While you have (accurately) noted that they did not specifically apply that to the labor exemption, they took pains to point out that they were NOT ruling out such application either!
That's something we agree on. My comments on
Brady were only intended to disprove your prior suggestion that the 8th Circuit somehow extended the labor exemption post-decertification, not to affirmatively prove that they were shutting the door on the possibility. Indeed, they didn't say either way. And they were careful to give rise to no inference either way as well.
I've even previously said that a court might allow the league to unilaterally impose new work rules
post-decertification, so long as it is only temporary. I haven't seen a court say that can be done, but I'm still willing to say that it's within the realm of possibility. We both recognize that if the NBPA decertifies, Hunter will probably still be involved in trying to hash out a deal on the players' behalf. In that sense, the decertification is a legal fiction of sort, and a de facto labor-management relationship would continue to exist.
What I've been rejecting is your belief that any court would allow the league to
permanently impose unilateral work rules after the union decertifies, without holding them liable for damages under the Sherman Act. And yes, even if the rules are reasonable. And even if they're approved by a judge and his/her special master. Disagree with me? Well then you disagree with the Supreme Court's dicta in
Brown v. Pro Football Inc. too. Although the issue we're discussing wasn't before them, here's where they hinted they'd go if it was:
For these reasons, we hold that the implicit ("nonstatutory") antitrust exemption applies to the employer conduct at issue here. . .Our holding is not intended to insulate from antitrust review every joint imposition of terms by employers, for an agreement among employers could be sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly interfere with that process. See, e.g., 50 F. 3d, at 1057 (suggesting that exemption lasts until collapse of the collective bargaining relationship, as evidenced by decertification of the union); El Cerrito Mill & Lumber Co., 316 N. L. R. B., at 1006-1007 (suggesting that "extremely long" impasse, accompanied by "instability" or "defunctness" of multiemployer unit, might justify union withdrawal from group bargaining).
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/95-388.ZO.htmlIt so happens that that quote was included in the 8th Circuit's
Brady decision (that's how I lucked into it).
But I'm not just relying on Supreme Court precedent. Here's what could happen after your ruling. Every industry previously required to bargain with a union in order to be sheltered from anti-trust liability could simply wait for their current CBA to expire. Then they'd take a hardline bargaining stance until impasse and resume work under their unilaterally imposed last best offer. Left with no option but decertification,** the workers would then be permanently forced to accept terms of employment dictated to them by management and the court. You've now removed the workers' spot at the table and arbitrarily replaced them with your special master. In so doing, you've effectively undermined 100 plus years of established labor law. And is Section 1 of the Sherman Act left with any teeth?
**In other industries the workers might strike, but management can outlast them with replacement workers.