Lakers get Steve Nash

[Levity]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kW86Uv7DaSw&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

just salivating...

[GMATCallahan]

.

[GMATCallahan]

You guys got a great leader both on and off the court. He'll make things much easier for both Byrant & Gasol.

Well, Bryant shot 16-41 from the field last night. Indeed, Kobe is more of a "stand alone" player whose style and statistics are unlikely to be significantly affected by whoever he's playing with. Heck, he never even shot .470 from the field when he was playing with Shaquille O'Neal.

[GMATCallahan]

I get a kick out of how much Steve Nash looks and talks like a young Clint Eastwood. The comparisons will grow even more if the Lakers start kicking butt with a Dirty Harry like Steve Nash.

I don't see how Nash looks or talks like Clint Eastwood (circa forty years ago) at all, and that Canadian accent doesn't exactly help the argument ...

[D-BE-LAW]

I get a kick out of how much Steve Nash looks and talks like a young Clint Eastwood. The comparisons will grow even more if the Lakers start kicking butt with a Dirty Harry like Steve Nash.

I don't see how Nash looks or talks like Clint Eastwood (circa forty years ago) at all, and that Canadian accent doesn't exactly help the argument ...

I hope you're joking about the Canadian accent ROFL.

[GMATCallahan]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kW86Uv7DaSw&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

just salivating...

... very good video, but I need to take issue with a couple points there.

First, Steve Nash did not turn Jared Dudley into an NBA player, give me a break. One of the myths about Nash is that he turns "scrubs into real players," or something along those lines, but it's bogus. Just because some people had never or scarcely heard of Raja Bell or James Jones before they joined Phoenix didn't mean that they couldn't play. Indeed, the Suns signed them precisely because they had already established themselves as dangerous shooters (and useful defenders), with Bell having shot a combined .387 on threes over the previous two seasons in Utah before joining Nash in Phoenix, including .403 for the Jazz in '04-'05. (And Bell wasn't playing with John Stockton or Deron Williams in Salt Lake City, either). In fact, Bell shot .454 from the field and .403 on threes in '04-'05 with Utah, compared to .438 from the field and .419 on threes in his three full seasons with Nash in Phoenix.

Likewise, James Jones had shot .398 on threes in '04-'05 for an Indiana team that advanced to the Eastern Conference Semifinals. In '04-'05, Jones shot .396 from the field and .398 on threes; in two seasons with Nash in Phoenix, he would shoot a combined .397 from the field and .382 on threes. And actually, in his six seasons since leaving Nash, Jones has shot .407 from the field and .416 on threes, including .444 on threes for Portland in '07-'08. Jones and Bell constituted high-quality three-point shooters before they ever joined Nash in Phoenix, explaining why the Suns signed them in the first place. The fact that many people proved ignorant of these facts does not change the fact that those facts existed.

Jared Dudley amounts to a somewhat different case because Phoenix traded for him in the middle of the '08-'09 season, when Dudley was only twenty-three and in just his second NBA season. But already, Dudley was showing signs of being a good three-point shooter before joining Nash, shooting .375 on threes in 20 games for Charlotte that season prior to the deal. In his first full season with Nash and the Suns, '09-'10, Dudley's three-point field goal percentage mushroomed to a staggering .458, but Dudley spent a significant share of his minutes that year playing without Nash. Coming off the bench for 81 regular season games, Dudley was often playing with Goran Dragic and/or Leandro Barbosa at guard. And this season without Nash, Dudley is currently shooting a career-high .489 from the field while connecting on threes at a .396 clip, higher than his .383 mark from last season with Nash, when Dudley started 60 games (in a 66-game schedule). Dudley grabbed 7 boards on Saturday night and passed for 10 assists on Friday night, after enjoying a game with 15 points, 9 rebounds, and 5 assists earlier in the month. In fact, over his last 12 games, Dudley is averaging 14.6 points, 3.3 rebounds, 3.6 assists, just 1.0 turnovers, a 3.58:1.00 assists-to-turnover ratio, 1.3 steals, a .556 field goal percentage, a .451 three-point field goal percentage (in 4.3 attempts per game), an .842 free throw percentage, and a stunning .702 True Shooting percentage and 137 Offensive Rating. Over his last 7 games, Dudley has posted at least 15 points six times, 19 points five times, and 20 points four times. Over his last 7 games, Dudley has recorded 5 or more assists four times and multiple steals four times, including 3 steals three different times. Dudley is an NBA player not because Steve Nash turned him into one, but because Dudley turned himself into one. He reminds me of three-time NBA champion Mario Elie, except (unfortunately) with less athleticism and slashing ability.

The other problem with the video is that it suggests that just because the "roll man" proved so prolific and efficient in Phoenix playing with Nash, he will necessarily be that way with the Lakers. But that situation existed with the Suns not simply because of Nash, but largely due to the way that Phoenix spread the floor. As one can see from the video, the Suns generally surrounded the pick-and-roll with three off-ball three-point shooters or perimeter players, spaced perfectly. When combined with the modern, revamped defensive three seconds rule (instituted following the 2001 season), the result was that the middle (or the lane) usually proved almost completely open. In basketball, space equals time (the game's fundamental equation), so when defenders are fanned out that widely and need to cover so much space, they often can't help on the pick-and-roll and deal with the "roll man" in time. Often times, the opposing defense doesn't even want to help on the "roll man" (or the ball-handler, Nash in this case) for fear of not being able to help and recover in time to contest a perimeter jump shot for a dangerous perimeter shooter or scorer. Thus if you scrutinize those highlights, you'll find that the Spurs usually preferred to take their chances in the two-on-one situation created by the Suns' pick-and-roll, rather than sending a third defender to help on the play. For when the court is spaced so widely, successful defensive rotations become extremely difficult, sometimes impossible. Therefore, instead of allowing three-point shooters such as Jared Dudley and Channing Frye to find their groove from the perimeter via open looks, San Antonio preferred to gamble that two players (Nash, the ball-handler, and Marcin Gortat, the "roll man") wouldn't be able to overcome the Spurs, even if they proved prolific and efficient. Indeed, the Spurs employed much the same approach when they defeated Phoenix in the 2005, 2007, and 2008 playoffs (back then, Phoenix's primary "roll man" constituted Amar'e Stoudemire). For instance, in Game One of the 2005 Western Conference Finals at Phoenix, Stoudemire and Nash combined for 70 points on .581 (25-43) field goal shooting, but the Spurs limited Shawn Marion and Quentin Richardson to a total of 10 points on .267 (4-15) field goal shooting.

http://www.basketball-reference.com/boxscores/200505220PHO.html

In Game Five at Phoenix, Stoudemire and Nash combined for 62 points, but the other three Phoenix starters—Shawn Marion, Quentin Richardson, and Joe Johnson—combined for just 23. Actually, the entire Suns' team aside from Stoudemire and Nash combined for only 33 points.

http://www.basketball-reference.com/boxscores/200506010PHO.html

Indeed, the sheer stupidity of most basketball fans could be found in the many Suns' fans who became giddy over Stoudemire's performances while censuring Marion and Richardson for their diminished productivity. But of course, those results largely stemmed from San Antonio's defensive response to Phoenix's offensive scheme. The Spurs bet that impressive production from the Suns' two primary pick-and-roll players would not be enough to defeat San Antonio, especially given Phoenix's defensive mediocrity. Sure enough, the Spurs won the series four games to one, winning all three contests in Arizona.

A similar situation occurred in Game Six of the 2007 Western Conference Semifinals, when the Spurs eliminated the Suns in San Antonio. Stoudemire and Nash combined for 56 points, but no other Sun scored over 13. Stoudemire's statistics proved especially significant: he scored 38 points and attempted 28 field goals, but he passed for 0 assists and recorded just 1 assist in the entire series.

http://www.basketball-reference.com/boxscores/200705180SAS.html

Those results stemmed in part from Stoudemire being a disinterested passer (to phrase matters with euphemistic kindness), but also because the Spurs weren't overly concerned with collapsing on the "roll man." They knew that if they routinely attempted to stop Stoudemire by constantly sending help defenders to the pick-and-roll, they would rarely be able to successfully rotate to Phoenix's widely spread shooters and slashers, given that there was so much space to cover.

The lesson for the Lakers is twofold. First, overwhelming numbers by the "roll man" aren't necessarily a positive sign come playoff time. When Stoudemire scored more than 31 points in a playoff game against the Spurs during his Phoenix career, the Suns went 0-7. Second, the apparent dominance of the "roll man" is created not simply by Nash, but the combination of Nash, the system, the personnel, and the spacing that results. Since Phoenix typically surrounded the Nash-Stoudemire (or later Nash-Gortat) pick-and-roll with three perimeter players or three-point shooters, the middle was open, the defense proved unwilling to help for fear of being burned (sometimes, the defense just couldn't help successfully even when it tried because there was so much space to cover and the help defense couldn't get there in time), and the "roll man" could enjoy all kinds of prime opportunities resulting from switches or two-on-one situations. The Lakers, however, are not going to surround the pick-and-roll with three perimeter players or three-point shooters, at least not when they're playing their starting lineup. Relative to the Suns' offense (or to many offenses around the league nowadays), the Lakers are not going to feature as much court spacing, thus enticing and enabling defenders to collapse to the "roll man" more often. Here's what Jeff Van Gundy stated in November on ESPN Radio:

But a lot of pick-and-roll basketball, guys, is dependent on how the other three guys can space the floor. Remember in Phoenix, Nash was always playing with great perimeter shooting to open up the roll man. So it didn't matter if it was Stoudemire rollin' or Marcin Gortat rollin', the lane was open because of the great three-point shooting. Right now, the Lakers—they're not a great shooting team. They play a big four man, Gasol, so his man's gonna clog the lane. Artest is a little bit erratic as a three-point shooter, so his man will be in the lane. And so too will Kobe Bryant's man. And then off the bench, they don't really have that shooter—other than Jodie Meeks—that's really gonna spread the floor. So the pick-and-roll game is even tougher because of the roster composition.

http://espn.go.com/espnradio/play?id=8622897

Due to presence of the modern defensive three seconds rule and the fact that Pau Gasol can certainly step out and hit a nineteen-foot jumper, I don't think that the Lakers' offensive situation is as dire as Van Gundy suggests. That said, he offers the salient point that the pick-and-roll's dynamics and the quandaries that it creates for the defense are largely determined by spacing, and that the Lakers' spacing usually will not be as wide and deep as Nash and the "roll man" enjoyed in Phoenix. The Lakers can still be effective on that play, but just because Nash is now in Los Angeles doesn't mean that there's going to be a carbon copy of what occurred in Phoenix, even with D'Antoni as coach. For again, the spacing and three-point threats will be comparatively diminished for LA and defenses will hence feel emboldened to help on the "roll man" more so than was the case against Nash's Suns. Of course, the bet is that with superior talent, the Lakers don't need the "perfect" pick-and-roll game that existed in Phoenix, just a more effective one than they featured last year.

Finally, but similarly, the video notes how effective Nash happened to be as an isolation player, but surely, one of the reasons for that efficiency was because so many (perhaps most) of Nash's one-on-one scoring attempts came after the defense switched on the pick-and-roll, leaving Nash against a big man who couldn't stay with him off the dribble or who wouldn't guard him outside. But if the court isn't spaced as widely, the defense will feel less inclined to make disadvantageous switches that result in glaring mismatches, instead choosing to send a third defender to the play, to help and recover. Back when Nash entered the NBA, for example, defenses rarely switched on the pick-and-roll because there was usually little need to do so: there wasn't as much court spacing or as many three-point shooters on the floor and the league had yet to revamp its defensive three seconds rule. Thus defenses could protect the paint more easily and with less fear of being burned from outside.

The game has changed plenty since that time (to the benefit of the pick-and-roll, both the ball-handler and the "roll man"), and Nash will still be able to take advantage of some of those changes as a Laker. But because LA features more of a conventional starting lineup or primary lineup, Nash and the "roll man" won't be able to maximize those advantages to the same extent as in Phoenix. There surely won't be as many two-on-one situations without help, and there surely won't be as many one-on-one plays resulting from switches.

[GMATCallahan]

I get a kick out of how much Steve Nash looks and talks like a young Clint Eastwood. The comparisons will grow even more if the Lakers start kicking butt with a Dirty Harry like Steve Nash.

I don't see how Nash looks or talks like Clint Eastwood (circa forty years ago) at all, and that Canadian accent doesn't exactly help the argument ...

I hope you're joking about the Canadian accent ROFL.

I'm not joking at all; are you suggesting that Nash's Canadian accent has become sufficiently muted or flattened over the years?

Regardless, it's still there and Nash still sounds like a hockey player.

[ennui]

Great posts gmatcallahan

[WVSArtist]

great post? more like pointless 5 month bump.

[ennui]

Someone who actually posts with interesting insights and it's frowned upon. Typical.

[Nashty]

Someone who actually posts with interesting insights and it's frowned upon. Typical.

Was a crap post and waste of time to read.

[IamBBAnalysis]

You guys got a great leader both on and off the court. He'll make things much easier for both Byrant & Gasol.

Well, Bryant shot 16-41 from the field last night. Indeed, Kobe is more of a "stand alone" player whose style and statistics are unlikely to be significantly affected by whoever he's playing with. Heck, he never even shot .470 from the field when he was playing with Shaquille O'Neal.

That doesn't make sense and it was one game. Will Kobe be a catch and shoot player? No. Will he be helped because the defense is focusing on Nash and because Nash will set him up for some easy shots and make him have to work less hard on offense?

Yes.

[IamBBAnalysis]

... very good video, but I need to take issue with a couple points there.

First, Steve Nash did not turn Jared Dudley into an NBA player, give me a break. One of the myths about Nash is that he turns "scrubs into real players," or something along those lines, but it's bogus. Just because some people had never or scarcely heard of Raja Bell or James Jones before they joined Phoenix didn't mean that they couldn't play. Indeed, the Suns signed them precisely because they had already established themselves as dangerous shooters (and useful defenders), with Bell having shot a combined .387 on threes over the previous two seasons in Utah before joining Nash in Phoenix, including .403 for the Jazz in '04-'05. (And Bell wasn't playing with John Stockton or Deron Williams in Salt Lake City, either). In fact, Bell shot .454 from the field and .403 on threes in '04-'05 with Utah, compared to .438 from the field and .419 on threes in his three full seasons with Nash in Phoenix.

Likewise, James Jones had shot .398 on threes in '04-'05 for an Indiana team that advanced to the Eastern Conference Semifinals. In '04-'05, Jones shot .396 from the field and .398 on threes; in two seasons with Nash in Phoenix, he would shoot a combined .397 from the field and .382 on threes. And actually, in his six seasons since leaving Nash, Jones has shot .407 from the field and .416 on threes, including .444 on threes for Portland in '07-'08. Jones and Bell constituted high-quality three-point shooters before they ever joined Nash in Phoenix, explaining why the Suns signed them in the first place. The fact that many people proved ignorant of these facts does not change the fact that those facts existed.

Jared Dudley amounts to a somewhat different case because Phoenix traded for him in the middle of the '08-'09 season, when Dudley was only twenty-three and in just his second NBA season. But already, Dudley was showing signs of being a good three-point shooter before joining Nash, shooting .375 on threes in 20 games for Charlotte that season prior to the deal. In his first full season with Nash and the Suns, '09-'10, Dudley's three-point field goal percentage mushroomed to a staggering .458, but Dudley spent a significant share of his minutes that year playing without Nash. Coming off the bench for 81 regular season games, Dudley was often playing with Goran Dragic and/or Leandro Barbosa at guard. And this season without Nash, Dudley is currently shooting a career-high .489 from the field while connecting on threes at a .396 clip, higher than his .383 mark from last season with Nash, when Dudley started 60 games (in a 66-game schedule). Dudley grabbed 7 boards on Saturday night and passed for 10 assists on Friday night, after enjoying a game with 15 points, 9 rebounds, and 5 assists earlier in the month. In fact, over his last 12 games, Dudley is averaging 14.6 points, 3.3 rebounds, 3.6 assists, just 1.0 turnovers, a 3.58:1.00 assists-to-turnover ratio, 1.3 steals, a .556 field goal percentage, a .451 three-point field goal percentage (in 4.3 attempts per game), an .842 free throw percentage, and a stunning .702 True Shooting percentage and 137 Offensive Rating. Over his last 7 games, Dudley has posted at least 15 points six times, 19 points five times, and 20 points four times. Over his last 7 games, Dudley has recorded 5 or more assists four times and multiple steals four times, including 3 steals three different times. Dudley is an NBA player not because Steve Nash turned him into one, but because Dudley turned himself into one. He reminds me of three-time NBA champion Mario Elie, except (unfortunately) with less athleticism and slashing ability.

The other problem with the video is that it suggests that just because the "roll man" proved so prolific and efficient in Phoenix playing with Nash, he will necessarily be that way with the Lakers. But that situation existed with the Suns not simply because of Nash, but largely due to the way that Phoenix spread the floor. As one can see from the video, the Suns generally surrounded the pick-and-roll with three off-ball three-point shooters or perimeter players, spaced perfectly. When combined with the modern, revamped defensive three seconds rule (instituted following the 2001 season), the result was that the middle (or the lane) usually proved almost completely open. In basketball, space equals time (the game's fundamental equation), so when defenders are fanned out that widely and need to cover so much space, they often can't help on the pick-and-roll and deal with the "roll man" in time. Often times, the opposing defense doesn't even want to help on the "roll man" (or the ball-handler, Nash in this case) for fear of not being able to help and recover in time to contest a perimeter jump shot for a dangerous perimeter shooter or scorer. Thus if you scrutinize those highlights, you'll find that the Spurs usually preferred to take their chances in the two-on-one situation created by the Suns' pick-and-roll, rather than sending a third defender to help on the play. For when the court is spaced so widely, successful defensive rotations become extremely difficult, sometimes impossible. Therefore, instead of allowing three-point shooters such as Jared Dudley and Channing Frye to find their groove from the perimeter via open looks, San Antonio preferred to gamble that two players (Nash, the ball-handler, and Marcin Gortat, the "roll man") wouldn't be able to overcome the Spurs, even if they proved prolific and efficient. Indeed, the Spurs employed much the same approach when they defeated Phoenix in the 2005, 2007, and 2008 playoffs (back then, Phoenix's primary "roll man" constituted Amar'e Stoudemire). For instance, in Game One of the 2005 Western Conference Finals at Phoenix, Stoudemire and Nash combined for 70 points on .581 (25-43) field goal shooting, but the Spurs limited Shawn Marion and Quentin Richardson to a total of 10 points on .267 (4-15) field goal shooting.

http://www.basketball-reference.com/boxscores/200505220PHO.html

In Game Five at Phoenix, Stoudemire and Nash combined for 62 points, but the other three Phoenix starters—Shawn Marion, Quentin Richardson, and Joe Johnson—combined for just 23. Actually, the entire Suns' team aside from Stoudemire and Nash combined for only 33 points.

http://www.basketball-reference.com/boxscores/200506010PHO.html

Indeed, the sheer stupidity of most basketball fans could be found in the many Suns' fans who became giddy over Stoudemire's performances while censuring Marion and Richardson for their diminished productivity. But of course, those results largely stemmed from San Antonio's defensive response to Phoenix's offensive scheme. The Spurs bet that impressive production from the Suns' two primary pick-and-roll players would not be enough to defeat San Antonio, especially given Phoenix's defensive mediocrity. Sure enough, the Spurs won the series four games to one, winning all three contests in Arizona.

A similar situation occurred in Game Six of the 2007 Western Conference Semifinals, when the Spurs eliminated the Suns in San Antonio. Stoudemire and Nash combined for 56 points, but no other Sun scored over 13. Stoudemire's statistics proved especially significant: he scored 38 points and attempted 28 field goals, but he passed for 0 assists and recorded just 1 assist in the entire series.

http://www.basketball-reference.com/boxscores/200705180SAS.html

Those results stemmed in part from Stoudemire being a disinterested passer (to phrase matters with euphemistic kindness), but also because the Spurs weren't overly concerned with collapsing on the "roll man." They knew that if they routinely attempted to stop Stoudemire by constantly sending help defenders to the pick-and-roll, they would rarely be able to successfully rotate to Phoenix's widely spread shooters and slashers, given that there was so much space to cover.

The lesson for the Lakers is twofold. First, overwhelming numbers by the "roll man" aren't necessarily a positive sign come playoff time. When Stoudemire scored more than 31 points in a playoff game against the Spurs during his Phoenix career, the Suns went 0-7. Second, the apparent dominance of the "roll man" is created not simply by Nash, but the combination of Nash, the system, the personnel, and the spacing that results. Since Phoenix typically surrounded the Nash-Stoudemire (or later Nash-Gortat) pick-and-roll with three perimeter players or three-point shooters, the middle was open, the defense proved unwilling to help for fear of being burned (sometimes, the defense just couldn't help successfully even when it tried because there was so much space to cover and the help defense couldn't get there in time), and the "roll man" could enjoy all kinds of prime opportunities resulting from switches or two-on-one situations. The Lakers, however, are not going to surround the pick-and-roll with three perimeter players or three-point shooters, at least not when they're playing their starting lineup. Relative to the Suns' offense (or to many offenses around the league nowadays), the Lakers are not going to feature as much court spacing, thus enticing and enabling defenders to collapse to the "roll man" more often. Here's what Jeff Van Gundy stated in November on ESPN Radio:

But a lot of pick-and-roll basketball, guys, is dependent on how the other three guys can space the floor. Remember in Phoenix, Nash was always playing with great perimeter shooting to open up the roll man. So it didn't matter if it was Stoudemire rollin' or Marcin Gortat rollin', the lane was open because of the great three-point shooting. Right now, the Lakers—they're not a great shooting team. They play a big four man, Gasol, so his man's gonna clog the lane. Artest is a little bit erratic as a three-point shooter, so his man will be in the lane. And so too will Kobe Bryant's man. And then off the bench, they don't really have that shooter—other than Jodie Meeks—that's really gonna spread the floor. So the pick-and-roll game is even tougher because of the roster composition.

http://espn.go.com/espnradio/play?id=8622897

Due to presence of the modern defensive three seconds rule and the fact that Pau Gasol can certainly step out and hit a nineteen-foot jumper, I don't think that the Lakers' offensive situation is as dire as Van Gundy suggests. That said, he offers the salient point that the pick-and-roll's dynamics and the quandaries that it creates for the defense are largely determined by spacing, and that the Lakers' spacing usually will not be as wide and deep as Nash and the "roll man" enjoyed in Phoenix. The Lakers can still be effective on that play, but just because Nash is now in Los Angeles doesn't mean that there's going to be a carbon copy of what occurred in Phoenix, even with D'Antoni as coach. For again, the spacing and three-point threats will be comparatively diminished for LA and defenses will hence feel emboldened to help on the "roll man" more so than was the case against Nash's Suns. Of course, the bet is that with superior talent, the Lakers don't need the "perfect" pick-and-roll game that existed in Phoenix, just a more effective one than they featured last year.

Finally, but similarly, the video notes how effective Nash happened to be as an isolation player, but surely, one of the reasons for that efficiency was because so many (perhaps most) of Nash's one-on-one scoring attempts came after the defense switched on the pick-and-roll, leaving Nash against a big man who couldn't stay with him off the dribble or who wouldn't guard him outside. But if the court isn't spaced as widely, the defense will feel less inclined to make disadvantageous switches that result in glaring mismatches, instead choosing to send a third defender to the play, to help and recover. Back when Nash entered the NBA, for example, defenses rarely switched on the pick-and-roll because there was usually little need to do so: there wasn't as much court spacing or as many three-point shooters on the floor and the league had yet to revamp its defensive three seconds rule. Thus defenses could protect the paint more easily and with less fear of being burned from outside.

The game has changed plenty since that time (to the benefit of the pick-and-roll, both the ball-handler and the "roll man"), and Nash will still be able to take advantage of some of those changes as a Laker. But because LA features more of a conventional starting lineup or primary lineup, Nash and the "roll man" won't be able to maximize those advantages to the same extent as in Phoenix. There surely won't be as many two-on-one situations without help, and there surely won't be as many one-on-one plays resulting from switches.

Impressive that you took so much time. Unfortunately your analysis is flawed and you use examples that fit your your hypothesis while ignoring those that do not. In short, you appear to have an agenda.

Of course no NBA player is "made" by another. You're arguing with the guy's use of poor semantics and a cliche idea that no one really believes. The actual benefit Nash brings is he makes players better (more efficient) in the offense. And sometimes this means a "no name" player will have a career year with Phoenix in terms of efficiency OR increased output (or both).

For example, while you are correct that Bell and Jones could shoot the 3 well before Phoenix that is only a small part of the story.

Raja Bell's best shooting years were in Phoenix. He had his best shooting years there...largely because of the wide open looks. His three best (.442, .468, and .421). Also he led the league in makes one year. Of course he was noticed for this and gained his reputation there. Since leaving Phoenix he has dropped into obscurity and shot the ball less well.

James Jones on the otherhand never really fit in with Phoenix. His slow release was not ideal and his confidence also seemed to waver. But he's one guy out of many.

Look at guys like Channing Frye (not a 3 pt shooter but shot .439 his first year with the Suns), Tim Thomas, and Gortat?

Also, you mention the system and spreading the floor. How was Amare's fg% in NY when they spread the floor compared to when they did the same with Phoenix? Right, much worse.

Also, the Suns have not always spread the floor with Nash under Gentry. They often had a Lopez/Amare lineup and even had Shaq/Amare. So you saying the Lakers can't do what the Suns did with Nash is not accurate.

Anyway, I just wanted to provide a quick response. If you wanted to go into specific points perhaps you can keep it to a couple points per post. Or not. I have seen your posts before on the ESPN board back in the day. I know this is what you do and you are a Suns fan. If you could make a concise point that would be helpful. Are you trying to say something of consequence or just making subtle jabs at Nash?

[GMATCallahan]

Great posts gmatcallahan

Thank you, and I must say that if one goes back and reads them, I've proved completely correct. Kobe is Kobe, irrespective of the point guard, a "stand alone" player whose efficiency is basically determined by himself, not the people around him. Most great or highly prolific players are that way. And since the Lakers' court spacing isn't nearly what Nash enjoyed in Phoenix, Gasol did not excel or dominate in the pick-and-roll (nor has Howard, nor, most likely, would Bynum have done so had he been the center). Thus D'Antoni has decided that he can rarely play two true big men together and a final breakup of the seeming Dream Team lineup appears inevitable, sooner or later.

Steve Nash is a much better offensive point guard than Jason Kidd, but one might wonder if the Lakers would have been better off signing Kidd instead, or maybe Raymond Felton. For the decision to go with Nash led to a domino effect where instead of the Lakers being currently coached by Phil Jackson (or even Mike Brown or Bernie Bickerstaff) with Bryant, Gasol, and Howard dominating in the post (with, say, Kidd spotting up for catch-and-shoot threes and providing floor guidance, but not dissipating LA's strengths), the Lakers are attempting to remake themselves into the D'Antoni-Nash teams in Phoenix, but without the right personnel. NBA columnist and reporter Adrian Wojnarowski discusses the dilemma here:

http://sports.yahoo.com/news/nba--forget-kobe-dwight--the-lakers-will-pay-for-doubling-down-on-failed-reunion-tour-of-d-antoni-nash-094336411.html

[GMATCallahan]

Someone who actually posts with interesting insights and it's frowned upon. Typical.

Was a crap post and waste of time to read.

It was neither "crap" nor a "waste of time to read." Obviously, you just didn't like the message, which turned out to be correct.

And I doubt that you possess much intellectual stamina; I'd be curious to examine your educational credentials.

[GMATCallahan]

Well, Bryant shot 16-41 from the field last night. Indeed, Kobe is more of a "stand alone" player whose style and statistics are unlikely to be significantly affected by whoever he's playing with. Heck, he never even shot .470 from the field when he was playing with Shaquille O'Neal.

That doesn't make sense and it was one game. Will Kobe be a catch and shoot player? No. Will he be helped because the defense is focusing on Nash and because Nash will set him up for some easy shots and make him have to work less hard on offense?

Yes.

Of course my comments made sense and I proved completely correct. Entering tonight's game, Bryant has shot .448 from the field and .312 on threes in 16 games since Nash returned from his fractured fibula.

http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/b/bryanko01/gamelog/2013/#1188-1203-sum:pgl_basic

And for his career, Bryant is a .453 field goal shooter and a .337 shooter on threes.

Now, one might blame "tired legs" or whatever, but anyone who really knows basketball will know that what I wrote makes absolute sense. With great players or hugely prolific players, they possess their own style or rhythm and no teammate is likely to significantly alter it or the efficiency that results. Bryant has never shot .470 from the field—not when he was playing with Shaquille O'Neal, not when he was playing with Pau Gasol at the Spaniard's peak, and not in the Steve Nash/Mike D'Antoni offense—because he is what he is, essentially a one-one-one player who, despite possessing the best scoring skill of his generation, attempts a lot of bad shots. Playing with Steve Nash wasn't going to fundamentally alter that tendency any more than playing with Kevin Johnson in Phoenix was going to stop Charles Barkley from holding the ball or slowly dribbling within a limited radius for an eternity. Great point guards are going to change the game for the lesser players, not the true superstars, and that first game versus Golden State merely amounted to an indication of greater truths. One can theorize about this or that in the abstract, but basketball as played on the floor is largely about instincts and Bryant's instincts were not going to change because of Nash's presence.

[Peregrine01]

Well, Bryant shot 16-41 from the field last night. Indeed, Kobe is more of a "stand alone" player whose style and statistics are unlikely to be significantly affected by whoever he's playing with. Heck, he never even shot .470 from the field when he was playing with Shaquille O'Neal.

That doesn't make sense and it was one game. Will Kobe be a catch and shoot player? No. Will he be helped because the defense is focusing on Nash and because Nash will set him up for some easy shots and make him have to work less hard on offense?

Yes.

Of course my comments made sense and I proved completely correct. Entering tonight's game, Bryant has shot .448 from the field and .312 on threes in 16 games since Nash returned from his fractured fibula.

http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/b/bryanko01/gamelog/2013/#1188-1203-sum:pgl_basic

And for his career, Bryant is a .453 field goal shooter and a .337 shooter on threes.

Now, one might blame "tired legs" or whatever, but anyone who really knows basketball will know that what I wrote makes absolute sense. With great players or hugely prolific players, they possess their own style or rhythm and no teammate is likely to significantly alter it or the efficiency that results. Bryant has never shot .470 from the field—not when he was playing with Shaquille O'Neal, not when he was playing with Pau Gasol at the Spaniard's peak, and not in the Steve Nash/Mike D'Antoni offense—because he is what he is, essentially a one-one-one player who, despite possessing the best scoring skill of his generation, attempts a lot of bad shots. Playing with Steve Nash wasn't going to fundamentally alter that tendency any more than playing with Kevin Johnson in Phoenix was going to stop Charles Barkley from holding the ball or slowly dribbling within a limited radius for an eternity. Great point guards are going to change the game for the lesser players, not the true superstars, and that first game versus Golden State merely amounted to an indication of greater truths. One can theorize about this or that in the abstract, but basketball as played on the floor is largely about instincts and Bryant's instincts were not going to change because of Nash's presence.

You're exactly on the money with this. It is in Bryant's DNA.

[IamBBAnalysis]

Well, Bryant shot 16-41 from the field last night. Indeed, Kobe is more of a "stand alone" player whose style and statistics are unlikely to be significantly affected by whoever he's playing with. Heck, he never even shot .470 from the field when he was playing with Shaquille O'Neal.

That doesn't make sense and it was one game. Will Kobe be a catch and shoot player? No. Will he be helped because the defense is focusing on Nash and because Nash will set him up for some easy shots and make him have to work less hard on offense?

Yes.

Of course my comments made sense and I proved completely correct. Entering tonight's game, Bryant has shot .448 from the field and .312 on threes in 16 games since Nash returned from his fractured fibula.

http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/b/bryanko01/gamelog/2013/#1188-1203-sum:pgl_basic

And for his career, Bryant is a .453 field goal shooter and a .337 shooter on threes.

Now, one might blame "tired legs" or whatever, but anyone who really knows basketball will know that what I wrote makes absolute sense. With great players or hugely prolific players, they possess their own style or rhythm and no teammate is likely to significantly alter it or the efficiency that results. Bryant has never shot .470 from the field—not when he was playing with Shaquille O'Neal, not when he was playing with Pau Gasol at the Spaniard's peak, and not in the Steve Nash/Mike D'Antoni offense—because he is what he is, essentially a one-one-one player who, despite possessing the best scoring skill of his generation, attempts a lot of bad shots. Playing with Steve Nash wasn't going to fundamentally alter that tendency any more than playing with Kevin Johnson in Phoenix was going to stop Charles Barkley from holding the ball or slowly dribbling within a limited radius for an eternity. Great point guards are going to change the game for the lesser players, not the true superstars, and that first game versus Golden State merely amounted to an indication of greater truths. One can theorize about this or that in the abstract, but basketball as played on the floor is largely about instincts and Bryant's instincts were not going to change because of Nash's presence.

You need to actually watch the games instead of just using stats. Nash has not had an impact on any Laker so far in a positive way. The offense is not being run correctly and Nash has not been able to affect the game in a huge way on the offensive end of the ball. So your "analysis" (if that is what you call having an idea and then using stats to try to prove them) is incorrect.

Now, if Nash was running the offense and Kobe was involved then that would be a different story. Also, in combination with that Kobe having less defensive attention on him should allow for easier scores. Again though no true analysis or conclusions can be made at this point since the Lakers have been in such disarray.

However, it is foolish to think that a good passing player that draws attention and is not selfish is not going to make the game easier for other players. And hence get easier shots. Just like KJ would get Barkley easy shots. "Dramatic" increases in fg% though may or may not happen.

[GMATCallahan]

Impressive that you took so much time. Unfortunately your analysis is flawed and you use examples that fit your your hypothesis while ignoring those that do not. In short, you appear to have an agenda.

Of course no NBA player is "made" by another. You're arguing with the guy's use of poor semantics and a cliche idea that no one really believes. The actual benefit Nash brings is he makes players better (more efficient) in the offense. And sometimes this means a "no name" player will have a career year with Phoenix in terms of efficiency OR increased output (or both).

For example, while you are correct that Bell and Jones could shoot the 3 well before Phoenix that is only a small part of the story.

Raja Bell's best shooting years were in Phoenix. He had his best shooting years there...largely because of the wide open looks. His three best (.442, .468, and .421). Also he led the league in makes one year. Of course he was noticed for this and gained his reputation there. Since leaving Phoenix he has dropped into obscurity and shot the ball less well.

James Jones on the otherhand never really fit in with Phoenix. His slow release was not ideal and his confidence also seemed to waver. But he's one guy out of many.

Look at guys like Channing Frye (not a 3 pt shooter but shot .439 his first year with the Suns), Tim Thomas, and Gortat?

Also, you mention the system and spreading the floor. How was Amare's fg% in NY when they spread the floor compared to when they did the same with Phoenix? Right, much worse.

Also, the Suns have not always spread the floor with Nash under Gentry. They often had a Lopez/Amare lineup and even had Shaq/Amare. So you saying the Lakers can't do what the Suns did with Nash is not accurate.

Anyway, I just wanted to provide a quick response. If you wanted to go into specific points perhaps you can keep it to a couple points per post. Or not. I have seen your posts before on the ESPN board back in the day. I know this is what you do and you are a Suns fan. If you could make a concise point that would be helpful. Are you trying to say something of consequence or just making subtle jabs at Nash?

I didn't have an agenda and my analysis was inductive, not deductive. You might have suspected that I possessed an agenda because I'm a Suns' fan and was thus angry at Nash for defecting via free agency, especially to the Lakers, of all teams. But although I was shocked to learn that Nash signed with the Lakers (primarily because of the historical relationship between the two franchises and because LA hadn't seemed to be on Nash's radar), I wasn't upset with him at all. In fact, I think that he made the correct move. Not only did he score a "market value" contract and a superior one than the Suns were offering, but he was able to remain close to his children and play for a club that figured to constitute a championship contender while playing in a glamorous city to boot. Nash made a smart business decision, as did Amar'e Stoudemire in signing with the Knicks two summers earlier. I wasn't frustrated with either player and I felt that leaving Phoenix made sense for both of them. The NBA is a business and unlike the media and most fans, I don't treat the game like some combination of People magazine and figure skating. And actually, I'd wanted the Suns to trade Nash six or twelve months earlier, for I felt that the franchise needed to advance, rather than sentimentally delay, the inevitable rebuilding process.

I think that your suspicion that I harbored an agenda or that I was trying to coyly chip away at Nash led you to misinterpret some of my points or see certain idea that weren't actually there, but that can happen on the Internet and I'll attempt to clarify the various issues. I never stated that Nash did not, on average, make teammates more effective and efficient on offense. After all, he is a great point guard and that's what great point guards do. Had I possessed a vote, I would have voted for Nash for MVP in 2005, even though Shaquille O'Neal also offered a strong case. And although I'm not sure that I would have voted for Nash in 2006, his statistics became even better that year, he certainly offered a compelling case, and I certainly would have voted for him over Kobe Bryant. And some players, such as Raja Bell, indeed became more efficient playing with Nash.

But regarding the guy's comment about Dudley, first, I'm not sure that everyone understands that Nash does not actually turn certain teammates into a NBA players. Back in 2006, I was attempting to explain to certain Suns' fans that Raja Bell and James Jones were not "scrubs," that they'd proven to be legitimate shooters before joining Nash in Phoenix, hence explaining why the Suns signed them in the first place. Obviously, most of the more intelligent fans (and you do seem fairly intelligent) understand that such a concept is a cliché that should not be interpreted literally, but I do think that some fans and media members basically believe that Nash can turn non-shooters into shooters, or guys who wouldn't otherwise be in the NBA into solid rotational players on championship contenders. I can't speak for the guy in that video, but whether he literally meant what he said or not, he was inadvertently reflecting a larger fallacy that many fans may well absorb at face value.

Second, even if the guy in the video just used the wrong word, his point (or his logic) suggested that without Nash, someone such as Jared Dudley would fall apart. Instead, Dudley has displayed no appreciable decline without Nash in terms of either production or scoring efficiency and he actually posted a career-high 36 points last month, tallying over twice as many points as he attempted field goals.

http://www.basketball-reference.com/boxscores/201212260PHO.html

Overall, Dudley's True Shooting Percentage this season (at this very moment) is .594, identical to his True Shooting Percentage during his three full seasons with Nash.

http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/d/dudleja01.html#2010-2012-sum:advanced

To be sure, Nash helped Dudley while they were teammates in Phoenix, but according to that guy's logic, Dudley would have fallen apart after Nash departed. Instead, Dudley is currently as efficient without Nash as he used to be with him, even though he is no longer embedded in an efficient offense or playing with a stellar point guard. And just as Dudley is a legitimate NBA player with or without Nash, the same was true of Bell and Jones, hence my point. In Bell's case, Nash (along with the Suns' system) did push him to a higher level of scoring efficiency and three-point shooting efficiency, especially in '05-'06 when he shot .442 on threes. But Bell was a 40 percent three-point shooter the season before he joined Nash in Phoenix, and Bell was about a 40 percent three-point shooter after leaving Nash. In 45 games with Charlotte in '08-'09, Bell shot .395 on threes. In 6 games between two franchises in '09-'10, he shot .444 on threes (obviously a tiny sample, but obviously Bell could shoot the lights out without Nash assisting him), and last season back in Utah, Bell shot .391 on threes. He has dropped into obscurity since leaving Nash due to age, injury, more conservative offensive systems, and some issue with Jazz head coach Tyrone Corbin, but not because he couldn't constitute an efficient three-point shooter without Nash.

Jones fit fine in Phoenix; he filled his role solidly, to the point where he even started 12 playoff games for the Suns over the course of his two seasons with the organization. The Suns traded him simply to dump salary and his mechanical shooting form wasn't a problem because he was usually attempting wide-open, catch-and-shoot threes. A quick shooting release is more important for a player who creates his own shots, such as Steve Nash or Kobe Bryant, and who thus doesn't enjoy as much space and time to see the basket. Quentin Richardson, by the way, possessed a very quick shooting release, but like James Jones, he posted his best field goal percentage, three-point field goal percentage, and True Shooting Percentage in other uniforms, away from Nash.

The broader point about all these guys is that the Suns acquired them because they were skilled long-range shooters to begin with and could thus open the floor for Nash. In some cases and categories, Nash made them even more efficient and prolific and in others he did not, but Phoenix brought those players on board because they had already established themselves as shooters, not in the vague hope that Nash could turn them into NBA-quality snipers. Even in Channing Frye's case, he'd already constituted a good-shooting big man in New York and Portland. The main difference in Phoenix was that the Suns told him (to borrow Clint Eastwood's second line in The Good, the Bad and the Ugly) to take "a couple steps back" and shoot threes, thus creating the floor spacing that Nash needs to be at his best. And Nash helped Frye, too, but as with the other shooters, there was a yin-yang equation. The Suns signed Frye because he could shoot, not in the hope that he could shoot, and they obviously felt that "stretching him out" as a three-point marksman would not be a problem. In his final year in Portland, Frye actually shot .500 or better on threes in three calendar months, but his attempts proved low because he hadn't entered the D'Antoni system (then being run in Phoenix, of course, by Alvin Gentry).

http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/f/fryech01/splits/2009/

But even if Nash made Frye better and more prolific, the system also played a significant role and Frye enjoyed the natural talent to fit the system. Tim Thomas, too, had established himself as a .400-plus three-point shooter in the years before he joined Nash in Phoenix, and his career playoff three-point field goal percentage (in 33 games) was .433 prior to joining the Suns. Thomas then shot .444 on threes in Phoenix's 20-game playoff run in 2006, so Nash may have bolstered him that much more; again, Nash is a great point guard who excels at creating open opportunities for teammates. But with the Suns, he also prospered from the imported shooters—such as Thomas, Frye, Richardson, Jones, Bell, and Dudley—who could spread the floor widely, create bigger driving, passing, and sight lanes for Nash, and also render defensive rotations more difficult, all of which would lead to more and better shots for those shooters. To be sure, Nash amounted to the maestro, but the orchestra that he brilliantly conducted could not have worked so smoothly and efficiently had the Suns not given him the optimal instrumentalists for his composing skills. Phoenix's management did not bring in these shooters and complementary players randomly, even if they may have seemed random to the media and fans who follow the game in a People magazine style. Instead, there was a clear design complemented by specialized imports, everything working in conjunction. That sense of consonance between components and architectural blueprint has been sorely lacking for the Lakers this season, and my post about a month ago was warning that given LA's personnel, everything wasn't going to flow as easily, naturally, and logically as it did with Nash in Phoenix. Just transplanting the great point guard from one environment to the other wasn't going to produce the same effect without the same spatial concepts and the personnel needed to realize them, and that's the point that the Youtube video missed.

You mention Marcin Gortat's improvement with Nash in Phoenix and the Youtube guy cited it as an example for what would supposedly happen with the Lakers, how Nash would maximize the "roll man" in LA. But as I was correctly arguing, that maximization was not likely to occur in Los Angeles, at least not with the planned starting lineup, because the Lakers did not possess the same floor-spacing personnel as the Suns. In other words, transplanting Nash by himself was not going to be enough. What helped Gortat in Phoenix was not just Nash, but the fact that the Suns typically surrounded the Nash-Gortat pick-and-roll with three perimeter players, including a three-point shooting power forward named Channing Frye. Thus the widely stretched opposing defense often proved unwilling or unable to help on the Nash-Gortat pick-and-roll, creating all manner of two-on-one situations or advantageous switches where Gortat could cash in. But if you'd removed Frye and played more of a traditional big man, then the opposing defense would not have been stretched as widely and would have been more willing or able to help on the Nash-Gortat pick-and-roll. As a result, Nash would not have been able to maximize Gortat, just as he has been unable to maximize either Howard or Gasol, certainly not when the two have been playing together. The spacing just isn't the same as when you're featuring a three-point shooting or perimeter-oriented "power forward," thus allowing the defense to compress the court to a greater degree and to help and recover (via rotations) more successfully.

You counter by citing the times that Nash's Suns featured Amar'e Stoudemire and Robin Lopez, or Stoudemire and Shaquille O'Neal, simultaneously. However, Stoudemire and Lopez did not play together that often and Phoenix's offense was not quite the same when they did. Lopez only started 38 regular season games (plus the 6 playoff games versus the Lakers in the 2010 Western Conference Finals) with Stoudemire during their two seasons together in Phoenix, and even then, he averaged 24.1 minutes as a starter, meaning that he was only playing about half the game, significantly less than the expectation for players such as Howard and Gasol. And obviously, not all of those 24.1 minutes came with Stoudemire; a good-sized portion (I would guess at least eight minutes, possibly more) probably came without him. For example, Lopez might have played the first six minutes of each half with Stoudemire and then come back later in the half to play six more minutes while giving Stoudemire a rest. (I’m just speaking roughly; I’m sure that you can grasp the point.) And at the start of a half, a team such as the Suns will run and play in the open court more frequently, thus minimizing the half-court spatial compression that can result from playing two true big men simultaneously. For example, the 1993 Suns (who defeated the Lakers in the First Round and reached the NBA Finals) would start the non-shooting, defensive-minded Mark West, but would often play Tom Chambers at center down the stretch because the game was slower and more half-court oriented and Chambers gave the Suns another shooter, someone to create more floor spacing (although not as much as Channing Frye in contemporary times; more like Gasol, to be honest). And you can see here that among the six Phoenix lineups that played at least 100 minutes in '09-'10, the three most offensively efficient came with Frye—not Lopez—on the floor.

http://www.82games.com/0910/0910PHO2.HTM

Indeed, you might recall that during the 2010 Western Conference Finals, the Suns would often start a half slowly and then come roaring back when they inserted Frye and fully opened the floor.

As for Shaquille O’Neal, he was an historical anomaly. Even though he failed to space the floor in a traditional sense, he represented such a threat—he was so big and his hands were so strong—that opponents proved leery of leaving him unguarded on the baseline in order to plug the lane or help out elsewhere. Recall that over the first couple months of the ’10-’11 season when Shaq proved healthy, the Celtics were actually a pretty efficient offensive team, even though O’Neal failed to stretch the defense any more than Kendrick Perkins. Just his presence meant that opposing defenders either would not leave him or would pay if they did. Compared to Shaq, Dwight Howard is a Mini-Me and he lacks the same feel for the game, too.

Even so, while the Suns enjoyed offensive success in the second half of the ’07-’08 season with O’Neal (following the trade for him), Phoenix only won one playoff game that year. In fact, after falling into a 0-3 hole in the First Round versus the Spurs, Mike D’Antoni largely scrapped his pick-and-roll offense and switched to a post-up offense revolving around small forward Boris Diaw. If you know how much D’Antoni loathes post-ups (as I’m sure that you now do), you’ll appreciate what a radical step that maneuver happened to be.

I should also note that in Phoenix, Amar'e Stoudemire developed into a better shooter with better range than Pau Gasol, so they're not exactly carbon copies of each other in that regard. For a big man, I'd say that Gasol is a pretty good shooter out to about nineteen feet, but that Stoudemire is a very good shooter out to about twenty-one feet. Stoudemire will stretch the floor a little more and hit that pick-and-pop jumper more consistently. Indeed, he perhaps developed into the third-best two-point jump-shooting big man in the NBA, after Dirk Nowitzki and Kevin Garnett. Gasol can shoot, too, but not as well as Stoudemire and not with quite as much range. (And by the way, I was not surprised that Stoudemire's shooting efficiency declined with the Knicks; I'd predicted such a development for years because his field goal percentage had plunged in Phoenix whenever Nash missed gamed. But the point is that to maximize Stoudemire, you needed a great point guard such as Nash and the widely spaced floor, not just one or the other.)

Anyway, whether there have been exceptions to the rule or not, the point was always that the Lakers’ personnel was going to create less space for Nash, which was going to render the “Nash effect” that he achieved in Phoenix more difficult to attain in LA—not impossible, but more difficult and less potent. Certainly, matters have played out that way (at a minimum) with the Lakers, proving that my argument all along was rooted in objective basketball analysis, not some kind of agenda.

[GMATCallahan]

If you want a synthesis of the argument, I’ll gladly provide it. The long posts provide all the details, evidence, and explanations, so that one can see what’s behind and inside what I’m saying. But I can summarize something better than anyone, too.

Steve Nash is a great point guard, but his greatness in Phoenix was embedded in a yin-yang equation dependent upon the right spacing and the personnel to create that spacing. Indeed, to be a historically elite player, Nash needs space almost the way that a fish needs water. Without that same type of spacing and personnel in Los Angeles, Nash’s effect was not going to be the same with the Lakers that it was for the Suns. One can transplant Nash, but if you’re not transplanting the other ingredients from Phoenix, such as a three-point shooting power forward and a host of off-ball perimeter players who can run and shoot with range, you’re not going to see the same sort of “presto” dynamic.

Now, I never said that Nash couldn’t be successful with the Lakers and I’m still not foreclosing the possibility that they can figure matters out to the point where they make the playoffs. But I was saying that contrary to the suggestions of that Youtube guy, what happened with Nash in Phoenix wasn’t going to instantly or perfectly replicate itself in Los Angeles due to the different floor spacing and personnel. At best, there was going to be some diminishment and distortion, as opposed to the clarity and ease that existed with the Suns. In Phoenix, Nash proved that with the ideal spacing and personnel, the pick-and-roll truly constituted an unstoppable play that could constantly create a good shot for someone. But without the ideal spacing and personnel, Nash’s pick-and-roll isn’t quite unstoppable.

What D’Antoni and Phoenix’s management did for Nash—dovetailing with the revamped, modern defensive three seconds rule instituted by the NBA in 2001—was to remove the friction from the pick-and-roll and “preset” the play (and even the fast break or transition offense) for maximum efficiency. This removal of friction was not something that the previous generation of great pick-and-roll point guards, namely Kevin Johnson, John Stockton, and Mark Price, had really enjoyed. With the Lakers, conversely, you’ve seen the return of that friction that Nash hadn’t needed to worry about in Phoenix, and obviously the results haven’t been the same. In a nutshell, that’s the point that I was making and that the Youtube dude was failing to offer.