Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In later entries I also add the Offensive and Defensive Ratings for each playoff series. This is just how well the team did, adjusted by the opponent's regular season average (if you play a team with an average Defensive Rating of 102, and you play them with an offensive rating of 106, you get credited with a +4). Pace for teams below 1973 or so is estimated based on regular season numbers, so it could easily be wrong by some.
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In later entries I also add the Offensive and Defensive Ratings for each playoff series. This is just how well the team did, adjusted by the opponent's regular season average (if you play a team with an average Defensive Rating of 102, and you play them with an offensive rating of 106, you get credited with a +4). Pace for teams below 1973 or so is estimated based on regular season numbers, so it could easily be wrong by some.
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#12. The 1987 Los Angeles Lakers
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +11.26, Standard Deviations: +2.24, Won NBA Finals (Preseason 3rd)
PG: Magic Johnson, +8.8 / +9.3
SG: Byron Scott, +1.1 / -0.7
SF: James Worthy, +2.6 / +5.0
PF: A.C. Green, +1.0 / +0.1
C: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, +1.6 / +2.5
6th: Michael Cooper, +2.1 / +5.6
7th: Mychal Thompson, -2.7 / -3.4
Regular Season Metrics:
Regular Season Record: 65-17, Regular Season SRS: +8.32 (19th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +7.3 (6th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.8 (77th)
Shooting Advantage: +5.6%, Possession Advantage: -2.0 shooting possessions per game
Magic Johnson (PG, 27): 36 MPPG, 30% OLoad, 24 / 6 / 12 / 2 on +6.4%
James Worthy (SF, 25): 34 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 19 / 6 / 3 / 2 on +4.0%
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (C, 39): 31 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 17 / 7 / 3 / 2 on +5.9%
Mychal Thompson (PF, 32): 20 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 10 / 4 / 1 / 1 on -0.7%
Byron Scott (SG, 25): 33 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 17 / 3 / 3 / 2 on +2.3%
Michael Cooper (PG, 30): 27 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 10 / 3 / 5 / 2 on -0.2%
A.C. Green (PF, 23): 28 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 11 / 8 / 1 / 2 on +6.1%
Scoring/100: Magic Johnson (31.1 / +6.4%), James Worthy (26.7 / +4.0%), Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (26.4 / +5.9%)
Assists/100: Magic Johnson (15.9), Michael Cooper (7.8), Byron Scott (4.9)
Heliocentrism: 41.7% (25th of 84 teams) - Magic
Wingmen: 29.2% (74th) - Worthy & Cooper
Depth: 29.1% (35th)
Playoff Metrics:
Playoff Offensive Rating: +10.50 (8th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.30 (82nd)
Playoff SRS: +13.18 (23rd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.94 (39th)
Shooting Advantage: +6.9%, Possession Advantage: -2.5 shooting possessions per game
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.60 (39th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: +1.07 (98th)
Magic Johnson (PG, 27): 36 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 21 / 8 / 12 / 2 on +6.9%
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (C, 39): 31 MPPG, 23% OLoad, 19 / 7 / 2 / 2 on +6.2%
James Worthy (SF, 25): 37 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 23 / 6 / 3 / 3 on +8.6%
Michael Cooper (PG, 30): 29 MPPG, 19% OLoad, 13 / 3 / 5 / 2 on +10.2%
Byron Scott (SG, 25): 33 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 15 / 3 / 3 / 1 on +1.7%
Mychal Thompson (PF, 32); 22 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 9 / 5 / 1 / 1 on -4.1%
A.C. Green (PF, 23): 28 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 11 / 8 / 1 / 1 on +7.7%
Scoring/100: James Worthy (29.8 / +8.6%), Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (29.5 / +6.2%), Magic Johnson (28.1 / +6.9%)
Assists/100: Magic Johnson (15.7), Michael Cooper (8.2), Byron Scott (4.5)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 39.6% (30th of 84 teams) - Magic
Playoff Wingmen: 45.8% (18th) - Worthy & Cooper
Playoff Depth: 14.6% (72nd)
Round 1: Denver Nuggets (-1.1), won 3-0, by +27.4 points per game (+26.3 SRS eq)
Round 2: Golden State Warriors (-1.4), won 4-1, by +10.6 points per game (+9.2 SRS eq)
Round 3: Seattle SuperSonics (+2.5), won 4-0, by +11.3 points per game (+13.8 SRS eq)
Round 4: Boston Celtics (+5.3), won 4-2, by +4.2 points per game (+9.5 SRS eq)
Offensive / Defensive Ratings from Opposition Regular Season Average:
Denver Nuggets: +14.9 / -9.4
Golden State Warriors: +10.5 / +2.3
Seattle SuperSonics: +6.9 / -4.9
Boston Celtics: +11.6 / +0.6
Shooting Advantage / Possession Advantage per game (unadjusted):
Denver Nuggets: +12.5% / -0.9
Golden State Warriors: +8.4% / -5.8
Seattle SuperSonics: +10.8% / -9.4
Boston Celtics: -0.2% / +4.0
Postseason Usage/Efficiency Change adjusted for Opposition:
Magic Johnson: -3.2% / +0.5%
Byron Scott: -2.7% / -0.6%
James Worthy: -0.7% / +4.6%
A.C. Green: +0.4% / +1.6%
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar: +2.1% / +0.3%
Michael Cooper +1.1% / +10.4%
Mychal Thompson: -4.1% / -3.4%
There was a great movie from 1990 named “Quigley Down Under”. To fast-forward a lot, the bad guy, played by Alan Rickman, fancies himself something of a wild west gunslinger who happens to have been born on the wrong continent (Australia). There are several scenes where Rickman demonstrates his incredible quickdraw speed and accuracy, which he has practiced diligently. He hires Quigley (Tom Selleck) for a job. Quigley is a long-distance marksman, one of the best in the world. When they’re being introduced Rickman shows off his skill with the pistol and then asks Quigley about his own abilities with the pistol. Quigley demures, saying “I never had much use for one”. Later, the two have a falling out, which ultimately leads to Quigley being captured and beaten badly. But Rickman doesn’t just want to off Quigley, he wants to make it interesting. So he sets Quigley up, takes off his bindings and puts a pistol in his belt. Rickman explains that he’ll give Quigley a chance, that if Quigley can beat him in a quick draw, Quigley can go. And Rickman’s two men will be off to the side making sure it is fair (hint, fairness is not the goal here). Rickman reminds Quigley of his own inferiority, that his survival is now dependent on his skill with a pistol, something that Quigley had dismissed as unnecessary. So here’s Quigley, quite roughed up, trying to rub some life into his blood-starved hands facing down three gunmen with a gun he’d admitted little use for. What was going to happen?
After the predictable drawn out pause where the camera does quick cuts to everybody’s face, Quigley suddenly draws and guns all three gunmen down before they can fire. Quigley walks over to Rickman’s character who is lying in the dirt bleeding out, and Rickman expresses confusion. Quigley smirks and quips, “I said I never had much use for one. I never said I didn’t know how to use it.”
Mic Drop.
Because Quigley had, the whole time, been the best pistoleer among them. He’d just deflected by saying that he didn’t have much use for a pistol, because he generally hadn’t. But when push came to shove he was more than equal to the task.
What does this have to do with the ‘87 Lakers? Great question.
Through much of the 80s the Lakers had been the best team in the West (the achievement itself wasn’t impressive given the quality of the conference, but the consistency was). From ‘82 to ‘85 they’d won the West four straight times. Through this time Magic had been running the offense, but the primary scorer had been Kareem, consistently posting 25+% usage rates while Magic and Worthy stayed in the low 20s. This was all well and good until 1986. In the playoffs they ran into the Houston Rockets with young Hakeem Olajuwon. And Kareem faltered, struggling to score against Olajuwon (who was 15 years younger) and the Lakers’ offense was shut down. The Lakers were whipped in five games by the young Rockets. It may have seemed like the Lakers’ dominance was at an end.
Instead, the Lakers returned with almost the exact same roster and posted their best regular season of the decade. They posted 65 wins (their next best was 62) and a +8.32 RSRS (next best was +6.84). But it was the same roster, and we know that Kareem probably couldn’t keep maintaining the scoring load at age 39. What changed?
Magic took over the offense. From ‘86 to ‘87 he jumped in usage all the way to 26.3% (not crazy-high, but comparable to Garnett levels of usage). He posted scoring numbers north of 30 PPX and pretty much maintained his efficiency. Do you realize how nuts it is that from ‘86 to ‘87 he increased his usage by 4.7% and only saw his efficiency drop by 0.8%? I’m not trying to say that Magic became one of the best scorers in the league . . . but he was pretty good. 26.3% usage and +6% shooting was actually comparable to Kareem the year before, and Ginobili from ‘07 is another good comparison. To that point Magic had merely been an efficient scorer on limited volume while running the offense. In 1987 he led the offense in both playmaking *and* scoring, and instead of crumbling the offense posted its finest season to date. Jumps of usage that big are extremely rare. And Magic’s OLoad jumped all the way to 32%, which is comparable to ‘16/’17 LeBron James. His Helio went from 32.6% in ‘86 to 41.7% in ‘87. He was twenty-seven. You know people often flap their yaps about “I never saw this player raise his game and carry his team”? Magic freaking raised his game and freaking carried his team in ‘87.
That’s the Quigley comparison. Magic played like somebody who “never had much use” for scoring a lot. But when it became clear that it was necessary, he proved that he’d had the ability all along (or at least, certainly by ‘87). I tried finding other comparisons and it’s very rare. In general, when a team suddenly relies on one player more (specifically mid-career) the team usually suffers. But in ‘87 Magic rose to the occasion and the Lakers rose with him. Let’s look at this roster:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2011 LeBron James (but better on offense and in the playoffs)
SG: 2010 Ray Allen
SF: 2011 Luol Deng
PF: 2014 Amir Johnson
C: 2019 Pascal Siakam
6th: 2013 George Hill
7th: 2007 Juwon Howard
That’s a pretty sweet group. For some reason the comp engine really loves matching high-usage Magic to ‘11 LeBron. And there’s no shame there, ‘11 LeBron was a monster . . . in the regular season anyways. Yet most metrics have ‘87 Magic has better and offense, and certainly better in the playoffs. This is a season where Magic was an *openly* ATG (or even GOAT-level) player. Byron Scott as ‘10 Allen may seem like a reach, but Ray Allen by ‘10, while still decent, was mostly simply a strong floor-spacer. Worthy as ‘11 Deng isn’t intuitive but both were solid defenders and good scorers. ‘14 Amir Johnson mostly provides rebounding and some defense, and Kareem’s comparison to ‘19 Siakam may seem crazy. But remember that Kareem rebounded like a 4 or strong 3 by this age. Statistically, the two are kind of comparable. And it’s a credit to Kareem that he was still so valuable even at 39. And Michael Cooper provided strong all-around play from the bench.
The Lakers’ offense in ‘87 was one of the best ever. They’re top ten for this list, tied with the ‘92 Bulls and bracketed by the ‘97 Jazz and the ‘07 Suns. But it’s notable that all the teams on this list ahead of them came later in time, when exploiting the three point line was more common. Up to this point, the ‘87 Lakers were the best regular season offense on a great team that the NBA had ever seen. They shot really well (taking a lot of threes for their time (5.5 per game) and leading the league in 3P%, and finishing second in 2P%, while making it to the line a ton). But they also crashed the boards decently. This is notable, because they had no dominant offensive rebounder in their starting lineup (though Magic and Worthy were both quite good for their positions). But their bench (besides Cooper) was heavy on offensive rebounding. And for all of Magic’s reputation for turnovers, the Lakers were above average in that category too.
Perhaps more impressive is that their defense was decent. Not so strong as the defense of the 90s Bulls (who on occasion posted comparable offenses) but not so weak as the Nash Suns. They weren’t a remarkable defense; they simply defended shots well (thanks mostly to a horde of bigs and some quality athletic wings). In general the Lakers didn’t win through taking more shots than the other team, they won by shooting way better than the other team. And they usually did so.
The Lakers had been the 3rd ranked team in the league going into the season. #1, of course, was the Celtics who were coming off an historically dominant season. And #2, predictably, was the Rockets who had just embarrassed the Lakers the year before. But both teams suffered from injuries and other problems. The Celtics were still good, but nowhere near the level of ‘86, and the Rockets barely made the playoffs. The Lakers were *clearly* the best team of the ‘87 regular season. And the West was . . . thin. There were only two other teams in the West better than +1 RSRS, the +5.5 Mavericks and the +2.6 Blazers. Both teams lost in the first round. So the red-hot Lakers were going against kerosene-soaked crap. You can probably guess what happened next.
In the first round the Lakers drew the -1.1 Denver Nuggets. And the Lakers swept by an average of 27.4 points per game. The Lakers shot +6.2% as a team, Magic averaged an 18/7/14 on +10.8% and Worthy averaged a 23/5/5 on +24%. It wasn’t close, it was an insult to gods and men.
In the second round they faced the -1.4 Golden State Warriors (can we take a moment to appreciate that *half* of the Lakers’ playoff opponents were below league average?). This one was far closer; the Lakers actually lost a game and won the series by only 10.6 points a game. The Lakers got banged up on possessions, with the Warriors generating 5 more steals per game. But the Lakers, as per usual, dominated shooting so completely that it didn’t really matter. The Warriors were held to -1.1% shooting, while the Lakers shot +7.3% as a team. Worthy averaged a 22/6/3 on +11.9% and Magic averaged a 21/8/11 on +10%. The rebounding situation was pretty emblematic of the ‘87 Lakers. They fast-broke a lot, so a team could punish them there; Larry Smith averaged 7 per game. But the Lakers outrebounded them by a massive margin, yet no player averaged more than 3.5 a game. But A.C. Green pulled down 3.4 a game, Mychal Thompson 2.4, Worthy and Kareem 2.2, Byron Scott 2.0 and Magic 1.8. That doesn’t sound like a lot but the aggregate was far more effective than the Warriors’ one-man attack. And, of course, crashing the glass against the Lakers meant that if you *didn’t* get the ball their fast break was going to kill you. So that’s a thing too.
In the Western Conference Finals they faced the toughest team to date, the +2.5 Seattle SuperSonics. The Sonics did a good job controlling possessions, owning the boards and earning an extra 9.4 shots a game. It didn’t matter because the Lakers, you guessed it, outshot them by a ton. They held the Sonics to -4.2% shooting, while averaging +6.6% themselves. Worthy averaged a 31/6/2 on +10.3% (2.3 steals a game) and Magic averaged a 20/7/11 on +4.2% (2 steals a game). The Lakers swept the series by 11.3 points per game. A dominant win, though against a mediocre team.
And in the Finals, for the first and only time these playoffs, the Lakers faced a good team in the +5.3 Boston Celtics. The Celtics had been unstoppable in ‘86. But they weren’t the same team in ‘87. Part of it was losing Bill Walton for the year (and exposing their paper-thin bench), and part of it was accumulated injuries. They’d posted a strong regular season (+6.6 RSRS) but their playoffs had been a little underwhelming. In the Semis they barely made it past the +3.3 Milwaukee Bucks (7 games, and barely outscoring the Bucks by 0.3 points a game). That series saw Ainge, McHale and Parish all injured; all were able to play but all missed time and saw their performance suffer. And in the Conference Finals they were nearly eliminated by the Pistons (7 games, and again outscored, this time by 3.7 points per game). So it’s a credit to the Celtics that they made it through, but they were hardly looking like a juggernaut (they might have been if they’d been healthy . . . but they weren’t). But in contrast, the Lakers hadn’t actually faced any remotely decent teams so far. So the Lakers were favored . . . but it was hard to know how it would go.
Game 1 was a curious affair. The Celtics actually outshot the Lakers. Larry Bird had a 32/7/6 on +6.0% and the team shot at +6.7%. The Lakers still shot well (+4.9%) but not as well. The Lakers, contrary to form, won by owning the glass completely. No Celtic put up more than 2 offensive boards, while the Lakers’ entire starting lineup posted 2 or more (Magic 4, Kareem and Green 3, Scott and Worthy 2). With the 14 extra shots the Lakers prevailed by 13 points, but it was a bad sign that they couldn’t control the Celtics’ shooting. In Game 2 the Lakers banished any doubt, blowing the Celtics apart by shooting +13.8% as a team (!!) with Worthy posting a 23/3/3 on +13.1% and Magic a 22/5/20 on +15.3% (this was one of three times *ever* that a player had posted 20+ assists in an NBA Finals. The other two times? Magic Johnson in ‘84 and ‘91). The Celtics still shot well (+3.9%) but it wasn’t close to enough, and the Lakers won by 19. Two games in the Lakers’ offense was looking unstoppable.
In Game 3, in Boston Gardens, the Celtics struck back. The Lakers’ offense was slowed somewhat, with Worthy struggling on a 13/3/3 on -20.9% shooting (3 steals) while Magic had a 32/11/9 on +12.9%. As a team they only shot +1.6%, little better than the Celtics’ +1.4%. But the Celtics had twice the offensive boards that the Lakers did, getting them 6 extra shots. The aggregate was a narrow 6-point win, but the Celtics were on the board, 2-1. Game 4 didn’t go well for the Lakers either. The Lakers barely shot above league average (+0.2%); Magic had a 29/8/5 on +10.2% but Kareem and Scott both shot below -10%, while the Celtics shot +3.2% mostly on the back of Kevin McHale (25/13/0 on +17.5%, talk about the best and the worst of Kevin McHale in one stat line). The Celtics led by 7 going into the final three minutes:
2:48- Magic entries to Kareem who is ISOd on Parish, Kareem takes the hook and misses. There’s a scrum and the Lakers come down with it, still down 7.
2:28- Magic entries to Kareem *again* and Kareem is called for travelling setting up his shot, Celtics’ ball, Lakers down 7.
2:12: Larry Bird comes off a screen just inside the three point arc. Bird gets the pass, surprised that he isn’t defended and shoots early in the shot clock, clanking it off the rim, Lakers get the rebound, down by 7.
1:59 - Magic fakes an entry to Kareem but fires it into the paint to Mychal Thompson who has good position. Thompson shoots but is fouled and he goes to the line. He misses one, makes one, Lakers down by 6.
1:39 - Ainge passes to Parish in the high post, who is immediately doubled by Michael Cooper, Parish turns the ball over and Cooper gets the ball, Lakers down by 6.
1:36 - Cooper passes to Magic who attacks, drawing the defense, and then dishes back out to Cooper who is wide open. Cooper patiently steps behind the line and takes the three, draining it. Lakers down by 3.
1:20 - The Celtics pass to Larry Bird who passes to McHale and misses him, turning the ball over, Lakers down by 3.
1:02 - Worthy is ISOd on McHale, attacks across the paint and takes an ugly shot against a double-team, sinking it, Lakers down by 1.
0:46 - Bird tries to attack off the dribble, it doesn’t go well, he ends up defended by Kareem. Instead of taking Kareem off the dribble he takes a seriously contested fadeaway and misses, Lakers get the rebound, down by 1.
0:30 - Magic has the ball on the perimeter, while Michael Cooper bangs for position on the post against DJ. Cooper spins around the defender, but instead of going rim he picks Parish under the hoop, freeing up Kareem. Magic throws the lob perfectly, DJ tries to contest but is, you know, a foot shorter than Kareem and Kareem dunks it. Beautiful freaking play. Two points, Lakers now up by 1.
0:12 - The Lakers are trapping aggressively. Johnson has the ball and the Lakers get him defended by Kareem. DJ entries to Parish, but the pass is a little errant to get over Kareem. Parish is instantly doubled by Kareem. Parish tosses back out to DJ who is immediately doubled, but jumps and tosses it to a wide-open Ainge. But the Lakers have rotated to close out on Ainge so Ainge tosses it to the last free man in the corner who is totally open (because the Lakers rotated out of players and Mychal Thompson was a little slow coming off of McHale). And it’s Larry Bird. Could've been better. Bird cans it, Celtics by 2.
0:08 - the Lakers inbound to Magic who entries to Kareem, who immediately goes up into a double-teamed shot (McHale looks psychic, always being on Kareem’s right hand the instant he shoots) and is fouled. Kareem makes the first, misses the second, and in the process of going for the rebound McHale accidentally knocks it out of bounds. Lakers ball, down by 1.
0:02 - Magic looks for the entry, doesn’t see it dribbles across into the key (the Celtics clearly aren’t expecting this because they don’t collapse hard on him) and Magic takes a hard hook shot and nails it. Lakers by 1.
0:00 - The Celtics inbound from half-court. Bird breaks free toward the corner and DJ throws it in, Bird catches it, turns and shoots it, shooting about 6 inches too far and clanking off the back of the rim. Lakers win.
A lot of notable things. First off, Magic took *one* shot in that final three minutes, but it was the one that counted. Second, the Celtics monumentally choked. I don’t mean in terms of missing shots (though that didn’t help), I mean in terms of shots early in the clock and unnecessary turnovers. But either way, the Celtics seemed to have had the game well in hand, and the Lakers came back and pulled it off somehow.
The momentum narrative would suggest that the Celtics folded after that. Instead, they fought back hard. They shot very well in Game 5 (+6.1% as a team) and held the Lakers to below average shooting (-2.2%, with Magic’s 29/8/12 and 4 steals on +9.9% the only bright spot on the offense). And the Celtics prevailed decisively by 15. But that meant that the Lakers were 2-0 at home and the Celtics only 2-1, and the final two games were in LA. In Game 6 the Lakers struggled to shoot again (-2.4%, with Magic struggling to score on a 16/8/19 on -17.2%). But the Lakers, in turn, played excellent defense and held the Celtics to -4.7% shooting as a team. And the Lakers forced 5 more steals than the Celtics (Magic and Worthy each had 3, while Bird and McHale had 7 turnovers between them). At the intersection of these things the Lakers won the game by 13, taking the series in 6. Their average margin of victory was 4.2 points per game.
It is worth noting that the '87 Lakers' playoff offense, while exceptional, did involve Magic's playoff usage dropping by 3.2%. It's normal for usage to drop a little in the playoffs, but I thought it curious that, despite Magic's carrying the scoring (mostly) in the regular season, in the playoffs he settled more into the pass-first part of a scoring trio. And it led to great playoff offense. Whether this is because Magic had more impact when he scored less, or because Magic's instinct when push came to shove was to pass instead of score, is unknown. Do you know how many teams finished in the top 10 (for this list) in both regular season offense and playoff offense? Three. The '05 Suns, the '87 Lakers and the '17 Warriors. Good list to be on.
11 | Lakers
10 |
9 |
8 |
7 | Pistons
6 |
5 | Celtics, Hawks
4 | Bucks
3 | Mavs
2 | Rockets, Sonics
1 |
0 | 76ers, Pacers, Bulls, Blazers
-0 | Warriors
-1 | Jazz
-2 | Suns
-3 | Cavs, Kings
-4 | Bullets, Nuggets, Nets
-5 | Knicks, Spurs
-6 |
-7 |
-8 |
-9 |
-10|
-11| Clippers
1987 was a fairly noncompetitive season. Which may seem weird, because there are only two teams on the edges of the spectrum (all teams but 3 were between +6 and -6). But few teams are right around the middle, most teams were either good or bad but few were average. And the Clippers were extremely unusual in how awful they were. This isn’t a bad distribution, but there were a lot of bad teams in ‘87, if only one awful team. But the Lakers’ dominance over this year certainly stands out.
But what do we make of their performance this year? Their regular season was strong, but only 19th on this list. It’s their playoffs that make them ranked so highly here; their playoff SRS was quite good (23rd, which may not sound good, but few teams combine a Top 25 regular season, Top 20 playoffs and a championship). But how seriously can we take their playoffs? The second best team they played (the Sonics) were the level of some teams *worst* playoff opponent. Series against sub-zero opponents are rightly treated with a healthy skepticism, and the Lakers played two of them. The only series we have against a good team was the Finals, and the Lakers kind of struggled there. Granted, they won, but the ‘87 Celtics had really not looked strong in the playoffs on account of their injuries. If all you had was a 6-game, 4.2 MoV win over a +5.3 OSRS team . . . there’s no way you’d conclude that the winner was a top 15 team. I’m afraid to say that I don’t think that the ‘87 Lakers belong this high. The only reason they’re here was because of big wins against weak teams (and really, against the Nuggets in the first round). I think this season deserves a special place in our memories for Magic’s ascendance (and clutch shot in game 4). But I think their resume compared to other teams this high is pretty weak. Their strength of opposition in the playoffs was simply very, very low. And for a team that played weak opponents, they didn’t dominate as much as they could have. I think the ‘87 Lakers, as much as I love the team, should be lower.
PG: Magic Johnson, +8.8 / +9.3
SG: Byron Scott, +1.1 / -0.7
SF: James Worthy, +2.6 / +5.0
PF: A.C. Green, +1.0 / +0.1
C: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, +1.6 / +2.5
6th: Michael Cooper, +2.1 / +5.6
7th: Mychal Thompson, -2.7 / -3.4
Regular Season Metrics:
Regular Season Record: 65-17, Regular Season SRS: +8.32 (19th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +7.3 (6th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.8 (77th)
Shooting Advantage: +5.6%, Possession Advantage: -2.0 shooting possessions per game
Magic Johnson (PG, 27): 36 MPPG, 30% OLoad, 24 / 6 / 12 / 2 on +6.4%
James Worthy (SF, 25): 34 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 19 / 6 / 3 / 2 on +4.0%
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (C, 39): 31 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 17 / 7 / 3 / 2 on +5.9%
Mychal Thompson (PF, 32): 20 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 10 / 4 / 1 / 1 on -0.7%
Byron Scott (SG, 25): 33 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 17 / 3 / 3 / 2 on +2.3%
Michael Cooper (PG, 30): 27 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 10 / 3 / 5 / 2 on -0.2%
A.C. Green (PF, 23): 28 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 11 / 8 / 1 / 2 on +6.1%
Scoring/100: Magic Johnson (31.1 / +6.4%), James Worthy (26.7 / +4.0%), Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (26.4 / +5.9%)
Assists/100: Magic Johnson (15.9), Michael Cooper (7.8), Byron Scott (4.9)
Heliocentrism: 41.7% (25th of 84 teams) - Magic
Wingmen: 29.2% (74th) - Worthy & Cooper
Depth: 29.1% (35th)
Playoff Metrics:
Playoff Offensive Rating: +10.50 (8th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.30 (82nd)
Playoff SRS: +13.18 (23rd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.94 (39th)
Shooting Advantage: +6.9%, Possession Advantage: -2.5 shooting possessions per game
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.60 (39th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: +1.07 (98th)
Magic Johnson (PG, 27): 36 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 21 / 8 / 12 / 2 on +6.9%
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (C, 39): 31 MPPG, 23% OLoad, 19 / 7 / 2 / 2 on +6.2%
James Worthy (SF, 25): 37 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 23 / 6 / 3 / 3 on +8.6%
Michael Cooper (PG, 30): 29 MPPG, 19% OLoad, 13 / 3 / 5 / 2 on +10.2%
Byron Scott (SG, 25): 33 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 15 / 3 / 3 / 1 on +1.7%
Mychal Thompson (PF, 32); 22 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 9 / 5 / 1 / 1 on -4.1%
A.C. Green (PF, 23): 28 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 11 / 8 / 1 / 1 on +7.7%
Scoring/100: James Worthy (29.8 / +8.6%), Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (29.5 / +6.2%), Magic Johnson (28.1 / +6.9%)
Assists/100: Magic Johnson (15.7), Michael Cooper (8.2), Byron Scott (4.5)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 39.6% (30th of 84 teams) - Magic
Playoff Wingmen: 45.8% (18th) - Worthy & Cooper
Playoff Depth: 14.6% (72nd)
Round 1: Denver Nuggets (-1.1), won 3-0, by +27.4 points per game (+26.3 SRS eq)
Round 2: Golden State Warriors (-1.4), won 4-1, by +10.6 points per game (+9.2 SRS eq)
Round 3: Seattle SuperSonics (+2.5), won 4-0, by +11.3 points per game (+13.8 SRS eq)
Round 4: Boston Celtics (+5.3), won 4-2, by +4.2 points per game (+9.5 SRS eq)
Offensive / Defensive Ratings from Opposition Regular Season Average:
Denver Nuggets: +14.9 / -9.4
Golden State Warriors: +10.5 / +2.3
Seattle SuperSonics: +6.9 / -4.9
Boston Celtics: +11.6 / +0.6
Shooting Advantage / Possession Advantage per game (unadjusted):
Denver Nuggets: +12.5% / -0.9
Golden State Warriors: +8.4% / -5.8
Seattle SuperSonics: +10.8% / -9.4
Boston Celtics: -0.2% / +4.0
Postseason Usage/Efficiency Change adjusted for Opposition:
Magic Johnson: -3.2% / +0.5%
Byron Scott: -2.7% / -0.6%
James Worthy: -0.7% / +4.6%
A.C. Green: +0.4% / +1.6%
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar: +2.1% / +0.3%
Michael Cooper +1.1% / +10.4%
Mychal Thompson: -4.1% / -3.4%
There was a great movie from 1990 named “Quigley Down Under”. To fast-forward a lot, the bad guy, played by Alan Rickman, fancies himself something of a wild west gunslinger who happens to have been born on the wrong continent (Australia). There are several scenes where Rickman demonstrates his incredible quickdraw speed and accuracy, which he has practiced diligently. He hires Quigley (Tom Selleck) for a job. Quigley is a long-distance marksman, one of the best in the world. When they’re being introduced Rickman shows off his skill with the pistol and then asks Quigley about his own abilities with the pistol. Quigley demures, saying “I never had much use for one”. Later, the two have a falling out, which ultimately leads to Quigley being captured and beaten badly. But Rickman doesn’t just want to off Quigley, he wants to make it interesting. So he sets Quigley up, takes off his bindings and puts a pistol in his belt. Rickman explains that he’ll give Quigley a chance, that if Quigley can beat him in a quick draw, Quigley can go. And Rickman’s two men will be off to the side making sure it is fair (hint, fairness is not the goal here). Rickman reminds Quigley of his own inferiority, that his survival is now dependent on his skill with a pistol, something that Quigley had dismissed as unnecessary. So here’s Quigley, quite roughed up, trying to rub some life into his blood-starved hands facing down three gunmen with a gun he’d admitted little use for. What was going to happen?
After the predictable drawn out pause where the camera does quick cuts to everybody’s face, Quigley suddenly draws and guns all three gunmen down before they can fire. Quigley walks over to Rickman’s character who is lying in the dirt bleeding out, and Rickman expresses confusion. Quigley smirks and quips, “I said I never had much use for one. I never said I didn’t know how to use it.”
Mic Drop.
Because Quigley had, the whole time, been the best pistoleer among them. He’d just deflected by saying that he didn’t have much use for a pistol, because he generally hadn’t. But when push came to shove he was more than equal to the task.
What does this have to do with the ‘87 Lakers? Great question.
Through much of the 80s the Lakers had been the best team in the West (the achievement itself wasn’t impressive given the quality of the conference, but the consistency was). From ‘82 to ‘85 they’d won the West four straight times. Through this time Magic had been running the offense, but the primary scorer had been Kareem, consistently posting 25+% usage rates while Magic and Worthy stayed in the low 20s. This was all well and good until 1986. In the playoffs they ran into the Houston Rockets with young Hakeem Olajuwon. And Kareem faltered, struggling to score against Olajuwon (who was 15 years younger) and the Lakers’ offense was shut down. The Lakers were whipped in five games by the young Rockets. It may have seemed like the Lakers’ dominance was at an end.
Instead, the Lakers returned with almost the exact same roster and posted their best regular season of the decade. They posted 65 wins (their next best was 62) and a +8.32 RSRS (next best was +6.84). But it was the same roster, and we know that Kareem probably couldn’t keep maintaining the scoring load at age 39. What changed?
Magic took over the offense. From ‘86 to ‘87 he jumped in usage all the way to 26.3% (not crazy-high, but comparable to Garnett levels of usage). He posted scoring numbers north of 30 PPX and pretty much maintained his efficiency. Do you realize how nuts it is that from ‘86 to ‘87 he increased his usage by 4.7% and only saw his efficiency drop by 0.8%? I’m not trying to say that Magic became one of the best scorers in the league . . . but he was pretty good. 26.3% usage and +6% shooting was actually comparable to Kareem the year before, and Ginobili from ‘07 is another good comparison. To that point Magic had merely been an efficient scorer on limited volume while running the offense. In 1987 he led the offense in both playmaking *and* scoring, and instead of crumbling the offense posted its finest season to date. Jumps of usage that big are extremely rare. And Magic’s OLoad jumped all the way to 32%, which is comparable to ‘16/’17 LeBron James. His Helio went from 32.6% in ‘86 to 41.7% in ‘87. He was twenty-seven. You know people often flap their yaps about “I never saw this player raise his game and carry his team”? Magic freaking raised his game and freaking carried his team in ‘87.
That’s the Quigley comparison. Magic played like somebody who “never had much use” for scoring a lot. But when it became clear that it was necessary, he proved that he’d had the ability all along (or at least, certainly by ‘87). I tried finding other comparisons and it’s very rare. In general, when a team suddenly relies on one player more (specifically mid-career) the team usually suffers. But in ‘87 Magic rose to the occasion and the Lakers rose with him. Let’s look at this roster:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2011 LeBron James (but better on offense and in the playoffs)
SG: 2010 Ray Allen
SF: 2011 Luol Deng
PF: 2014 Amir Johnson
C: 2019 Pascal Siakam
6th: 2013 George Hill
7th: 2007 Juwon Howard
That’s a pretty sweet group. For some reason the comp engine really loves matching high-usage Magic to ‘11 LeBron. And there’s no shame there, ‘11 LeBron was a monster . . . in the regular season anyways. Yet most metrics have ‘87 Magic has better and offense, and certainly better in the playoffs. This is a season where Magic was an *openly* ATG (or even GOAT-level) player. Byron Scott as ‘10 Allen may seem like a reach, but Ray Allen by ‘10, while still decent, was mostly simply a strong floor-spacer. Worthy as ‘11 Deng isn’t intuitive but both were solid defenders and good scorers. ‘14 Amir Johnson mostly provides rebounding and some defense, and Kareem’s comparison to ‘19 Siakam may seem crazy. But remember that Kareem rebounded like a 4 or strong 3 by this age. Statistically, the two are kind of comparable. And it’s a credit to Kareem that he was still so valuable even at 39. And Michael Cooper provided strong all-around play from the bench.
The Lakers’ offense in ‘87 was one of the best ever. They’re top ten for this list, tied with the ‘92 Bulls and bracketed by the ‘97 Jazz and the ‘07 Suns. But it’s notable that all the teams on this list ahead of them came later in time, when exploiting the three point line was more common. Up to this point, the ‘87 Lakers were the best regular season offense on a great team that the NBA had ever seen. They shot really well (taking a lot of threes for their time (5.5 per game) and leading the league in 3P%, and finishing second in 2P%, while making it to the line a ton). But they also crashed the boards decently. This is notable, because they had no dominant offensive rebounder in their starting lineup (though Magic and Worthy were both quite good for their positions). But their bench (besides Cooper) was heavy on offensive rebounding. And for all of Magic’s reputation for turnovers, the Lakers were above average in that category too.
Perhaps more impressive is that their defense was decent. Not so strong as the defense of the 90s Bulls (who on occasion posted comparable offenses) but not so weak as the Nash Suns. They weren’t a remarkable defense; they simply defended shots well (thanks mostly to a horde of bigs and some quality athletic wings). In general the Lakers didn’t win through taking more shots than the other team, they won by shooting way better than the other team. And they usually did so.
The Lakers had been the 3rd ranked team in the league going into the season. #1, of course, was the Celtics who were coming off an historically dominant season. And #2, predictably, was the Rockets who had just embarrassed the Lakers the year before. But both teams suffered from injuries and other problems. The Celtics were still good, but nowhere near the level of ‘86, and the Rockets barely made the playoffs. The Lakers were *clearly* the best team of the ‘87 regular season. And the West was . . . thin. There were only two other teams in the West better than +1 RSRS, the +5.5 Mavericks and the +2.6 Blazers. Both teams lost in the first round. So the red-hot Lakers were going against kerosene-soaked crap. You can probably guess what happened next.
In the first round the Lakers drew the -1.1 Denver Nuggets. And the Lakers swept by an average of 27.4 points per game. The Lakers shot +6.2% as a team, Magic averaged an 18/7/14 on +10.8% and Worthy averaged a 23/5/5 on +24%. It wasn’t close, it was an insult to gods and men.
In the second round they faced the -1.4 Golden State Warriors (can we take a moment to appreciate that *half* of the Lakers’ playoff opponents were below league average?). This one was far closer; the Lakers actually lost a game and won the series by only 10.6 points a game. The Lakers got banged up on possessions, with the Warriors generating 5 more steals per game. But the Lakers, as per usual, dominated shooting so completely that it didn’t really matter. The Warriors were held to -1.1% shooting, while the Lakers shot +7.3% as a team. Worthy averaged a 22/6/3 on +11.9% and Magic averaged a 21/8/11 on +10%. The rebounding situation was pretty emblematic of the ‘87 Lakers. They fast-broke a lot, so a team could punish them there; Larry Smith averaged 7 per game. But the Lakers outrebounded them by a massive margin, yet no player averaged more than 3.5 a game. But A.C. Green pulled down 3.4 a game, Mychal Thompson 2.4, Worthy and Kareem 2.2, Byron Scott 2.0 and Magic 1.8. That doesn’t sound like a lot but the aggregate was far more effective than the Warriors’ one-man attack. And, of course, crashing the glass against the Lakers meant that if you *didn’t* get the ball their fast break was going to kill you. So that’s a thing too.
In the Western Conference Finals they faced the toughest team to date, the +2.5 Seattle SuperSonics. The Sonics did a good job controlling possessions, owning the boards and earning an extra 9.4 shots a game. It didn’t matter because the Lakers, you guessed it, outshot them by a ton. They held the Sonics to -4.2% shooting, while averaging +6.6% themselves. Worthy averaged a 31/6/2 on +10.3% (2.3 steals a game) and Magic averaged a 20/7/11 on +4.2% (2 steals a game). The Lakers swept the series by 11.3 points per game. A dominant win, though against a mediocre team.
And in the Finals, for the first and only time these playoffs, the Lakers faced a good team in the +5.3 Boston Celtics. The Celtics had been unstoppable in ‘86. But they weren’t the same team in ‘87. Part of it was losing Bill Walton for the year (and exposing their paper-thin bench), and part of it was accumulated injuries. They’d posted a strong regular season (+6.6 RSRS) but their playoffs had been a little underwhelming. In the Semis they barely made it past the +3.3 Milwaukee Bucks (7 games, and barely outscoring the Bucks by 0.3 points a game). That series saw Ainge, McHale and Parish all injured; all were able to play but all missed time and saw their performance suffer. And in the Conference Finals they were nearly eliminated by the Pistons (7 games, and again outscored, this time by 3.7 points per game). So it’s a credit to the Celtics that they made it through, but they were hardly looking like a juggernaut (they might have been if they’d been healthy . . . but they weren’t). But in contrast, the Lakers hadn’t actually faced any remotely decent teams so far. So the Lakers were favored . . . but it was hard to know how it would go.
Game 1 was a curious affair. The Celtics actually outshot the Lakers. Larry Bird had a 32/7/6 on +6.0% and the team shot at +6.7%. The Lakers still shot well (+4.9%) but not as well. The Lakers, contrary to form, won by owning the glass completely. No Celtic put up more than 2 offensive boards, while the Lakers’ entire starting lineup posted 2 or more (Magic 4, Kareem and Green 3, Scott and Worthy 2). With the 14 extra shots the Lakers prevailed by 13 points, but it was a bad sign that they couldn’t control the Celtics’ shooting. In Game 2 the Lakers banished any doubt, blowing the Celtics apart by shooting +13.8% as a team (!!) with Worthy posting a 23/3/3 on +13.1% and Magic a 22/5/20 on +15.3% (this was one of three times *ever* that a player had posted 20+ assists in an NBA Finals. The other two times? Magic Johnson in ‘84 and ‘91). The Celtics still shot well (+3.9%) but it wasn’t close to enough, and the Lakers won by 19. Two games in the Lakers’ offense was looking unstoppable.
In Game 3, in Boston Gardens, the Celtics struck back. The Lakers’ offense was slowed somewhat, with Worthy struggling on a 13/3/3 on -20.9% shooting (3 steals) while Magic had a 32/11/9 on +12.9%. As a team they only shot +1.6%, little better than the Celtics’ +1.4%. But the Celtics had twice the offensive boards that the Lakers did, getting them 6 extra shots. The aggregate was a narrow 6-point win, but the Celtics were on the board, 2-1. Game 4 didn’t go well for the Lakers either. The Lakers barely shot above league average (+0.2%); Magic had a 29/8/5 on +10.2% but Kareem and Scott both shot below -10%, while the Celtics shot +3.2% mostly on the back of Kevin McHale (25/13/0 on +17.5%, talk about the best and the worst of Kevin McHale in one stat line). The Celtics led by 7 going into the final three minutes:
2:48- Magic entries to Kareem who is ISOd on Parish, Kareem takes the hook and misses. There’s a scrum and the Lakers come down with it, still down 7.
2:28- Magic entries to Kareem *again* and Kareem is called for travelling setting up his shot, Celtics’ ball, Lakers down 7.
2:12: Larry Bird comes off a screen just inside the three point arc. Bird gets the pass, surprised that he isn’t defended and shoots early in the shot clock, clanking it off the rim, Lakers get the rebound, down by 7.
1:59 - Magic fakes an entry to Kareem but fires it into the paint to Mychal Thompson who has good position. Thompson shoots but is fouled and he goes to the line. He misses one, makes one, Lakers down by 6.
1:39 - Ainge passes to Parish in the high post, who is immediately doubled by Michael Cooper, Parish turns the ball over and Cooper gets the ball, Lakers down by 6.
1:36 - Cooper passes to Magic who attacks, drawing the defense, and then dishes back out to Cooper who is wide open. Cooper patiently steps behind the line and takes the three, draining it. Lakers down by 3.
1:20 - The Celtics pass to Larry Bird who passes to McHale and misses him, turning the ball over, Lakers down by 3.
1:02 - Worthy is ISOd on McHale, attacks across the paint and takes an ugly shot against a double-team, sinking it, Lakers down by 1.
0:46 - Bird tries to attack off the dribble, it doesn’t go well, he ends up defended by Kareem. Instead of taking Kareem off the dribble he takes a seriously contested fadeaway and misses, Lakers get the rebound, down by 1.
0:30 - Magic has the ball on the perimeter, while Michael Cooper bangs for position on the post against DJ. Cooper spins around the defender, but instead of going rim he picks Parish under the hoop, freeing up Kareem. Magic throws the lob perfectly, DJ tries to contest but is, you know, a foot shorter than Kareem and Kareem dunks it. Beautiful freaking play. Two points, Lakers now up by 1.
0:12 - The Lakers are trapping aggressively. Johnson has the ball and the Lakers get him defended by Kareem. DJ entries to Parish, but the pass is a little errant to get over Kareem. Parish is instantly doubled by Kareem. Parish tosses back out to DJ who is immediately doubled, but jumps and tosses it to a wide-open Ainge. But the Lakers have rotated to close out on Ainge so Ainge tosses it to the last free man in the corner who is totally open (because the Lakers rotated out of players and Mychal Thompson was a little slow coming off of McHale). And it’s Larry Bird. Could've been better. Bird cans it, Celtics by 2.
0:08 - the Lakers inbound to Magic who entries to Kareem, who immediately goes up into a double-teamed shot (McHale looks psychic, always being on Kareem’s right hand the instant he shoots) and is fouled. Kareem makes the first, misses the second, and in the process of going for the rebound McHale accidentally knocks it out of bounds. Lakers ball, down by 1.
0:02 - Magic looks for the entry, doesn’t see it dribbles across into the key (the Celtics clearly aren’t expecting this because they don’t collapse hard on him) and Magic takes a hard hook shot and nails it. Lakers by 1.
0:00 - The Celtics inbound from half-court. Bird breaks free toward the corner and DJ throws it in, Bird catches it, turns and shoots it, shooting about 6 inches too far and clanking off the back of the rim. Lakers win.
A lot of notable things. First off, Magic took *one* shot in that final three minutes, but it was the one that counted. Second, the Celtics monumentally choked. I don’t mean in terms of missing shots (though that didn’t help), I mean in terms of shots early in the clock and unnecessary turnovers. But either way, the Celtics seemed to have had the game well in hand, and the Lakers came back and pulled it off somehow.
The momentum narrative would suggest that the Celtics folded after that. Instead, they fought back hard. They shot very well in Game 5 (+6.1% as a team) and held the Lakers to below average shooting (-2.2%, with Magic’s 29/8/12 and 4 steals on +9.9% the only bright spot on the offense). And the Celtics prevailed decisively by 15. But that meant that the Lakers were 2-0 at home and the Celtics only 2-1, and the final two games were in LA. In Game 6 the Lakers struggled to shoot again (-2.4%, with Magic struggling to score on a 16/8/19 on -17.2%). But the Lakers, in turn, played excellent defense and held the Celtics to -4.7% shooting as a team. And the Lakers forced 5 more steals than the Celtics (Magic and Worthy each had 3, while Bird and McHale had 7 turnovers between them). At the intersection of these things the Lakers won the game by 13, taking the series in 6. Their average margin of victory was 4.2 points per game.
It is worth noting that the '87 Lakers' playoff offense, while exceptional, did involve Magic's playoff usage dropping by 3.2%. It's normal for usage to drop a little in the playoffs, but I thought it curious that, despite Magic's carrying the scoring (mostly) in the regular season, in the playoffs he settled more into the pass-first part of a scoring trio. And it led to great playoff offense. Whether this is because Magic had more impact when he scored less, or because Magic's instinct when push came to shove was to pass instead of score, is unknown. Do you know how many teams finished in the top 10 (for this list) in both regular season offense and playoff offense? Three. The '05 Suns, the '87 Lakers and the '17 Warriors. Good list to be on.
11 | Lakers
10 |
9 |
8 |
7 | Pistons
6 |
5 | Celtics, Hawks
4 | Bucks
3 | Mavs
2 | Rockets, Sonics
1 |
0 | 76ers, Pacers, Bulls, Blazers
-0 | Warriors
-1 | Jazz
-2 | Suns
-3 | Cavs, Kings
-4 | Bullets, Nuggets, Nets
-5 | Knicks, Spurs
-6 |
-7 |
-8 |
-9 |
-10|
-11| Clippers
1987 was a fairly noncompetitive season. Which may seem weird, because there are only two teams on the edges of the spectrum (all teams but 3 were between +6 and -6). But few teams are right around the middle, most teams were either good or bad but few were average. And the Clippers were extremely unusual in how awful they were. This isn’t a bad distribution, but there were a lot of bad teams in ‘87, if only one awful team. But the Lakers’ dominance over this year certainly stands out.
But what do we make of their performance this year? Their regular season was strong, but only 19th on this list. It’s their playoffs that make them ranked so highly here; their playoff SRS was quite good (23rd, which may not sound good, but few teams combine a Top 25 regular season, Top 20 playoffs and a championship). But how seriously can we take their playoffs? The second best team they played (the Sonics) were the level of some teams *worst* playoff opponent. Series against sub-zero opponents are rightly treated with a healthy skepticism, and the Lakers played two of them. The only series we have against a good team was the Finals, and the Lakers kind of struggled there. Granted, they won, but the ‘87 Celtics had really not looked strong in the playoffs on account of their injuries. If all you had was a 6-game, 4.2 MoV win over a +5.3 OSRS team . . . there’s no way you’d conclude that the winner was a top 15 team. I’m afraid to say that I don’t think that the ‘87 Lakers belong this high. The only reason they’re here was because of big wins against weak teams (and really, against the Nuggets in the first round). I think this season deserves a special place in our memories for Magic’s ascendance (and clutch shot in game 4). But I think their resume compared to other teams this high is pretty weak. Their strength of opposition in the playoffs was simply very, very low. And for a team that played weak opponents, they didn’t dominate as much as they could have. I think the ‘87 Lakers, as much as I love the team, should be lower.
Back to the Main Thread
I tease!
