Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#47. The 2020 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +9.92, Standard Deviations: +1.87, Lost in Conference Finals (Preseason 9th)
Regular Season Record: 48-24, Regular Season SRS: +5.83 (73rd), Earned the 3 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.7 (67th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.6 (52nd)
PG: Kemba Walker, +4.6 / +3.0
SG: Marcus Smart, +1.4 / +0.4
SF: Jaylen Brown, +0.8 / +3.3
PF: Jayson Tatum, +4.0 / +6.3
C: Daniel Theis, +2.4 / +0.5
6th: Gordon Hayward, +2.7 / -0.1
Kemba Walker (PG, 29): 31 MPPG, 28% OLoad, 21 / 4 / 5 / 1 on +1.0%
Jayson Tatum (PF, 21): 35 MPPG, 28% OLoad, 24 / 7 / 3 / 2 on +0.2%
Jaylen Brown (SF, 23): 34 MPPG, 24% OLoad, 20 / 6 / 2 / 2 on +1.8%
Gordon Hayward (SF, 29): 34 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 18 / 7 / 4 / 1 on +3.0%
Marcus Smart (SG, 25): 32 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 13 / 4 / 5 / 2 on -4.7%
Daniel Theis (C, 27): 24 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 9 / 7 / 2 / 2 on +6.6%
Scoring/100: Jayson Tatum (33.0 / +0.2%), Kemba Walker (31.7 / +1.0%), Jaylen Brown (28.9 / +1.8%)
Assists/100: Kemba Walker (7.4), Marcus Smart (7.3), Gordon Hayward (5.9)
Heliocentrism: 23.4% (74th of 83 teams) - Tatum
Wingmen: 33.8% (59th) - Walker & Hayward
Depth: 42.8% (9th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +3.77 (66th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.34 (46th)
Playoff SRS: +12.39 (29th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.09 (23rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.04 (81st), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.07 (27th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 31.8% - Tatum
Playoff Wingmen: 38.6% - Brown & Walker
Playoff Bench: 29.6%
Round 1: Philadelphia 76ers (+2.2), won 4-0, by +11.8 points per game (+14.0 SRS eq)
Round 2: Toronto Raptors (+9.8), won 4-3, by +5.3 points per game (+15.1 SRS eq)
Round 3: Miami Heat (+8.0), lost 2-4, by +0.2 points per game (+8.2 SRS eq)
Round 4:
The 2020 Celtics ahead of the 1973 New York Knicks!? What’s the world coming to!? Is there no decency!? At long last sir, have you no decency? Kobescarf is going to come after me with a machete . . .
Jokes aside, I was really, really surprised by this one. About as much as by the ‘09 Nuggets. The Nuggets, after examination, probably shouldn’t have been there. But the Celtics? The more I look at them, the more it makes a certain degree of sense. So give me a second to tell you a story and we’ll see where this shakes out . . .
Once upon a time, there were the 2013 Boston Celtics. They were only an average team, but they were the vestigial remnants of the excellent Celtics teams of ‘08-’12. Kevin Garnett was 36 and Paul Pierce was 35. GM Danny Ainge decided to blow it up, just as decisively as he decided to swing for the fences leading into the ‘08 season. He traded Garnett, Pierce and Jason Terry and a second for three firsts and a pick swap. It may sound like a standard deal, except for the fact that Garnett and Pierce were already running on fumes. The trade actually led to the Nets dropping 5 wins the next year, 6 the year after, and then falling into the 20s for three years. So it’s not a huge exaggeration to say that Ainge traded mostly nothing in exchange for three firsts (and a pick swap that ended up becoming the #1 overall) from a bottom-dwelling team. Was this an Ainge masterstroke, or the Nets’ GM (with pressure from his new owner) completely crapping the bed? More the latter I think, but Ainge gets credit for pulling it off.
The Celtics spent one year in the 20s before vaulting back to mediocrity. Ainge hired former Butler coach Brad Stevens to coach the Celtics and it proved extremely effective. While not particularly gifted at handling NBA-sized egos Stevens was to demonstrate one of the better tactical minds in the game, with a penchant for getting the most out of ensemble casts. Which is good, because ensemble casts are what Ainge would give him. The Celtics became a decent team for a few years, then acquired Kyrie Irving and were surprised to find that his addition didn’t pay the dividends that they had expected. They let him walk in free agency, trusting their young and deep roster. And it was an interesting composition.
They snatched up a disgruntled Kemba Walker from the Hornets for a song; Walker wasn’t as skilled as Irving, but he may have integrated into the offense better. Jaylen Brown was 23 and full of potential, even if he hadn’t really delivered on it yet. Jayson Tatum (former #3 pick) would be 21, and had flashed potential the year before. Marcus Smart on the glass half empty side was a weak scorer and only a decent passer. On the glass half-full side, he was perhaps the best defender in the league at 6’3” or under, fierce and strong enough to defend even bigs for a pinch. And at center was the no-named Daniel Theis, a big man who’d been on three straight champions in the German leagues. Ainge signed the 25 year-old Theis to an extremely team friendly contract that he’d more than earn, proving to be an intelligent rim-runner, converting low usage at high efficiency with good rebounding and strong defense. It was an interesting mix of talent and skill, with reason to expect improvement. But the preseason odds-makers put the Celtics 9th, down from 2nd the year before (people had been quite bullish about Kyrie Irving combining with Jayson Tatum and Jaylen Brown).
And I wouldn’t say that the Celtics exactly dominated the regular season. In the pandemic-shortened season they put up an RSRS of +5.83, 5th in the league. That’s 73rd on the list; nothing to brag about but decent enough to show up if the postseason goes their way. But then the pandemic happened. An extremely contagious (more than flu, way less than measles) new virus swept through the world. The fatality rate itself was not dramatically high (maybe 4-5 times as high as the seasonal flu depending on estimates). But it was contagious enough that if it was allowed to go unchecked through a state it *would* overwhelm the hospital system (eventually), which would in turn drive up the mortality of COVID and, well, everything else. And it defied easy diagnosis; you could have zero symptoms and yet carry the disease and infect others (or interact with asymptomatic people and get infected). On March 12th, the first wave of the pandemic already sweeping up some beaches, the President declared a state of emergency (most states were pretty unaffected but the states that were exposed were hit quite hard - this extremely disproportionate first exposure did nothing to get different parts of the country on the same page about it).
With that, the NBA stopped its season cold. For three-four months no games were played. Teams weren’t even allowed to work out with each other, lest they risk catching the disease and spread it through the roster. Everyone was on their own. The NBA and the players union brainstormed as hard as they could to figure out a way to hold games safely. They eventually decided on hosting the end of the season, and the playoffs, in the Disney Wide World of Sports complex. The players and staff, once admitted, would be unable to leave the complex. Free run of the facility was theirs, but the outside world, including their families, would be off limits. They could bring no personal chefs, no personal trainers; they’d be at the mercy of the staff at the Wide World of Sports. They’d only play eight regular season games and then the playoffs, only inviting teams with a shot of making the postseason. Teams could only leave the “bubble” when they were eliminated. That doesn’t sound particularly dramatic, but the teams that made the Finals spent more than three months without access to the outside world. And it wasn’t easy; a fairly consistent theme of player interviews after the fact was how difficult the situation was. Apparently early on the food wasn’t close to what the players were used to, and everyone was homesick. And this adversity manifested in curious ways. Specifically, it seemed as though teams with a strong team bond were unusually favored by this setup. The teams that would go on to distinguish themselves were all (as far as I can tell) very close. The mental challenges of playing in the bubble after a three-four month layoff were one of the hidden subplots of the season, and the Boston Celtics (a team-oriented ensemble cast) handled it extremely well.
In the first round they faced the 76ers, a decent six seed (+2.2). The Celtics wrecked them in a sweep, by 11.8 points a game. The Celtics shut down the Sixers’ shooting (besides Joel Embiid) holding them to -5.3%. On the other side Tatum, Walker and Brown combined for 72.8 points a game on +4.2% or better. It was a dominant win. But there was an asterisk; the Sixers were missing Ben Simmons. I’m not certain of how big a deal this was; Simmons actually had a negative plus/minus in 2020, and an RPM (from ESPN) of +1.29, so this isn’t like losing Durant for a series. Still, it is a factor.
The Celtics advanced to face the Toronto Raptors. The Raptors had put up a strong RSRS, but in the first round had obliterated the Brooklyn Nets by 20.5 points a game. And this wasn’t even a one-game thing. The Raptors’ wins were by 24, 5, 25 and 28 points. OSRS bumps them all the way from +6 to +9.8 for that series. On one hand that may have been an overreaction, but beating a team (even a weak team) consistently by 20+ a game is really, really impressive. What the formula doesn’t know is that the Nets were short Taurean Prince and Spencer Dinwiddie, both due to COVID positives. So it’s an impressive win . . . but not by as much.
Either way, the Celtics outplayed them fairly decisively. They held the Raptors to -4.5% shooting and prevailed by 5.3 points per game. This may not jibe with our memories of the series. The Celtics’ wins were by 18, 3, 22 and 5. The Raptors wins were by 1, 7 and 3. I feel pretty comfortable in saying that, even if it went to seven games, that the Celtics were the better team and played like it. The Raptors probably weren’t a +9.8 SRS team, but they were certainly better than +6. For the Celtics to win by 5.3 a game was a really nice series win. And it sent them to the Conference Finals against the Miami Heat.
The Heat had been only a decent regular season team, but had transformed by the playoffs. They decisively beat the Pacers by 10.5 a game. And in the semifinals they played (by SRS) the best team in the league, the Milwaukee Bucks. In Game 1 the Heat had won by 11. In Game 2 the Heat won by 2. In Game 3 Giannis twisted his ankle and the Heat won by 15. In Game 4 Giannis only played 11 minutes, and the Bucks somehow pulled the win off by 3. But he didn’t dress for Game 5, which the Heat won by 9. So. The formula credits the Heat with beating a +9 SRS team by 6.8 points a game. Obviously that isn’t entirely fair (with Giannis’ injury) but the Heat were winning just fine when Giannis was healthy too. So by the Conference Finals the Heat were graded with an OSRS of +8 themselves.
The Celtics and Heat battled almost to a standstill. Both were diverse, high-skill, well-coached teams. The Celtics turned it over slightly more, but had more success on the boards. The Heat ended up with a 1 shot a game advantage. The Celtics, in turn, shot better, +1.5% to +1.0%. The end result was incredibly tight, with the Celtics barely averaging 0.2 more points per game. Unfortunately, the games didn’t actually break down like that. The Celtics lost in 6, with their two wins of 11 and 13 points falling to the Heat’s wins of 3, 5, 3 and 12 points. It was a tough loss, but the Celtics had certainly played the Heat toe to toe.
So. Where does all this shape up? The Celtics’ RSRS wasn’t great, but it wasn’t bad. They were the 5th best team in the regular season, which doesn’t sound good, but it’s pretty much the same as being the 2nd or 3rd best in a 15-team league, which certainly describes many of the teams discussed here. And their playoffs were very strong. Their sweep of the Sixers was probably less than a +14 SRS (on account of missing Simmons), but not much less. Their performance against an excellent Toronto team really speaks well of them; Toronto was somewhere between a +6 and a +9 SRS team in the playoffs, and Boston beat them by 5 points a game. And the series against Miami? Miami in the playoffs was really good, decisively beating the Bucks even when Giannis was healthy. Put it all together, a low-ish RSRS with a really strong PSRS, and this ranking makes complete sense.
Do I think they should be this high? Probably not. Let’s say that I drop the Bucks by 1.5 SRS for Giannis’ injury, the Nets to -5 SRS and the Sixers down by 1.2 SRS. Those changes keep the ‘20 Celtics on this list easily, but drops them to 68th (again, the gap between these teams is often fairly small this low on the list). But I want to be clear: the 2020 Boston Celtics were really good, and probably the second best team in the NBA this year. The Heat had a weak regular season, the Bucks got whipped by the Heat and the Clippers folded to the Nuggets. It was a weird year, perhaps the most mentally challenging playoffs ever, but the team-first Boston Celtics really distinguished themselves in a time of adversity. Make no mistake; the '20 Celtics may not deserve to be ranked this high, but they belong on this list.
Regular Season Record: 48-24, Regular Season SRS: +5.83 (73rd), Earned the 3 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.7 (67th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.6 (52nd)
PG: Kemba Walker, +4.6 / +3.0
SG: Marcus Smart, +1.4 / +0.4
SF: Jaylen Brown, +0.8 / +3.3
PF: Jayson Tatum, +4.0 / +6.3
C: Daniel Theis, +2.4 / +0.5
6th: Gordon Hayward, +2.7 / -0.1
Kemba Walker (PG, 29): 31 MPPG, 28% OLoad, 21 / 4 / 5 / 1 on +1.0%
Jayson Tatum (PF, 21): 35 MPPG, 28% OLoad, 24 / 7 / 3 / 2 on +0.2%
Jaylen Brown (SF, 23): 34 MPPG, 24% OLoad, 20 / 6 / 2 / 2 on +1.8%
Gordon Hayward (SF, 29): 34 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 18 / 7 / 4 / 1 on +3.0%
Marcus Smart (SG, 25): 32 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 13 / 4 / 5 / 2 on -4.7%
Daniel Theis (C, 27): 24 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 9 / 7 / 2 / 2 on +6.6%
Scoring/100: Jayson Tatum (33.0 / +0.2%), Kemba Walker (31.7 / +1.0%), Jaylen Brown (28.9 / +1.8%)
Assists/100: Kemba Walker (7.4), Marcus Smart (7.3), Gordon Hayward (5.9)
Heliocentrism: 23.4% (74th of 83 teams) - Tatum
Wingmen: 33.8% (59th) - Walker & Hayward
Depth: 42.8% (9th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +3.77 (66th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.34 (46th)
Playoff SRS: +12.39 (29th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.09 (23rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.04 (81st), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.07 (27th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 31.8% - Tatum
Playoff Wingmen: 38.6% - Brown & Walker
Playoff Bench: 29.6%
Round 1: Philadelphia 76ers (+2.2), won 4-0, by +11.8 points per game (+14.0 SRS eq)
Round 2: Toronto Raptors (+9.8), won 4-3, by +5.3 points per game (+15.1 SRS eq)
Round 3: Miami Heat (+8.0), lost 2-4, by +0.2 points per game (+8.2 SRS eq)
Round 4:
The 2020 Celtics ahead of the 1973 New York Knicks!? What’s the world coming to!? Is there no decency!? At long last sir, have you no decency? Kobescarf is going to come after me with a machete . . .
Jokes aside, I was really, really surprised by this one. About as much as by the ‘09 Nuggets. The Nuggets, after examination, probably shouldn’t have been there. But the Celtics? The more I look at them, the more it makes a certain degree of sense. So give me a second to tell you a story and we’ll see where this shakes out . . .
Once upon a time, there were the 2013 Boston Celtics. They were only an average team, but they were the vestigial remnants of the excellent Celtics teams of ‘08-’12. Kevin Garnett was 36 and Paul Pierce was 35. GM Danny Ainge decided to blow it up, just as decisively as he decided to swing for the fences leading into the ‘08 season. He traded Garnett, Pierce and Jason Terry and a second for three firsts and a pick swap. It may sound like a standard deal, except for the fact that Garnett and Pierce were already running on fumes. The trade actually led to the Nets dropping 5 wins the next year, 6 the year after, and then falling into the 20s for three years. So it’s not a huge exaggeration to say that Ainge traded mostly nothing in exchange for three firsts (and a pick swap that ended up becoming the #1 overall) from a bottom-dwelling team. Was this an Ainge masterstroke, or the Nets’ GM (with pressure from his new owner) completely crapping the bed? More the latter I think, but Ainge gets credit for pulling it off.
The Celtics spent one year in the 20s before vaulting back to mediocrity. Ainge hired former Butler coach Brad Stevens to coach the Celtics and it proved extremely effective. While not particularly gifted at handling NBA-sized egos Stevens was to demonstrate one of the better tactical minds in the game, with a penchant for getting the most out of ensemble casts. Which is good, because ensemble casts are what Ainge would give him. The Celtics became a decent team for a few years, then acquired Kyrie Irving and were surprised to find that his addition didn’t pay the dividends that they had expected. They let him walk in free agency, trusting their young and deep roster. And it was an interesting composition.
They snatched up a disgruntled Kemba Walker from the Hornets for a song; Walker wasn’t as skilled as Irving, but he may have integrated into the offense better. Jaylen Brown was 23 and full of potential, even if he hadn’t really delivered on it yet. Jayson Tatum (former #3 pick) would be 21, and had flashed potential the year before. Marcus Smart on the glass half empty side was a weak scorer and only a decent passer. On the glass half-full side, he was perhaps the best defender in the league at 6’3” or under, fierce and strong enough to defend even bigs for a pinch. And at center was the no-named Daniel Theis, a big man who’d been on three straight champions in the German leagues. Ainge signed the 25 year-old Theis to an extremely team friendly contract that he’d more than earn, proving to be an intelligent rim-runner, converting low usage at high efficiency with good rebounding and strong defense. It was an interesting mix of talent and skill, with reason to expect improvement. But the preseason odds-makers put the Celtics 9th, down from 2nd the year before (people had been quite bullish about Kyrie Irving combining with Jayson Tatum and Jaylen Brown).
And I wouldn’t say that the Celtics exactly dominated the regular season. In the pandemic-shortened season they put up an RSRS of +5.83, 5th in the league. That’s 73rd on the list; nothing to brag about but decent enough to show up if the postseason goes their way. But then the pandemic happened. An extremely contagious (more than flu, way less than measles) new virus swept through the world. The fatality rate itself was not dramatically high (maybe 4-5 times as high as the seasonal flu depending on estimates). But it was contagious enough that if it was allowed to go unchecked through a state it *would* overwhelm the hospital system (eventually), which would in turn drive up the mortality of COVID and, well, everything else. And it defied easy diagnosis; you could have zero symptoms and yet carry the disease and infect others (or interact with asymptomatic people and get infected). On March 12th, the first wave of the pandemic already sweeping up some beaches, the President declared a state of emergency (most states were pretty unaffected but the states that were exposed were hit quite hard - this extremely disproportionate first exposure did nothing to get different parts of the country on the same page about it).
With that, the NBA stopped its season cold. For three-four months no games were played. Teams weren’t even allowed to work out with each other, lest they risk catching the disease and spread it through the roster. Everyone was on their own. The NBA and the players union brainstormed as hard as they could to figure out a way to hold games safely. They eventually decided on hosting the end of the season, and the playoffs, in the Disney Wide World of Sports complex. The players and staff, once admitted, would be unable to leave the complex. Free run of the facility was theirs, but the outside world, including their families, would be off limits. They could bring no personal chefs, no personal trainers; they’d be at the mercy of the staff at the Wide World of Sports. They’d only play eight regular season games and then the playoffs, only inviting teams with a shot of making the postseason. Teams could only leave the “bubble” when they were eliminated. That doesn’t sound particularly dramatic, but the teams that made the Finals spent more than three months without access to the outside world. And it wasn’t easy; a fairly consistent theme of player interviews after the fact was how difficult the situation was. Apparently early on the food wasn’t close to what the players were used to, and everyone was homesick. And this adversity manifested in curious ways. Specifically, it seemed as though teams with a strong team bond were unusually favored by this setup. The teams that would go on to distinguish themselves were all (as far as I can tell) very close. The mental challenges of playing in the bubble after a three-four month layoff were one of the hidden subplots of the season, and the Boston Celtics (a team-oriented ensemble cast) handled it extremely well.
In the first round they faced the 76ers, a decent six seed (+2.2). The Celtics wrecked them in a sweep, by 11.8 points a game. The Celtics shut down the Sixers’ shooting (besides Joel Embiid) holding them to -5.3%. On the other side Tatum, Walker and Brown combined for 72.8 points a game on +4.2% or better. It was a dominant win. But there was an asterisk; the Sixers were missing Ben Simmons. I’m not certain of how big a deal this was; Simmons actually had a negative plus/minus in 2020, and an RPM (from ESPN) of +1.29, so this isn’t like losing Durant for a series. Still, it is a factor.
The Celtics advanced to face the Toronto Raptors. The Raptors had put up a strong RSRS, but in the first round had obliterated the Brooklyn Nets by 20.5 points a game. And this wasn’t even a one-game thing. The Raptors’ wins were by 24, 5, 25 and 28 points. OSRS bumps them all the way from +6 to +9.8 for that series. On one hand that may have been an overreaction, but beating a team (even a weak team) consistently by 20+ a game is really, really impressive. What the formula doesn’t know is that the Nets were short Taurean Prince and Spencer Dinwiddie, both due to COVID positives. So it’s an impressive win . . . but not by as much.
Either way, the Celtics outplayed them fairly decisively. They held the Raptors to -4.5% shooting and prevailed by 5.3 points per game. This may not jibe with our memories of the series. The Celtics’ wins were by 18, 3, 22 and 5. The Raptors wins were by 1, 7 and 3. I feel pretty comfortable in saying that, even if it went to seven games, that the Celtics were the better team and played like it. The Raptors probably weren’t a +9.8 SRS team, but they were certainly better than +6. For the Celtics to win by 5.3 a game was a really nice series win. And it sent them to the Conference Finals against the Miami Heat.
The Heat had been only a decent regular season team, but had transformed by the playoffs. They decisively beat the Pacers by 10.5 a game. And in the semifinals they played (by SRS) the best team in the league, the Milwaukee Bucks. In Game 1 the Heat had won by 11. In Game 2 the Heat won by 2. In Game 3 Giannis twisted his ankle and the Heat won by 15. In Game 4 Giannis only played 11 minutes, and the Bucks somehow pulled the win off by 3. But he didn’t dress for Game 5, which the Heat won by 9. So. The formula credits the Heat with beating a +9 SRS team by 6.8 points a game. Obviously that isn’t entirely fair (with Giannis’ injury) but the Heat were winning just fine when Giannis was healthy too. So by the Conference Finals the Heat were graded with an OSRS of +8 themselves.
The Celtics and Heat battled almost to a standstill. Both were diverse, high-skill, well-coached teams. The Celtics turned it over slightly more, but had more success on the boards. The Heat ended up with a 1 shot a game advantage. The Celtics, in turn, shot better, +1.5% to +1.0%. The end result was incredibly tight, with the Celtics barely averaging 0.2 more points per game. Unfortunately, the games didn’t actually break down like that. The Celtics lost in 6, with their two wins of 11 and 13 points falling to the Heat’s wins of 3, 5, 3 and 12 points. It was a tough loss, but the Celtics had certainly played the Heat toe to toe.
So. Where does all this shape up? The Celtics’ RSRS wasn’t great, but it wasn’t bad. They were the 5th best team in the regular season, which doesn’t sound good, but it’s pretty much the same as being the 2nd or 3rd best in a 15-team league, which certainly describes many of the teams discussed here. And their playoffs were very strong. Their sweep of the Sixers was probably less than a +14 SRS (on account of missing Simmons), but not much less. Their performance against an excellent Toronto team really speaks well of them; Toronto was somewhere between a +6 and a +9 SRS team in the playoffs, and Boston beat them by 5 points a game. And the series against Miami? Miami in the playoffs was really good, decisively beating the Bucks even when Giannis was healthy. Put it all together, a low-ish RSRS with a really strong PSRS, and this ranking makes complete sense.
Do I think they should be this high? Probably not. Let’s say that I drop the Bucks by 1.5 SRS for Giannis’ injury, the Nets to -5 SRS and the Sixers down by 1.2 SRS. Those changes keep the ‘20 Celtics on this list easily, but drops them to 68th (again, the gap between these teams is often fairly small this low on the list). But I want to be clear: the 2020 Boston Celtics were really good, and probably the second best team in the NBA this year. The Heat had a weak regular season, the Bucks got whipped by the Heat and the Clippers folded to the Nuggets. It was a weird year, perhaps the most mentally challenging playoffs ever, but the team-first Boston Celtics really distinguished themselves in a time of adversity. Make no mistake; the '20 Celtics may not deserve to be ranked this high, but they belong on this list.
#46. The 1981 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.45, Standard Deviations: +1.92, Won NBA Finals (Preseason X)
Regular Season Record: 62-20, Regular Season SRS: +6.05 (70th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.9 (62nd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.9 (61st)
PG: Tiny Archibald, +-0.1 / -0.1
SG: Chris Ford, +-0.9 / -0.2
SF: Larry Bird, +4.3 / +7.7
PF: Cedric Maxwell, +3.5 / +5.3
C: Robert Parish, +4.3 / +2.3
Robert Parish (C, 27): 28 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 19 / 9 / 2 / 4 on +4.5%
Larry Bird (SF, 24): 39 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 21 / 11 / 6 on -0.6%
Tiny Archibald (PG, 32): 35 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 14 / 2 / 8 / 1 on +4.8%
Cedric Maxwell (PF, 25): 33 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 15 / 6 / 3 / 2 on +11.7%
Chris Ford (SG, 32): 33 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 9 / 2 / 4 / 2 on -4.6%
Scoring/100: Robert Parish (32.2 / +4.5%), Larry Bird (25.6 / -0.6%), Cedric Maxwell (21.5 / +11.7%)
Assists/100: Tiny Archibald (10.4), Larry Bird (6.6), Chris Ford (5.2)
Heliocentrism: 31.0% (48th of 84 teams) - Bird
Wingmen: 48.2% (6th) - Parish & Maxwell
Depth: 20.8% (60th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +4.60 (59th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.58 (40th)
Playoff SRS: +10.11 (61st), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.40 (50th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.68 (64th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.20 (46th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 40.0% (29th of 84 teams) - Bird
Playoff Wingmen: 35.6% (61st) - Maxwell & Parish
Playoff Bench: 24.4% (45th)
Round 1:
Round 2: Chicago Bulls (+3.1), won 4-0, by +8.3 points per game (+11.4 SRS eq)
Round 3: Philadelphia 76ers (+7.4), won 4-3, by +1.5 points per game (+8.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: Houston Rockets (+2.9), won 4-2, by +7.8 points per game (+10.7 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2006 Derek Fisher
SG: 2011 Derek Fisher
SF: 2015 Marc Gasol
PF: 1981 Cedric Maxwell
C: 1999 Tim Duncan
I’ve always thought that it was interesting that the 80s Celtics seemed to favor passing shooting guards. Chris Ford wasn’t much of a scorer, but he passed pretty well. Henderson wasn’t as much, but when Ainge came up he also passed decently. The comp engine always seems to compare young Bird to ‘15 Marc Gasol. Good passing, good load, strong defense, great rebounding (especially on defense) but only moderate efficiency, it’s an easy comparison, at least on a statistical level. Prime Robert Parish as young Tim Duncan may seem crazy, but probably not as much as you think. ‘81 Parish carried a sizeable load on offense, converted efficiently, played strong defense, rebounded a ton and was only a sufficient passer. It’s one of the curiosities of time; Parish is most remembered for his role on the mid-80s Celtics, but by that point he was already past his prime. I’m not saying that peak Parish was the best player on this team, he wasn’t. But peak Parish was probably better than most people remember. And as for ‘81 Maxwell . . . He was a good defender, a good offensive rebounder, but on defense he preferred to leak out in transition and trust Bird and Parish to handle the rebound (a reasonable bet) and leverage his speed and finishing ability to convert at efficient rates. He wasn’t much of a passer. But 16 points a game (pace adjusted) on +11.7% shooting in ‘81 is really impressive. How did he do it? By being amazing at the rim and having a host of little moves that could get him there. His load was always on the low side; either his shots were there (and he made them at an insane rate) or they weren’t and he checked out of the scoring-side of the offense. But he, Bird and peak Parish made easily the best frontcourt in the NBA.
In 1980, thanks to the addition of Larry Bird, Bill Fitch and wildly improved chemistry (didn’t take much) the Celtics had posted a fantastic +7.37 SRS in the regular season, by far the best in the league. However they’d fallen in the playoffs to the excellent 76ers, with Bird struggling to score against Philly’s stout defense. Heading into the 1981 season the Celtics knew that they’d need to get past the Sixers if they wanted to win a championship. And in ‘81 the East was dominated by three outstanding teams: the ‘81 Celtics (+6.05), the ‘81 Bucks (+7.14) and the ‘81 Sixers (+7.76). The Sixers didn’t appear to be going away anytime soon. The Celtics, however, did have the advantage of the one seed, assuring that at least one of the other two would be eliminated by the Conference Finals.
In the semis (the Celtics got a bye) they faced the quite decent Chicago Bulls (+3.1). The Bulls (one of the best rebounding teams in the game) absolutely controlled the ball (9 shots a game). But the Celtics smothered their shooters: Reggie Theus shot at -3.6% and the Bulls overall shot only at -2.5%. The Celtics in contrast may as well have been lighting the net on fire, NBA Jam style. They shot +7.2% as a team (which is insane). Bird averaged a 24/13/7 on +4.1% and every other starter shot at +6.8% or better. From a glance it looks like the Celtics let the Bulls get their rebounds and got into transition every chance they got. I don’t know if that’s true, but it explains the Celtics (a solid rebounding team) being dominated in that area, and the Celtics scoring at such insane rates (and the Celtics really did love to run). Either way the Celtics swept the series by 8.3 points a game, an strong win.
In the Conference Finals were (of course) the 76ers. But the Sixers were actually outscored by the Bucks in the prior series; despite the gap in their RSRS the Celtics were seen by OSRS as being almost equal. They completely changed tactics, slowing it down and playing for possession. They controlled the ball to the tune of 8 shooting possessions a game, and they needed every one of them. While they held Julius Erving to a 20/6/4 on -4.6%, Darryl Dawkins had an efficient 15/7/1 on +10.7% and as a team they shot +0.5%. It was solid, a 2.3% drop from their regular season average. But the Celtics struggled to shoot effectively. Parish couldn’t get anything going (14/9/1 on -5.5%), and many of the lower minutes players shot at -10% or worse. Larry Bird averaged a 27/13/5 on +2% and Cedric Maxwell put up a 16/6/2 on +12%. The aggregate was that the Celtics only shot at -2.8%. Game 7 went down to the wire. With about a minute left the game was tied. Darryl Dawkins missed a hard shot and Bird ran the fast break, pulling up at midrange and nailing it to put the Celtics up by 2. The Sixers pushed the ball back down and Erving got the ball (defended tightly by Maxwell). Henderson came off of Cheeks with the double and Erving threw an awful pass across court that the Celtics got. The Celtics milked the clock up the court, but Gerald Henderson got the ball poked away and the Sixers fast broke hard, and Maurice Cheeks took a heavily contested layup, missing it but getting free throws. Cheeks hit one, so the Celtics had it with 27 to go, leading by one. Archibald just sat on the ball and the Sixers let him (I guess fouling to force free throws hadn’t come up yet), Archibald passed, the Celtics missed the shot, the ball kicked around and Bobby Jones grabbed it and called timeout with one second remaining. The Sixers’ inbound play was a long-distance alley-oop which missed, and the Celtics had won. The series was tight, with the Celtics prevailing in seven by only 1.5 points a game. Bird had held up over the series, shooting above his regular season average and the Celtics had finally beaten the Sixers, advancing to the NBA Finals.
Waiting for them were the ‘81 Rockets, led by Moses Malone. The Rockets had been a -0.2 RSRS team, so them making the Finals is certainly surprising. It fits the profile of a team coming alive in the postseason, but it’s not quite that simple. Here are their series:
Los Angeles Lakers (+3.3), won 2-1 by +0.7 points per game (+4.0 SRS eq)
San Antonio Spurs (+2.2), won 4-3 by +2.0 points per game (+4.2 SRS eq)
Kansas City Kings (+0.7), won 4-1 by +6.8 points per game (+7.5 SRS eq)
So on one hand, yeah, you’re seeing a big jump up in quality, but it’s from -0.2 to +5.25 SRS. Which is a big improvement . . . but only to the level of a very good team. Not close to the Bucks, Sixers or Celtics. OSRS favored the Celtics by five points a game. And it was less close than that. True to form, Moses Malone averaged a 22/16/1 (including 7 offensive boards a game) but on -6.6% shooting. Even with Moses’ rebounding, the Celtics controlled the boards. And they completely obliterated the Rockets’ shooting. You know how Moses shot really badly? That was the best scoring performance on the team. The next two highest scorers, Robert Reid and Billy Paultz, shot at -11.9% and -11.8%; the Rockets overall shot at an eye-bleeding (in the bad way) -10.6%. Bird struggled to shoot in the Finals (15/15/7 on -7.6% with 2 steals) but Maxwell had a 18/10/3 on +7.5% and the Celtics shot at -0.2%, which doesn’t sound good, but it was wildly better than the Rockets. The Celtics rolled the series by 7.8 points a game, and had won their first championship of the Bird era.
The Celtics had posted a low-ish RSRS and a decent PSRS (strong, but not overwhelming wins against the Bulls and Rockets, and a near win against the Sixers), which isn’t a great profile. But it was a very competitive year; half the teams were between -2 and +2, and only four teams were more than 6 away from zero; the Celtics finished at +8.45. At the intersection of finishing two standard deviations above the mean and winning the championship, this is a solid ranking for them.
My sheet actually has this as the second best Larry Bird Celtics team. It’s easy to see why. So much of a team’s quality is built on the career arcs of all its players. In ‘81 Bird was still growing, but young Bird was still really good. And Maxwell and Parish were at the height of their powers, and Tiny still had value. Move forward and Bird gets better, but Parish, Maxwell and Archibald all get worse, Gerald Henderson isn’t much of an upgrade on Chris Ford and it takes a while for Danny Ainge and Kevin McHale to develop. But there, eventually, is a team with peak Bird, where Parish is still good, where they have a better point guard, a decent shooting guard, a power forward as good as peak Maxwell, and a special talent off the bench. Only then do all the arcs line up ideally.
Regular Season Record: 62-20, Regular Season SRS: +6.05 (70th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.9 (62nd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.9 (61st)
PG: Tiny Archibald, +-0.1 / -0.1
SG: Chris Ford, +-0.9 / -0.2
SF: Larry Bird, +4.3 / +7.7
PF: Cedric Maxwell, +3.5 / +5.3
C: Robert Parish, +4.3 / +2.3
Robert Parish (C, 27): 28 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 19 / 9 / 2 / 4 on +4.5%
Larry Bird (SF, 24): 39 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 21 / 11 / 6 on -0.6%
Tiny Archibald (PG, 32): 35 MPPG, 20% OLoad, 14 / 2 / 8 / 1 on +4.8%
Cedric Maxwell (PF, 25): 33 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 15 / 6 / 3 / 2 on +11.7%
Chris Ford (SG, 32): 33 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 9 / 2 / 4 / 2 on -4.6%
Scoring/100: Robert Parish (32.2 / +4.5%), Larry Bird (25.6 / -0.6%), Cedric Maxwell (21.5 / +11.7%)
Assists/100: Tiny Archibald (10.4), Larry Bird (6.6), Chris Ford (5.2)
Heliocentrism: 31.0% (48th of 84 teams) - Bird
Wingmen: 48.2% (6th) - Parish & Maxwell
Depth: 20.8% (60th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +4.60 (59th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.58 (40th)
Playoff SRS: +10.11 (61st), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.40 (50th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.68 (64th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.20 (46th)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 40.0% (29th of 84 teams) - Bird
Playoff Wingmen: 35.6% (61st) - Maxwell & Parish
Playoff Bench: 24.4% (45th)
Round 1:
Round 2: Chicago Bulls (+3.1), won 4-0, by +8.3 points per game (+11.4 SRS eq)
Round 3: Philadelphia 76ers (+7.4), won 4-3, by +1.5 points per game (+8.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: Houston Rockets (+2.9), won 4-2, by +7.8 points per game (+10.7 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2006 Derek Fisher
SG: 2011 Derek Fisher
SF: 2015 Marc Gasol
PF: 1981 Cedric Maxwell
C: 1999 Tim Duncan
I’ve always thought that it was interesting that the 80s Celtics seemed to favor passing shooting guards. Chris Ford wasn’t much of a scorer, but he passed pretty well. Henderson wasn’t as much, but when Ainge came up he also passed decently. The comp engine always seems to compare young Bird to ‘15 Marc Gasol. Good passing, good load, strong defense, great rebounding (especially on defense) but only moderate efficiency, it’s an easy comparison, at least on a statistical level. Prime Robert Parish as young Tim Duncan may seem crazy, but probably not as much as you think. ‘81 Parish carried a sizeable load on offense, converted efficiently, played strong defense, rebounded a ton and was only a sufficient passer. It’s one of the curiosities of time; Parish is most remembered for his role on the mid-80s Celtics, but by that point he was already past his prime. I’m not saying that peak Parish was the best player on this team, he wasn’t. But peak Parish was probably better than most people remember. And as for ‘81 Maxwell . . . He was a good defender, a good offensive rebounder, but on defense he preferred to leak out in transition and trust Bird and Parish to handle the rebound (a reasonable bet) and leverage his speed and finishing ability to convert at efficient rates. He wasn’t much of a passer. But 16 points a game (pace adjusted) on +11.7% shooting in ‘81 is really impressive. How did he do it? By being amazing at the rim and having a host of little moves that could get him there. His load was always on the low side; either his shots were there (and he made them at an insane rate) or they weren’t and he checked out of the scoring-side of the offense. But he, Bird and peak Parish made easily the best frontcourt in the NBA.
In 1980, thanks to the addition of Larry Bird, Bill Fitch and wildly improved chemistry (didn’t take much) the Celtics had posted a fantastic +7.37 SRS in the regular season, by far the best in the league. However they’d fallen in the playoffs to the excellent 76ers, with Bird struggling to score against Philly’s stout defense. Heading into the 1981 season the Celtics knew that they’d need to get past the Sixers if they wanted to win a championship. And in ‘81 the East was dominated by three outstanding teams: the ‘81 Celtics (+6.05), the ‘81 Bucks (+7.14) and the ‘81 Sixers (+7.76). The Sixers didn’t appear to be going away anytime soon. The Celtics, however, did have the advantage of the one seed, assuring that at least one of the other two would be eliminated by the Conference Finals.
In the semis (the Celtics got a bye) they faced the quite decent Chicago Bulls (+3.1). The Bulls (one of the best rebounding teams in the game) absolutely controlled the ball (9 shots a game). But the Celtics smothered their shooters: Reggie Theus shot at -3.6% and the Bulls overall shot only at -2.5%. The Celtics in contrast may as well have been lighting the net on fire, NBA Jam style. They shot +7.2% as a team (which is insane). Bird averaged a 24/13/7 on +4.1% and every other starter shot at +6.8% or better. From a glance it looks like the Celtics let the Bulls get their rebounds and got into transition every chance they got. I don’t know if that’s true, but it explains the Celtics (a solid rebounding team) being dominated in that area, and the Celtics scoring at such insane rates (and the Celtics really did love to run). Either way the Celtics swept the series by 8.3 points a game, an strong win.
In the Conference Finals were (of course) the 76ers. But the Sixers were actually outscored by the Bucks in the prior series; despite the gap in their RSRS the Celtics were seen by OSRS as being almost equal. They completely changed tactics, slowing it down and playing for possession. They controlled the ball to the tune of 8 shooting possessions a game, and they needed every one of them. While they held Julius Erving to a 20/6/4 on -4.6%, Darryl Dawkins had an efficient 15/7/1 on +10.7% and as a team they shot +0.5%. It was solid, a 2.3% drop from their regular season average. But the Celtics struggled to shoot effectively. Parish couldn’t get anything going (14/9/1 on -5.5%), and many of the lower minutes players shot at -10% or worse. Larry Bird averaged a 27/13/5 on +2% and Cedric Maxwell put up a 16/6/2 on +12%. The aggregate was that the Celtics only shot at -2.8%. Game 7 went down to the wire. With about a minute left the game was tied. Darryl Dawkins missed a hard shot and Bird ran the fast break, pulling up at midrange and nailing it to put the Celtics up by 2. The Sixers pushed the ball back down and Erving got the ball (defended tightly by Maxwell). Henderson came off of Cheeks with the double and Erving threw an awful pass across court that the Celtics got. The Celtics milked the clock up the court, but Gerald Henderson got the ball poked away and the Sixers fast broke hard, and Maurice Cheeks took a heavily contested layup, missing it but getting free throws. Cheeks hit one, so the Celtics had it with 27 to go, leading by one. Archibald just sat on the ball and the Sixers let him (I guess fouling to force free throws hadn’t come up yet), Archibald passed, the Celtics missed the shot, the ball kicked around and Bobby Jones grabbed it and called timeout with one second remaining. The Sixers’ inbound play was a long-distance alley-oop which missed, and the Celtics had won. The series was tight, with the Celtics prevailing in seven by only 1.5 points a game. Bird had held up over the series, shooting above his regular season average and the Celtics had finally beaten the Sixers, advancing to the NBA Finals.
Waiting for them were the ‘81 Rockets, led by Moses Malone. The Rockets had been a -0.2 RSRS team, so them making the Finals is certainly surprising. It fits the profile of a team coming alive in the postseason, but it’s not quite that simple. Here are their series:
Los Angeles Lakers (+3.3), won 2-1 by +0.7 points per game (+4.0 SRS eq)
San Antonio Spurs (+2.2), won 4-3 by +2.0 points per game (+4.2 SRS eq)
Kansas City Kings (+0.7), won 4-1 by +6.8 points per game (+7.5 SRS eq)
So on one hand, yeah, you’re seeing a big jump up in quality, but it’s from -0.2 to +5.25 SRS. Which is a big improvement . . . but only to the level of a very good team. Not close to the Bucks, Sixers or Celtics. OSRS favored the Celtics by five points a game. And it was less close than that. True to form, Moses Malone averaged a 22/16/1 (including 7 offensive boards a game) but on -6.6% shooting. Even with Moses’ rebounding, the Celtics controlled the boards. And they completely obliterated the Rockets’ shooting. You know how Moses shot really badly? That was the best scoring performance on the team. The next two highest scorers, Robert Reid and Billy Paultz, shot at -11.9% and -11.8%; the Rockets overall shot at an eye-bleeding (in the bad way) -10.6%. Bird struggled to shoot in the Finals (15/15/7 on -7.6% with 2 steals) but Maxwell had a 18/10/3 on +7.5% and the Celtics shot at -0.2%, which doesn’t sound good, but it was wildly better than the Rockets. The Celtics rolled the series by 7.8 points a game, and had won their first championship of the Bird era.
The Celtics had posted a low-ish RSRS and a decent PSRS (strong, but not overwhelming wins against the Bulls and Rockets, and a near win against the Sixers), which isn’t a great profile. But it was a very competitive year; half the teams were between -2 and +2, and only four teams were more than 6 away from zero; the Celtics finished at +8.45. At the intersection of finishing two standard deviations above the mean and winning the championship, this is a solid ranking for them.
My sheet actually has this as the second best Larry Bird Celtics team. It’s easy to see why. So much of a team’s quality is built on the career arcs of all its players. In ‘81 Bird was still growing, but young Bird was still really good. And Maxwell and Parish were at the height of their powers, and Tiny still had value. Move forward and Bird gets better, but Parish, Maxwell and Archibald all get worse, Gerald Henderson isn’t much of an upgrade on Chris Ford and it takes a while for Danny Ainge and Kevin McHale to develop. But there, eventually, is a team with peak Bird, where Parish is still good, where they have a better point guard, a decent shooting guard, a power forward as good as peak Maxwell, and a special talent off the bench. Only then do all the arcs line up ideally.
#45. The 1970 New York Knicks
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.01, Standard Deviations: +2.08, Won NBA Finals (Preseason X)
Regular Season Record: 62-20, Regular Season SRS: +8.42 (16th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +1.3 (84th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -6.6 (11th)
PG: Walt Frazier, 0.236 / 0.163
SG: Dick Barnett, 0.117 / 0.111
SF: Bill Bradley, 0.112 / 0.068
PF: Dave DeBusschere, 0.120 / 0.075
C: Willis Reed, 0.227 / 0.168
Walt Frazier (PG, 24): 35 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 18 / 5 / 7 on +6.4%
Willis Reed (C, 27): 33 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 19 / 12 / 2 on +4.1%
Bill Bradley (SF, 26): 27 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 13 / 3 / 4 on -1.3%
Dave DeBusschere (PF, 29): 29 MPPG, 19% OLoad, 13 / 9 / 2 on -2.9%
Dick Barnett (SG, 33): 30 MPPG, 19% OLoad, 13 / 2 / 3 on +0.5%
Scoring/100: Willis Reed (23.9 / +4.1%), Walt Frazier (22.2 / +6.4%), Bill Bradley (19.4 / -1.3%)
Assists/100: Walt Frazier (7.1), Bill Bradley (3.5), Dick Barnett (3.2)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +0.94 (92nd), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.91 (52nd)
Playoff SRS: +7.76 (97th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: -0.41 (100th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.96 (82nd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.60 (63rd)
Round 1:
Round 2: Baltimore Bullets (+1.9), won 4-3, by +1.6 points per game (+3.5 SRS eq)
Round 3: Milwaukee Bucks (+7.1), won 4-1, by +10.4 points per game (+17.5 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+4.1), won 4-3, by +0.9 points per game (+5.0 SRS eq)
I suppose, in covering the ‘70 Knicks, I must begin with Red Holzman. In 1968 the Knicks struggled under coach Dick McGuire, despite having twin towers in Walt Bellamy and Willis Reed. When they were 15-23 McGuire was fired and Holzman was brought in. Under Holzman the Knicks went 28-16 and made the playoffs. Holzman had two principles that he coached by. The first was defense, above all else. The second was that you should always pass to the open man, at the expense of taking your own contested shot. In other words, he prioritized the team before the individual. And three trends show up very quickly in his first three seasons with the team. First, the team’s defense jumped, going from 5th in ‘68, to 3rd in ‘69 to 1st in ‘70. Second, the team’s free throw rate dropped, from 5th, to 14th to 13th. And lastly, their pace slowed down, from 9th, to 14th to 12th. The first is impressive (though the reduction in Cazzie Russell’s minutes may have played a role). The other two dovetail somewhat. Free throws are, by definition, the results of contested shots, so a team that only takes open shots will take few free throws.
The team construction itself is unusual. In 1968 the Knicks were decent (at least under Holzman) but their roster was still in development. They boasted two great centers in Bellamy and Reed, an all-offense no-defense small forward in Cazzie Russell, a decent shooter and good defender in Dick Barnett and a 22 year-old rookie point guard named Walt Frazier. In 1969 three critical things happened. One, Walt Frazier took a massive jump forward, becoming an excellent scorer with no real weaknesses (he was basically Oscar Robertson, definitely worse but more at home on a team of equals). Two, Cazzie Russell broke his ankle and Holzman moved his third guard, Bill Bradley, to small forward. Bradley was not individually great, but he fit perfectly with the team-first concept Holzman preached. And lastly, the tension between Walt Bellamy and Willis Reed was diffused by trading Bellamy for Dave DeBusschere. On paper this was a loss, as Bellamy was the superficially better player. But DeBusschere was a team-first, tough defending power forward with a strong jump shot. And suddenly, the Knicks were top-to-bottom pass-first jump shooters who played tough defense, the identity that would lead them to two titles. And their OLoad numbers really jump out; all five starters were between 19% and 22%. That is an insanely egalitarian distribution of shooting; just as their coach would have wished.
In 1969 they had met with the Celtics in the Conference Finals, in what would be Bill Russell’s final year. The Knicks played them as close as anyone could, but the Celtics were victorious, and went on to win their eleventh championship. But in 1970 the Celtics had fallen off the map, and the league was wide-open for the Knicks. They would go 62-20 (the best record in the league by 6 games) and put up an SRS of +8.42 (the best margin by 4.37). It’s hard to overstate how dominant the Knicks were in the regular season. Unlike the three-four years that would follow, 1970 was really competitive. There were fourteen teams in the league: thirteen of them were between +4.25 and -4.15. The Knicks were at +8.42. The gap between the Knicks and an average team was bigger than the gap between the 2nd best team and the worst team in the league. I know I’m going on about this a bit, but I want to be clear: the 1970 Knicks had one of the most dominant regular seasons ever. You know the first commandment, “Thou shalt have no other gods before me”? There were *no* other teams before the Knicks, or anywhere close.
In the semifinals they drew the Baltimore Bullets (+1.9), a tough defensive team led by a young Wes Unseld and Earl Monroe. The Knicks played excellent defense (of course); Monroe shot at 3.2% but the Bullets as a whole shot well below league average (-3.9%). But the Knicks gained no advantage in possession (the Bullets took 1-2 more shots a game). And the Knicks struggled to score. Frazier averaged a 19/8/6 on +0.8%, but Willis Reed averaged a 21/18/3 on -4.5% and no other starters shot at or above league average. In the end the Knicks prevailed by 1.6 points per game over the full seven. It was a win, but it was a surprisingly weak showing. Instead of the Knicks starting their coronation early by crushing the four-seed, they struggled to put their opposition away. It wasn’t the first time a great team would struggle in an early matchup, but it wasn’t great.
In the Conference Finals they drew the Milwaukee Bucks. The Bucks were only in their second year of existence, but they had rookie phenom Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and absolutely wrecked the 76ers in the first round by 10.4 points per game. It would be an interesting challenge; the Knicks’ team vs the Bucks’ star, the Bucks’ sudden momentum vs the Knicks’ sudden struggles. It wasn’t close. Kareem was the clear best player in the series, averaging a 34/18/5 on +7.4%. But the Knicks owned possession (9 shots a game or so) and it was almost all in turnovers (rebounds were pretty even). Willis Reed scored well against Kareem, averaging a 28/12/3 on +5.3% and the Knicks overall outshot the Bucks slightly, -0.5% to -1.3%. When the final tally came due the Knicks outscored the Bucks by 10.4 points per game, winning in five. The Bucks were a very good team; a 10.4 win per game was exactly the kind of dominance you’d expect from an all-time great team.
In the Finals were the Los Angeles Lakers. That should have been no surprise: the Lakers had Wilt Chamberlain and Jerry West, and had made the Finals six of the last eight years. But it would be a mistake to characterize them as historically dominant; the Lakers in the 60s benefited from the same conditions they would in the 80s, that the West was the considerably weaker conference. In 1970 they went 46-36 with an SRS of +1.76 . . . which was the best SRS in the West. Their first round was a +4.3 SRS eq showing and in the Conference Finals they put up a +10.7 in a sweep of the Hawks. So don’t get me wrong, the Lakers were good, but they were going into the Finals with an OSRS of +4.13, good but not great.
In Game 1 the Knicks forced turnover after turnover, finishing the game with 11 more shots despite being outrebounded. Willis Reed had a 37/16/5 on +4.8% to lead the Knicks to a 12 point win. In Game 2 the Knicks crushed the Lakers on the glass, with Reed, DeBusschere and Frazier combining for 41 rebounds (the entire non-Wilt Lakers got 22). This led to the Knicks getting an extra 7 shots for the game. But this time the Knicks struggled to score, with Reed’s 29/15/5 coming on -7.7% shooting and the team shooting at -5.1%. It was close, but the Knicks lost by two. In Game 3 the Knicks owned the boards again (the same three combined for 43), leading to an astounding 17 extra shots. But the Lakers shot decently (led by Wilt’s 21/26/4 on +15.7%) and the Knicks’ starters shot at 0.3% or worse (except for Reed and his 38/17/3 on +5.6%). The Knicks prevailed narrowly by 3. In Game 4 the Lakers controlled the boards, and the Knicks’ propensity for generating turnovers only led to an equal number of shots. All three of the Lakers’ stars shot at +4% or better, while Reed and Frazier shot at -6.2% and -3.3% respectively. Some Knicks shot well (Barnett had 29 on +5.9% and DeBusschere had a 20/11/2 on +14.2%) but they were exceptions, and the Lakers outshot the Knicks +0.9% to -1.7%, winning in overtime by 6. Game 5 was part of the same pattern. The Knicks shot poorly (-3.1%) despite Walt Frazier’s 21/7/12 on +17.4%. And the Lakers shot excellently (all three Lakers stars scored 20+ on 4.6% or better). But the Knicks forced a hideous amount of turnovers without committing many themselves, ending with 18 more shots than the Lakers. Despite being shot by 11.8%, the Knicks prevailed by 7. But in the first quarter Willis Reed had torn his thigh badly, and did not expect to be playing at all the rest of the series.
After five games the Knicks had a 3-2 lead, with an average MoV of about +3. But they would have no Willis Reed, who to that point had been both their leading scorer and leading rebounder. Without Reed to hold Chamberlain in check he ran amok in Game 6, with a 45/27/3 on +16.8% and Jerry West added an excellent 33/6/13 on +12.5%. The Lakers owned the boards, and even the Knicks’ insane turnover advantage was only enough for a four shot advantage, nowhere near enough to counter the Lakers’ scoring onslaught. The Knicks lost by 22, and their prospects for Game 7 looked bleak.
It was gameday in Madison Square Gardens, and the air was thick with tension. The Knicks shot the ball around, absent their injured captain. Suddenly there was movement from the tunnel to the locker room and out came Willis Reed, walking deliberately on his injured leg and the crowd absolutely went bonkers. It became clear that he didn’t have close to full mobility, but for his team and its fans he would gut it out and play.
Reed hit his first two baskets, but on offense would be a virtual nonentity (4/3/1 on -11.1%). His contribution was to inspire his team (as Bill Bradley stated, ‘When he came out we really thought that we could pull this off’), but most of all to body up the massive Wilt Chamberlain. Wilt wasn’t stopped (21/24/4) but was held in check (-0.7% shooting). And Walt Frazier submitted one of the most clutch Game 7s in NBA history, putting up a 36/7/19 on +29.7% and the Knicks closed Game 7 and the series out by 14 points.
Give me a second, I’ve got chills. That Game 7 has got to be one of the most spiritually significant Game 7s ever. Willis Reed fighting through his injury only to slow the titanic Wilt Chamberlain enough for his team to win. Walt Frazier rising up when his team needed him the most, putting on a clinic in both passing and scoring efficiency (with Jerry freaking West defending him no less). Is this on the level of Magic’s Game 6 in 1980? I don’t know but it sure as heck should be in the same discussion. I know I’m going on a bit, but that Game 7 personifies pretty much all that is inspirational and beautiful about sports.
As for their ranking? Here’s the problem: the Knicks’ postseason performance was pretty weak. Surprisingly weak. Of all the teams on this list, the ‘70 Knicks had the biggest drop-off from the regular season to the postseason. The series against the Bucks was excellent, but what the heck were they doing getting taken to 7 and barely beating the Bullets? And the victory over the Lakers, heroic though it may have been, shouldn’t have required heroism. The Knicks in the regular season were a much better team. Nothing about the Lakers suggests that they should have been able to seriously challenge the Knicks. As it was the Knicks snuck by a +4.1 OSRS team by +0.9 points a game. They combined an insanely dominant regular season with a surprisingly weak playoff run. Because again, great teams don’t win heroically over good teams, they stomp them. And you can very reasonably point out that Reed being out led to the Lakers’ one big win. Totally true. If we pretend that that game had never happened the ‘71 Knicks would jump to around 31st on this list. But players getting injured is part of the game; the ‘15 Cavs suffered in the playoffs, and in these rankings, because of their injuries and so do the Knicks.
Great team. Great story. But struggled a surprising amount in the playoffs against teams they probably shouldn’t have. This is as good a place as any to put them.
Also, you know what surprised me? How awful their era was for their strategy. Seriously, they’re basically running a slow-it-down look for the open jump shot style offense. Nothing wrong with that . . . except that they did it before the three point line existed. I’d like to say that I wish we’d have been able to see this team in the modern game.
Then again, I think we did see their spiritual successor, the 2014 San Antonio Spurs. And they were beautiful to watch.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2009 Andre Iguodala (slightly better scoring and defense)
SG: 2006 Smush Parker (slightly worse)
SF: 2008 Anthony Carter
PF: 2010 Kenyon Martin
C: 2001 David Robinson (more minutes, slightly worse)
Iguodala is an intuitive comp for Frazier, given the intersection of passing, rebounding and shooting. You may be outraged at ‘01 Robinson as Reed, but they were somewhat similar players. Both great defenders, both bigs with jump shots and both decent passers for their size. Even in 2001 Robinson was great, when he could stay on the court.
Regular Season Record: 62-20, Regular Season SRS: +8.42 (16th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +1.3 (84th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -6.6 (11th)
PG: Walt Frazier, 0.236 / 0.163
SG: Dick Barnett, 0.117 / 0.111
SF: Bill Bradley, 0.112 / 0.068
PF: Dave DeBusschere, 0.120 / 0.075
C: Willis Reed, 0.227 / 0.168
Walt Frazier (PG, 24): 35 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 18 / 5 / 7 on +6.4%
Willis Reed (C, 27): 33 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 19 / 12 / 2 on +4.1%
Bill Bradley (SF, 26): 27 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 13 / 3 / 4 on -1.3%
Dave DeBusschere (PF, 29): 29 MPPG, 19% OLoad, 13 / 9 / 2 on -2.9%
Dick Barnett (SG, 33): 30 MPPG, 19% OLoad, 13 / 2 / 3 on +0.5%
Scoring/100: Willis Reed (23.9 / +4.1%), Walt Frazier (22.2 / +6.4%), Bill Bradley (19.4 / -1.3%)
Assists/100: Walt Frazier (7.1), Bill Bradley (3.5), Dick Barnett (3.2)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +0.94 (92nd), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.91 (52nd)
Playoff SRS: +7.76 (97th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: -0.41 (100th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.96 (82nd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.60 (63rd)
Round 1:
Round 2: Baltimore Bullets (+1.9), won 4-3, by +1.6 points per game (+3.5 SRS eq)
Round 3: Milwaukee Bucks (+7.1), won 4-1, by +10.4 points per game (+17.5 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+4.1), won 4-3, by +0.9 points per game (+5.0 SRS eq)
I suppose, in covering the ‘70 Knicks, I must begin with Red Holzman. In 1968 the Knicks struggled under coach Dick McGuire, despite having twin towers in Walt Bellamy and Willis Reed. When they were 15-23 McGuire was fired and Holzman was brought in. Under Holzman the Knicks went 28-16 and made the playoffs. Holzman had two principles that he coached by. The first was defense, above all else. The second was that you should always pass to the open man, at the expense of taking your own contested shot. In other words, he prioritized the team before the individual. And three trends show up very quickly in his first three seasons with the team. First, the team’s defense jumped, going from 5th in ‘68, to 3rd in ‘69 to 1st in ‘70. Second, the team’s free throw rate dropped, from 5th, to 14th to 13th. And lastly, their pace slowed down, from 9th, to 14th to 12th. The first is impressive (though the reduction in Cazzie Russell’s minutes may have played a role). The other two dovetail somewhat. Free throws are, by definition, the results of contested shots, so a team that only takes open shots will take few free throws.
The team construction itself is unusual. In 1968 the Knicks were decent (at least under Holzman) but their roster was still in development. They boasted two great centers in Bellamy and Reed, an all-offense no-defense small forward in Cazzie Russell, a decent shooter and good defender in Dick Barnett and a 22 year-old rookie point guard named Walt Frazier. In 1969 three critical things happened. One, Walt Frazier took a massive jump forward, becoming an excellent scorer with no real weaknesses (he was basically Oscar Robertson, definitely worse but more at home on a team of equals). Two, Cazzie Russell broke his ankle and Holzman moved his third guard, Bill Bradley, to small forward. Bradley was not individually great, but he fit perfectly with the team-first concept Holzman preached. And lastly, the tension between Walt Bellamy and Willis Reed was diffused by trading Bellamy for Dave DeBusschere. On paper this was a loss, as Bellamy was the superficially better player. But DeBusschere was a team-first, tough defending power forward with a strong jump shot. And suddenly, the Knicks were top-to-bottom pass-first jump shooters who played tough defense, the identity that would lead them to two titles. And their OLoad numbers really jump out; all five starters were between 19% and 22%. That is an insanely egalitarian distribution of shooting; just as their coach would have wished.
In 1969 they had met with the Celtics in the Conference Finals, in what would be Bill Russell’s final year. The Knicks played them as close as anyone could, but the Celtics were victorious, and went on to win their eleventh championship. But in 1970 the Celtics had fallen off the map, and the league was wide-open for the Knicks. They would go 62-20 (the best record in the league by 6 games) and put up an SRS of +8.42 (the best margin by 4.37). It’s hard to overstate how dominant the Knicks were in the regular season. Unlike the three-four years that would follow, 1970 was really competitive. There were fourteen teams in the league: thirteen of them were between +4.25 and -4.15. The Knicks were at +8.42. The gap between the Knicks and an average team was bigger than the gap between the 2nd best team and the worst team in the league. I know I’m going on about this a bit, but I want to be clear: the 1970 Knicks had one of the most dominant regular seasons ever. You know the first commandment, “Thou shalt have no other gods before me”? There were *no* other teams before the Knicks, or anywhere close.
In the semifinals they drew the Baltimore Bullets (+1.9), a tough defensive team led by a young Wes Unseld and Earl Monroe. The Knicks played excellent defense (of course); Monroe shot at 3.2% but the Bullets as a whole shot well below league average (-3.9%). But the Knicks gained no advantage in possession (the Bullets took 1-2 more shots a game). And the Knicks struggled to score. Frazier averaged a 19/8/6 on +0.8%, but Willis Reed averaged a 21/18/3 on -4.5% and no other starters shot at or above league average. In the end the Knicks prevailed by 1.6 points per game over the full seven. It was a win, but it was a surprisingly weak showing. Instead of the Knicks starting their coronation early by crushing the four-seed, they struggled to put their opposition away. It wasn’t the first time a great team would struggle in an early matchup, but it wasn’t great.
In the Conference Finals they drew the Milwaukee Bucks. The Bucks were only in their second year of existence, but they had rookie phenom Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and absolutely wrecked the 76ers in the first round by 10.4 points per game. It would be an interesting challenge; the Knicks’ team vs the Bucks’ star, the Bucks’ sudden momentum vs the Knicks’ sudden struggles. It wasn’t close. Kareem was the clear best player in the series, averaging a 34/18/5 on +7.4%. But the Knicks owned possession (9 shots a game or so) and it was almost all in turnovers (rebounds were pretty even). Willis Reed scored well against Kareem, averaging a 28/12/3 on +5.3% and the Knicks overall outshot the Bucks slightly, -0.5% to -1.3%. When the final tally came due the Knicks outscored the Bucks by 10.4 points per game, winning in five. The Bucks were a very good team; a 10.4 win per game was exactly the kind of dominance you’d expect from an all-time great team.
In the Finals were the Los Angeles Lakers. That should have been no surprise: the Lakers had Wilt Chamberlain and Jerry West, and had made the Finals six of the last eight years. But it would be a mistake to characterize them as historically dominant; the Lakers in the 60s benefited from the same conditions they would in the 80s, that the West was the considerably weaker conference. In 1970 they went 46-36 with an SRS of +1.76 . . . which was the best SRS in the West. Their first round was a +4.3 SRS eq showing and in the Conference Finals they put up a +10.7 in a sweep of the Hawks. So don’t get me wrong, the Lakers were good, but they were going into the Finals with an OSRS of +4.13, good but not great.
In Game 1 the Knicks forced turnover after turnover, finishing the game with 11 more shots despite being outrebounded. Willis Reed had a 37/16/5 on +4.8% to lead the Knicks to a 12 point win. In Game 2 the Knicks crushed the Lakers on the glass, with Reed, DeBusschere and Frazier combining for 41 rebounds (the entire non-Wilt Lakers got 22). This led to the Knicks getting an extra 7 shots for the game. But this time the Knicks struggled to score, with Reed’s 29/15/5 coming on -7.7% shooting and the team shooting at -5.1%. It was close, but the Knicks lost by two. In Game 3 the Knicks owned the boards again (the same three combined for 43), leading to an astounding 17 extra shots. But the Lakers shot decently (led by Wilt’s 21/26/4 on +15.7%) and the Knicks’ starters shot at 0.3% or worse (except for Reed and his 38/17/3 on +5.6%). The Knicks prevailed narrowly by 3. In Game 4 the Lakers controlled the boards, and the Knicks’ propensity for generating turnovers only led to an equal number of shots. All three of the Lakers’ stars shot at +4% or better, while Reed and Frazier shot at -6.2% and -3.3% respectively. Some Knicks shot well (Barnett had 29 on +5.9% and DeBusschere had a 20/11/2 on +14.2%) but they were exceptions, and the Lakers outshot the Knicks +0.9% to -1.7%, winning in overtime by 6. Game 5 was part of the same pattern. The Knicks shot poorly (-3.1%) despite Walt Frazier’s 21/7/12 on +17.4%. And the Lakers shot excellently (all three Lakers stars scored 20+ on 4.6% or better). But the Knicks forced a hideous amount of turnovers without committing many themselves, ending with 18 more shots than the Lakers. Despite being shot by 11.8%, the Knicks prevailed by 7. But in the first quarter Willis Reed had torn his thigh badly, and did not expect to be playing at all the rest of the series.
After five games the Knicks had a 3-2 lead, with an average MoV of about +3. But they would have no Willis Reed, who to that point had been both their leading scorer and leading rebounder. Without Reed to hold Chamberlain in check he ran amok in Game 6, with a 45/27/3 on +16.8% and Jerry West added an excellent 33/6/13 on +12.5%. The Lakers owned the boards, and even the Knicks’ insane turnover advantage was only enough for a four shot advantage, nowhere near enough to counter the Lakers’ scoring onslaught. The Knicks lost by 22, and their prospects for Game 7 looked bleak.
It was gameday in Madison Square Gardens, and the air was thick with tension. The Knicks shot the ball around, absent their injured captain. Suddenly there was movement from the tunnel to the locker room and out came Willis Reed, walking deliberately on his injured leg and the crowd absolutely went bonkers. It became clear that he didn’t have close to full mobility, but for his team and its fans he would gut it out and play.
Reed hit his first two baskets, but on offense would be a virtual nonentity (4/3/1 on -11.1%). His contribution was to inspire his team (as Bill Bradley stated, ‘When he came out we really thought that we could pull this off’), but most of all to body up the massive Wilt Chamberlain. Wilt wasn’t stopped (21/24/4) but was held in check (-0.7% shooting). And Walt Frazier submitted one of the most clutch Game 7s in NBA history, putting up a 36/7/19 on +29.7% and the Knicks closed Game 7 and the series out by 14 points.
Give me a second, I’ve got chills. That Game 7 has got to be one of the most spiritually significant Game 7s ever. Willis Reed fighting through his injury only to slow the titanic Wilt Chamberlain enough for his team to win. Walt Frazier rising up when his team needed him the most, putting on a clinic in both passing and scoring efficiency (with Jerry freaking West defending him no less). Is this on the level of Magic’s Game 6 in 1980? I don’t know but it sure as heck should be in the same discussion. I know I’m going on a bit, but that Game 7 personifies pretty much all that is inspirational and beautiful about sports.
As for their ranking? Here’s the problem: the Knicks’ postseason performance was pretty weak. Surprisingly weak. Of all the teams on this list, the ‘70 Knicks had the biggest drop-off from the regular season to the postseason. The series against the Bucks was excellent, but what the heck were they doing getting taken to 7 and barely beating the Bullets? And the victory over the Lakers, heroic though it may have been, shouldn’t have required heroism. The Knicks in the regular season were a much better team. Nothing about the Lakers suggests that they should have been able to seriously challenge the Knicks. As it was the Knicks snuck by a +4.1 OSRS team by +0.9 points a game. They combined an insanely dominant regular season with a surprisingly weak playoff run. Because again, great teams don’t win heroically over good teams, they stomp them. And you can very reasonably point out that Reed being out led to the Lakers’ one big win. Totally true. If we pretend that that game had never happened the ‘71 Knicks would jump to around 31st on this list. But players getting injured is part of the game; the ‘15 Cavs suffered in the playoffs, and in these rankings, because of their injuries and so do the Knicks.
Great team. Great story. But struggled a surprising amount in the playoffs against teams they probably shouldn’t have. This is as good a place as any to put them.
Also, you know what surprised me? How awful their era was for their strategy. Seriously, they’re basically running a slow-it-down look for the open jump shot style offense. Nothing wrong with that . . . except that they did it before the three point line existed. I’d like to say that I wish we’d have been able to see this team in the modern game.
Then again, I think we did see their spiritual successor, the 2014 San Antonio Spurs. And they were beautiful to watch.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2009 Andre Iguodala (slightly better scoring and defense)
SG: 2006 Smush Parker (slightly worse)
SF: 2008 Anthony Carter
PF: 2010 Kenyon Martin
C: 2001 David Robinson (more minutes, slightly worse)
Iguodala is an intuitive comp for Frazier, given the intersection of passing, rebounding and shooting. You may be outraged at ‘01 Robinson as Reed, but they were somewhat similar players. Both great defenders, both bigs with jump shots and both decent passers for their size. Even in 2001 Robinson was great, when he could stay on the court.
#44. The 1965 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.14, Standard Deviations: +2.08, Won NBA Finals (Preseason X)
Regular Season Record: 62-18, Regular Season SRS: +7.46 (31st), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -2.7 (98th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -9.4 (2nd)
PG: K.C. Jones, 0.132 / 0.156
SG: Sam Jones, 0.213 / 0.195
SF: John Havlicek, 0.100 / 0.025
PF: Tom Sanders, 0.146 / 0.132
C: Bill Russell, 0.234 / 0.286
6th: Tom Heinsohn, 0.102 / 0.017
John Havlicek (SF, 24): 23 MPPG, 28% OLoad, 15 / 4 / 2 on -3.8%
Sam Jones (SG, 31): 29 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 21 / 4 / 2 on +2.6%
Tom Heinsohn (PF, 30): 21 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 11 / 5 / 2 on -4.7%
Tom Sanders (PF, 26): 25 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 10 / 7 / 1 on -0.1%
K.C. Jones (PG, 32): 25 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 7 / 3 / 5 on -4.0%
Bill Russell (C, 30): 36 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 11 / 20 / 4 on -0.7%
Scoring/100: Sam Jones (27.9 / +2.6%), John Havlicek (24.6 / -3.8%), Tom Heinsohn (20.8 / -4.7%)
Assists/100: K.C. Jones (4.5), Bill Russell (4.3), Sam Jones (2.3)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +1.48 (87th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.90 (54th)
Playoff SRS: +8.78 (82nd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.68 (87th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.87 (61st), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: +1.27 (99th)
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3: Philadelphia 76ers (+1.9), won 4-3, by +2.9 points per game (+4.8 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+1.8), won 4-1, by +12.6 points per game (+14.4 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2001 Bruce Bowen (better passing, less spacing)
SG: 2014 Klay Thompson (more shot creation, less spacing)
SF: 2012 O.J. Mayo
PF: 2003 Theo Ratliff (less rebounding, better besides that)
C: 1965 Bill Russell
6th: 2016 Michael Carter-Williams (worse passing)
This team is obviously very similar to its predecessor, the ‘64 Celtics. Weak offense, all-time great defense. I can’t get over this offense at all. Look at those assists per 100! Nobody above 5! Granted, basketball in the 60s had lower assists per 100 generally, but these numbers are still pretty low. And every scorer below average efficiency except for Sam Jones? Havlicek running up huge OLoad numbers but on weak efficiency? No bueno at all. It’s very fortunate that they had one of the very best defenses ever.
So, 1965. Going into the season the Celtics had won the last six NBA championships. Their machine just kept chugging along. Tommy Heinsohn had regressed hard (at 30) but Tom Sanders stepped forward, a worse scorer than Heinsohn had been but a better defender. The offensive downgrade meant that the scorers on the team (of which there were two) needed to step their games up a little bit. Sam Jones (at 31) handled the transition gracefully, upping both his volume and efficiency (from 24% to 27%, from +0.6% to +2.6%) while comparative youngster John Havlicek (at 24) struggled a bit, going from 26% to 28% OLoad and seeing efficiency drop farther, from -2.2% to -3.8%. There seemed to be no end in sight to their dominance.
In the regular season the Celtics went 62-18 with a +7.46 SRS. That looks good, but it’s much better than that, loosely comparable to the ‘70 Knicks. Here’s a truncated Stem and Leaf (really just a stem) of the RSRSs of 1965:
7 | Celtics
6 |
5 |
4 |
3 |
2 | Royals, Hawks
1 | Lakers
0 |
-0 | 76ers
-1 | Bullets
-2 |
-3 | Knicks, Pistons
-4 |
-5 | Warriors
The Celtics were almost five points a game better than the 2nd best team, and the gap between them and average was as big as the gap between the #2 and the worst team in the league. This is some epic level dominance, and that they were still doing it going into their (hopefully) 7th championship year is unreal. Nobody was even close to them. There was, however, some disruption to the status quo. The San Francisco Warriors, in money troubles, traded their superstar Wilt Chamberlain midseason to the Philadelphia 76ers. The Sixers may have finished with a 40-40 record and a -0.13 SRS, but any team with Wilt was worth noting.
Speaking of Wilt and the Sixers, they manhandled Oscar Robertson’s Cincinnati Royals in the semifinals by +5.5 points per game, with Wilt averaging a 28/20/6 on +3.3%. And so the Sixers advanced, and Wilt faced off with Russell yet again. Noting their decisive upset of the Royals but low RSRS, it may seem intuitive that landing Wilt transformed the team from weak to a contender. This is an intuitive conclusion but it doesn’t seem borne out by the facts, at least not in the regular season.
76ers with Wilt: 18-17, +0.29 MoV
76ers before Wilt: 22-23, -0.49 MoV
While I speak not at all about any postseason transformation, it seems like Wilt’s addition, while helping didn’t exactly transform the Sixers into a juggernaut or anything. Overall, in spite of their win over the Royals, there was no reason to think that the Sixers would be able to seriously challenge the Celtics.
Game 1 was typical in many ways. Wilt had a sensational individual game with a 33/31/3 on +12.6%, but the team around him struggled to shoot. And despite Wilt’s individual success, the Celtics outrebounded the Sixers by 13 boards (non-center rebounds went 35 to 23 for the Celtics) which led to 12 more shooting possessions for the Celtics. That every single Celtics’ starter shot below average didn’t matter; they won going away by 10. In Game 2 the Sixers won the rebounding battle, but the Celtics forced so many turnovers that they still ended up with a 7-shot advantage. Wilt had an even better performance, a 30/39/8 on +17.4%, but the key was that Celtics besides Sam Jones ( 40/6/3 on +8.4%) really struggled (Sanders, Havlicek and Heinsohn all shot at -13.8% or worse). The Sixers won by six.
In Game 3 the Celtics roared back. Wilt had a stereotypical anti-hero game (24/37/1 on -4.4%, by anti-hero I mean he took a ton of shots and racked up individual achievements, but scored inefficiently and didn’t pass). Russell had the inverse, a 19/26/8 on +2.7%. The Celtics forced a ton of turnovers and controlled the boards, ending with a ridiculous 21 extra shooting possessions, and won by a dominant 18. In Game 4 the Celtics won possessions but by less (6), and couldn’t stop the Sixers’ scoring. Wilt put up a 34/34/3 on +3.9% while Sam Jones had a 36/5/4 on +4.9%. The Sixers outshot the Celtics overall by 3.4% and won by 3 in overtime. The first four games had split 2-2, with the home team winning each game and the Celtics had averaged an MoV of +5.25, about what you’d expect given the difference between the teams.
Game 5 in Boston was an enormous outlier; the Celtics actually outshot the Sixers, but the Sixers controlled the ball more. So the Sixers got 9 extra shots, but shot badly (-3.8% as a team), while Wilt put up a 30/21/2 on +8.7%. But Boston had another strong game from Sam Jones (29/5/3 on +2.7%) and Russell and Heinsohn combined for 36 points on +17.3% shooting. The Celtics prevailed by 6 and pushed the Sixers one game away from elimination. Game 6 was back to normal, with the Celtics getting 12 extra shots but being outshot badly. The Celtics’ scorers struggled, Sam Jones with a 20/4/2 on -2.9%, and Havlicek with a 14/6/3 on -20.9%. Wilt posted a 30/26/4 on +10.9% and won by 6. The series went down to Game 7 in Boston.
Game 7 was like every other game in the series, only more so. The Celtics controlled possession mostly through turnovers, taking 15 extra shots, but were outshot badly. Wilt put up a 30/32/2 on +24.5% (!!) while Russell posted a 15/29/8 on -3.5% and Sam Jones had a 37/2/1 on +5.0%. And the game went down to the wire. Down by three with the clock ticking down Wilt got the ball and dunked on Russell, bringing the Sixers within one with five seconds left. On the inbound pass Russell accidentally threw the ball into a guy-wire over the backboard, leading to a turnover. The Sixers now had possession, and time for one more shot. On Hal Greer’s inbound pass John Havlicek made a diving stop, tipping the ball to a Celtic and effectively ending the game and preserving the Celtics’ win. The Celtics had prevailed, but by only 2.9 points per game, a far narrower margin of victory than a team of their caliber should have allowed to an only good team.
They advanced to the NBA Finals to face a familiar foe, the Los Angeles Lakers. The Lakers, despite the presence of big names like Jerry West had not done well, posting a +1.7 RSRS and only beating the +0.4 Bullets by 1.7 a game in the Conference Finals (Elgin Baylor had gone down in the first game). The Finals weren’t close; the Celtics stomped them beginning to end, winning the series in five by 12.6 points per game. The Celtics owned the boards and forced tons of turnovers, getting almost 20 more shooting possessions per game. That the Lakers shot slightly better (+2.6% to league average) was irrelevant. Sam Jones averaged a 28/5/3 on +4.9% and Bill Russell put up a 18/25/6 on +21%. Jerry West played well with a 34/6/3 on +3.3% in the loss. It was a dominant win, if slightly asterisked by Baylor’s injury.
So. Very similar to the ‘70 Knicks, the ‘65 Celtics put up an extremely dominant regular season, but have a very mixed postseason, failing to whip teams that their regular seasons suggest that they should have. The Celtics’ +8.78 PSRS is quite low (86th on the list) and that doesn’t do them any favors. What they have going for them is being far and away the best team in their year. Of the nine teams, the top four go: Boston (+8.14), Philadelphia (+2.70), St. Louis (+0.36), Baltimore (+0.25). Completely unambiguous. Play that season from scratch with those team abilities ten times, the Celtics probably win it nine or ten times. So even if their ratings themselves are low, their dominance (as measured by standard deviations over the mean) is exceptional.
Regular Season Record: 62-18, Regular Season SRS: +7.46 (31st), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -2.7 (98th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -9.4 (2nd)
PG: K.C. Jones, 0.132 / 0.156
SG: Sam Jones, 0.213 / 0.195
SF: John Havlicek, 0.100 / 0.025
PF: Tom Sanders, 0.146 / 0.132
C: Bill Russell, 0.234 / 0.286
6th: Tom Heinsohn, 0.102 / 0.017
John Havlicek (SF, 24): 23 MPPG, 28% OLoad, 15 / 4 / 2 on -3.8%
Sam Jones (SG, 31): 29 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 21 / 4 / 2 on +2.6%
Tom Heinsohn (PF, 30): 21 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 11 / 5 / 2 on -4.7%
Tom Sanders (PF, 26): 25 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 10 / 7 / 1 on -0.1%
K.C. Jones (PG, 32): 25 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 7 / 3 / 5 on -4.0%
Bill Russell (C, 30): 36 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 11 / 20 / 4 on -0.7%
Scoring/100: Sam Jones (27.9 / +2.6%), John Havlicek (24.6 / -3.8%), Tom Heinsohn (20.8 / -4.7%)
Assists/100: K.C. Jones (4.5), Bill Russell (4.3), Sam Jones (2.3)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +1.48 (87th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.90 (54th)
Playoff SRS: +8.78 (82nd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.68 (87th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.87 (61st), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: +1.27 (99th)
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3: Philadelphia 76ers (+1.9), won 4-3, by +2.9 points per game (+4.8 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+1.8), won 4-1, by +12.6 points per game (+14.4 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2001 Bruce Bowen (better passing, less spacing)
SG: 2014 Klay Thompson (more shot creation, less spacing)
SF: 2012 O.J. Mayo
PF: 2003 Theo Ratliff (less rebounding, better besides that)
C: 1965 Bill Russell
6th: 2016 Michael Carter-Williams (worse passing)
This team is obviously very similar to its predecessor, the ‘64 Celtics. Weak offense, all-time great defense. I can’t get over this offense at all. Look at those assists per 100! Nobody above 5! Granted, basketball in the 60s had lower assists per 100 generally, but these numbers are still pretty low. And every scorer below average efficiency except for Sam Jones? Havlicek running up huge OLoad numbers but on weak efficiency? No bueno at all. It’s very fortunate that they had one of the very best defenses ever.
So, 1965. Going into the season the Celtics had won the last six NBA championships. Their machine just kept chugging along. Tommy Heinsohn had regressed hard (at 30) but Tom Sanders stepped forward, a worse scorer than Heinsohn had been but a better defender. The offensive downgrade meant that the scorers on the team (of which there were two) needed to step their games up a little bit. Sam Jones (at 31) handled the transition gracefully, upping both his volume and efficiency (from 24% to 27%, from +0.6% to +2.6%) while comparative youngster John Havlicek (at 24) struggled a bit, going from 26% to 28% OLoad and seeing efficiency drop farther, from -2.2% to -3.8%. There seemed to be no end in sight to their dominance.
In the regular season the Celtics went 62-18 with a +7.46 SRS. That looks good, but it’s much better than that, loosely comparable to the ‘70 Knicks. Here’s a truncated Stem and Leaf (really just a stem) of the RSRSs of 1965:
7 | Celtics
6 |
5 |
4 |
3 |
2 | Royals, Hawks
1 | Lakers
0 |
-0 | 76ers
-1 | Bullets
-2 |
-3 | Knicks, Pistons
-4 |
-5 | Warriors
The Celtics were almost five points a game better than the 2nd best team, and the gap between them and average was as big as the gap between the #2 and the worst team in the league. This is some epic level dominance, and that they were still doing it going into their (hopefully) 7th championship year is unreal. Nobody was even close to them. There was, however, some disruption to the status quo. The San Francisco Warriors, in money troubles, traded their superstar Wilt Chamberlain midseason to the Philadelphia 76ers. The Sixers may have finished with a 40-40 record and a -0.13 SRS, but any team with Wilt was worth noting.
Speaking of Wilt and the Sixers, they manhandled Oscar Robertson’s Cincinnati Royals in the semifinals by +5.5 points per game, with Wilt averaging a 28/20/6 on +3.3%. And so the Sixers advanced, and Wilt faced off with Russell yet again. Noting their decisive upset of the Royals but low RSRS, it may seem intuitive that landing Wilt transformed the team from weak to a contender. This is an intuitive conclusion but it doesn’t seem borne out by the facts, at least not in the regular season.
76ers with Wilt: 18-17, +0.29 MoV
76ers before Wilt: 22-23, -0.49 MoV
While I speak not at all about any postseason transformation, it seems like Wilt’s addition, while helping didn’t exactly transform the Sixers into a juggernaut or anything. Overall, in spite of their win over the Royals, there was no reason to think that the Sixers would be able to seriously challenge the Celtics.
Game 1 was typical in many ways. Wilt had a sensational individual game with a 33/31/3 on +12.6%, but the team around him struggled to shoot. And despite Wilt’s individual success, the Celtics outrebounded the Sixers by 13 boards (non-center rebounds went 35 to 23 for the Celtics) which led to 12 more shooting possessions for the Celtics. That every single Celtics’ starter shot below average didn’t matter; they won going away by 10. In Game 2 the Sixers won the rebounding battle, but the Celtics forced so many turnovers that they still ended up with a 7-shot advantage. Wilt had an even better performance, a 30/39/8 on +17.4%, but the key was that Celtics besides Sam Jones ( 40/6/3 on +8.4%) really struggled (Sanders, Havlicek and Heinsohn all shot at -13.8% or worse). The Sixers won by six.
In Game 3 the Celtics roared back. Wilt had a stereotypical anti-hero game (24/37/1 on -4.4%, by anti-hero I mean he took a ton of shots and racked up individual achievements, but scored inefficiently and didn’t pass). Russell had the inverse, a 19/26/8 on +2.7%. The Celtics forced a ton of turnovers and controlled the boards, ending with a ridiculous 21 extra shooting possessions, and won by a dominant 18. In Game 4 the Celtics won possessions but by less (6), and couldn’t stop the Sixers’ scoring. Wilt put up a 34/34/3 on +3.9% while Sam Jones had a 36/5/4 on +4.9%. The Sixers outshot the Celtics overall by 3.4% and won by 3 in overtime. The first four games had split 2-2, with the home team winning each game and the Celtics had averaged an MoV of +5.25, about what you’d expect given the difference between the teams.
Game 5 in Boston was an enormous outlier; the Celtics actually outshot the Sixers, but the Sixers controlled the ball more. So the Sixers got 9 extra shots, but shot badly (-3.8% as a team), while Wilt put up a 30/21/2 on +8.7%. But Boston had another strong game from Sam Jones (29/5/3 on +2.7%) and Russell and Heinsohn combined for 36 points on +17.3% shooting. The Celtics prevailed by 6 and pushed the Sixers one game away from elimination. Game 6 was back to normal, with the Celtics getting 12 extra shots but being outshot badly. The Celtics’ scorers struggled, Sam Jones with a 20/4/2 on -2.9%, and Havlicek with a 14/6/3 on -20.9%. Wilt posted a 30/26/4 on +10.9% and won by 6. The series went down to Game 7 in Boston.
Game 7 was like every other game in the series, only more so. The Celtics controlled possession mostly through turnovers, taking 15 extra shots, but were outshot badly. Wilt put up a 30/32/2 on +24.5% (!!) while Russell posted a 15/29/8 on -3.5% and Sam Jones had a 37/2/1 on +5.0%. And the game went down to the wire. Down by three with the clock ticking down Wilt got the ball and dunked on Russell, bringing the Sixers within one with five seconds left. On the inbound pass Russell accidentally threw the ball into a guy-wire over the backboard, leading to a turnover. The Sixers now had possession, and time for one more shot. On Hal Greer’s inbound pass John Havlicek made a diving stop, tipping the ball to a Celtic and effectively ending the game and preserving the Celtics’ win. The Celtics had prevailed, but by only 2.9 points per game, a far narrower margin of victory than a team of their caliber should have allowed to an only good team.
They advanced to the NBA Finals to face a familiar foe, the Los Angeles Lakers. The Lakers, despite the presence of big names like Jerry West had not done well, posting a +1.7 RSRS and only beating the +0.4 Bullets by 1.7 a game in the Conference Finals (Elgin Baylor had gone down in the first game). The Finals weren’t close; the Celtics stomped them beginning to end, winning the series in five by 12.6 points per game. The Celtics owned the boards and forced tons of turnovers, getting almost 20 more shooting possessions per game. That the Lakers shot slightly better (+2.6% to league average) was irrelevant. Sam Jones averaged a 28/5/3 on +4.9% and Bill Russell put up a 18/25/6 on +21%. Jerry West played well with a 34/6/3 on +3.3% in the loss. It was a dominant win, if slightly asterisked by Baylor’s injury.
So. Very similar to the ‘70 Knicks, the ‘65 Celtics put up an extremely dominant regular season, but have a very mixed postseason, failing to whip teams that their regular seasons suggest that they should have. The Celtics’ +8.78 PSRS is quite low (86th on the list) and that doesn’t do them any favors. What they have going for them is being far and away the best team in their year. Of the nine teams, the top four go: Boston (+8.14), Philadelphia (+2.70), St. Louis (+0.36), Baltimore (+0.25). Completely unambiguous. Play that season from scratch with those team abilities ten times, the Celtics probably win it nine or ten times. So even if their ratings themselves are low, their dominance (as measured by standard deviations over the mean) is exceptional.
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