1. Alonzo Mourning (2000)Mourning is an elite defensive player, but in the abstract we can say maybe not to the same extent as Dikembe or Thurmond were in their eras. However… I kind-of think era is what shortchanges Mourning, or at least relative to Dikembe. He is more similar to Howard on defence than he is to Dikembe or Gobert — and at this point I think most people recognise how rough the modern schemes can be on that Gobert/Dikembe archetype. None of that is quantified as easily as Mourning’s advantage as a volume and isolation scorer, but even that is just one aspect of offensive value (e.g. what ground if any is made up through spacing or screening?). If we acknowledge Mourning’s isolation scoring is a less than ideal choice on offence, how do we weigh that lessened value in a good scheme against its raised value in a limited scheme (e.g. Rasheed)? What about his flexibility as a potential emergency power forward option (also applicable to Thurmond)?
1997: 81.5% of total minutes played alongside Hardaway
1998: 82.5% of total minutes played alongside Hardaway
1999: 77% of total minutes played alongside Hardaway; will note that Mourning scored at 52.2% efficiency in his first 14 games of the lockout season and at 58.7% efficiency in his subsequent 32 games
2000: 49% of total minutes played alongside Hardaway
Mourning set career highs in scoring rate, scoring efficiency, and relative scoring efficiency in 2000, as well as setting career lows in turnovers and turnover percentage — all despite playing a large portion of the season without his primary offensive initiator, taking more shots than ever from midrange, and (relatedly) generating a career low free throw rate. He also matched his spike in block production from the prior season. His best series was in 1999, when he put up 25 points per 75 on 57% efficiency against a Knicks team that had held opponents to an average under 49% efficiency and held the collective rest of his teammates to 47% efficiency, but 2000 similarly saw Mourning provide his team’s only capable scoring output. And for as maligned as his turnover rate has been in these types of projects (perhaps excessively as a peak), should note from 1998-2000 Mourning consistently decreased his turnovers in the postseason.
Alonzo Mourning in the first 11 games of the 2000 season: 22.5/9.5/3.5 (blocks) on 61.7% efficiency with a +8 plus/minus in 36.4 minutes per game.
Alonzo Mourning during Tim Hardaway’s 26-game absence in the middle of the 2000 season: 23/10/5 (blocks
) on 56.65% efficiency with a +0.7 plus/minus (team went 16-10 in that stretch) in 37 minutes per game.
Alonzo Mourning’s next 37 games with Tim Hardaway: 21/9.5/3 (blocks) on 61.83% efficiency with a +4.1 plus/minus in 33.6 minutes per game.
To add to this, in 1996 Alonzo averaged 24 points in 38.7 minutes per game on 57.3% efficiency before Tim Hardaway arrived in Miami, and 22 points in 37.3 minutes per game on 60.4% efficiency after Tim Hardaway arrived in Miami.
I alluded to this earlier, but I am even more secure now in the assertion that Mourning kind-of played in an unideal era for his skillset. He was an excellent rim-runner peaking when the league was at its slowest. He was a brilliant team and help defender with some comparative weaknesses squaring up against bigger all-stars, so of course he primarily played under illegal defence rules in a league that disproportionately pushed scoring in the post. Yeah, no one likes watching his isolation scoring, but it is not really his fault that it was such a necessity to his team, and he at least made it work.
Being a first option while also being arguably the league’s best defender is pretty rare and difficult. The players who have successfully done so are among the best peaks we have (Wilt, Kareem, Hakeem, Robinson, Ewing, Duncan, Garnett, Howard, Giannis, Embiid…). I did briefly consider a penalty for “needing” good guard play to score at an elite level — contrast with guys like Lanier or Kareem or Moses or peak Ewing — but I just cannot really see it as a negative to be a plus efficiency isolationist who becomes immediately maximised with any capable lead passer.
Muggsy Bogues had him putting up 22.5 points per 75 on 59% efficiency; imagine what he could have done with someone like Nash or DWill. Hard to find many teams that would not be thrilled with an efficient volume scoring DPoY sporting ~18-foot shooting range and elite finishing in motion.
2. Nate Thurmond a.) 1969 b.) 1967AEnigma wrote:Been looking a bit more at a case for Thurmond.
Doing some rudimentary (i.e. no real SRS or even MOV analysis) WOWY work of my own…
1967: 38-26 with (3-0 with no Barry), 6-11 without (all with Barry in)
1968 (Barry gone): 32-19 with, 9-20 without
1969: 38-33 with, 3-8 without
1970: 21-21 with, 9-31 without
OVERALL 1967-70: 46.5-win pace with, 23-win pace without
ThaRegul8r wrote:“Thurmond is the key to our team. You’ve got to have a great center. We have one in Thurmond. The Celtics have Bill Russell, the 76ers have Wilt Chamberlain. We’d still be up there without me but not without Thurmond.” — Rick BarryThe Pittsburgh Press, February 3, 1967“The growing number of people who think Nate Thurmond is the most valuable big man in pro basketball picked up a whole new group of believers Friday night.”— LA Times writer Dan Hafer, after the Warriors lose to LA 129-80 without ThurmondLos Angeles Times, February 4, 1967“The Warriors, despite Super Soph. Rick Barry’s heroics, never would have won the Western Division title this season nor made it to the playoffs, for that matter, had it not been for Thurmond’s defensive work under the boards.”The Pittsburgh Press, March 30, 1967“If there was any doubt prior to this series that San Francisco’s Nate Thurmond is Chamberlain’s heir apparent as the league’s best center, it was quickly dispelled.” — Christian Science Monitor, April 26, 1967“Nate Thurmond, the man who is the only heir to Chamberlain and Bill Russell. […] He performed marvelously against Chamberlain; it was not just by choice that Wilt shot so infrequently.” — Frank DefordSports Illustrated, May 8, 1967Oct. 28, 1966, Thurmond had 19 points and 25 rebounds in a 105-104 win over Baltimore, and “
blocked a shot by Gus Johnson that would have tied the game […]” (
The Sumter Daily Item, Oct. 29, 1966). Jeff Mullins tied up Baltimore’s Don Ohl with 39 seconds left. “With these key plays stopping the Bullets, Jim King connected on a 10-foot jump shot with 26 seconds left for the San Francisco victory” (
The Sumter Daily Item, Oct. 29, 1966). Nov. 14, 1966, Thurmond had
20 points, 30 rebounds and 15 blocked shots in a 115-104 win over Detroit (
The Evening Independent, Nov. 15, 1966). Dec. 8, 1966, Rick Barry had an off night with 21 points on 8-for-33 shooting (24.2%) in a 116-106 loss to Baltimore, but Thurmond picked up the slack with 30 points.
Dec. 22, 1966, Thurmond held Wilt Chamberlain to 14 points (6-12 FG) and outrebounded him 25-22 in a 116-114 loss to Philadelphia (
Tri City Herald, Dec. 22, 1966).
Nate Thurmond, Wilt Chamberlain’s understudy when both played for San Francisco, hounded Philadelphia’s super star tenaciously but in vain Thursday night. Thurmond may have won the contest, but the 76ers won the game.
In the only National Basketball Association action, the Philadelphia 76ers outlasted a dogged Warrior squad and won, 116-114, although Thurmond held Chamberlain to 14 points and outrebounded the Big Dipper.
[…]
Thurmond played for years in Chamberlain’s super image. When the Big Dipper was traded by the Warriors to Philadelphia, Thurmond took over as San Francisco’s regular center.
Against Chamberlain, the Warrior center allowed only one field goal in six attempts in the first half. In the final quarter, however, Wilt made five of six attempts from the field and ended with 14 points.
Chamberlain had 22 rebounds and eight assists, Thurmond scored nine points, gathered in 25 rebounds and assisted on three goals.
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=sXcoAAAAIBAJ&sjid=IwYGAAAAIBAJ&pg=926,4442937"
In their next meeting, Feb. 2, 1967, Thurmond “blocked eight of Wilt’s shots, dominated both backboards with 23 rebounds and scored 16 points” in a 137-120 win over Philadelphia. “Chamberlain only managed 16 points” (
Park City Daily News, Feb. 3, 1967).
San Francisco coach Bill Sharman said, “I consider Nate right in the same class, but kinda in between, a Russell or a Chamberlain. Bill Russell, now who’s a little quicker than either one of ’em, will go to the corners, block a shot, or get back underneath and get the big rebound, or again pick up the cutter. Where Nate, won’t go out quite as far, but he will go out a bit farther than Wilt. Now of course Wilt is much stronger than both of ’em, so he will muscle and do a better job in close”
Rick Barry was All-Star Game MVP with a game-high 38 points (16-27 FG, 6-8 FT)—second only to Wilt Chamberlain’s 42 in 1962, six rebounds and three assists in 34 minutes, but “[t]here are those who think it should have gone to Thurmond. ‘Nate was the equalizer,’ commented Coach Fred Schaus of Los Angeles who directed the West. ‘
He was the entire key to the ball game. With Thurmond able to contest the entire East front line (on rebounds), we were able to run. This was our game plan’” (
The Sumter Daily Item, Jan. 11, 1967). Thurmond had 16 points (7-16 FG, 2-4 FT) and 18 rebounds in 42 minutes. “
Thurmond definitely was the most valuable player,” said Chamberlain. “He did the entire job while Barry just put the ball through the hoop.”
Feb. 5, 1967, Thurmond scored the winning basket on a tip-in with four seconds left and blocked a last shot in a 142-141 overtime win over Chicago. Feb. 10, 1967, Thurmond fractured two bones in his left hand during the second quarter of a 137-136 double overtime loss to Boston (
The Free Lance-Star, Feb. 11, 1967).
“If Thurmond is out for six weeks, he could miss one or two playoff games. But if he misses eight weeks, his teammates might join him on the sidelines because of elimination.”Lodi News-Sentinel, March 15, 1967The San Francisco Warriors clinched the Western Division regular season championship nine days ago, but it’s doubtful if they get anywhere when the National Basketball Association playoffs begin next week.
The combination of numerous injuries and erratic performances by those in good shape have resulted in a flock of defeats. The San Franciscans have lost nine of their last 11 contests and often looked like the worst team in the Western Division rather than the title winner.
The Warriors began to struggle when 6 ft. 11 in. center Nate Thurmond broke his hand against Boston Feb. 10. Thurmond is back but unless he’s in top shape for the playoffs, a doubtful prospect, the San Francisco pros will have a tough time beating anyone.
Sparked by high scoring Rick Barry and Thurmond, the Warriors got off to a fast start last October and had run up a 9½ game lead over second place St. Louis by the middle of January. They were breezing along until Thurmond’s injury.[Thurmond] led Warriors to NBA Finals, and did best job on Chamberlain of anyone, and the Warriors did better in the postseason against the 76ers than anyone else. “It was a personal thing for us to fight back,” Thurmond said after San Francisco won Game 3. “Boston took only one game from the 76ers and as a matter of pride we want to do better than the Celtics [...].”
Elgee wrote:[1967] DRtg
Code: Select all
1. Boston 91.2
2. San Francisco 92.9
3. Detroit 94.6
4. Chicago 94.8
5. Philadelphia 95.1
LEAGUE AVG. 96.1
6. Los Angeles 97.3
7. St. Louis 97.6
8. Baltimore 98.2
9. Cincinnati 98.8
10. New York 100.9Ran the +/- for [1967] Thurmond:
w/out Thurmond - 119.1 ppg 126.6 opp ppg
with Thurmond - 123.2 ppg 117.8 opp ppg
That's a monstrous +12.9. It should be noted that the number is exaggerated by a pretty difficult schedule (SRS 1.13, 9H 6A).
So after all that, why am I giving preference to 1969 Thurmond?
I think his team anchoring without Barry was more laudable. Thurmond takes a lot of grief for his poor shot efficiency, and some have even unfairly maligned him as a chucker (he was not, he just played heavy minutes in a fast league). Look at those 1969 Warriors. Jeff Mullins is rightfully their leading scorer, although that year I think there around fifteen scorers I would take over him. Past Mullins, they have an inefficient Rudy LaRusso as their second option, and then by necessity Nate Thurmond is the third option. Thurmond is an ineffective scorer, do not get me wrong, and this is his biggest weakness relative to almost every other all-time centre. If you need Thurmond to be your third best scorer, it is pretty ugly… but man, not many teams would ever need Thurmond to handle the scoring load needed on the 1969 Warriors. The team also misses their best passer for 30 games, further exacerbating their offensive situation. Terrible offensive year, but the team structure makes him looks worse than he actually is, and I do not really believe that his 1967 self would do any better or that his 1969 self would do worse on the 1967 team.
The playoffs come around. The Warriors build a shocking 2-0 road lead against the Lakers. And then… Jeff Mullins gets hurt. He manages to be in half-decent playing shape by Game 6 (which turns into a brutal blow-out), but by then it is too late. Games 3-5, he averages 3 points in 18.7 minutes per game on
20% efficiency. The team’s only real scoring option, reduced to that. How many centres are winning in that circumstance? You look at what Russell did that year on the Celtics. Do team results change if you swap the two of them for the postseason? Margins were close in the Finals, but I am not sure the results do change (setting aside Russell’s unparalleled clutch factor). And what would we say if Jeff Mullins stays healthy, and the Lakers are pushed to seven games or possibly even lose? I recognise these are not undeniable arguments to take 1969 over 1967, and you can just as easily ponder the what-if where the 1967 Warriors make one more free throw in Game 1 of the Finals and push the Greatest Team Ever to a seventh game, but I do feel 1969 is a little more individually impressive with how much disruption Thurmond was able to impose on a dramatically more talented team (much as what he did to the Bucks a few years later).
3. Walt Frazier (1972)Proxy’s and 70sFan’s posts make decent arguments for Frazier’s consistency over Butler. Ball-handling, eh, tough to measure with the eye test considering different rulesets. Foul-drawing is an odd feather to try to place in his cap relative to Butler,
but Frazier’s game is clearly less dependent on that by virtue of having a more stable shot. Passing, eh, again I guess tough to call by the eye-test and when considering Frazier’s era. My initial inclination was to side with Butler’s defence, most because of his size, but there again there is enough uncertainty that I could easily envision Frazier being a Jrue-level impact defender, and relative to his era he was even better than that with his ability to force turnovers and hound weaker opposing guards. Frazier in general wins all era-relative considerations and of course has the better résumé and list of accomplishments. Do question whether he quite reached the same level Rick Barry did in 1975, but again will use Frazier’s consistency and his well-proven ability to mesh with other scorers — maybe with Frazier the 197
6 Warriors would have won the title — to side with him.
