRS eq)
Offensive / Defensive Ratings from Opposition Regular Season Average
Miami Heat: +15.8 / +0.5
New York Knicks: +7.0 / -1.8
Cleveland Cavaliers: +1.2 / -6.6
Portland Trail Blazers: +6.6 / -8.4
Shooting Advantage / Possession Advantage per game (unadjusted):
Miami Heat: +6.0% / +5.7
New York Knicks: +1.7% / +0.9
Cleveland Cavaliers: -1.6% / +4.6
Portland Trail Blazers: +5.1% / -1.8
Postseason Usage/Efficiency Change adjusted for Opposition:
John Paxson: +0.2% / +4.6%
Michael Jordan: +5.4% / -0.1%
Scottie Pippen: -1.0% / -0.4%
Horace Grant: -2.8% / -3.6%
Bill Cartwright: -5.6% / -1.6%
Huh. I’m not super-surprised that Jordan’s Helio rating was 40+%. I was more surprised by the other two ratings, that the ‘92 Bulls’ Wingmen rating was stupid high (the ‘96 Jazz were the only team higher on this list). And their Depth ratings were 79th in the regular season and 83rd in the playoffs (out of 84). I think that’s interesting. Let’s talk about that.
Here are the Roster ratings for the Bulls over Jordan’s career (I’m skipping 1986 for these purposes because he missed so much time) and the team’s SRS for reference:
1985: -0.5 SRS, 76.3% Helio, 29.9% Wingmen, -7.4% Depth
1987: +1.3 SRS, 89.1% Helio, 11.8% Wingmen, -0.9% Depth
1988: +3.8 SRS, 85.0% Helio, 13.6% Wingmen, 1.4% Depth
1989: +2.1 SRS, 90.0% Helio, 19.8% Wingmen, -9.8% Depth
1990: +2.7 SRS, 79.1% Helio, 38.1% Wingmen, -17.2% Depth
1991: +8.6 SRS, 54.3% Helio, 44.7% Wingmen, 1.0% Depth
1992: +10.1 SRS, 41.4% Helio, 52.2% Wingmen, 6.4% Depth
1993: +6.2 SRS, 58.3% Helio, 41.7% Wingmen, 0% Depth
1994: +2.9 SRS, 50.3% Helio, 40.0% Wingmen, 9.7% Depth
1995: +4.3 SRS, 47.4% Helio, 39.5% Wingmen, 13.1% Depth
1996: +11.8 SRS, 39.5% Helio, 39.9% Wingmen, 20.6% Depth
1997: +10.7 SRS, 37.4% Helio, 39.1% Wingmen, 23.5% Depth
1998: +7.2 SRS, 37.2% Helio, 30.9% Wingmen, 31.9% Depth
I realize that’s a lot of information, but I think it’s worth looking at. Here are my thoughts in no real order:
There are Helio scores that you don’t want. The Bulls had Helio scores north of 75% in five of these years, and had some *good* teams but all were well short of being actual contenders. The highest Helio scores that successful Bulls teams posted were 58% and 54% in ‘93 and ‘91 respectively. And that’s with Jordan being, you know, Jordan (Helio scales, so a 50% Helio player on a 30-win team is much, much worse than a 50% Helio player on a 55-win team). Much above 60% and it’s basically saying that your supporting cast is too weak. To make a Helio score that high work you’d need a player who is notably better than Jordan. Improbable.
Note how hard Jordan’s Helio score drops from ‘90 to ‘91. It’s not because he got worse, it’s because his teammates got much better around him and he became a smaller share of the team quality. And note that the ‘96 through ‘98 Bulls all have Helio scores below 40%. This isn’t because Jordan was worse in those years (he probably was, but not by a ton) but because his team got a lot better.
The big difference between the first threepeat and second was Depth. The roster from #4 on down after ‘96 was quite strong. The roster from #4 on down at ‘93 and before was, on average, replacement level (according to BPM anyways).
People arguing that Jordan got more support than some other superstars would be well-served to point at the late ‘90s Bulls. Those teams were quite deep (especially considering that BPM *guaranteed* underrates Rodman). But it gets weirder pointing to the first threepeat Bulls. In terms of his #2 and #3, he had great help. Between them he probably had as much help from those two slots as anyone (some teams definitely had better #2s, but not necessarily the combination). But after the #3 slot those rosters were really, really, really weak. LeBron’s Cavs (v1 and v2) averaged Depths in the mid-teens and his Heat averaged Depths in the low teens. By BPM, the ‘91-93 Bulls had the worst 4-and-down of any remotely great team . . . by a lot. So in one sense he had help at the top of the rotation, but after that it got thin really, really fast. And, of course, before ‘91 his help ranged from ‘limited’ to “excruciatingly nonexistent”.
So. In the late 80s the Bulls had started to become something of a capable also-ran in the East. They could get past the first round, but they were not remotely a match for the Celtics (earlier) or Pistons (later). But in 1991 Pippen and Grant had taken big steps forward and the Bulls showed themselves to be true contenders. To prove it they romped through the playoffs, wrecking the Pistons and the Lakers both to win their first championship. In ‘92 they looked to repeat.
Let’s take a look at their roster:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2003 Derek Fisher
SG: 2018 Kevin Durant (but better on offense)
SF: 2002 Chris Webber
PF: 1992 Horace Grant
C: 2010 Brad Miller
This is not a normal roster construction. Their point guard was a bit of a non-factor. It’s easy to remember Paxson as a long distance gunner (on account of his shot in the ‘93 Finals). But in ‘92 Paxson took 0.8 threes a game, and made them at a 27.3% clip. He shot slightly above league average on very low usage, didn’t make many plays, didn’t rebound (but didn’t turn the ball over). He’s basically Ron Harper minus the defense. And along with him was Bill Cartwright. Box Score stats *hate* Cartwright. He was almost certainly better on defense than his blocks/steals (which isn’t saying much, given that his block rate was a third of Pippen’s) but his weakness on offense was pretty hard to miss. His usage was on the low side, he struggled to convert near league average, he rebounded no better than a solid 3 and wasn’t much of a playmaker. Even if we consider him an above average defender for the position, he’s still a pretty weak 5. Few contenders have two players this weak in their starting lineup. But their top 3 were exceptional.
Pippen’s comps are often bigs, because few wings have Pippen-level defensive impacts. ‘02 Chris Webber is an unusual comp, but it’s not crazy either. Both were high (but not really high) usage players who shot well (but not really well), both were strong (but not great) playmakers, both rebounded well (but not really well for a 4), neither turned it over a ton given their playmaking and both were strong contributors on defense. I was a little surprised that Webber was considered as valuable a defender as Pippen, but even if that were true it would mean that Pippen was more valuable for his position (as the average 4 is more defensively valuable than the average 3). Not a world-beater, but a really nice player to have. And ‘92 Grant is surprisingly hard to find. He didn’t take a lot of shots, but he converted the ones he did take at a very high level. He rebounded very well (and extremely well on the offensive side). He wasn’t much of a playmaker, but he rarely turned the ball over and played consistent strong defense. Would you want this version of Grant to lead your team? Probably not; Grant’s selling point was scalability. He shot efficiently, didn’t cost the team possessions, played strong defense and crashed the offensive glass very well. In short, he had almost all the skills you want in an off-ball player. Horace Grant was an extraordinarily good third best player.
And of course, Jordan. ‘18 Durant isn’t a crazy comp, but let the record show that Durant got to work with space created by Curry and the offense, while Jordan had to create most of his own space. ‘92 Jordan had a lot of finishes in the top 5 of categories: #1 in shots made, #1 in shots taken, 2nd in free throws made, 1st in points, 1st in Usage rate, 1st in Win Shares, 1st in Offensive Win Shares, 1st in WS/48, 1st in BPM, 1st in OBPM and 1st in VORP. It wasn’t a bad year. Jordan had surprisingly few weaknesses. He rebounded extremely well for a guard and turned the ball over with extreme rarity. He wasn’t a great passer, but he was one of the best passing score-first players (of the Kobe/Wade type). He was a strong defender, probably not as good as his steals/blocks suggest but clearly capable of dominating on that end in spurts where his scoring load allowed. But above all he was an amazing scorer. It’s legitimately nuts that he was able to score in such volume with such success without a three point shot. It’s not like he couldn’t make them, but he averaged 1.3 attempts per game and made 27% of them. Jordan’s scoring was at a level that few have reached, and he did almost all of it inside the arc. By himself he could only do so much. But with excellent wingmen like Pippen and Grant? The Bulls were defending champions.
The ‘92 Bulls ripped through the regular season even better than they had the year before, winning 67 games (the most in the league by 10 games) and posting an RSRS of +10.07 (the highest in the league by more than 3 points). Only ten teams have ever posted an RSRS of +10 or higher. And they’re notably clumped. Three happen in ‘71 and ‘72 (when massive overexpansion along with a rival league thinned out the talent pool such that the best teams were insane relative to the league), four happen from ‘15 to ‘17 (three Warriors and one Spurs) and three are Jordan Bulls teams (‘92, ‘96 and ‘97). The Bulls had the best offense in the league by 1.6 points per 100, and the 4th best defense (only 0.4 points per 100 behind the leader). They shot really well, they rebounded well, they never turned it over and they played strong all-around defense. As favored as they had been going into the season, going into the playoffs they surely had to be more favored.
In the first round they played the outright-bad Miami Heat (-3.9). The Bulls completely wrecked them, unsurprisingly. Jordan averaged a 45/10/7 on +13.7% (and 3 steals a game) . . . holy mackerel is that an impressive stat-line. Were the Heat one of the easiest first round matchups ever? Yup! Still though. The Bulls shot +6.5% through the series, and won by 18 points a game. That said, they clearly slacked off on defense, allowing the Heat to score more per 100 than their regular season average. That said, it was a decisive win even against a weak team.
The first round was the only round where the Bulls got an easy matchup. In the semis they drew the +5.5 Knicks, the best defensive team in the league. And the Bulls’ offense was seriously slowed down. Jordan averaged a 31/6/4 but only on +0.8% shooting, while Pippen averaged a 16/8/7 on -3.8% (2 steals a game). The Bulls as a whole only shot at +0.1%. And Patrick Ewing held down the defensive glass enough (over 9 per game) that the Bulls weren’t able to get their usual rebounding advantage. I don’t want to sell the idea that the Bulls’ offense was elastic; their offensive rating against the Knicks was comparable to their regular season average (adjusted for opposition). Their offense neither wilted against, nor rose to meet, the Knicks’ defense. They simply played an outstanding defense and played them exactly as well as you’d guess. The problems for the Bulls’ were on the defensive end. The Knicks didn’t have a particularly strong offense (12th in the league) so you’d expect that the Bulls’ excellent defense would shut them down. But that didn’t actually happen. The Knicks had a lot of success on the offensive glass (Oakley, Mason and McDaniel combined for almost 9 offensive boards per game). The Bulls were a very strong rebounding team, but the Knicks were better. And their offense managed to run reasonably well, through Patrick Ewing (22/11/2 on -0.8%) and John Starks (14/3/3 on +3.1%). As a team they shot at -1.6%, only a little below the Bulls. The Bulls managed to prevail, but it took seven games. And going into Game 7 the Knicks had actually led in MoV. The Bulls ultimately won by 3.8 points a game (winning Game 7 by 29). It was a win, but the Knicks weren’t *that* good (except on defense); 3.8 points a game is an underperformance from a +10 SRS team.
In the Conference Finals were the +6.3 Cleveland Cavs. And again, the Bulls had a harder time with them than you’d guess. The Bulls didn’t shoot particularly well. Jordan averaged a 32/7/6 on -2.0% (2.5 steals per game) and the team overall shot -1.4%. In contrast Mark Price put on a shooting clinic (12 of 22 threes and 23 of 25 free throws), averaging a 19/2/5 on +7.9% shooting. The rest of the Cavs didn’t perform at that level (unsurprisingly) but the Cavs did shoot at +0.2%, better than the Bulls. But the Bulls managed to eek out a possession victory (4.6 shots a game), mostly on offensive rebounding (Grant averaged 6+ per game while Jordan and Pippen combined for another 6+). The Bulls prevailed in six, but by only 1.8 points. Their wins had been by 14, 9, 23 and 5, while their losses had been by 26 and 14. It was a win, but again disappointing given the Cavs’ only being a pretty good team.
And in the Finals they would face the +9.8 Portland Trail Blazers. That number may seem high, but the ‘92 Blazers were the clear 2nd best team in the league (if by a good amount) and had a strong playoffs. They decisively beat the Lakers, edged out an extremely strong Suns team (probably the 3rd best team in the league) and then whipped the Jazz (who themselves were pretty good) to make the Finals. Purely based on the playoffs to that point, the Blazers had looked better. For this and a variety of reasons, many thought that the Finals would be a pretty even matchup (OSRS certainly thought so). Unlike the Bulls, who kind of went from zero to hero in ‘91 and continued in ‘92, the Blazers had been looking quite good for a while. They’d beaten the Showtime Lakers in ‘90 and narrowly lost to them in ‘91. The Blazers had established themselves as a contender in the minds of the NBA, while the Bulls were a bit newer. And Jordan was, well, a bit of an aberration. Historically, scoring champs had been all hat and no cattle. You were far more likely to win a championship with a Magic Johnson or Larry Bird than a George Gervin or a Bob McAdoo. And, ignoring scoring, Drexler actually looked pretty good against Jordan. He was a better rebounder (and that’s saying something) and better shot-creator for his teammates. And they were both high-flying players at the rim. And Drexler was the better floor-spacer, taking 6 threes a game at 33.7%. It was possible to squint and see them as comparable. Of course, you’d have to ignore that Jordan turned the ball over less, was almost certainly the better defender and was a considerably better scorer. Despite this, many thought that this Finals matchup was even, and that Drexler and Jordan were pretty comparable.
You’d never believe it, but Jordan took it personal.
In Game 1 he posted a 39/3/11 on +18% with only one turnover, and shot 6 of 10 from beyond the arc. The series was not close. Jordan averaged a 36/5/7 on +8.6%. The Bulls as a whole shot +3.7%. The Bulls won in six by 7.3 points a game, one of the more decisive stompings in NBA Finals history. And again, the Blazers had been really good to that point in the season/playoffs, and the Bulls thumped them hard. And established pretty decisively that they were the new dynasty in the league.
It would be easy to say that the Bulls’ dominant performance was the result of Jordan putting the team on his back, but that wasn’t necessarily true.
Here are Jordan’s usage rates and SRS eqs for each series:
Heat: 40.8% Usage, +14.1 SRS eq
Knicks: 37.1% Usage, +9.3 SRS eq
Cavs: 37.5% Usage, +8.1 SRS eq
Blazers: 35.9% Usage, +17.1 SRS eq
First off, to be clear, Jordan was pulling down insane usage numbers in these playoffs. But the weird thing is that the Finals were his most restrained performance. But I think that it’s notable that his best performance (ignoring the one against the Heat, which is gaudy but not against actual playoff opposition) was the one where he held himself back a little.
11 | Bulls
10 |
9 |
8 | Blazers
7 |
6 | Cavs, Suns
5 | Knicks, Jazz
4 |
3 | Celtics, Warriors
2 |
1 | Spurs, Sonics, Clippers
0 | Pistons, Pacers
-0 | Sixers
-1 | Nets, Hawks, Bucks, Rockets
-2 | Lakers
-3 | Hornets
-4 | Heat, Bullets
-5 | Kings
-6 | Magic, TWolves
-7 | Nuggets, Mavericks
-8 |
-9 |
-10|
1992 was a little non-competitive. You do have a good bunching around the middle, but 11 of the 27 teams are above +5 or below -5, which seems higher than normal.
So, how to evaluate this team? Well, their regular season is one of the best ever. You can’t shake a stick at a +10 RSRS. And their performance in the NBA Finals was outstanding. The only knocks on them are their relatively weak series against the Knicks and Cavs. They weren’t bad by a long shot, but at this point any series below +10 SRS eq are notable. So they’re an ATG regular season team, but only a really good team in the playoffs (34th in playoff SRS).
I won’t pretend that I know where they go. I don’t think they’re Top 5 or anything. But their regular season pretty much means that they have to be in the Top 25, and they didn’t embarrass themselves in the playoffs by a long shot. I think that, relative to the other modern teams here, this is a pretty reasonable rating.
PG: John Paxson, -0.8 / +0.5
SG: Michael Jordan, +9.7 / +9.9
SF: Scottie Pippen, +6.1 / +6.6
PF: Horace Grant, +5.3 / +4.8
C: Bill Cartwright, -3.2 / -2.4
Regular Season Metrics:
Regular Season Record: 67-15, Regular Season SRS: +10.07 (9th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +7.3 (6th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.7 (49th)
Shooting Advantage: +3.6%, Possession Advantage: +3.2 shooting possessions per game
Michael Jordan (SG, 28): 41 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 32 / 7 / 7 / 3 on +4.8%
Scottie Pippen (SF, 26): 41 MPPG, 26% OLoad, 22 / 8 / 7 / 3 on +2.4%
Bill Cartwright (C, 34): 24 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 9 / 5 / 1 / 1 on -3.4%
Horace Grant (PF, 26): 37 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 15 / 11 / 3 / 3 on +8.7%
John Paxson (PG, 31): 26 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 7 / 1 / 3 / 1 on +2.0%
Scoring/100: Michael Jordan (39.4 / +4.8%), Scottie Pippen (27.6 / +2.4%), Horace Grant (20 / +8.7%)
Assists/100: Scottie Pippen (9.2), Michael Jordan (8.0), John Paxson (6.3)
Heliocentrism: 41.4% (27th of 84 teams) - Jordan
Wingmen: 52.2% (2nd) - Pippen & Grant
Depth: 6.4% (79th)
Playoff Metrics:
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.0 (44th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.15 (48th)
Playoff SRS: +11.75 (34th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.09 (80th)
Shooting Advantage: +2.3%, Possession Advantage: +1.5 shooting possessions per game
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.25 (56th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.00 (51st)
Michael Jordan (SG, 28): 44 MPPG, 36% OLoad, 37 / 7 / 6 / 3 on +4.0%
Scottie Pippen (SF, 26): 43 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 21 / 9 / 7 / 3 on +1.3%
Horace Grant (PF, 26): 41 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 12 / 9 / 3 / 3 on +4.4%
John Paxson (PG, 31): 29 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 8 / 1 / 3 / 1 on +5.9%
Bill Cartwright (C, 34): 30 MPPG, 12% OLoad, 6 / 5 / 2 / 1 on -5.7%
Scoring/100: Michael Jordan (44.5 / +4.0%), Scottie Pippen (25.7 / +1.3%), Horace Grant (15.7 / +4.4%)
Assists/100: Scottie Pippen (8.8), Michael Jordan (7.4), John Paxson (5.5)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 42.4% (21st of 84 teams) - Jordan
Playoff Wingmen: 53.0% (2nd) - Pippen & Grant
Playoff Depth: 4.6% (83rd)
Round 1: Miami Heat (-3.9), won 3-0, by +18.0 points per game (+14.1 SRS eq)
Round 2: New York Knicks (+5.5), won 4-3, by +3.8 points per game (+9.3 SRS eq)
Round 3: Cleveland Cavaliers (+6.3), won 4-2, by +1.8 points per game (+8.1 SRS eq)
Round 4: Portland Trail Blazers (+9.8), won 4-2, by +7.3 points per game (+17.1 SRS eq)
Offensive / Defensive Ratings from Opposition Regular Season Average
Miami Heat: +15.8 / +0.5
New York Knicks: +7.0 / -1.8
Cleveland Cavaliers: +1.2 / -6.6
Portland Trail Blazers: +6.6 / -8.4
Shooting Advantage / Possession Advantage per game (unadjusted):
Miami Heat: +6.0% / +5.7
New York Knicks: +1.7% / +0.9
Cleveland Cavaliers: -1.6% / +4.6
Portland Trail Blazers: +5.1% / -1.8
Postseason Usage/Efficiency Change adjusted for Opposition:
John Paxson: +0.2% / +4.6%
Michael Jordan: +5.4% / -0.1%
Scottie Pippen: -1.0% / -0.4%
Horace Grant: -2.8% / -3.6%
Bill Cartwright: -5.6% / -1.6%
Huh. I’m not super-surprised that Jordan’s Helio rating was 40+%. I was more surprised by the other two ratings, that the ‘92 Bulls’ Wingmen rating was stupid high (the ‘96 Jazz were the only team higher on this list). And their Depth ratings were 79th in the regular season and 83rd in the playoffs (out of 84). I think that’s interesting. Let’s talk about that.
Here are the Roster ratings for the Bulls over Jordan’s career (I’m skipping 1986 for these purposes because he missed so much time) and the team’s SRS for reference:
1985: -0.5 SRS, 76.3% Helio, 29.9% Wingmen, -7.4% Depth
1987: +1.3 SRS, 89.1% Helio, 11.8% Wingmen, -0.9% Depth
1988: +3.8 SRS, 85.0% Helio, 13.6% Wingmen, 1.4% Depth
1989: +2.1 SRS, 90.0% Helio, 19.8% Wingmen, -9.8% Depth
1990: +2.7 SRS, 79.1% Helio, 38.1% Wingmen, -17.2% Depth
1991: +8.6 SRS, 54.3% Helio, 44.7% Wingmen, 1.0% Depth
1992: +10.1 SRS, 41.4% Helio, 52.2% Wingmen, 6.4% Depth
1993: +6.2 SRS, 58.3% Helio, 41.7% Wingmen, 0% Depth
1994: +2.9 SRS, 50.3% Helio, 40.0% Wingmen, 9.7% Depth
1995: +4.3 SRS, 47.4% Helio, 39.5% Wingmen, 13.1% Depth
1996: +11.8 SRS, 39.5% Helio, 39.9% Wingmen, 20.6% Depth
1997: +10.7 SRS, 37.4% Helio, 39.1% Wingmen, 23.5% Depth
1998: +7.2 SRS, 37.2% Helio, 30.9% Wingmen, 31.9% Depth
I realize that’s a lot of information, but I think it’s worth looking at. Here are my thoughts in no real order:
There are Helio scores that you don’t want. The Bulls had Helio scores north of 75% in five of these years, and had some *good* teams but all were well short of being actual contenders. The highest Helio scores that successful Bulls teams posted were 58% and 54% in ‘93 and ‘91 respectively. And that’s with Jordan being, you know, Jordan (Helio scales, so a 50% Helio player on a 30-win team is much, much worse than a 50% Helio player on a 55-win team). Much above 60% and it’s basically saying that your supporting cast is too weak. To make a Helio score that high work you’d need a player who is notably better than Jordan. Improbable.
Note how hard Jordan’s Helio score drops from ‘90 to ‘91. It’s not because he got worse, it’s because his teammates got much better around him and he became a smaller share of the team quality. And note that the ‘96 through ‘98 Bulls all have Helio scores below 40%. This isn’t because Jordan was worse in those years (he probably was, but not by a ton) but because his team got a lot better.
The big difference between the first threepeat and second was Depth. The roster from #4 on down after ‘96 was quite strong. The roster from #4 on down at ‘93 and before was, on average, replacement level (according to BPM anyways).
People arguing that Jordan got more support than some other superstars would be well-served to point at the late ‘90s Bulls. Those teams were quite deep (especially considering that BPM *guaranteed* underrates Rodman). But it gets weirder pointing to the first threepeat Bulls. In terms of his #2 and #3, he had great help. Between them he probably had as much help from those two slots as anyone (some teams definitely had better #2s, but not necessarily the combination). But after the #3 slot those rosters were really, really, really weak. LeBron’s Cavs (v1 and v2) averaged Depths in the mid-teens and his Heat averaged Depths in the low teens. By BPM, the ‘91-93 Bulls had the worst 4-and-down of any remotely great team . . . by a lot. So in one sense he had help at the top of the rotation, but after that it got thin really, really fast. And, of course, before ‘91 his help ranged from ‘limited’ to “excruciatingly nonexistent”.
So. In the late 80s the Bulls had started to become something of a capable also-ran in the East. They could get past the first round, but they were not remotely a match for the Celtics (earlier) or Pistons (later). But in 1991 Pippen and Grant had taken big steps forward and the Bulls showed themselves to be true contenders. To prove it they romped through the playoffs, wrecking the Pistons and the Lakers both to win their first championship. In ‘92 they looked to repeat.
Let’s take a look at their roster:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2003 Derek Fisher
SG: 2018 Kevin Durant (but better on offense)
SF: 2002 Chris Webber
PF: 1992 Horace Grant
C: 2010 Brad Miller
This is not a normal roster construction. Their point guard was a bit of a non-factor. It’s easy to remember Paxson as a long distance gunner (on account of his shot in the ‘93 Finals). But in ‘92 Paxson took 0.8 threes a game, and made them at a 27.3% clip. He shot slightly above league average on very low usage, didn’t make many plays, didn’t rebound (but didn’t turn the ball over). He’s basically Ron Harper minus the defense. And along with him was Bill Cartwright. Box Score stats *hate* Cartwright. He was almost certainly better on defense than his blocks/steals (which isn’t saying much, given that his block rate was a third of Pippen’s) but his weakness on offense was pretty hard to miss. His usage was on the low side, he struggled to convert near league average, he rebounded no better than a solid 3 and wasn’t much of a playmaker. Even if we consider him an above average defender for the position, he’s still a pretty weak 5. Few contenders have two players this weak in their starting lineup. But their top 3 were exceptional.
Pippen’s comps are often bigs, because few wings have Pippen-level defensive impacts. ‘02 Chris Webber is an unusual comp, but it’s not crazy either. Both were high (but not really high) usage players who shot well (but not really well), both were strong (but not great) playmakers, both rebounded well (but not really well for a 4), neither turned it over a ton given their playmaking and both were strong contributors on defense. I was a little surprised that Webber was considered as valuable a defender as Pippen, but even if that were true it would mean that Pippen was more valuable for his position (as the average 4 is more defensively valuable than the average 3). Not a world-beater, but a really nice player to have. And ‘92 Grant is surprisingly hard to find. He didn’t take a lot of shots, but he converted the ones he did take at a very high level. He rebounded very well (and extremely well on the offensive side). He wasn’t much of a playmaker, but he rarely turned the ball over and played consistent strong defense. Would you want this version of Grant to lead your team? Probably not; Grant’s selling point was scalability. He shot efficiently, didn’t cost the team possessions, played strong defense and crashed the offensive glass very well. In short, he had almost all the skills you want in an off-ball player. Horace Grant was an extraordinarily good third best player.
And of course, Jordan. ‘18 Durant isn’t a crazy comp, but let the record show that Durant got to work with space created by Curry and the offense, while Jordan had to create most of his own space. ‘92 Jordan had a lot of finishes in the top 5 of categories: #1 in shots made, #1 in shots taken, 2nd in free throws made, 1st in points, 1st in Usage rate, 1st in Win Shares, 1st in Offensive Win Shares, 1st in WS/48, 1st in BPM, 1st in OBPM and 1st in VORP. It wasn’t a bad year. Jordan had surprisingly few weaknesses. He rebounded extremely well for a guard and turned the ball over with extreme rarity. He wasn’t a great passer, but he was one of the best passing score-first players (of the Kobe/Wade type). He was a strong defender, probably not as good as his steals/blocks suggest but clearly capable of dominating on that end in spurts where his scoring load allowed. But above all he was an amazing scorer. It’s legitimately nuts that he was able to score in such volume with such success without a three point shot. It’s not like he couldn’t make them, but he averaged 1.3 attempts per game and made 27% of them. Jordan’s scoring was at a level that few have reached, and he did almost all of it inside the arc. By himself he could only do so much. But with excellent wingmen like Pippen and Grant? The Bulls were defending champions.
The ‘92 Bulls ripped through the regular season even better than they had the year before, winning 67 games (the most in the league by 10 games) and posting an RSRS of +10.07 (the highest in the league by more than 3 points). Only ten teams have ever posted an RSRS of +10 or higher. And they’re notably clumped. Three happen in ‘71 and ‘72 (when massive overexpansion along with a rival league thinned out the talent pool such that the best teams were insane relative to the league), four happen from ‘15 to ‘17 (three Warriors and one Spurs) and three are Jordan Bulls teams (‘92, ‘96 and ‘97). The Bulls had the best offense in the league by 1.6 points per 100, and the 4th best defense (only 0.4 points per 100 behind the leader). They shot really well, they rebounded well, they never turned it over and they played strong all-around defense. As favored as they had been going into the season, going into the playoffs they surely had to be more favored.
In the first round they played the outright-bad Miami Heat (-3.9). The Bulls completely wrecked them, unsurprisingly. Jordan averaged a 45/10/7 on +13.7% (and 3 steals a game) . . . holy mackerel is that an impressive stat-line. Were the Heat one of the easiest first round matchups ever? Yup! Still though. The Bulls shot +6.5% through the series, and won by 18 points a game. That said, they clearly slacked off on defense, allowing the Heat to score more per 100 than their regular season average. That said, it was a decisive win even against a weak team.
The first round was the only round where the Bulls got an easy matchup. In the semis they drew the +5.5 Knicks, the best defensive team in the league. And the Bulls’ offense was seriously slowed down. Jordan averaged a 31/6/4 but only on +0.8% shooting, while Pippen averaged a 16/8/7 on -3.8% (2 steals a game). The Bulls as a whole only shot at +0.1%. And Patrick Ewing held down the defensive glass enough (over 9 per game) that the Bulls weren’t able to get their usual rebounding advantage. I don’t want to sell the idea that the Bulls’ offense was elastic; their offensive rating against the Knicks was comparable to their regular season average (adjusted for opposition). Their offense neither wilted against, nor rose to meet, the Knicks’ defense. They simply played an outstanding defense and played them exactly as well as you’d guess. The problems for the Bulls’ were on the defensive end. The Knicks didn’t have a particularly strong offense (12th in the league) so you’d expect that the Bulls’ excellent defense would shut them down. But that didn’t actually happen. The Knicks had a lot of success on the offensive glass (Oakley, Mason and McDaniel combined for almost 9 offensive boards per game). The Bulls were a very strong rebounding team, but the Knicks were better. And their offense managed to run reasonably well, through Patrick Ewing (22/11/2 on -0.8%) and John Starks (14/3/3 on +3.1%). As a team they shot at -1.6%, only a little below the Bulls. The Bulls managed to prevail, but it took seven games. And going into Game 7 the Knicks had actually led in MoV. The Bulls ultimately won by 3.8 points a game (winning Game 7 by 29). It was a win, but the Knicks weren’t *that* good (except on defense); 3.8 points a game is an underperformance from a +10 SRS team.
In the Conference Finals were the +6.3 Cleveland Cavs. And again, the Bulls had a harder time with them than you’d guess. The Bulls didn’t shoot particularly well. Jordan averaged a 32/7/6 on -2.0% (2.5 steals per game) and the team overall shot -1.4%. In contrast Mark Price put on a shooting clinic (12 of 22 threes and 23 of 25 free throws), averaging a 19/2/5 on +7.9% shooting. The rest of the Cavs didn’t perform at that level (unsurprisingly) but the Cavs did shoot at +0.2%, better than the Bulls. But the Bulls managed to eek out a possession victory (4.6 shots a game), mostly on offensive rebounding (Grant averaged 6+ per game while Jordan and Pippen combined for another 6+). The Bulls prevailed in six, but by only 1.8 points. Their wins had been by 14, 9, 23 and 5, while their losses had been by 26 and 14. It was a win, but again disappointing given the Cavs’ only being a pretty good team.
And in the Finals they would face the +9.8 Portland Trail Blazers. That number may seem high, but the ‘92 Blazers were the clear 2nd best team in the league (if by a good amount) and had a strong playoffs. They decisively beat the Lakers, edged out an extremely strong Suns team (probably the 3rd best team in the league) and then whipped the Jazz (who themselves were pretty good) to make the Finals. Purely based on the playoffs to that point, the Blazers had looked better. For this and a variety of reasons, many thought that the Finals would be a pretty even matchup (OSRS certainly thought so). Unlike the Bulls, who kind of went from zero to hero in ‘91 and continued in ‘92, the Blazers had been looking quite good for a while. They’d beaten the Showtime Lakers in ‘90 and narrowly lost to them in ‘91. The Blazers had established themselves as a contender in the minds of the NBA, while the Bulls were a bit newer. And Jordan was, well, a bit of an aberration. Historically, scoring champs had been all hat and no cattle. You were far more likely to win a championship with a Magic Johnson or Larry Bird than a George Gervin or a Bob McAdoo. And, ignoring scoring, Drexler actually looked pretty good against Jordan. He was a better rebounder (and that’s saying something) and better shot-creator for his teammates. And they were both high-flying players at the rim. And Drexler was the better floor-spacer, taking 6 threes a game at 33.7%. It was possible to squint and see them as comparable. Of course, you’d have to ignore that Jordan turned the ball over less, was almost certainly the better defender and was a considerably better scorer. Despite this, many thought that this Finals matchup was even, and that Drexler and Jordan were pretty comparable.
You’d never believe it, but Jordan took it personal.
In Game 1 he posted a 39/3/11 on +18% with only one turnover, and shot 6 of 10 from beyond the arc. The series was not close. Jordan averaged a 36/5/7 on +8.6%. The Bulls as a whole shot +3.7%. The Bulls won in six by 7.3 points a game, one of the more decisive stompings in NBA Finals history. And again, the Blazers had been really good to that point in the season/playoffs, and the Bulls thumped them hard. And established pretty decisively that they were the new dynasty in the league.
It would be easy to say that the Bulls’ dominant performance was the result of Jordan putting the team on his back, but that wasn’t necessarily true.
Here are Jordan’s usage rates and SRS eqs for each series:
Heat: 40.8% Usage, +14.1 SRS eq
Knicks: 37.1% Usage, +9.3 SRS eq
Cavs: 37.5% Usage, +8.1 SRS eq
Blazers: 35.9% Usage, +17.1 SRS eq
First off, to be clear, Jordan was pulling down insane usage numbers in these playoffs. But the weird thing is that the Finals were his most restrained performance. But I think that it’s notable that his best performance (ignoring the one against the Heat, which is gaudy but not against actual playoff opposition) was the one where he held himself back a little.
11 | Bulls
10 |
9 |
8 | Blazers
7 |
6 | Cavs, Suns
5 | Knicks, Jazz
4 |
3 | Celtics, Warriors
2 |
1 | Spurs, Sonics, Clippers
0 | Pistons, Pacers
-0 | Sixers
-1 | Nets, Hawks, Bucks, Rockets
-2 | Lakers
-3 | Hornets
-4 | Heat, Bullets
-5 | Kings
-6 | Magic, TWolves
-7 | Nuggets, Mavericks
-8 |
-9 |
-10|
1992 was a little non-competitive. You do have a good bunching around the middle, but 11 of the 27 teams are above +5 or below -5, which seems higher than normal.
So, how to evaluate this team? Well, their regular season is one of the best ever. You can’t shake a stick at a +10 RSRS. And their performance in the NBA Finals was outstanding. The only knocks on them are their relatively weak series against the Knicks and Cavs. They weren’t bad by a long shot, but at this point any series below +10 SRS eq are notable. So they’re an ATG regular season team, but only a really good team in the playoffs (34th in playoff SRS).
I won’t pretend that I know where they go. I don’t think they’re Top 5 or anything. But their regular season pretty much means that they have to be in the Top 25, and they didn’t embarrass themselves in the playoffs by a long shot. I think that, relative to the other modern teams here, this is a pretty reasonable rating.
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