Highly recommend this video. I really enjoyed the analysis and overall tone Taylor had, really fantastic stuff here.
I found the portrayal of Wilt's offensive abilities to be accurate, and overall, it was a fair and positive assessment of his game. In the video, Taylor delves into aspects such as:
1. Offensive Fouls: He discusses the challenges Wilt faced in getting a position in the paint and how this impacted his game compared to players like Shaq.
2. Spacing: The era's spacing made it difficult to find passes and create opportunities for teammates, a problem evident in the 1964 footage that explains the teams offensive issues. His team was notably poor offensively, with the footage showcasing Hightower, Thurmond, and Guy Rodgers all on the court simultaneously, leading to some terrible spacing:
3. Celtics' Defensive Strategy: Newspapers often mention teams doubling or tripling Wilt, especially in the playoffs. Although zone defense was theoretically illegal, the referees didn't enforce it. The Celtics would typically have a guard, usually K.C. Jones, fronting Wilt, while Russell covered him from behind. This ball denial strategy complicated the task of getting the ball to Wilt and reduced his shot attempts. Heinsohn or Jones would also sometimes drift from their man and disturb Wilt as he set-up in the post.
4. Monstrous Off-Ball Game: Wilt's status as one of the greatest offensive rebounders ever, combined with his ability to guide shots in for his team, made him virtually unstoppable around the paint.
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I do believe that the limitations in Wilt's dribbling that Taylor mentions, as well as the lack of scoring moves that create opportunities for teammates, are heavily influenced by the rules of the era in which he played. Such as harsher three-second calls, traveling violations, and dribble rules--this made offense significantly more challenging.
I agree with Taylor's analysis of Hannum's system in '67 taking better advantage of their talent. Players like Chet Walker and Hal Greer could also create their offense to take pressure off Wilt. Taylor is right to infer that Hannum's system didn't so much correct Wilt's approach but rather assembled the right players and structure to support him.
Taylor concludes by expressing a preference for the '64 version of Wilt. Wilt had the scoring and passing that season to anchor a team like the '67 76ers, but unfortunately, he lacked the offensive talent to achieve this.
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It's noteworthy to add that the '64 Warriors actually declined in relative Offensive Rating compared to the '62 (Wilt's 50 PPG) and '63 (missed playoffs) Warriors. The same offense that Hannum implemented, although perfect for the 76ers, didn't work as well on a team with poor shooters and limited offensive talent.
This is something I've mentioned before, but those early Warriors teams were solid defensively but lacking in offense. After all, they were the worst offense in the league in '59 before Wilt joined—and that was with Arizin and Gola both playing.
This aligns with Taylor's final (and correct) conclusion in the video: That the 1964 version of Wilt offers the best blend of his offensive strengths.
Yet, the '64 team was actually the worst offense that prime Wilt played on.
This leads me to conclude that Wilt's peak offensive performance in '64 was hampered by some truly dismal offensive talent—a recurring theme throughout his early career.
This is why I believe that, although it may seem sub-optimal, the '62 offense was more efficient
for that team. Because Wilt was on a more defensively oriented team, him taking a large portion of his team's shots made the offense better because he was far and away the most efficient scorer on the Warriors. As Pat Riley states in the documentary
Goliath:
"Was he selfish? I don't think he was selfish. I think he had to shoot as much as he could for his team to win."
During the '62 season the Warriors were:
32-13 (71%) when Wilt scored 50+ points.
28-14 (67%) when Wilt attempted 40+ shots.
Hannum's shift towards a more pass-oriented style with his 'wheel' offense ended up enabling less efficient scorers to shoot more frequently. This allowed Wilt to conserve energy for defense and was worth the risk that teammates might improve with more open looks.
When Hannum joined the 76ers in '67 and implemented the same wheel system, the team had the necessary skill set to thrive under this offense with Wilt.
Let me clarify that I completely agree with Ben Taylor that Wilt and his teams were better when he passed more. Hannum's wheel offense was more reliable and consistent under the right conditions than Wilt shooting 30-40 times. It was also advantageous that, now that he was taking fewer shots, Wilt had more energy for defense. Sharing the ball and keeping it moving is the optimal way to play basketball when you have the right offensive talent—but the Warriors lacked that during Wilt's time there.
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Overall, this was an impressive and well-researched video that I have few gripes about. Good work, Ben Taylor.
