Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#22. The 1983 Philadelphia 76ers
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +10.32, Standard Deviations: +2.08, Won NBA Finals (Preseason X)
PG: Maurice Cheeks, +4.7 / +4.1
SG: Andrew Toney, +0.7 / -0.2
SF: Julius Erving, +6.5 / +2.9
PF: Marc Iavaroni, -3.1 / +1.2
C: Moses Malone, +3.7 / +6.4
6th: Bobby Jones, +4.0 / +6.3
7th: Clint Richardson, -0.4 / +0.3
Regular Season Stats:
Regular Season Record: 65-17, Regular Season SRS: +7.53 (30th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.6 (36th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.8 (46th)
Andrew Toney (SG, 25): 30 MPPG, 28% OLoad, 21 / 3 / 5 / 1 on +2.7%
Julius Erving (SF, 32): 33 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 23 / 7 / 4 / 4 on +3.5%
Moses Malone (C, 27): 37 MPPG, 24% OLoad, 24 / 15 / 1 / 3 on +4.7%
Maurice Cheeks (PG, 26): 30 MPPG, 19% OLoad, 13 / 3 / 7 / 3 on +5.1%
Clint Richardson (SG, 26): 22 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 8 / 3 / 2 / 1 on -4.6%
Bobby Jones (PF, 31): 23 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 10 / 5 / 2 / 3 on +7.2%
Marc Iavaroni (PF, 26): 20 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 5 / 4 / 1 / 1 on -2.9%
Scoring/100: Moses Malone (30.5 / +4.7%), Andrew Toney (30.2 / +2.7%), Julius Erving (29.8 / +3.5%)
Assists/100: Maurice Cheeks (10.3), Andrew Toney (6.9), Julius Erving (5.1)
Playoff Stats:
Playoff Offensive Rating: +5.89 (45th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.80 (55th)
Playoff SRS: +12.83 (28th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.79 (43rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.50 (68th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.59 (35th)
Andrew Toney (SG, 25): 29 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 20 / 3 / 5 / 1 on -0.6%
Moses Malone (C, 27): 39 MPPG, 24% OLoad, 25 / 15 / 2 / 3 on +5.6%
Julius Erving (SF, 32): 37 MPPG, 23% OLoad, 20 / 8 / 4 / 3 on -3.5%
Maurice Cheeks (PG, 26): 36 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 17 / 3 / 8 / 2 on +1.8%
Bobby Jones (PF, 31): 26 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 9 / 5 / 3 / 3 on +6.2%
Clint Richardson (SG, 26): 24 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 7 / 3 / 2 / 2 on -4.5%
Marc Iavaroni (PF, 26): 21 MPPG, 11% OLoad, 6 / 5 / 2 / 1 on +2.8%
Scoring/100: Moses Malone (31.9 / +5.6%), Andrew Toney (31.3 / -0.6%), Julius Erving (23.9 / -3.5%)
Assists/100: Maurice Cheeks (9.3), Andrew Toney (7.6), Bobby Jones (5.2)
Round 1:
Round 2: New York Knicks (+3.9), won 4-0, by +5.5 points per game (+9.4 SRS eq)
Round 3: Milwaukee Bucks (+7.7), won 4-1, by +4.4 points per game (+12.1 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+7.2), won 4-0, by +10.0 points per game (+17.2 SRS eq)
Offensive / Defensive Ratings from Opposition Regular Season Average:
New York Knicks: +9.4 / +1.2
Milwaukee Bucks: +5.0 / -4.0
Los Angeles Lakers: +4.4 / -10.8
Oh the 1983 Philadelphia 76ers. What a fascinating team. Let’s have some history shall we?
In 1976 the Sixers were just barely above average (48 wins, +1.66 OSRS). They were led by three players: efficient but low usage forward Steve Mix, good-shooting guard Doug Collins and the high-usage but inefficient, athletic passing big man George McGinnis. They also had two promising youngsters in World B. Free and Darryl Dawkins. In 1977 they added the following: Henry Bibby, Caldwell Jones and Julius Erving. Hooo-wee! Their team got better, but not by as much as you’d guess (50 wins and +3.14 OSRS, and an appearance in the NBA Finals). What happened? The ABA folded and a ton of talent suddenly flooded into the league. So while the 76ers added a ton of quality, the entire league got better so it cancelled out a little.
Julius Erving. Doctor J. This is obviously to be taken with an asterisk; others will be able to speak of him better than I. But Erving was an athletic phenomenon. He was tall, long and fast, an absolute terror on the fast break. Everything about his game was getting to the rim or near it; blowby finishes, low post attempts or high post spins. He had a jumper but it was pretty inconsistent past a certain distance. When he was young in the ABA, at the intersection of his athleticism, play in a faster more aggressive league (the ABA), the existence of a three point line (and possibly the lower amount of talent) Doc was an incredibly successful scorer, putting up high usage and efficiency numbers, leading the ABA in points per game three times. He was a solid passer, nothing great but plenty capable of leveraging his defensive attention into good looks for his teammates. His defense was very hit or miss; his length and athleticism led to a lot of blocks and steals, so box score metrics think very highly of him. But he also, curiously, lacked some lateral quickness and struggled to contain quicker players. He also, understandably, liked to leak out on fast breaks which occasionally hurt his team if they gave up the offensive rebound. He benefits and suffers from different things. On one hand, his skill in the open court and at the rim made him the poster child for dunks and cool scoring moves; everybody remembered Doctor J. On the other hand, his success in the ABA has a bit of an asterisk, and his first three years in the NBA were not incredibly successful. Erving’s first three years in the NBA saw diminished scoring rates, efficiency and usage rates.
For the next few years the Sixers were good but not great. In 1978 they won 55 games with a strong +6.01 OSRS, but were knocked out in the Conference Finals by the Bullets. In 1979 the Sixers changed things up. They replaced World B. Free with the young Maurice Cheeks (who would grow into a strong all-around player), they added all-around great sixth man Bobby Jones and new coach Billy Cunningham was given a full year to work with. At this point the lineup was huge, with the 6’11” Caldwell Jones, 6’11” Darryl Dawkins, the 6’9” Bobby Jones and 6’7” Julius Erving. In ‘78 the Sixers’s offense flourished, in part, from their offensive rebounding. In ‘79 Cunningham shook it up and had his Sixers crash the boards less, and the result was a stronger defense, but a far worse offense. They were to win 47 games and post a +3.79 OSRS.
It’s worth bearing in mind that this team was constructed with mostly post-peak veterans (Erving, Henry Bibby, Bobby Jones, Caldwell Jones, Doug Collins) but had some very nice young talent, specifically in Cheeks and Darryl Dawkins. The development of both players would help to lift the Sixers in the early 80s. In 1980 the Sixers made a leap, winning 59 games, posting a +6.35 OSRS and winning the Eastern Conference over the rookie-Bird Boston Celtics. The keys to the jump? First, their defense got even better, jumping from -3.5 to -4.3. They started phasing out Henry Bibby and focusing more on their lineup of giants. The Sixers played an eight-deep squad, but their minutes were shifting toward the Cheeks/Erving/Bobby Jones/Dawkins/Caldwell Jones squad. And that group was so long that it was really hard to shoot against (Bird notably struggled against them in the Eastern Conference Finals). But that said, their offense regressed to league average. At the intersection of Cheeks improving as a passer and the offense being built more around Erving, Doc took a jump in usage *and* efficiency to carry a squad dependent normal usage players (Dawkins and Bobby Jones) and low usage specialists (Caldwell Jones and Cheeks). It was a successful year, but ended with a decisive loss in the Finals to the Los Angeles Lakers.
In 1981 the squad was even better. Their defense jumped from -4.3 to -6.0 and their offense improved, primarily driven by Darryl Dawkins emergence as a serious scoring threat and the addition of secondary passer Lionel Hollins. The ‘81 Sixers won 62 games, posted a +7.76 RSRS, both the highest mark in the league. This was clearly the year of destiny for them . . . except that the Larry Bird Celtics had improved even more, and in the Eastern Conference Finals the two would meet and the Sixers would get edged out in seven, by 1.5 points per game. It was a frustrating year, to be better than ever before, only to lose because there happened to be a really strong team with an ATG player pop into existence in your conference.
In 1982 the basketball gods both gave and took away. Downside, Darryl Dawkins struggled to stay on the court and the defense suffered. Upside, second-year player Andrew Toney exploded onto the league. Granted, he was 24 already, but his 29% Usage and +3% TS really jumped out. Do you know how many players in one of their first two years have posted numbers like that or better?
‘79 Walter Davis
‘82 Andrew Toney
‘85 Michael Jordan
‘94 Shaquille O’Neal
‘20 Trae Young
Obviously that’s to be taken with a grain of salt. But it’s still a pretty nice list to be on. With the injuries to Dawkins the Sixers really needed a shot-maker to pair with Erving, and Toney demonstrated the remarkable ability to take a ton of shots and still make them at a decent rate. Granted, he only played 25 minutes per game off the bench, but it was a serious help. The defense slid (with the loss of Dawkins) but the offense took a step forward. The ‘82 Sixers won 58 games, posted a +5.74 RSRS and won the Eastern Conference (the Celtics were knocked out in an earlier round by the Bucks). But in the Finals the Sixers again ran into the Los Angeles Lakers and again were defeated (though this time had a far closer series). The Sixers’ management was frustrated; if they couldn’t beat the Lakers there was no point. So they swung for the fences, intending that 1983 would be their year. It worked.
How to talk about Moses Malone . . . Moses was one of the most unusual players in NBA history. He won three MVPs, yet is generally considered well-below the other players to have won that many (Bird and Magic). It’s hard to do a player like that justice. Let’s get it out of the way. Malone was a pretty weak passer. Whether you attribute that to his weakness in reading the defense for open men or simple preference, Moses played 21 seasons in the NBA, often on high-pace teams and never averaged more than 2 assists per game. He was an above-average defensive big but was never a huge needle-mover on that end. What did Moses Malone do well? He rebounded. He rebounded the **** out of the ball. He was one of the best defensive rebounders in the league, but he may have been the best offensive rebounder ever. Nobody was better at coming in from the baseline, boxing out the defender as the shot was coming in, springing up and grabbing the rebound, and then either scoring or getting fouled. And he did it over, and over, and over again. For all of his weaknesses (and they were real), Moses’ game translated extremely well to the playoffs. Teammates didn’t really enter into it; nobody could keep him off the offensive glass, and once he had the ball under the hoop, points of some kind were pretty much a given. He had more skill than that; he was quick and had a viable midrange shot, but the offensive glass was where he made his money.
Moses joined the ABA at 19, and moved to the Rockets after the merger happened. The Rockets, I say charitably, were pretty weak besides Moses. In 1981, the blend of Moses’ transcendence and a paper-thin Western Conference gave them a Finals berth, where they were waxed by the ‘81 Celtics. The Rockets were looking at rebuilding and the Sixers saw an opportunity, trading veteran defensive mainstay Caldwell Jones and a first for Moses. At the same time they moved Darryl Dawkins for a first, replacing him with recent addition Marc Iavaroni. Basically, in one fell swoop they replaced their two big men of many years with Moses Malone and an unproven big. And it (along with Toney getting even better) completely transformed the team.
The 1983 Philadelphia 76ers ripped the league apart, winning 65 games (the 5th team to that point to win that many) and posting a +7.53 RSRS, the highest mark in the lead by a solid margin. Their offense was quite good, with the three-headed monster of Moses, Toney and Erving leading the way. They shot well, dominated the offensive glass and got to the line constantly. But the surprising part was that their defense got better as well. They jumped from -3.0 to -3.8 from ‘82 to ‘83. Their blocks dropped, but their shot defense got better and they fouled far less. How much of this was replacing the missing-time Dawkins with a not-injured Iavaroni? Either way, it’s safe to say that Moses’ net effect on defense was probably respectable, given that Caldwell Jones was considered a pretty capable defender. Either way, the team proved to be an extremely strong blend of talent. This wasn’t Doc’s team, it wasn’t Moses’ team, it was a team with a lot of strong players that had simply added a HoF big to their roster.
In the Semis (the Sixers got a bye on account of their one-seed) they faced a solid New York Knicks (+3.9) team. The Sixers handled them effectively, sweeping the series by 5.5 points a game. Moses averaged a 31/16/2 on +9.5% and Maurice Cheeks an 18/4/8 on +8.1% (but Erving and Toney shot poorly, at -9% or worse). The sweep was nice, but a 5.5 margin of victory suggests that the win was less decisive than it appeared. The final two games were decided by 2 and 3 points; hardly overwhelming.
In the Conference Finals they faced the extremely good Milwaukee Bucks (+7.7). The Nellie-ball Bucks actually won the battle on the glass and possession, buying themselves an additional 3 shots a game. But the Sixers’ defense smothered their shooting, holding them to -3.6% as a team. It’s not as though the Sixers’ offense did great, but they shot well enough. Toney averaged a 22/3/4 on +3.4%, Moses averaged a 22/14/1 on +4% and Erving averaged a 19/6/2 on -0.5%. The Sixers prevailed in five, by 4.4 points per game. 4.4 isn’t a big margin, but the Bucks were quite good.
In the NBA Finals they got their opportunity for vengeance by facing the Lakers (+7.2) again. And this time they dominated beginning to end. Four games, four wins, 10 points a game. The Lakers’ weren’t exactly healthy; Bob McAdoo had been struggling with injuries all year and the 21 year-old James Worthy missed the playoffs altogether. I don’t think that’s much of an asterisk. The Lakers’ OSRS basically assumes those things. Even with those issues they beat a decent Blazers team by 5.6 and a strong Spurs team by 3.3. They weren’t world-beaters or anything, but even with the injuries they were strong (and let’s not pretend that 21 year-old Worthy was a giant difference-maker). The Sixers simply demolished them - that 10 point a game sweep was epic. It would be another 31 years before a team would post a margin of victory that high in the Finals. I don’t want to make like the ‘83 Lakers were an ATG team, they weren’t. But they were plenty good, and the Sixers took care of business without restraint.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2014 Mario Chalmers
SG: 2006 Tony Parker
SF: 2019 Jusuf Nurkic
PF: 2012 Kendrick Perkins
C: 1983 Moses Malone
6th: 2009 Kenyon Martin (but better)
7th: 2012 Ronnie Brewer
I hate these comps so much. I get why it’s comparing Cheeks to Chalmers; they’re both strong defensive guards with low usage and somewhat efficient scoring. I’ve just always liked Cheeks and respected his game and Chalmers seems low to me. And Toney as ‘06 Parker? Look, I get that Toney 1) took a ton of shots 2) didn’t make them terribly efficiently, 3) didn’t rebound at all, 4) posted limited defensive counting stats and 5) was a decent shot-creator for his teammates. And all of those sound like prime Tony Parker. Still. I feel like it’s selling Toney short. Though maybe that’s just because I’ve never liked Parker that much. Nurkic is a bit of a joke; he’s what the comp engine spits out with 1) strong defense, 2) strong wing/weak big rebounding, 3) decent passing, 4) decent volume, 5) decent efficiency and 6) shot selection near the basket. Statistically it makes sense, it just looks weird. Iavaroni as Perkins works (a no-offense defender) and even though I resent Bobby Jones as a better ‘09 Kenyon Martin, I can see where it’s coming from. And of course there’s no such thing as a modern comp for Moses.
I’m not saying the above is wrong in a statistical sense . . . I think it’s just missing on the elegance of these players. Maybe I’m just sentimental about this team. Who knows?
10 | 76ers
9 |
8 |
7 |
6 | Bucks, Lakers
5 | Spurs
4 |
3 | Knicks, Suns
2 | Celtics, Blazers
1 | Nets, Sonics, Kings
0 | Bullets
-0 | Pistons, Mavericks
-1 | Hawks, Nuggets
-2 |
-3 | Warriors
-4 | Bulls, Jazz, Clippers
-5 | Pacers
-6 | Cavs
-7 |
-8 |
-9 |
-10|
-11| Rockets
1983 was slightly non-competitive. There weren’t a ton of teams clustered around zero; quite a lot of the league was between +3 and +7 or -3 and -7. But once you got through those very good and very bad teams there were two outliers. The tank-tastic Houston Rockets and the Sixers. Nobody this year was anywhere close to Philadelphia; this was their year beginning to end.
But how good were they really? Well, their RSRS is very good (30th on this list) but not historically dominant. And their playoffs? Their PSRS was also very strong (28th on this list) but again not historically dominant. While they owned the Lakers in the Finals, they just did enough against the Knicks. And while they swept the series (so I can’t really fault that), it sends weaker signals of dominance than blowing the weaker team away.
In the end my formula puts them at #22. That seemed low to me at first glance. But the more I look at their resume the more they look really, really good but not historically dominant. When I compare them to some of the other teams above them . . . I would have a hard time moving them up. I think in a world that tends to prioritize performance in the Finals above all other rounds (as long as you win), the Sixers would be higher. That series against the Lakers was outstanding.
PG: Maurice Cheeks, +4.7 / +4.1
SG: Andrew Toney, +0.7 / -0.2
SF: Julius Erving, +6.5 / +2.9
PF: Marc Iavaroni, -3.1 / +1.2
C: Moses Malone, +3.7 / +6.4
6th: Bobby Jones, +4.0 / +6.3
7th: Clint Richardson, -0.4 / +0.3
Regular Season Stats:
Regular Season Record: 65-17, Regular Season SRS: +7.53 (30th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.6 (36th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.8 (46th)
Andrew Toney (SG, 25): 30 MPPG, 28% OLoad, 21 / 3 / 5 / 1 on +2.7%
Julius Erving (SF, 32): 33 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 23 / 7 / 4 / 4 on +3.5%
Moses Malone (C, 27): 37 MPPG, 24% OLoad, 24 / 15 / 1 / 3 on +4.7%
Maurice Cheeks (PG, 26): 30 MPPG, 19% OLoad, 13 / 3 / 7 / 3 on +5.1%
Clint Richardson (SG, 26): 22 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 8 / 3 / 2 / 1 on -4.6%
Bobby Jones (PF, 31): 23 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 10 / 5 / 2 / 3 on +7.2%
Marc Iavaroni (PF, 26): 20 MPPG, 13% OLoad, 5 / 4 / 1 / 1 on -2.9%
Scoring/100: Moses Malone (30.5 / +4.7%), Andrew Toney (30.2 / +2.7%), Julius Erving (29.8 / +3.5%)
Assists/100: Maurice Cheeks (10.3), Andrew Toney (6.9), Julius Erving (5.1)
Playoff Stats:
Playoff Offensive Rating: +5.89 (45th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.80 (55th)
Playoff SRS: +12.83 (28th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.79 (43rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.50 (68th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.59 (35th)
Andrew Toney (SG, 25): 29 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 20 / 3 / 5 / 1 on -0.6%
Moses Malone (C, 27): 39 MPPG, 24% OLoad, 25 / 15 / 2 / 3 on +5.6%
Julius Erving (SF, 32): 37 MPPG, 23% OLoad, 20 / 8 / 4 / 3 on -3.5%
Maurice Cheeks (PG, 26): 36 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 17 / 3 / 8 / 2 on +1.8%
Bobby Jones (PF, 31): 26 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 9 / 5 / 3 / 3 on +6.2%
Clint Richardson (SG, 26): 24 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 7 / 3 / 2 / 2 on -4.5%
Marc Iavaroni (PF, 26): 21 MPPG, 11% OLoad, 6 / 5 / 2 / 1 on +2.8%
Scoring/100: Moses Malone (31.9 / +5.6%), Andrew Toney (31.3 / -0.6%), Julius Erving (23.9 / -3.5%)
Assists/100: Maurice Cheeks (9.3), Andrew Toney (7.6), Bobby Jones (5.2)
Round 1:
Round 2: New York Knicks (+3.9), won 4-0, by +5.5 points per game (+9.4 SRS eq)
Round 3: Milwaukee Bucks (+7.7), won 4-1, by +4.4 points per game (+12.1 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+7.2), won 4-0, by +10.0 points per game (+17.2 SRS eq)
Offensive / Defensive Ratings from Opposition Regular Season Average:
New York Knicks: +9.4 / +1.2
Milwaukee Bucks: +5.0 / -4.0
Los Angeles Lakers: +4.4 / -10.8
Oh the 1983 Philadelphia 76ers. What a fascinating team. Let’s have some history shall we?
In 1976 the Sixers were just barely above average (48 wins, +1.66 OSRS). They were led by three players: efficient but low usage forward Steve Mix, good-shooting guard Doug Collins and the high-usage but inefficient, athletic passing big man George McGinnis. They also had two promising youngsters in World B. Free and Darryl Dawkins. In 1977 they added the following: Henry Bibby, Caldwell Jones and Julius Erving. Hooo-wee! Their team got better, but not by as much as you’d guess (50 wins and +3.14 OSRS, and an appearance in the NBA Finals). What happened? The ABA folded and a ton of talent suddenly flooded into the league. So while the 76ers added a ton of quality, the entire league got better so it cancelled out a little.
Julius Erving. Doctor J. This is obviously to be taken with an asterisk; others will be able to speak of him better than I. But Erving was an athletic phenomenon. He was tall, long and fast, an absolute terror on the fast break. Everything about his game was getting to the rim or near it; blowby finishes, low post attempts or high post spins. He had a jumper but it was pretty inconsistent past a certain distance. When he was young in the ABA, at the intersection of his athleticism, play in a faster more aggressive league (the ABA), the existence of a three point line (and possibly the lower amount of talent) Doc was an incredibly successful scorer, putting up high usage and efficiency numbers, leading the ABA in points per game three times. He was a solid passer, nothing great but plenty capable of leveraging his defensive attention into good looks for his teammates. His defense was very hit or miss; his length and athleticism led to a lot of blocks and steals, so box score metrics think very highly of him. But he also, curiously, lacked some lateral quickness and struggled to contain quicker players. He also, understandably, liked to leak out on fast breaks which occasionally hurt his team if they gave up the offensive rebound. He benefits and suffers from different things. On one hand, his skill in the open court and at the rim made him the poster child for dunks and cool scoring moves; everybody remembered Doctor J. On the other hand, his success in the ABA has a bit of an asterisk, and his first three years in the NBA were not incredibly successful. Erving’s first three years in the NBA saw diminished scoring rates, efficiency and usage rates.
For the next few years the Sixers were good but not great. In 1978 they won 55 games with a strong +6.01 OSRS, but were knocked out in the Conference Finals by the Bullets. In 1979 the Sixers changed things up. They replaced World B. Free with the young Maurice Cheeks (who would grow into a strong all-around player), they added all-around great sixth man Bobby Jones and new coach Billy Cunningham was given a full year to work with. At this point the lineup was huge, with the 6’11” Caldwell Jones, 6’11” Darryl Dawkins, the 6’9” Bobby Jones and 6’7” Julius Erving. In ‘78 the Sixers’s offense flourished, in part, from their offensive rebounding. In ‘79 Cunningham shook it up and had his Sixers crash the boards less, and the result was a stronger defense, but a far worse offense. They were to win 47 games and post a +3.79 OSRS.
It’s worth bearing in mind that this team was constructed with mostly post-peak veterans (Erving, Henry Bibby, Bobby Jones, Caldwell Jones, Doug Collins) but had some very nice young talent, specifically in Cheeks and Darryl Dawkins. The development of both players would help to lift the Sixers in the early 80s. In 1980 the Sixers made a leap, winning 59 games, posting a +6.35 OSRS and winning the Eastern Conference over the rookie-Bird Boston Celtics. The keys to the jump? First, their defense got even better, jumping from -3.5 to -4.3. They started phasing out Henry Bibby and focusing more on their lineup of giants. The Sixers played an eight-deep squad, but their minutes were shifting toward the Cheeks/Erving/Bobby Jones/Dawkins/Caldwell Jones squad. And that group was so long that it was really hard to shoot against (Bird notably struggled against them in the Eastern Conference Finals). But that said, their offense regressed to league average. At the intersection of Cheeks improving as a passer and the offense being built more around Erving, Doc took a jump in usage *and* efficiency to carry a squad dependent normal usage players (Dawkins and Bobby Jones) and low usage specialists (Caldwell Jones and Cheeks). It was a successful year, but ended with a decisive loss in the Finals to the Los Angeles Lakers.
In 1981 the squad was even better. Their defense jumped from -4.3 to -6.0 and their offense improved, primarily driven by Darryl Dawkins emergence as a serious scoring threat and the addition of secondary passer Lionel Hollins. The ‘81 Sixers won 62 games, posted a +7.76 RSRS, both the highest mark in the league. This was clearly the year of destiny for them . . . except that the Larry Bird Celtics had improved even more, and in the Eastern Conference Finals the two would meet and the Sixers would get edged out in seven, by 1.5 points per game. It was a frustrating year, to be better than ever before, only to lose because there happened to be a really strong team with an ATG player pop into existence in your conference.
In 1982 the basketball gods both gave and took away. Downside, Darryl Dawkins struggled to stay on the court and the defense suffered. Upside, second-year player Andrew Toney exploded onto the league. Granted, he was 24 already, but his 29% Usage and +3% TS really jumped out. Do you know how many players in one of their first two years have posted numbers like that or better?
‘79 Walter Davis
‘82 Andrew Toney
‘85 Michael Jordan
‘94 Shaquille O’Neal
‘20 Trae Young
Obviously that’s to be taken with a grain of salt. But it’s still a pretty nice list to be on. With the injuries to Dawkins the Sixers really needed a shot-maker to pair with Erving, and Toney demonstrated the remarkable ability to take a ton of shots and still make them at a decent rate. Granted, he only played 25 minutes per game off the bench, but it was a serious help. The defense slid (with the loss of Dawkins) but the offense took a step forward. The ‘82 Sixers won 58 games, posted a +5.74 RSRS and won the Eastern Conference (the Celtics were knocked out in an earlier round by the Bucks). But in the Finals the Sixers again ran into the Los Angeles Lakers and again were defeated (though this time had a far closer series). The Sixers’ management was frustrated; if they couldn’t beat the Lakers there was no point. So they swung for the fences, intending that 1983 would be their year. It worked.
How to talk about Moses Malone . . . Moses was one of the most unusual players in NBA history. He won three MVPs, yet is generally considered well-below the other players to have won that many (Bird and Magic). It’s hard to do a player like that justice. Let’s get it out of the way. Malone was a pretty weak passer. Whether you attribute that to his weakness in reading the defense for open men or simple preference, Moses played 21 seasons in the NBA, often on high-pace teams and never averaged more than 2 assists per game. He was an above-average defensive big but was never a huge needle-mover on that end. What did Moses Malone do well? He rebounded. He rebounded the **** out of the ball. He was one of the best defensive rebounders in the league, but he may have been the best offensive rebounder ever. Nobody was better at coming in from the baseline, boxing out the defender as the shot was coming in, springing up and grabbing the rebound, and then either scoring or getting fouled. And he did it over, and over, and over again. For all of his weaknesses (and they were real), Moses’ game translated extremely well to the playoffs. Teammates didn’t really enter into it; nobody could keep him off the offensive glass, and once he had the ball under the hoop, points of some kind were pretty much a given. He had more skill than that; he was quick and had a viable midrange shot, but the offensive glass was where he made his money.
Moses joined the ABA at 19, and moved to the Rockets after the merger happened. The Rockets, I say charitably, were pretty weak besides Moses. In 1981, the blend of Moses’ transcendence and a paper-thin Western Conference gave them a Finals berth, where they were waxed by the ‘81 Celtics. The Rockets were looking at rebuilding and the Sixers saw an opportunity, trading veteran defensive mainstay Caldwell Jones and a first for Moses. At the same time they moved Darryl Dawkins for a first, replacing him with recent addition Marc Iavaroni. Basically, in one fell swoop they replaced their two big men of many years with Moses Malone and an unproven big. And it (along with Toney getting even better) completely transformed the team.
The 1983 Philadelphia 76ers ripped the league apart, winning 65 games (the 5th team to that point to win that many) and posting a +7.53 RSRS, the highest mark in the lead by a solid margin. Their offense was quite good, with the three-headed monster of Moses, Toney and Erving leading the way. They shot well, dominated the offensive glass and got to the line constantly. But the surprising part was that their defense got better as well. They jumped from -3.0 to -3.8 from ‘82 to ‘83. Their blocks dropped, but their shot defense got better and they fouled far less. How much of this was replacing the missing-time Dawkins with a not-injured Iavaroni? Either way, it’s safe to say that Moses’ net effect on defense was probably respectable, given that Caldwell Jones was considered a pretty capable defender. Either way, the team proved to be an extremely strong blend of talent. This wasn’t Doc’s team, it wasn’t Moses’ team, it was a team with a lot of strong players that had simply added a HoF big to their roster.
In the Semis (the Sixers got a bye on account of their one-seed) they faced a solid New York Knicks (+3.9) team. The Sixers handled them effectively, sweeping the series by 5.5 points a game. Moses averaged a 31/16/2 on +9.5% and Maurice Cheeks an 18/4/8 on +8.1% (but Erving and Toney shot poorly, at -9% or worse). The sweep was nice, but a 5.5 margin of victory suggests that the win was less decisive than it appeared. The final two games were decided by 2 and 3 points; hardly overwhelming.
In the Conference Finals they faced the extremely good Milwaukee Bucks (+7.7). The Nellie-ball Bucks actually won the battle on the glass and possession, buying themselves an additional 3 shots a game. But the Sixers’ defense smothered their shooting, holding them to -3.6% as a team. It’s not as though the Sixers’ offense did great, but they shot well enough. Toney averaged a 22/3/4 on +3.4%, Moses averaged a 22/14/1 on +4% and Erving averaged a 19/6/2 on -0.5%. The Sixers prevailed in five, by 4.4 points per game. 4.4 isn’t a big margin, but the Bucks were quite good.
In the NBA Finals they got their opportunity for vengeance by facing the Lakers (+7.2) again. And this time they dominated beginning to end. Four games, four wins, 10 points a game. The Lakers’ weren’t exactly healthy; Bob McAdoo had been struggling with injuries all year and the 21 year-old James Worthy missed the playoffs altogether. I don’t think that’s much of an asterisk. The Lakers’ OSRS basically assumes those things. Even with those issues they beat a decent Blazers team by 5.6 and a strong Spurs team by 3.3. They weren’t world-beaters or anything, but even with the injuries they were strong (and let’s not pretend that 21 year-old Worthy was a giant difference-maker). The Sixers simply demolished them - that 10 point a game sweep was epic. It would be another 31 years before a team would post a margin of victory that high in the Finals. I don’t want to make like the ‘83 Lakers were an ATG team, they weren’t. But they were plenty good, and the Sixers took care of business without restraint.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2014 Mario Chalmers
SG: 2006 Tony Parker
SF: 2019 Jusuf Nurkic
PF: 2012 Kendrick Perkins
C: 1983 Moses Malone
6th: 2009 Kenyon Martin (but better)
7th: 2012 Ronnie Brewer
I hate these comps so much. I get why it’s comparing Cheeks to Chalmers; they’re both strong defensive guards with low usage and somewhat efficient scoring. I’ve just always liked Cheeks and respected his game and Chalmers seems low to me. And Toney as ‘06 Parker? Look, I get that Toney 1) took a ton of shots 2) didn’t make them terribly efficiently, 3) didn’t rebound at all, 4) posted limited defensive counting stats and 5) was a decent shot-creator for his teammates. And all of those sound like prime Tony Parker. Still. I feel like it’s selling Toney short. Though maybe that’s just because I’ve never liked Parker that much. Nurkic is a bit of a joke; he’s what the comp engine spits out with 1) strong defense, 2) strong wing/weak big rebounding, 3) decent passing, 4) decent volume, 5) decent efficiency and 6) shot selection near the basket. Statistically it makes sense, it just looks weird. Iavaroni as Perkins works (a no-offense defender) and even though I resent Bobby Jones as a better ‘09 Kenyon Martin, I can see where it’s coming from. And of course there’s no such thing as a modern comp for Moses.
I’m not saying the above is wrong in a statistical sense . . . I think it’s just missing on the elegance of these players. Maybe I’m just sentimental about this team. Who knows?
10 | 76ers
9 |
8 |
7 |
6 | Bucks, Lakers
5 | Spurs
4 |
3 | Knicks, Suns
2 | Celtics, Blazers
1 | Nets, Sonics, Kings
0 | Bullets
-0 | Pistons, Mavericks
-1 | Hawks, Nuggets
-2 |
-3 | Warriors
-4 | Bulls, Jazz, Clippers
-5 | Pacers
-6 | Cavs
-7 |
-8 |
-9 |
-10|
-11| Rockets
1983 was slightly non-competitive. There weren’t a ton of teams clustered around zero; quite a lot of the league was between +3 and +7 or -3 and -7. But once you got through those very good and very bad teams there were two outliers. The tank-tastic Houston Rockets and the Sixers. Nobody this year was anywhere close to Philadelphia; this was their year beginning to end.
But how good were they really? Well, their RSRS is very good (30th on this list) but not historically dominant. And their playoffs? Their PSRS was also very strong (28th on this list) but again not historically dominant. While they owned the Lakers in the Finals, they just did enough against the Knicks. And while they swept the series (so I can’t really fault that), it sends weaker signals of dominance than blowing the weaker team away.
In the end my formula puts them at #22. That seemed low to me at first glance. But the more I look at their resume the more they look really, really good but not historically dominant. When I compare them to some of the other teams above them . . . I would have a hard time moving them up. I think in a world that tends to prioritize performance in the Finals above all other rounds (as long as you win), the Sixers would be higher. That series against the Lakers was outstanding.
#21. The 2013 San Antonio Spurs
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +10.78, Standard Deviations: +2.20, Lost in the NBA Finals (Preseason 5th)
PG: Tony Parker, +3.6 / +3.8
SG: Danny Green, +2.8 / +4.8
SF: Kawhi Leonard, +3.1 / +5.1
PF: Tim Duncan, +5.3 / +2.9
C: Tiago Splitter, +2.2 / +0.6
6th: Manu Ginobili, +3.6 / +2.8
Regular Season Metrics:
Regular Season Record: 58-24, Regular Season SRS: +6.67 (53rd), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.4 (72nd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.3 (36th)
Tony Parker (PG, 30): 35 MPPG, 30% OLoad, 22 / 3 / 8 / 1 on +5.3%
Manu Ginobili (SG, 35): 25 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 13 / 4 / 5 / 2 on +2.5%
Tim Duncan (PF, 36): 32 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 19 / 11 / 3 / 4 on +1.9%
Tiago Splitter (C, 28): 26 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 11 / 7 / 2 / 2 on +7.4%
Danny Green (SG, 25): 29 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 11 / 3 / 2 / 2 on +6.5%
Kawhi Leonard (SF, 21): 33 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 13 / 6 / 2 / 2 on +5.7%
Scoring/100: Tony Parker (31.4 / +5.3%), Tim Duncan (30.1 / +1.9%), Manu Ginobili (25.8 / +2.5%)
Assists/100: Tony Parker (11.7), Manu Ginobili (10.0), Tim Duncan (4.5)
Heliocentrism: 21.0% (80th of 84 teams) - Duncan
Wingmen: 32.0% (68th) - Parker & Green
Depth: 47.0% (6th)
Playoff Metrics:
Playoff Offensive Rating: +4.58 (60th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -7.25 (26th)
Playoff SRS: +13.07 (25th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.11 (21st)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.45 (45th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.78 (55th)
Tony Parker (PG, 30): 39 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 22 / 3 / 7 / 1 on -1.4%
Manu Ginobili (SG, 35): 28 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 12 / 4 / 5 / 2 on -0.5%
Tim Duncan (PF, 36): 37 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 19 / 11 / 2 / 3 on -1.2%
Tiago Splitter (C, 28): 22 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 7 / 3 / 1 / 2 on +5.4%
Danny Green (SG, 25): 34 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 12 / 4 / 2 / 2 on +7.0%
Kawhi Leonard (SF, 21): 39 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 14 / 10 / 1 / 2 on +7.6%
Scoring/100: Tony Parker (30.2 / -1.4%), Tim Duncan (27.8 / -1.2%), Manu Ginobili (23.1 / -0.5%)
Assists/100: Tony Parker (10.2), Manu Ginobili (10.0), Tiago Splitter (3.2)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 23.3% (82nd of 84 teams) - Kawhi
Playoff Wingmen: 36.7% (58th) - Parker & Green
Playoff Depth: 40.0% (5th)
Round 1: Los Angeles Lakers (+1.5), won 4-0, by +18.7 points per game (+20.2 SRS eq)
Round 2: Golden State Warriors (+4.1), won 4-2, by +3.8 points per game (+7.9 SRS eq)
Round 3: Memphis Grizzlies (+8.3), won 4-0, by +11.0 points per game (+19.3 SRS eq)
Round 4: Miami Heat (+9.2), lost 3-4, by +0.7 points per game (+9.9 SRS eq)
Offensive / Defensive Ratings from Opposition Regular Season Average:
Los Angeles Lakers: +6.6 / -15.0
Golden State Warriors: +1.2 / -3.7
Memphis Grizzlies: +8.6 / -8.1
Miami Heat: +5.6 / -3.8
Postseason Usage/Shooting Change adjusted for Opposition*:
Tony Parker, +1.2% / -4.9%
Danny Green, -1.6% / +2.3%
Kawhi Leonard, -0.8% / +3.7%
Tim Duncan, -1.7% / -1.3%
Tiago Splitter, -3.3% / -0.2%
Manu Ginobili, -1.3% / -1.2%
Playoff teams allowed 0.71 TS% less than expected in playoffs
In 2012 the San Antonio Spurs were forecast 12th in the league. Instead they surprised everybody by putting together the best offense in the league. And what star drove this top-tier offense? Good question. Instead of the ‘12 Spurs being star-driven, they blended creaky veterans and no-names into an offensive engine that almost nobody could stop. The got the one-seed, marched past everyone in their way and only ended up falling to the ‘12 Thunder in the Conference Finals. In 2013 the oddsmakers gave the Spurs a ton more respect, giving them a 1 in 17 chance of winning the Finals and putting them behind the Heat, Lakers, Thunder and Bulls. The Heat and Thunder I completely understand and the Bulls I kind of get. The Lakers were their own weird story. After getting humiliated by the Mavs in 2011 and blown out by the Thunder in 2012, the Lakers decided that their roster as constructed just couldn’t compete. Pau Gasol was 31, Kobe Bryant was 33, Metta World Peace was 32 . . . most of their big players were old and slowing down. So the Lakers tried to solve this problem with an infusion of . . . old players! They added the 38 year-old Steve Nash (despite the fact that Kobe had never played with a ball-dominant point guard . . . ever) and the 27 year-old Dwight Howard. Howard wasn’t technically old, he was coming off of his peak, but he’d just had an intense back surgery in the offeason and went through six months where he wasn’t practicing, just recovering. So when the 2013 season started, Howard had only been able to play for a month or so. So he was young . . . but there were some serious questions. Anyhow, the oddsmakers thought that the Spurs were good . . . but not that good.
And, let it be said, in 2013 their offense was a little worse. But their defense was considerably better. They had Boris Diaw for an entire year and their budding 21 year-old prospect, Kawhi Leonard, was showing serious promise on the defensive end. While he wasn’t able to carry much of an offensive load, Leonard showed the ability to make his shots and provided a lot of talent on defense. The Spurs posted the 3rd best record and RSRS in the league (behind the Thunder and Heat), but they did it playing their best players very little. In the 82-game season their best players sat out the following number of games:
Tim Duncan: 13 games
Tony Parker: 16 games
Manu Ginobili: 22 games
Kawhi Leonard: 24 games
Their player that played the most total minutes (Danny Green with 2201) would have finished fifth on the Thunder (almost 900 behind Kevin Durant) and would have finished 4th on the Heat (playing 676 minutes less than LeBron James). This is a long way of saying that the Spurs may have shown 3rd, but they were on cruise control the entire year. And their roster was so deep that they could load-manage like that and still finish insanely high. I cannot overstate a) how careful the Spurs were with their players and b) how deep their roster was. My Depth rating is a measure of what percentage of a team’s VORP comes from anyone besides the Top 3 players. In this measure the ‘12-’14 Spurs finished 1st, 6th and 2nd, and for the playoffs they finished 1st, 5th and 2nd. It is hard to overstate how unusual this is.
Here are the breakdowns of Regular Season Depth scores for the Top 25 teams:
0s: 4
10s: 0
20s: 11
30s: 3
40s: 2 (‘16 Spurs, ‘13 Spurs)
50s: 1 (‘14 Spurs)
And Depth Rating for Playoff Teams:
0s: 2
10s: 8
20s: 6
30s: 2
40s: 2 (‘13 Spurs, ‘19 Bucks)
50s: 1 (‘14 Spurs)
I’m just saying, the 2012-2016 Spurs were the most successful depth-driven dynasty ever (apologies to the ‘87-91 Pistons). And it’s not really close. There are other teams that were comparably this deep, but not this deep *and* this good.
The ‘13 Spurs, despite a very strong regular season, finished 2nd in their conference to the ‘13 Thunder who, as expected, were wrecking everything. So in the first round the Spurs drew the +1.5 Los Angeles Lakers who had struggled all year. Steve Nash couldn’t stay on the floor, Dwight Howard had been lackluster and, to compound matters, Kobe had torn his achilles just before the end of the regular season. So the Lakers a) weren’t very good and b) didn’t have Kobe in the playoffs. Unsurprisingly, the Spurs cremated the Lakers, sweeping them to the tune of 18.7 points per game. Does their win get an asterisk because of Kobe being out? It probably should. At the same time Kobe had posted an unadjusted +/- of +2.8 that season, and a AuRPM of +2.2 for the regular season. So losing Kobe hurt . . . but probably not as much as you might have thought. It was an extremely decisive win for the Spurs.
In the second round they faced the up-and-coming Golden State Warriors (+4.1). And it was a struggle. The Spurs weren’t able to score very effectively, shooting -0.9% as a team. All of the Big Three struggled to score efficiently: Parker averaged a 23/5/6 on -2.9%, Duncan a 20/10/2 on -4.3% and Ginobili a 13/5/6 on -8.7%. Fortunately, the Spurs were able to play even more effective defense, stopping the Warriors’ arsenal of shooters (Curry shot -2.9%, Barnes -2.1% and Thompson -4.2%). The Spurs prevailed in six by 3.8 points per game. It was a win, but not the quality of win you want in a Top 25 team.
In a playoffs that would be remembered as unlucky for the Spurs (*cough*RayAllen*cough*) they were really lucky in one respect. The Thunder, who had looked like the team to beat all year, had lost Russell Westbrook for the season. And without him the Thunder folded hard, losing to the Memphis Grizzlies in the semis. So instead of facing the Thunder they got to face the Grizzlies (+8.3) instead. I’m not saying that they couldn’t have beaten the Thunder (2-2 in the regular season matchups with a -3.0 MoV) and I’m not saying that the Grizzlies were weak (they did have the best defense in the league). I’m just saying that the Grizzlies were certainly an easier matchup.
The Spurs completely wrecked them on both sides of the court, both strangling their offense and scoring well on their defense (adjusted for regular season performance, the Spurs were 8 points per 100 better than expected on both sides of the ball. The Spurs swept the series by 11 points a game. And the Grizzlies were a really good team. OSRS overrates them a bit because of beating the Thunder, but they were a +6.9 OSRS team even before that series. The Spurs played a very strong team and completely demolished them. *That* is the kind of win I want from my Top 25 teams.
And so in the Finals, to absolutely nobody’s surprise, were the +9.2 Miami Heat. The contrast between the two teams was obvious: one was led by the best player in the game, while the other was one of the deepest contenders ever. But they had one thing in common; they were both excellent teams, and both one series win away from an NBA championship.
Game 1 was a preview of just how close this series would be. The Heat led by 3 going into the fourth, only for the Spurs to go on a 16-7 run in the fourth, pulling out the win by four. The Heat struggled to shoot (non-LeBron members of the Heat shot -22.8% in the quarter) and committed 4 turnovers to the Spurs’ zero. Tim Duncan posted a 20/14/4 on -5.3% (with 3 blocks) in the win. In Game 2 the Heat fought back, putting on an offensive clinic, shooting +4.3% with only six turnovers all game while the Spurs struggled (shooting -3.6% and turning the ball over 16 times). The Heat won by 19, sending the series to San Antonio with positive momentum going for them.
That momentum was less than worthless in Game 3. In every phase of the game the Spurs absolutely buried the Heat. The Spurs led by 15 going into the fourth and went nova in the final period, winning those 12 minutes by 21 points. The Spurs dominated everything. They shot +5.1% to the Heat’s -6.6%. Tim Duncan pounded the Heat’s smallball lineup with 7 offensive boards and the Spurs were able to take 16 extra shots. When you win possession big *and* win shooting big you get a blowout, and the Spurs won Game 3 by 36 points. In Game 4 the Heat bounced back, powered by LeBron’s 33/11/4 on +8.2% (2 steals and 2 blocks) and Wade’s 32/6/4 on +6.3% (6 steals, 1 block). This time the Spurs got only 5 offensive boards as a team, and despite the Spurs shooting well (+2.1%) the Heat had such a possession advantage (9 shots) that the game was out of reach. The Spurs lost by 16. Game 5 was the final game in San Antonio and the Spurs made the most of it, putting on a shooting clinic for the ages. As a team they shot +16.5% (!!). The starters (Parker, Ginobili, Green, Duncan and Leonard) combined all scored between 16 and 26 points, combining for 107 points on only 72 shooting possessions. For a team that rolled deep without a star it was a statement win, scoring at will without any one player standing out. The Heat controlled possession in the game but the Spurs shot so well that the issue was never in doubt, with the Spurs winning by 10.
So the series went back to Miami for the last time, with the Spurs leading 3-2 and showing a +3.0 MoV so far. The Spurs were hardly dominating, but they were leading decently. Which set up Game 6. A Game that would live . . . in Infamy. The Spurs were leading by 10 going into the fourth. The Heat surged back and by five minutes left they had gained a one-point lead. Here’s the last five minutes (with win probabilities, we start with the Heat up 1 with the ball, 60.9% chance of winning):
4:45 - LeBron ISOs on Boris Diaw, blows by him and lays it in, Heat by 3 (67.0%)
4:24 - The Spurs run a series of picks with the Heat playing tight defense, they trap Manu who tries to pass over the double, Chalmers deflects it and the Heat get the steal, up three (74.5%)
4:04 - James ISOs on Diaw again, this time Leonard shades a little off Miller to threaten help, LeBron takes a jumper and misses, Spurs’ ball down by 3 (68.6%)
3:48 - Ginobili drives, Chalmers gets in the way and is called for a blocking foul.
3:35 - The Spurs try to get the ball to Duncan who is being fronted hard by Bosh, Parker drives and takes a tough pull-up, missing, rebound Heat, up 3 (76.9%)
3:18 - LeBron gets isolated off-ball in the post against Parker, they jockey for position and James is called (a little dubiously) for a foul and the Spurs get possession, down by 3 (70.9%)
3:07 - Bosh helps a trap near the top of the key, the Spurs seize the moment by getting it in to Duncan when Bosh doesn’t have good position, Duncan takes a solid lefty hook but misses, Heat rebound, up by 3 (78.7%)
2:42 - the Heat get Wade cutting toward the ball baseline covered by Green, Wade gets the ball and takes a contested fallaway, missing big, Spurs get the rebound down by 3 (73.3%)
2:35 - the Spurs transition quickly, Ginobili drives and Duncan blocks out Bosh, Ginobili gets the easy layup, Heat by 1 (65.7%)
2:09 - Chalmers gets a screen from LeBron, drives, dishes to Wade in the paint, Wade is fouled in the act of shooting, Wade makes both, Spurs get the ball down 3 (77.0%)
1:54 - Ginobili passes to Green who is absolutely smothered by Allen, Ginobili cuts toward him and Green passes it back, Ginobili takes a three on the move, missing, Wade goes up for the rebound and punches it back out toward the Spurs where Green recovers it but is doubled immediately, Spurs call timeout, down 3 (78.8%)
1:27 - Parker is defended by James, Parker can’t get a good look, he makes to drive into the paint, James cuts him off aggressively, Parker steps back behind the line and lets fly and cans the shot, tie game (57.9%)
1:06 - Wade cuts through the paint under the rim, passes out to Chalmers beyond the arc, Chalmers drives hard inside and passes to Wade, only for a streaking Parker to intercept the pass, Spurs’ ball tie game (41.7%)
1:00 - Parker gets a screen on Chalmers, uses the space to drive inside, he parks back-to-the-basket in the paint, lets Chalmers go by, turns and and takes a short leaner into the basket, Spurs by 2 (26.4%)
0:40 - LeBron gets the matchup he wants with Parker defending him, Parker plays way, way off, giving James the jumper. But James tries to drive inside, gets good position but loses the ball, Duncan gets the steal, Spurs by 2 (11.6%)
0:37 - Parker and Ginobili two on one fastbreak, Ginobili is fouled in the act of shooting, he makes both free throws, Spurs by 4 (5.2%)
0:28 - LeBron gets inside, takes a contested shot (pass?) and misses bad, Ginobili gets the steal, Spurs by 4 (1.5%)
0:28 - Ginobili is fouled, makes one of two, Spurs by 5 (1.8%)
0:28 - the Heat spring LeBron at the top of the key, inbound to him, he takes the three and misses, the ball bounces in the air, eventually the Heat come up with it, down by 5 (1.5%)
0:20 - the ball gets passed back out to LeBron who takes another three, this time making it, Spurs by 2 (8.5%)
0:19 - the Spurs inbound to Kawhi who gets fouled and makes one of two, Spurs by 3 (9.2%)
0:11 - LeBron catches the pass moving beyond the arc, he takes the three, misses, Bosh gets the rebound and passes to the rapidly backpedaling Ray Allen who takes the three and cans it, tie game (39.5%)
0:00 - Tony Parker drives hard, takes an extremely hard shot as he’s falling out of bounds, misses big, overtime.
Overtime was a defensive struggle, but the Heat ended up prevailing, barely. It was a serious gut-punch, to end up losing a game that, at one point, they had a 98.5% chance of winning. But there was still Game 7. Except that Elimination Game James showed up, posting a 37/12/4 on +16.3% with 2 steals, and the Spurs struggled to shoot (-5.5% as a team). They lost by seven.
What to make of this? Well, the Spurs submitted a really good playoffs leading up to the Heat. They obliterated an admittedly short-staffed mediocre team. They had a weak series against the Warriors but then they demolished a legitimately very good team in Memphis. And they played the Heat pretty much to a standstill, outsourcing them by 0.7 points per game and few teams have come so close to win and still lost.
Let the record show that Tim Duncan averaged a 19-12-1 on +1.9% on 36 minutes a game in the NBA Finals, leading his team in points and both teams in rebounds. He was 37 years old. Let the record show that Tony Parker had a rough playoffs, seeing his efficiency drop almost 5 points from regular season to postseason (adjusted for defenses). In the Finals he shot -6.3%; in Game 7 he had a 10/4/3 on -17.2%, a bad game at a bad time. But let the record also show that Parker put together three plays back-to-back-to-back (the step-back 3, the steal and the post jumper) that swung the game from “Spurs down by 3 with 87 seconds left” to “Spurs up by 2 with 60 seconds left”, which combined to swing the Spurs’ odds of winning by more than 50% (ie, those three plays were worth more to the Spurs than Ray Allen’s shot hurt). Those three super-clutch plays don’t undo a weak Game 7.
And yet.
I think it’s kind of magical for Duncan to be 37, go up against (arguably) the best team in the league and (arguably) the best player in the league running a small-ball offense that is (arguably) the way of the future and, nonplussed, he just shrugs and grinds out solid shots, good rebounds and plays good defense in the NBA Finals (his 5th). I think it’s kind of magical that Parker in the first 11 years of his career was a 31% three point shooter. It wasn’t really a strength for him; in the entire Finals he had attempted 6 threes in 7 games. And yet, as it became clear that the three was an increasing part of their offense Parker had worked hard to improve at the shot, going all the way to 35.3% during the regular season. Parker could rarely boast great efficiency numbers, but his role in the offense had always been one of aggression, to attack without ego and in so doing create openings for his teammates, to basically be a high-energy decoy on many plays. For Parker to get the inbounds pass at 1:43, have LeBron on him fully dialed in, to cut inside only to execute a flawless stepback three and swish it in LeBron’s face to tie the game . . . you’ve got to have some giant brass balls to try crap like that, especially for somebody who never really shot threes well. And as the crowd is shouting (because his crazy shot just tied the game) and his teammates are congratulating him, he does nothing to acknowledge the shot besides a little smile; his eyes are on the Heat and the next possession.
I’ve never been a big Tony Parker fan, but it was a sequence that showed all of the good things about him. His hard work to improve, his fearlessness and the professionalism to take (and make) shots like that but always be looking toward the next play. I didn’t discover the true meaning of Christmas or anything, but it was a great sequence. It’s just so beautiful to watch these guys who have played together for so long give it one last effort. Maybe I’m a little nostalgic (which is funny because when I watched the game live it was as a Heat fan; it’s funny how things change).
10 | Spurs
9 | Heat
8 |
7 | Thunder
6 | Grizzlies
5 |
4 | Knicks, Pacers, Warriors
3 | Clippers, Rockets
2 | Nuggets
1 | Nets
0 | Jazz
-0 | Celtics, Hawks, Mavs
-1 | Bulls, Lakers, Raptors, TWolves
-2 | Wizards, Blazers
-3 | Bucks, 76ers, Hornets
-4 | Pistons, Cavaliers, Kings
-5 | Suns
-6 |
-7 | Magic
-8 |
-9 | Bobcats
-10|
I don’t want to call 2013 particularly competitive, but it’s pretty comparable to 1983. Only 7% of the league worse than -6, only 13% of the league better than +5. Sort of middle of the road. And of the teams in 2013, OSRS likes the Spurs the best. They had the 3rd best regular season SRS, but the best team (the Thunder) imploded and the 2nd best team (the Heat) had a worse playoffs, posting a lower MoV despite playing better teams. Their regular season was fairly unremarkable on this list (53rd) but in terms of playoffs the Spurs posted a really strong run, 25th on this list. My formula thinks that the 2013 Spurs are the best team to not win a championship and, truthfully, I don’t have a huge problem with that. The formula actually would think the ‘72 Bucks better if the Spurs had been knocked out in the Conference Finals. But given that they won their conference my sheet gives them the benefit of the doubt and places them here. Personally, I like the ‘72 Bucks better, but that’s me (because, again, it’s not their fault that the ‘72 Lakers were in their conference). From here on out, the Top 20 are all Championship teams.
And a side note. The discerning reader (it’s usually TREX who catches this stuff) may notice the following:
1983 and 2013 were similarly competitive;
The ‘83 Sixers had a better regular season than the ‘13 Spurs (+7.53 to +6.67)
Their postseasons were very similar (Sixers with +12.83, Spurs with +13.07)
The Sixers won the championship while the Spurs lost it, so surely that counts.
At the mix of these things, how could the ‘83 Sixers be placed lower than the ‘13 Spurs, given that the Spurs’ only advantage is a tiny margin in PSRS?
It’s a great question. And the answer is about sample size. The weight for OSRS is basically weighting each playoff game as seven regular season games. This is how I get around teams that do really well in the playoffs, but get knocked out early (like the ‘09 Nuggets); I don’t weight their postseason SRS as much because they didn’t play many games. Well here’s where the rubber meets the road: the ‘13 Spurs played 21 playoff games, the ‘83 Sixers played 13. So the formula takes the ‘13 Spurs’ playoff performance more seriously because they played at that level over more games.
Does this prejudice the formula against earlier great teams, who don’t get to play as many playoff games? Yes, to some extent. The counter is that earlier teams get the advantage of earning automatic berths in later rounds of the playoffs. The aggregate result is that earlier teams get a fixed edge (from being more likely to be farther in the playoffs) but later teams get a more volatile edge (the opportunity to play more games to improve your ranking). I think it washes out generally, but at the top end I am pretty certain that the current setup favors later teams, perhaps to the list’s detriment.
The real problem is the subtle fact that if you can beat a team by 15 points a game in a clean sweep, or beat a team by 15 points a game in a 4-1 win, the formula favors the latter because it’s a larger sample size. Which mathematically is intuitive. But it’s really strange for a formula evaluating dominance to effectively punish winning the series in fewer games (assuming similar MoV, which isn’t actually a reasonable assumption).
All of this is neither here nor there. I’m just a) trying to be thorough in explaining these things and b) laying the groundwork for the 2.0 discussion sometime in the next month.
PG: Tony Parker, +3.6 / +3.8
SG: Danny Green, +2.8 / +4.8
SF: Kawhi Leonard, +3.1 / +5.1
PF: Tim Duncan, +5.3 / +2.9
C: Tiago Splitter, +2.2 / +0.6
6th: Manu Ginobili, +3.6 / +2.8
Regular Season Metrics:
Regular Season Record: 58-24, Regular Season SRS: +6.67 (53rd), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.4 (72nd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.3 (36th)
Tony Parker (PG, 30): 35 MPPG, 30% OLoad, 22 / 3 / 8 / 1 on +5.3%
Manu Ginobili (SG, 35): 25 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 13 / 4 / 5 / 2 on +2.5%
Tim Duncan (PF, 36): 32 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 19 / 11 / 3 / 4 on +1.9%
Tiago Splitter (C, 28): 26 MPPG, 17% OLoad, 11 / 7 / 2 / 2 on +7.4%
Danny Green (SG, 25): 29 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 11 / 3 / 2 / 2 on +6.5%
Kawhi Leonard (SF, 21): 33 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 13 / 6 / 2 / 2 on +5.7%
Scoring/100: Tony Parker (31.4 / +5.3%), Tim Duncan (30.1 / +1.9%), Manu Ginobili (25.8 / +2.5%)
Assists/100: Tony Parker (11.7), Manu Ginobili (10.0), Tim Duncan (4.5)
Heliocentrism: 21.0% (80th of 84 teams) - Duncan
Wingmen: 32.0% (68th) - Parker & Green
Depth: 47.0% (6th)
Playoff Metrics:
Playoff Offensive Rating: +4.58 (60th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -7.25 (26th)
Playoff SRS: +13.07 (25th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.11 (21st)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.45 (45th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.78 (55th)
Tony Parker (PG, 30): 39 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 22 / 3 / 7 / 1 on -1.4%
Manu Ginobili (SG, 35): 28 MPPG, 27% OLoad, 12 / 4 / 5 / 2 on -0.5%
Tim Duncan (PF, 36): 37 MPPG, 25% OLoad, 19 / 11 / 2 / 3 on -1.2%
Tiago Splitter (C, 28): 22 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 7 / 3 / 1 / 2 on +5.4%
Danny Green (SG, 25): 34 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 12 / 4 / 2 / 2 on +7.0%
Kawhi Leonard (SF, 21): 39 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 14 / 10 / 1 / 2 on +7.6%
Scoring/100: Tony Parker (30.2 / -1.4%), Tim Duncan (27.8 / -1.2%), Manu Ginobili (23.1 / -0.5%)
Assists/100: Tony Parker (10.2), Manu Ginobili (10.0), Tiago Splitter (3.2)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 23.3% (82nd of 84 teams) - Kawhi
Playoff Wingmen: 36.7% (58th) - Parker & Green
Playoff Depth: 40.0% (5th)
Round 1: Los Angeles Lakers (+1.5), won 4-0, by +18.7 points per game (+20.2 SRS eq)
Round 2: Golden State Warriors (+4.1), won 4-2, by +3.8 points per game (+7.9 SRS eq)
Round 3: Memphis Grizzlies (+8.3), won 4-0, by +11.0 points per game (+19.3 SRS eq)
Round 4: Miami Heat (+9.2), lost 3-4, by +0.7 points per game (+9.9 SRS eq)
Offensive / Defensive Ratings from Opposition Regular Season Average:
Los Angeles Lakers: +6.6 / -15.0
Golden State Warriors: +1.2 / -3.7
Memphis Grizzlies: +8.6 / -8.1
Miami Heat: +5.6 / -3.8
Postseason Usage/Shooting Change adjusted for Opposition*:
Tony Parker, +1.2% / -4.9%
Danny Green, -1.6% / +2.3%
Kawhi Leonard, -0.8% / +3.7%
Tim Duncan, -1.7% / -1.3%
Tiago Splitter, -3.3% / -0.2%
Manu Ginobili, -1.3% / -1.2%
Playoff teams allowed 0.71 TS% less than expected in playoffs
In 2012 the San Antonio Spurs were forecast 12th in the league. Instead they surprised everybody by putting together the best offense in the league. And what star drove this top-tier offense? Good question. Instead of the ‘12 Spurs being star-driven, they blended creaky veterans and no-names into an offensive engine that almost nobody could stop. The got the one-seed, marched past everyone in their way and only ended up falling to the ‘12 Thunder in the Conference Finals. In 2013 the oddsmakers gave the Spurs a ton more respect, giving them a 1 in 17 chance of winning the Finals and putting them behind the Heat, Lakers, Thunder and Bulls. The Heat and Thunder I completely understand and the Bulls I kind of get. The Lakers were their own weird story. After getting humiliated by the Mavs in 2011 and blown out by the Thunder in 2012, the Lakers decided that their roster as constructed just couldn’t compete. Pau Gasol was 31, Kobe Bryant was 33, Metta World Peace was 32 . . . most of their big players were old and slowing down. So the Lakers tried to solve this problem with an infusion of . . . old players! They added the 38 year-old Steve Nash (despite the fact that Kobe had never played with a ball-dominant point guard . . . ever) and the 27 year-old Dwight Howard. Howard wasn’t technically old, he was coming off of his peak, but he’d just had an intense back surgery in the offeason and went through six months where he wasn’t practicing, just recovering. So when the 2013 season started, Howard had only been able to play for a month or so. So he was young . . . but there were some serious questions. Anyhow, the oddsmakers thought that the Spurs were good . . . but not that good.
And, let it be said, in 2013 their offense was a little worse. But their defense was considerably better. They had Boris Diaw for an entire year and their budding 21 year-old prospect, Kawhi Leonard, was showing serious promise on the defensive end. While he wasn’t able to carry much of an offensive load, Leonard showed the ability to make his shots and provided a lot of talent on defense. The Spurs posted the 3rd best record and RSRS in the league (behind the Thunder and Heat), but they did it playing their best players very little. In the 82-game season their best players sat out the following number of games:
Tim Duncan: 13 games
Tony Parker: 16 games
Manu Ginobili: 22 games
Kawhi Leonard: 24 games
Their player that played the most total minutes (Danny Green with 2201) would have finished fifth on the Thunder (almost 900 behind Kevin Durant) and would have finished 4th on the Heat (playing 676 minutes less than LeBron James). This is a long way of saying that the Spurs may have shown 3rd, but they were on cruise control the entire year. And their roster was so deep that they could load-manage like that and still finish insanely high. I cannot overstate a) how careful the Spurs were with their players and b) how deep their roster was. My Depth rating is a measure of what percentage of a team’s VORP comes from anyone besides the Top 3 players. In this measure the ‘12-’14 Spurs finished 1st, 6th and 2nd, and for the playoffs they finished 1st, 5th and 2nd. It is hard to overstate how unusual this is.
Here are the breakdowns of Regular Season Depth scores for the Top 25 teams:
0s: 4
10s: 0
20s: 11
30s: 3
40s: 2 (‘16 Spurs, ‘13 Spurs)
50s: 1 (‘14 Spurs)
And Depth Rating for Playoff Teams:
0s: 2
10s: 8
20s: 6
30s: 2
40s: 2 (‘13 Spurs, ‘19 Bucks)
50s: 1 (‘14 Spurs)
I’m just saying, the 2012-2016 Spurs were the most successful depth-driven dynasty ever (apologies to the ‘87-91 Pistons). And it’s not really close. There are other teams that were comparably this deep, but not this deep *and* this good.
The ‘13 Spurs, despite a very strong regular season, finished 2nd in their conference to the ‘13 Thunder who, as expected, were wrecking everything. So in the first round the Spurs drew the +1.5 Los Angeles Lakers who had struggled all year. Steve Nash couldn’t stay on the floor, Dwight Howard had been lackluster and, to compound matters, Kobe had torn his achilles just before the end of the regular season. So the Lakers a) weren’t very good and b) didn’t have Kobe in the playoffs. Unsurprisingly, the Spurs cremated the Lakers, sweeping them to the tune of 18.7 points per game. Does their win get an asterisk because of Kobe being out? It probably should. At the same time Kobe had posted an unadjusted +/- of +2.8 that season, and a AuRPM of +2.2 for the regular season. So losing Kobe hurt . . . but probably not as much as you might have thought. It was an extremely decisive win for the Spurs.
In the second round they faced the up-and-coming Golden State Warriors (+4.1). And it was a struggle. The Spurs weren’t able to score very effectively, shooting -0.9% as a team. All of the Big Three struggled to score efficiently: Parker averaged a 23/5/6 on -2.9%, Duncan a 20/10/2 on -4.3% and Ginobili a 13/5/6 on -8.7%. Fortunately, the Spurs were able to play even more effective defense, stopping the Warriors’ arsenal of shooters (Curry shot -2.9%, Barnes -2.1% and Thompson -4.2%). The Spurs prevailed in six by 3.8 points per game. It was a win, but not the quality of win you want in a Top 25 team.
In a playoffs that would be remembered as unlucky for the Spurs (*cough*RayAllen*cough*) they were really lucky in one respect. The Thunder, who had looked like the team to beat all year, had lost Russell Westbrook for the season. And without him the Thunder folded hard, losing to the Memphis Grizzlies in the semis. So instead of facing the Thunder they got to face the Grizzlies (+8.3) instead. I’m not saying that they couldn’t have beaten the Thunder (2-2 in the regular season matchups with a -3.0 MoV) and I’m not saying that the Grizzlies were weak (they did have the best defense in the league). I’m just saying that the Grizzlies were certainly an easier matchup.
The Spurs completely wrecked them on both sides of the court, both strangling their offense and scoring well on their defense (adjusted for regular season performance, the Spurs were 8 points per 100 better than expected on both sides of the ball. The Spurs swept the series by 11 points a game. And the Grizzlies were a really good team. OSRS overrates them a bit because of beating the Thunder, but they were a +6.9 OSRS team even before that series. The Spurs played a very strong team and completely demolished them. *That* is the kind of win I want from my Top 25 teams.
And so in the Finals, to absolutely nobody’s surprise, were the +9.2 Miami Heat. The contrast between the two teams was obvious: one was led by the best player in the game, while the other was one of the deepest contenders ever. But they had one thing in common; they were both excellent teams, and both one series win away from an NBA championship.
Game 1 was a preview of just how close this series would be. The Heat led by 3 going into the fourth, only for the Spurs to go on a 16-7 run in the fourth, pulling out the win by four. The Heat struggled to shoot (non-LeBron members of the Heat shot -22.8% in the quarter) and committed 4 turnovers to the Spurs’ zero. Tim Duncan posted a 20/14/4 on -5.3% (with 3 blocks) in the win. In Game 2 the Heat fought back, putting on an offensive clinic, shooting +4.3% with only six turnovers all game while the Spurs struggled (shooting -3.6% and turning the ball over 16 times). The Heat won by 19, sending the series to San Antonio with positive momentum going for them.
That momentum was less than worthless in Game 3. In every phase of the game the Spurs absolutely buried the Heat. The Spurs led by 15 going into the fourth and went nova in the final period, winning those 12 minutes by 21 points. The Spurs dominated everything. They shot +5.1% to the Heat’s -6.6%. Tim Duncan pounded the Heat’s smallball lineup with 7 offensive boards and the Spurs were able to take 16 extra shots. When you win possession big *and* win shooting big you get a blowout, and the Spurs won Game 3 by 36 points. In Game 4 the Heat bounced back, powered by LeBron’s 33/11/4 on +8.2% (2 steals and 2 blocks) and Wade’s 32/6/4 on +6.3% (6 steals, 1 block). This time the Spurs got only 5 offensive boards as a team, and despite the Spurs shooting well (+2.1%) the Heat had such a possession advantage (9 shots) that the game was out of reach. The Spurs lost by 16. Game 5 was the final game in San Antonio and the Spurs made the most of it, putting on a shooting clinic for the ages. As a team they shot +16.5% (!!). The starters (Parker, Ginobili, Green, Duncan and Leonard) combined all scored between 16 and 26 points, combining for 107 points on only 72 shooting possessions. For a team that rolled deep without a star it was a statement win, scoring at will without any one player standing out. The Heat controlled possession in the game but the Spurs shot so well that the issue was never in doubt, with the Spurs winning by 10.
So the series went back to Miami for the last time, with the Spurs leading 3-2 and showing a +3.0 MoV so far. The Spurs were hardly dominating, but they were leading decently. Which set up Game 6. A Game that would live . . . in Infamy. The Spurs were leading by 10 going into the fourth. The Heat surged back and by five minutes left they had gained a one-point lead. Here’s the last five minutes (with win probabilities, we start with the Heat up 1 with the ball, 60.9% chance of winning):
4:45 - LeBron ISOs on Boris Diaw, blows by him and lays it in, Heat by 3 (67.0%)
4:24 - The Spurs run a series of picks with the Heat playing tight defense, they trap Manu who tries to pass over the double, Chalmers deflects it and the Heat get the steal, up three (74.5%)
4:04 - James ISOs on Diaw again, this time Leonard shades a little off Miller to threaten help, LeBron takes a jumper and misses, Spurs’ ball down by 3 (68.6%)
3:48 - Ginobili drives, Chalmers gets in the way and is called for a blocking foul.
3:35 - The Spurs try to get the ball to Duncan who is being fronted hard by Bosh, Parker drives and takes a tough pull-up, missing, rebound Heat, up 3 (76.9%)
3:18 - LeBron gets isolated off-ball in the post against Parker, they jockey for position and James is called (a little dubiously) for a foul and the Spurs get possession, down by 3 (70.9%)
3:07 - Bosh helps a trap near the top of the key, the Spurs seize the moment by getting it in to Duncan when Bosh doesn’t have good position, Duncan takes a solid lefty hook but misses, Heat rebound, up by 3 (78.7%)
2:42 - the Heat get Wade cutting toward the ball baseline covered by Green, Wade gets the ball and takes a contested fallaway, missing big, Spurs get the rebound down by 3 (73.3%)
2:35 - the Spurs transition quickly, Ginobili drives and Duncan blocks out Bosh, Ginobili gets the easy layup, Heat by 1 (65.7%)
2:09 - Chalmers gets a screen from LeBron, drives, dishes to Wade in the paint, Wade is fouled in the act of shooting, Wade makes both, Spurs get the ball down 3 (77.0%)
1:54 - Ginobili passes to Green who is absolutely smothered by Allen, Ginobili cuts toward him and Green passes it back, Ginobili takes a three on the move, missing, Wade goes up for the rebound and punches it back out toward the Spurs where Green recovers it but is doubled immediately, Spurs call timeout, down 3 (78.8%)
1:27 - Parker is defended by James, Parker can’t get a good look, he makes to drive into the paint, James cuts him off aggressively, Parker steps back behind the line and lets fly and cans the shot, tie game (57.9%)
1:06 - Wade cuts through the paint under the rim, passes out to Chalmers beyond the arc, Chalmers drives hard inside and passes to Wade, only for a streaking Parker to intercept the pass, Spurs’ ball tie game (41.7%)
1:00 - Parker gets a screen on Chalmers, uses the space to drive inside, he parks back-to-the-basket in the paint, lets Chalmers go by, turns and and takes a short leaner into the basket, Spurs by 2 (26.4%)
0:40 - LeBron gets the matchup he wants with Parker defending him, Parker plays way, way off, giving James the jumper. But James tries to drive inside, gets good position but loses the ball, Duncan gets the steal, Spurs by 2 (11.6%)
0:37 - Parker and Ginobili two on one fastbreak, Ginobili is fouled in the act of shooting, he makes both free throws, Spurs by 4 (5.2%)
0:28 - LeBron gets inside, takes a contested shot (pass?) and misses bad, Ginobili gets the steal, Spurs by 4 (1.5%)
0:28 - Ginobili is fouled, makes one of two, Spurs by 5 (1.8%)
0:28 - the Heat spring LeBron at the top of the key, inbound to him, he takes the three and misses, the ball bounces in the air, eventually the Heat come up with it, down by 5 (1.5%)
0:20 - the ball gets passed back out to LeBron who takes another three, this time making it, Spurs by 2 (8.5%)
0:19 - the Spurs inbound to Kawhi who gets fouled and makes one of two, Spurs by 3 (9.2%)
0:11 - LeBron catches the pass moving beyond the arc, he takes the three, misses, Bosh gets the rebound and passes to the rapidly backpedaling Ray Allen who takes the three and cans it, tie game (39.5%)
0:00 - Tony Parker drives hard, takes an extremely hard shot as he’s falling out of bounds, misses big, overtime.
Overtime was a defensive struggle, but the Heat ended up prevailing, barely. It was a serious gut-punch, to end up losing a game that, at one point, they had a 98.5% chance of winning. But there was still Game 7. Except that Elimination Game James showed up, posting a 37/12/4 on +16.3% with 2 steals, and the Spurs struggled to shoot (-5.5% as a team). They lost by seven.
What to make of this? Well, the Spurs submitted a really good playoffs leading up to the Heat. They obliterated an admittedly short-staffed mediocre team. They had a weak series against the Warriors but then they demolished a legitimately very good team in Memphis. And they played the Heat pretty much to a standstill, outsourcing them by 0.7 points per game and few teams have come so close to win and still lost.
Let the record show that Tim Duncan averaged a 19-12-1 on +1.9% on 36 minutes a game in the NBA Finals, leading his team in points and both teams in rebounds. He was 37 years old. Let the record show that Tony Parker had a rough playoffs, seeing his efficiency drop almost 5 points from regular season to postseason (adjusted for defenses). In the Finals he shot -6.3%; in Game 7 he had a 10/4/3 on -17.2%, a bad game at a bad time. But let the record also show that Parker put together three plays back-to-back-to-back (the step-back 3, the steal and the post jumper) that swung the game from “Spurs down by 3 with 87 seconds left” to “Spurs up by 2 with 60 seconds left”, which combined to swing the Spurs’ odds of winning by more than 50% (ie, those three plays were worth more to the Spurs than Ray Allen’s shot hurt). Those three super-clutch plays don’t undo a weak Game 7.
And yet.
I think it’s kind of magical for Duncan to be 37, go up against (arguably) the best team in the league and (arguably) the best player in the league running a small-ball offense that is (arguably) the way of the future and, nonplussed, he just shrugs and grinds out solid shots, good rebounds and plays good defense in the NBA Finals (his 5th). I think it’s kind of magical that Parker in the first 11 years of his career was a 31% three point shooter. It wasn’t really a strength for him; in the entire Finals he had attempted 6 threes in 7 games. And yet, as it became clear that the three was an increasing part of their offense Parker had worked hard to improve at the shot, going all the way to 35.3% during the regular season. Parker could rarely boast great efficiency numbers, but his role in the offense had always been one of aggression, to attack without ego and in so doing create openings for his teammates, to basically be a high-energy decoy on many plays. For Parker to get the inbounds pass at 1:43, have LeBron on him fully dialed in, to cut inside only to execute a flawless stepback three and swish it in LeBron’s face to tie the game . . . you’ve got to have some giant brass balls to try crap like that, especially for somebody who never really shot threes well. And as the crowd is shouting (because his crazy shot just tied the game) and his teammates are congratulating him, he does nothing to acknowledge the shot besides a little smile; his eyes are on the Heat and the next possession.
I’ve never been a big Tony Parker fan, but it was a sequence that showed all of the good things about him. His hard work to improve, his fearlessness and the professionalism to take (and make) shots like that but always be looking toward the next play. I didn’t discover the true meaning of Christmas or anything, but it was a great sequence. It’s just so beautiful to watch these guys who have played together for so long give it one last effort. Maybe I’m a little nostalgic (which is funny because when I watched the game live it was as a Heat fan; it’s funny how things change).
10 | Spurs
9 | Heat
8 |
7 | Thunder
6 | Grizzlies
5 |
4 | Knicks, Pacers, Warriors
3 | Clippers, Rockets
2 | Nuggets
1 | Nets
0 | Jazz
-0 | Celtics, Hawks, Mavs
-1 | Bulls, Lakers, Raptors, TWolves
-2 | Wizards, Blazers
-3 | Bucks, 76ers, Hornets
-4 | Pistons, Cavaliers, Kings
-5 | Suns
-6 |
-7 | Magic
-8 |
-9 | Bobcats
-10|
I don’t want to call 2013 particularly competitive, but it’s pretty comparable to 1983. Only 7% of the league worse than -6, only 13% of the league better than +5. Sort of middle of the road. And of the teams in 2013, OSRS likes the Spurs the best. They had the 3rd best regular season SRS, but the best team (the Thunder) imploded and the 2nd best team (the Heat) had a worse playoffs, posting a lower MoV despite playing better teams. Their regular season was fairly unremarkable on this list (53rd) but in terms of playoffs the Spurs posted a really strong run, 25th on this list. My formula thinks that the 2013 Spurs are the best team to not win a championship and, truthfully, I don’t have a huge problem with that. The formula actually would think the ‘72 Bucks better if the Spurs had been knocked out in the Conference Finals. But given that they won their conference my sheet gives them the benefit of the doubt and places them here. Personally, I like the ‘72 Bucks better, but that’s me (because, again, it’s not their fault that the ‘72 Lakers were in their conference). From here on out, the Top 20 are all Championship teams.
And a side note. The discerning reader (it’s usually TREX who catches this stuff) may notice the following:
1983 and 2013 were similarly competitive;
The ‘83 Sixers had a better regular season than the ‘13 Spurs (+7.53 to +6.67)
Their postseasons were very similar (Sixers with +12.83, Spurs with +13.07)
The Sixers won the championship while the Spurs lost it, so surely that counts.
At the mix of these things, how could the ‘83 Sixers be placed lower than the ‘13 Spurs, given that the Spurs’ only advantage is a tiny margin in PSRS?
It’s a great question. And the answer is about sample size. The weight for OSRS is basically weighting each playoff game as seven regular season games. This is how I get around teams that do really well in the playoffs, but get knocked out early (like the ‘09 Nuggets); I don’t weight their postseason SRS as much because they didn’t play many games. Well here’s where the rubber meets the road: the ‘13 Spurs played 21 playoff games, the ‘83 Sixers played 13. So the formula takes the ‘13 Spurs’ playoff performance more seriously because they played at that level over more games.
Does this prejudice the formula against earlier great teams, who don’t get to play as many playoff games? Yes, to some extent. The counter is that earlier teams get the advantage of earning automatic berths in later rounds of the playoffs. The aggregate result is that earlier teams get a fixed edge (from being more likely to be farther in the playoffs) but later teams get a more volatile edge (the opportunity to play more games to improve your ranking). I think it washes out generally, but at the top end I am pretty certain that the current setup favors later teams, perhaps to the list’s detriment.
The real problem is the subtle fact that if you can beat a team by 15 points a game in a clean sweep, or beat a team by 15 points a game in a 4-1 win, the formula favors the latter because it’s a larger sample size. Which mathematically is intuitive. But it’s really strange for a formula evaluating dominance to effectively punish winning the series in fewer games (assuming similar MoV, which isn’t actually a reasonable assumption).
All of this is neither here nor there. I’m just a) trying to be thorough in explaining these things and b) laying the groundwork for the 2.0 discussion sometime in the next month.
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