1. Alonzo Mourning (2000)Mourning is an elite defensive player, but in the abstract we can say maybe not to the same extent as Dikembe or Thurmond were in their eras. However… I kind-of think era is what shortchanges Mourning, or at least relative to Dikembe. He is more similar to Howard on defence than he is to Dikembe or Gobert — and at this point I think most people recognise how rough the modern schemes can be on that Gobert/Dikembe archetype. None of that is quantified as easily as Mourning’s advantage as a volume and isolation scorer, but even that is just one aspect of offensive value (e.g. what ground if any is made up through spacing or screening?). If we acknowledge Mourning’s isolation scoring is a less than ideal choice on offence, how do we weigh that lessened value in a good scheme against its raised value in a limited scheme (e.g. Rasheed)? What about his flexibility as a potential emergency power forward option (also applicable to Thurmond)?
1997: 81.5% of total minutes played alongside Hardaway
1998: 82.5% of total minutes played alongside Hardaway
1999: 77% of total minutes played alongside Hardaway; will note that Mourning scored at 52.2% efficiency in his first 14 games of the lockout season and at 58.7% efficiency in his subsequent 32 games
2000: 49% of total minutes played alongside Hardaway
Mourning set career highs in scoring rate, scoring efficiency, and relative scoring efficiency in 2000, as well as setting career lows in turnovers and turnover percentage — all despite playing a large portion of the season without his primary offensive initiator, taking more shots than ever from midrange, and (relatedly) generating a career low free throw rate. He also matched his spike in block production from the prior season. His best series was in 1999, when he put up 25 points per 75 on 57% efficiency against a Knicks team that had held opponents to an average under 49% efficiency and held the collective rest of his teammates to 47% efficiency, but 2000 similarly saw Mourning provide his team’s only capable scoring output. And for as maligned as his turnover rate has been in these types of projects (perhaps excessively as a peak), should note from 1998-2000 Mourning consistently decreased his turnovers in the postseason.
Alonzo Mourning in the first 11 games of the 2000 season: 22.5/9.5/3.5 (blocks) on 61.7% efficiency with a +8 plus/minus in 36.4 minutes per game.
Alonzo Mourning during Tim Hardaway’s 26-game absence in the middle of the 2000 season: 23/10/5 (blocks
) on 56.65% efficiency with a +0.7 plus/minus (team went 16-10 in that stretch) in 37 minutes per game.
Alonzo Mourning’s next 37 games with Tim Hardaway: 21/9.5/3 (blocks) on 61.83% efficiency with a +4.1 plus/minus in 33.6 minutes per game.
To add to this, in 1996 Alonzo averaged 24 points in 38.7 minutes per game on 57.3% efficiency before Tim Hardaway arrived in Miami, and 22 points in 37.3 minutes per game on 60.4% efficiency after Tim Hardaway arrived in Miami.
I alluded to this earlier, but I am even more secure now in the assertion that Mourning kind-of played in an unideal era for his skillset. He was an excellent rim-runner peaking when the league was at its slowest. He was a brilliant team and help defender with some comparative weaknesses squaring up against bigger all-stars, so of course he primarily played under illegal defence rules in a league that disproportionately pushed scoring in the post. Yeah, no one likes watching his isolation scoring, but it is not really his fault that it was such a necessity to his team, and he at least made it work.
Being a first option while also being arguably the league’s best defender is pretty rare and difficult. The players who have successfully done so are among the best peaks we have (Wilt, Kareem, Hakeem, Robinson, Ewing, Duncan, Garnett, Howard, Giannis, Embiid…). I did briefly consider a penalty for “needing” good guard play to score at an elite level — contrast with guys like Lanier or Kareem or Moses or peak Ewing — but I just cannot really see it as a negative to be a plus efficiency isolationist who becomes immediately maximised with any capable lead passer.
Muggsy Bogues had him putting up 22.5 points per 75 on 59% efficiency; imagine what he could have done with someone like Nash or DWill. Hard to find many teams that would not be thrilled with an efficient volume scoring DPoY sporting ~18-foot shooting range and elite finishing in motion.
2. Nate Thurmond a.) 1969 b.) 1967AEnigma wrote:Been looking a bit more at a case for Thurmond.
Doing some rudimentary (i.e. no real SRS or even MOV analysis) WOWY work of my own…
1967: 38-26 with (3-0 with no Barry), 6-11 without (all with Barry in)
1968 (Barry gone): 32-19 with, 9-20 without
1969: 38-33 with, 3-8 without
1970: 21-21 with, 9-31 without
OVERALL 1967-70: 46.5-win pace with, 23-win pace without
ThaRegul8r wrote:“Thurmond is the key to our team. You’ve got to have a great center. We have one in Thurmond. The Celtics have Bill Russell, the 76ers have Wilt Chamberlain. We’d still be up there without me but not without Thurmond.” — Rick BarryThe Pittsburgh Press, February 3, 1967“The growing number of people who think Nate Thurmond is the most valuable big man in pro basketball picked up a whole new group of believers Friday night.”— LA Times writer Dan Hafer, after the Warriors lose to LA 129-80 without ThurmondLos Angeles Times, February 4, 1967“The Warriors, despite Super Soph. Rick Barry’s heroics, never would have won the Western Division title this season nor made it to the playoffs, for that matter, had it not been for Thurmond’s defensive work under the boards.”The Pittsburgh Press, March 30, 1967“If there was any doubt prior to this series that San Francisco’s Nate Thurmond is Chamberlain’s heir apparent as the league’s best center, it was quickly dispelled.” — Christian Science Monitor, April 26, 1967“Nate Thurmond, the man who is the only heir to Chamberlain and Bill Russell. […] He performed marvelously against Chamberlain; it was not just by choice that Wilt shot so infrequently.” — Frank DefordSports Illustrated, May 8, 1967Oct. 28, 1966, Thurmond had 19 points and 25 rebounds in a 105-104 win over Baltimore, and “
blocked a shot by Gus Johnson that would have tied the game […]” (
The Sumter Daily Item, Oct. 29, 1966). Jeff Mullins tied up Baltimore’s Don Ohl with 39 seconds left. “With these key plays stopping the Bullets, Jim King connected on a 10-foot jump shot with 26 seconds left for the San Francisco victory” (
The Sumter Daily Item, Oct. 29, 1966). Nov. 14, 1966, Thurmond had
20 points, 30 rebounds and 15 blocked shots in a 115-104 win over Detroit (
The Evening Independent, Nov. 15, 1966). Dec. 8, 1966, Rick Barry had an off night with 21 points on 8-for-33 shooting (24.2%) in a 116-106 loss to Baltimore, but Thurmond picked up the slack with 30 points.
Dec. 22, 1966, Thurmond held Wilt Chamberlain to 14 points (6-12 FG) and outrebounded him 25-22 in a 116-114 loss to Philadelphia (
Tri City Herald, Dec. 22, 1966).
Nate Thurmond, Wilt Chamberlain’s understudy when both played for San Francisco, hounded Philadelphia’s super star tenaciously but in vain Thursday night. Thurmond may have won the contest, but the 76ers won the game.
In the only National Basketball Association action, the Philadelphia 76ers outlasted a dogged Warrior squad and won, 116-114, although Thurmond held Chamberlain to 14 points and outrebounded the Big Dipper.
[…]
Thurmond played for years in Chamberlain’s super image. When the Big Dipper was traded by the Warriors to Philadelphia, Thurmond took over as San Francisco’s regular center.
Against Chamberlain, the Warrior center allowed only one field goal in six attempts in the first half. In the final quarter, however, Wilt made five of six attempts from the field and ended with 14 points.
Chamberlain had 22 rebounds and eight assists, Thurmond scored nine points, gathered in 25 rebounds and assisted on three goals.
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=sXcoAAAAIBAJ&sjid=IwYGAAAAIBAJ&pg=926,4442937"
In their next meeting, Feb. 2, 1967, Thurmond “blocked eight of Wilt’s shots, dominated both backboards with 23 rebounds and scored 16 points” in a 137-120 win over Philadelphia. “Chamberlain only managed 16 points” (
Park City Daily News, Feb. 3, 1967).
San Francisco coach Bill Sharman said, “I consider Nate right in the same class, but kinda in between, a Russell or a Chamberlain. Bill Russell, now who’s a little quicker than either one of ’em, will go to the corners, block a shot, or get back underneath and get the big rebound, or again pick up the cutter. Where Nate, won’t go out quite as far, but he will go out a bit farther than Wilt. Now of course Wilt is much stronger than both of ’em, so he will muscle and do a better job in close”
Rick Barry was All-Star Game MVP with a game-high 38 points (16-27 FG, 6-8 FT)—second only to Wilt Chamberlain’s 42 in 1962, six rebounds and three assists in 34 minutes, but “[t]here are those who think it should have gone to Thurmond. ‘Nate was the equalizer,’ commented Coach Fred Schaus of Los Angeles who directed the West. ‘
He was the entire key to the ball game. With Thurmond able to contest the entire East front line (on rebounds), we were able to run. This was our game plan’” (
The Sumter Daily Item, Jan. 11, 1967). Thurmond had 16 points (7-16 FG, 2-4 FT) and 18 rebounds in 42 minutes. “
Thurmond definitely was the most valuable player,” said Chamberlain. “He did the entire job while Barry just put the ball through the hoop.”
Feb. 5, 1967, Thurmond scored the winning basket on a tip-in with four seconds left and blocked a last shot in a 142-141 overtime win over Chicago. Feb. 10, 1967, Thurmond fractured two bones in his left hand during the second quarter of a 137-136 double overtime loss to Boston (
The Free Lance-Star, Feb. 11, 1967).
“If Thurmond is out for six weeks, he could miss one or two playoff games. But if he misses eight weeks, his teammates might join him on the sidelines because of elimination.”Lodi News-Sentinel, March 15, 1967The San Francisco Warriors clinched the Western Division regular season championship nine days ago, but it’s doubtful if they get anywhere when the National Basketball Association playoffs begin next week.
The combination of numerous injuries and erratic performances by those in good shape have resulted in a flock of defeats. The San Franciscans have lost nine of their last 11 contests and often looked like the worst team in the Western Division rather than the title winner.
The Warriors began to struggle when 6 ft. 11 in. center Nate Thurmond broke his hand against Boston Feb. 10. Thurmond is back but unless he’s in top shape for the playoffs, a doubtful prospect, the San Francisco pros will have a tough time beating anyone.
Sparked by high scoring Rick Barry and Thurmond, the Warriors got off to a fast start last October and had run up a 9½ game lead over second place St. Louis by the middle of January. They were breezing along until Thurmond’s injury.[Thurmond] led Warriors to NBA Finals, and did best job on Chamberlain of anyone, and the Warriors did better in the postseason against the 76ers than anyone else. “It was a personal thing for us to fight back,” Thurmond said after San Francisco won Game 3. “Boston took only one game from the 76ers and as a matter of pride we want to do better than the Celtics [...].”
Elgee wrote:[1967] DRtg
Code: Select all
1. Boston 91.2
2. San Francisco 92.9
3. Detroit 94.6
4. Chicago 94.8
5. Philadelphia 95.1
LEAGUE AVG. 96.1
6. Los Angeles 97.3
7. St. Louis 97.6
8. Baltimore 98.2
9. Cincinnati 98.8
10. New York 100.9Ran the +/- for [1967] Thurmond:
w/out Thurmond - 119.1 ppg 126.6 opp ppg
with Thurmond - 123.2 ppg 117.8 opp ppg
That's a monstrous +12.9. It should be noted that the number is exaggerated by a pretty difficult schedule (SRS 1.13, 9H 6A).
So after all that, why am I giving preference to 1969 Thurmond?
I think his team anchoring without Barry was more laudable. Thurmond takes a lot of grief for his poor shot efficiency, and some have even unfairly maligned him as a chucker (he was not, he just played heavy minutes in a fast league). Look at those 1969 Warriors. Jeff Mullins is rightfully their leading scorer, although that year I think there around fifteen scorers I would take over him. Past Mullins, they have an inefficient Rudy LaRusso as their second option, and then by necessity Nate Thurmond is the third option. Thurmond is an ineffective scorer, do not get me wrong, and this is his biggest weakness relative to almost every other all-time centre. If you need Thurmond to be your third best scorer, it is pretty ugly… but man, not many teams would ever need Thurmond to handle the scoring load needed on the 1969 Warriors. The team also misses their best passer for 30 games, further exacerbating their offensive situation. Terrible offensive year, but the team structure makes him looks worse than he actually is, and I do not really believe that his 1967 self would do any better or that his 1969 self would do worse on the 1967 team.
The playoffs come around. The Warriors build a shocking 2-0 road lead against the Lakers. And then… Jeff Mullins gets hurt. He manages to be in half-decent playing shape by Game 6 (which turns into a brutal blow-out), but by then it is too late. Games 3-5, he averages 3 points in 18.7 minutes per game on
20% efficiency. The team’s only real scoring option, reduced to that. How many centres are winning in that circumstance? You look at what Russell did that year on the Celtics. Do team results change if you swap the two of them for the postseason? Margins were close in the Finals, but I am not sure the results do change (setting aside Russell’s unparalleled clutch factor). And what would we say if Jeff Mullins stays healthy, and the Lakers are pushed to seven games or possibly even lose? I recognise these are not undeniable arguments to take 1969 over 1967, and you can just as easily ponder the what-if where the 1967 Warriors make one more free throw in Game 1 of the Finals and push the Greatest Team Ever to a seventh game, but I do feel 1969 is a little more individually impressive with how much disruption Thurmond was able to impose on a dramatically more talented team (much as what he did to the Bucks a few years later).
3. Dave Cowens a.) 1974 b.) 1973 c.) 1976As we approach #50 and as distinctions between player evaluations become increasingly thin, I find myself wanting to reward the remaining “winners” to close out the project. Cowens was the best player on a top three SRS team every year from 1973-76, winning two titles in that stretch. In 1973 the Celtics did not win a title, but Cowens did win MVP and take the 1973 Knicks to a tight seven games even as Havlicek was hampered by injury. 1975 was probably his best individual regular season, but a disappointing playoff performance is enough for me to exclude it from my alternates with all four years being otherwise pretty comparable (his defence saw a gradual decline as his passing saw a gradual improvement).
Cort Reynolds wrote: He may not have been named MVP of the NBA Finals in 1974 or 1976, but undersized Hall of Fame Boston center Dave Cowens was the key force in winning both clinching games of those memorable championship series for the Celtics.
In the 1970's no one played harder for Boston, or anyone else for that matter, with apologies to Jerry Sloan, Norm Van Lier and Dave DeBusschere, than the fiery 6-8.5 redhead.
In game seven of the epic 1974 NBA Finals, the Celtics faced the tall task of beating Milwaukee on the road. Buck center Kareem Abdul-Jabbar was in his youthful prime and enjoyed nearly a six-inch height advantage - which was probably close to a foot when reach is included - over Cowens.
…
The Bucks had forced a seventh game by winning a double overtime classic in Boston just two days earlier, when Jabbar's long running baseline hook over Celtic backup center Hank Finkel gave Milwaukee a see-saw 102-101 victory.
Cowens had fouled out earlier in overtime, or the outcome may well have been different, with the Celtics likely celebrating title number 12 at home.
John Havlicek had traded baskets with the 7-2 Jabbar throughout the final extra session, scoring nine of his 36 points in the second OT, but Kareem got the last shot in.
Yet a hustling play by Cowens that came to epitomize his career happened late in that classic sixth contest. Dave switched off on a pick defensively to cover Robertson, then used his quick hands to poke the ball away from the Hall of Famer.
The speedy center then out-sprinted the 6-5 guard for the loose ball, which rolled into the backcourt. Cowens dove for the ball and slid with it near the sidelines while the loose leather bobbled in and out of his arms. Oscar trailed the play and never left his feet, almost in disbelief at the bigger man's reckless dive.
Cowens left a sweat streak about 10 feet long on the old Garden parquet, probably along with some skin. While the Bucks argued that he never had possession of the ball, the referees correctly ruled that the 24-second clock had nevertheless run out to give Boston the ball.
Not long after, Cowens fouled out with just 13 points on five of 19 shooting, and his absence contributed to the series-tying Buck win. Determined to redeem himself, the proud Celtic star came out firing in game seven.
Boston came up with a new strategy to aid Dave. The Boston braintrust decided to pressure the aging Robertson hard with defensive ace Don Chaney while he brought the ball upcourt.
And then once Milwaukee was into its halfcourt offense, coach Tom Heinsohn had Paul Silas, Havlicek and others also double down and help while Cowens fronted and battled Jabbar for position.
After he was told about the change in defensive strategy, Dave would relate years later in an interview that he felt like saying, "Yes! I am finally going to get some help on this guy."
After having the redhead go one-on-one for six games with the much bigger man who was the total focal point of their offense, Jabbar had averaged almost 34 points per game, so the Celtic brass felt it had to try something.
By not having to expend as much energy defending the 7-2 Jabbar alone, it seemed as if Cowens had been unchained and energized for the decisive contest.
On offense, the muscular Cowens used his superior speed and quickness to take the slower Jabbar out on the floor and drive by him, taking advantage of Kareem's relative lack of lateral quickness.
The high-leaping, aggressive Cowens won the opening jump over Jabbar and tapped it it to Havlicek, who fed a cutting Chaney perfectly for a layup that set an immediate, positive tone in the contest for the Celtics.
As time ran out in the first period, Dave bombed a 25-footer from the right side at the buzzer that went straight in to give Boston a 22-20 lead.
The Celtics lengthened the lead late in the half as their defense stymied Jabbar and Robertson. Dave triggered the vaunted Celtic fast break with a defensive rebound and airborne outlet pass that led to a 16-footer by Don Nelson.
Shortly afterward, Cowens nailed consecutive foul line jumpers that gave the visitors a 53-40 intermission edge. Their defensive strategy, cooked up between games six and seven by Celtic patriarch Red Auerbach, Heinsohn and the legendary Bob Cousy, was working almost to perfection.
Robertson, who had played for Cousy in Cincinnati before their falling out led to the Big O's trade to Milwaukee, was hounded into perhaps the worst playoff game of his career at a very inopportune time.
If nothing else, the all-court pressure put on by the quicker Celtics rushed the Bucks and took vital seconds off the shot clock, forcing hurried decisions and field goal tries. With veteran leader and playmaker Robertson flustered, the Buck offense floundered.
As a result, scoring machine Jabbar was amazingly held without a single point in the entire second stanza and for half of the third period. This was a major drought when one realizes that Kareem came into game seven averaging his number per outing in the 1974 playoffs (33).
…
At the other end, Boston closed the door with a clever bit of body control and quick reactions. Cowens missed a half hook in the lane that richocheted off Jabbar's hands to a nearly-prone Westphal, who was just getting up off the hardwood after being floored while setting a screen.
Paul then hung in the air as he looked to shoot a short jumper over the looming 7-2 Buck center. But at the last second, he double-clutched and instead tossed a beautifully improvised short alley-oop pass to Cowens past Jabbar. Dave caught the ball in the air on the right side of the lane and cleverly kissed it in off glass before Kareem could recover.
That was the final nail in the Milwaukee coffin.
…
Havlicek, who enjoyed a great series, was named Finals MVP even though he tallied a modest 16 points on six of 20 shooting in the decisive contest.
His second fourth quarter three-point play on a foul line jumper as he was hit in the stomach capped a decisive 11-0 spurt that put the game well out of reach, 98-79.
But the game seven MVP was definitely Big Red. The final box score showed Cowens with game-high totals of 28 points and 14 rebounds, compared to 26 and 13 for Jabbar.
Yet the considerable numbers did not show his great intangible contribution, as well. Or how much energy the fiery redhead had supplied his team. Nor how his defense had helped Kareem wear down and fade. He sank just six of 11 free throws in the game and went scoreless for over a third of the game in the crucial middle section when Boston took command.
Or how Cowens had ignited the deadly Celtic transition game with his defensive rebounding and quick outlet bullets, often firing his passes in midair while coming down with the carom.
…
Due in large part to the scrambling defensive strategy of Boston, Jabbar only took 21 shots in the decisive seventh contest, six below his series average for attempts to that point.
He also converted only 10 field goals after making 14.5 baskets per contest over the first six games - well below his 54 percent shooting accuracy to that point in the title series.
…
The grueling style of play that the speedy 1970's Celtics employed, in concert with a short bench and going deep into the playoffs each year (and thus having shorter off-seasons), had started to take a toll on the club. Plus, team captain Havlicek and sixth man Don Nelson were each 36.
In 1976, a grizzled Boston squad fought its way to the Finals despite a foot injury to Havlicek. It was the 13th Celtic championship series appearance in 20 years, and the last before the Larry Bird era.
…
It was Cowens who took over and scored seven points in a clutch 9-4 Celtic spurt that clinched the crown.
Despite being plagued with five fouls, the redhead gambled and came up with the biggest play of the game. As Adams drove along the right side of the lane, Dave dangerously reached in and poked the ball away from the Rookie of the Year, lunging to tip the loose sphere away from Adams.
He then snatched up the loose ball and dribbled, or more accurately roared, 80 feet upcourt at top speed on a 2 on 1 fast break, a runaway red-headed center locomotive.
As he approached the basket, the Celtic center crossed over to the right side and gave a slight head fake to freeze defender Heard. Dave then laid in a twisting backhanded layup over his shoulder while being fouled. He cashed in the free throw to give Boston a 71-67 lead and a huge momentum swing.
After a Phoenix score, Dave sealed Adams outside the low block and took a perfectly timed top-side feed from Charlie Scott before converting a right-handed layin for a 73-69 advantage.
Cowens then forced a bad miss by Adams by hotly contesting his 15-footer. Adams later canned two foul shots to cut the lead back to two. Yet Havlicek swished a clutch 18-footer from the left wing to make it 75-71.
After a Westphal miss, Dave took an entry pass and spun quickly along the right baseline with his trademark move past Adams for a pretty layup. The pet move gave Boston a little breathing room with a 77-71 margin at the 3:29 mark.
White banked in a tough right side runner and added a free throw to stretch the lead to nine, and it was all over but the shouting as Boston ultimately held on to win, 87-80.
After the final buzzer sounded, a tired Cowens hugged retiring teammate Nelson as they strode off the court as champions for the last time. For Nellie, it was a satisfying fifth ring after being released by the Lakers over a decade earlier.
With White struggling and Hondo hurt, it was clearly the clutch late offensive burst from Cowens that capped banner number 13. His aggressive, all-out defense also led to a drought of over five minutes without a basket for the Suns down the stretch.
Even though Dave scored 21 points in the decisive win, paced the defense and led all players in rebounds during the series while averaging 20.5 ppg, teammate JoJo White (21.7 ppg) was named Finals MVP.
Yet in true Cowens fashion, Dave probably didn't care that much, as long as Boston won. He was simply about winning, an undersized center who won on great athleticism (strength, speed, quickness and jumping ability), high basketball intelligence, skill, and a burning desire as bright as his red mane.
"There is no player with greater desire than Dave Cowens," said CBS commentator and fiery Hall of Famer Rick Barry during the 1976 Finals.
A powerful leaper, Cowens frequently won jump balls against much taller centers like Jabbar and an older Chamberlain, and used great positioning to frustrate Kareem and occasionally block his shots as well by forcing him to turn back to his right shoulder, away from his patented hook.
Back then a center jump ball was held at the start of each quarter, and if that rule seems antiquated, consider that the original rules up through the 1930's required that there be a center jump after every basket. So each quarter jump ball could be a key extra possession gained.
As Havlicek, who played the first seven seasons of his career with the great Bill Russell and then his final eight with Cowens, the 1970-71 co-Rookie of the Year, once said - "no one ever did more for the Celtics than Dave Cowens."
In the post-game six locker room TV interviews with CBS, Havlicek reinforced this claim. "We were able to keep Dave on the floor (not foul out), and that made the difference," said Hondo.
Unfortunately, Dave's all-out style and annual deep playoff runs eventually contributed to his body breaking down by the time he reached his early 30's.
…
Heinsohn, who after the death of Red Auerbach assumed the mantel of Mr. Celtic after 50-plus years as star player, championship coach and team announcer, called his 1970's Boston teams "the quickest of all Celtic clubs."
As such he designed a revolutionary point center/forward type of up-tempo offense to take advantage of the extraordinary blend of skills, athleticism and desire of his speedy red-headed center and Havlicek, as well as the sharpshooting White.
Those Celtics did not have a true point guard. White, Chaney and Havlicek shared the ballhandling duties, while Cowens often directed the offense from the top of the key with his passing, driving and shooting ability.
Cowens’ Backpicks WOWYR scores are a bit underwhelming, but I was pretty impressed with what I saw from a similar type of raw win-loss analysis as I did with Thurmond.
1972: 54-25, 2-1
1973: 68-14
1974: 55-25, 1-1
1975: 51-14, 9-8
1976: 52-26, 2-2
1977: 29-21, 15-17
1978: 32-45, 0-5
1979: 27-41, 2-12
Overall: 368-211 with (52-win pace), 31-46 without (33-win pace)
And then even in 1980 he at least contributed to what would be the second-best regular season SRS team of Bird’s career.
Not my strongest case, but no one else has much of a draw. Reed will be voted in first, but to me he looks much less important to his team without any notable advantage in success. I think McAdoo was a less valuable offensive lead than Rick Barry (whose playmaking better maximised team offence while his position permitted the team to skew more toward defence), was a less valuable scorer than Bernard King (outright better scorer at a less defensively valuable position), and was a less valuable scoring power forward than Kevin McHale (much better defensively and efficiency gap overcomes volume difference); he is not a top 50 candidate for me.
Now, let's move into the reason why I put him on my voting list.
Mourning hovered around #50 in the careers project for years (top 50 in 2011 and 2014, #52 in 2017) before taking a tumble in 2020, but variance increases as these projects go on. Plenty of people have him top fifty.
Is Penny Hardaway a top fifty player? Hell, is Bill Walton and his uh one healthy postseason as a starter? You hate Reggie, but Reggie routinely finishes higher than Mourning in career lists; would you like us to start voting for Reggie in this 