RealGM Top 100 List #30

[Texas Chuck]

Run-Off Vote: Hondo

I have been voting for him for several threads now and only changed to Kidd in this one as drza has swayed me with his posts that showed on a more micro level what I was seeing with my eyes.

Hondo here because of a huge longevity edge. Grand Canyon sized really.

Excelled in multiple roles

Capable of playing huge minutes at breakneck speed.

More all-around player.

Better and longer prime.

[magicmerl]

I'm gonna go with John Havlicek here. Chris Paul seems to be being brought up about 10-20 slots too early. There are a lot of other candidates that I would consider over him.

[Doctor MJ]

Impact Stats comparison

Top 10 three-year peak normalized RAPM among PGs (1998 - 2012*)

Spoiler:

(*I put the asterisk on 2012 because that is the last year in Doc MJ's spreadsheet, but obviously Paul continues to play through 2014 and is still in his prime. However, Paul's general +/- scores were much better from '08 - '12 (avg on/off +/- = +13) than from '13 or '14 (avg on/off +/- = +7.9) so I think it fair to assume Paul's 3 max years in RAPM are in the seasons covered by the spreadsheet.)

(Nash): +8.2
Paul: +7.9
(Blaylock): +7.9
(Stockton): +7.8
Kidd: +7.2
(Payton): +6.7
(Baron Davis): +6.3
(Tim Hardaway): +6.2
(Tony Parker): +5.2
(Sam Cassell): +5.1
.

My issue with the 3 year comparison here is that I think it gives a very wrong impression about prime longevity. The 3 year cutoff makes sense given the 2012 cutoff, and Paul's coming of age, but look at it another way:

Paul has continued to put up big impact numbers in the time since, and he's handicapped the first year due to the way prior hurts a guy wasn't as good the prior year. What that gives us is a 7 year span in which it's reasonable to see him as a lock to be a +7.5 level guy on either of the two teams he played as long as he's healthy.

Kidd by contrast, has only 5 years total that we've seen him break the +6 barrier only 5 times in his career, and 4 of them were his first 4 years in Jersey (the other was one of the late years in Dallas, which is well above the other). Basically outside of that time, he's typically a guy in the +4.5 level range.

So while your snapshot gives the impression that Paul has less than a 10% edge over a 3-year peak, and Kidd takes the rest, what I see is Paul beating Kidd not only in peak but in duration in peak and in ability to sustain the peak across context.

To be clear: None of this means I don't see a case for Kidd regardless. He was a very nice player for a very long time and I take that seriously. But I really don't see the capacities of the two players as that close.

Wait a second here you lost me. Kidd has played many roles on many teams (outside of Mashburn getting hurt he was basically in the Rubio role in Dallas the first time, in Phoenix he usually played with other great PGs and shared distributing responsibilities, in Jersey he was the man, and his second time in Dallas he was purely a complimentary piece) but Paul has always played the exact same role (ball dominant point) on the same type of team (super slow paced outside of last year). He never had to sustain impact across context just in the same context with different teams.

What i was saying is that we didn't see Kidd sustain the level of impact that made him an MVP candidate other places. Or in other words, when his stature rose dramatically with his move to Jersey, the RAPM is agreeing with this. It's basically saying his first 4 years in Jersey represent something on a clearly higher tier than what a more encompassing "prime Kidd" actually was.

And this makes sense given what we already know about the Jersey situation. How everything clicked at the right time, and how the team had a very particular defensive focus. This is not something we can necessarily expect him to replicate just by letting him alpha on another team.

By contrast, Paul's impact in LA sure looks to be right in line with what we saw of him in NO. Seems like you can largely plug him in somewhere as long as you let him alpha, and he's not only a tier above Kidd at his best, but a couple tiers above Kidd outside of the place he really hit his stride.

[E-Balla]

My issue with the 3 year comparison here is that I think it gives a very wrong impression about prime longevity. The 3 year cutoff makes sense given the 2012 cutoff, and Paul's coming of age, but look at it another way:

Paul has continued to put up big impact numbers in the time since, and he's handicapped the first year due to the way prior hurts a guy wasn't as good the prior year. What that gives us is a 7 year span in which it's reasonable to see him as a lock to be a +7.5 level guy on either of the two teams he played as long as he's healthy.

Kidd by contrast, has only 5 years total that we've seen him break the +6 barrier only 5 times in his career, and 4 of them were his first 4 years in Jersey (the other was one of the late years in Dallas, which is well above the other). Basically outside of that time, he's typically a guy in the +4.5 level range.

So while your snapshot gives the impression that Paul has less than a 10% edge over a 3-year peak, and Kidd takes the rest, what I see is Paul beating Kidd not only in peak but in duration in peak and in ability to sustain the peak across context.

To be clear: None of this means I don't see a case for Kidd regardless. He was a very nice player for a very long time and I take that seriously. But I really don't see the capacities of the two players as that close.

Wait a second here you lost me. Kidd has played many roles on many teams (outside of Mashburn getting hurt he was basically in the Rubio role in Dallas the first time, in Phoenix he usually played with other great PGs and shared distributing responsibilities, in Jersey he was the man, and his second time in Dallas he was purely a complimentary piece) but Paul has always played the exact same role (ball dominant point) on the same type of team (super slow paced outside of last year). He never had to sustain impact across context just in the same context with different teams.

What i was saying is that we didn't see Kidd sustain the level of impact that made him an MVP candidate other places. Or in other words, when his stature rose dramatically with his move to Jersey, the RAPM is agreeing with this. It's basically saying his first 4 years in Jersey represent something on a clearly higher tier than what a more encompassing "prime Kidd" actually was.

And this makes sense given what we already know about the Jersey situation. How everything clicked at the right time, and how the team had a very particular defensive focus. This is not something we can necessarily expect him to replicate just by letting him alpha on another team.

By contrast, Paul's impact in LA sure looks to be right in line with what we saw of him in NO. Seems like you can largely plug him in somewhere as long as you let him alpha, and he's not only a tier above Kidd at his best, but a couple tiers above Kidd outside of the place he really hit his stride.

True but if Chris Paul wasn't allowed to be the alpha I'm guessing you'd see he same thing you see with Kidd (possibly to a larger degree since he isn't the pure passer Kidd is). If you are going off of "what they did" that's fine but I personally feel like taking from his career because for a decent period of his career he was misused is wrong. In that same light I won't assume a player could've been better than the best we've seen from him but if Kidd's best is slightly worse than Paul (I can get behind this) and his other years where he's misused are still in the All-NBA tier (I'd say they are), with his longevity advantage I can't see Paul winning this comparison. Paul has played less than half as many games as Kidd and comparing prime to prime (defining prime as all star level) Kidd was an all star 11 times in a 15 year period (I think he was all star level in all those years he missed but not in the last year he made it) and Chris Paul has been an all star for 7 years (including one year where he played 45 games due to injury and nearly half those games at a pretty low level). The longevity advantage is too great for me to be doubting how much better Paul is (honestly I'm close to regretting picking Walt Frazier over Kidd).

My only issue for Kidd is his playoff performances in Phoenix and 04.

[JordansBulls]

Vote: John Havlicek

The Best player on two championship teams, led them in win shares, won finals mvp, great on both ends of the floor and as well has 8 titles overall winning with two different squads as the best player.

[ceiling raiser]

Going to be honest, Chris Paul is my vote here, I just think he's a different level of player.

I was pretty high on Havlicek for a while. Great defensively, tremendous stamina, amazing longevity. I'd thought he was very important to those Celtics teams towards the end of Russell's career as well, when the offenses started performing almost as well as defenses.

Thing is though, from some posts by lorak a while ago:

viewtopic.php?p=38667005#p38667005

it seems there's a fair chance he wasn't a high impact player offensively. Great positional defender obviously, but he played with a GOAT level defender (Russell), and another who was no slouch on that end (Cowens).

Chris Paul before the injury in New Orleans, and during his time with the Clippers has been in the conversation the best offensive player in the league, and not a negative on the defensive end. His post-injury/pre-Clippers years are underrated as well.

I'm certainly open to changing my mind here, just where I presently stand.

[john248]

My official vote is for John Havlicek. He defines what an iron man is. Upon retirement, top 5 in games, points, and assists. Currently 23rd in games, 16th points, 28th assists. Upon Russell's retirement, averages 25/8/7 due to taking on the scoring volume which capped with a title in 74 with Cowens. Graceful decline while still playing substantial minutes of 17/4/4 to retirement at age 37. Excellent defender during his career and able to play any role asked. Lucky to play with a line of good players, but he was a constant on different title teams as his skill set was one that was very useful. Played starter minutes as a 6th man. 28/11/4 at 46% FG in the 69 Finals. 26/8/5/2 fMVP performance against KAJ and old Oscar. Probably shouldn't have shot so many jumpers due to his mediocre efficiency where he didn't get to the line much. Did everything else to make things easier for the team.

My main issue with Hondo is that I could probably find a dozen wing players who put up similar numbers or better factoring pace and deviation from the league efficiency. I'd have to be really convinced of his defense, which I am, and other intangibles.

I could be swayed to CP3. I have Hondo at 30 and CP3 in the next spot. Looking at Miller soon too.

[trex_8063]

My run-off vote: John Havlicek.

To me there is no question that Paul had the better peak (and by a pretty significant margin). However, the longevity and durability arguments for Havlicek are simply too much for Paul to overcome imo. 16 seasons wherein he NEVER missed more than 9 games (playing every single rs game in 8 of 16 seasons). To put that more in perspective relative to Paul: Chris Paul missed more games in '10 than Havlicek did in his entire career.

Havliceck has more than TWICE the number of rs games played, more than THREE TIMES the number of playoff games played.

That maybe wouldn't be terribly relevant if Hondo had been "merely an all-star".....but Hondo was deemed All-NBA 1st Team 4 times, 2nd Team 7 times, was top 5 in MVP voting twice, top 10 five times. Without going into an array of statistical support for the following statement (pretty sure it's already been done), I'd take the accolades/MVP voting as strong indication he was more than a mere all-star for a significant chunk of his career. And he was a "relevant" player in the NBA all 16 years of his career. He was the 2nd or 3rd-best player on SEVEN title teams, probably nearly a "1b" on one other title team.

I like Paul, and he'd be coming around shortly for me......but this is Hondo all the way imo. Total career value is too big.

[Doctor MJ]

True but if Chris Paul wasn't allowed to be the alpha I'm guessing you'd see he same thing you see with Kidd (possibly to a larger degree since he isn't the pure passer Kidd is). If you are going off of "what they did" that's fine but I personally feel like taking from his career because for a decent period of his career he was misused is wrong. In that same light I won't assume a player could've been better than the best we've seen from him but if Kidd's best is slightly worse than Paul (I can get behind this) and his other years where he's misused are still in the All-NBA tier (I'd say they are), with his longevity advantage I can't see Paul winning this comparison. Paul has played less than half as many games as Kidd and comparing prime to prime (defining prime as all star level) Kidd was an all star 11 times in a 15 year period (I think he was all star level in all those years he missed but not in the last year he made it) and Chris Paul has been an all star for 7 years (including one year where he played 45 games due to injury and nearly half those games at a pretty low level). The longevity advantage is too great for me to be doubting how much better Paul is (honestly I'm close to regretting picking Walt Frazier over Kidd).

My only issue for Kidd is his playoff performances in Phoenix and 04.

In what realistic scenario would it be wise to not let Paul be the alpha?

Let's also note that it's not like what we're talking about here is that Kidd was otherwise not allowed to alpha. He was Phoenix' star without question. What changed in RAPM in Jersey is his defensive stuff, not his offense, and that almost certainly had to do with team clicking on defense and going through an improvement on that end far beyond just Kidd's impact.

Re: Kidd's other years at All-NBA level. Y'know, Paul already has as many All-NBA years as Kidd. Kidd has an all-star advantage of course, and if that's how he gets the edge for you that's cool. That is however, basically saying that Paul has the edge in Top 5 years, they have even numbers of Top 15 years, but Kidd gets the edge because has an 11-7 years as an all-star based on having 4 years as a fringe all-star level guy.

[D Nice]

What i was saying is that we didn't see Kidd sustain the level of impact that made him an MVP candidate other places. Or in other words, when his stature rose dramatically with his move to Jersey, the RAPM is agreeing with this. It's basically saying his first 4 years in Jersey represent something on a clearly higher tier than what a more encompassing "prime Kidd" actually was.

And this makes sense given what we already know about the Jersey situation. How everything clicked at the right time, and how the team had a very particular defensive focus. This is not something we can necessarily expect him to replicate just by letting him alpha on another team.

By contrast, Paul's impact in LA sure looks to be right in line with what we saw of him in NO. Seems like you can largely plug him in somewhere as long as you let him alpha, and he's not only a tier above Kidd at his best, but a couple tiers above Kidd outside of the place he really hit his stride.

Is the thinking then that NJ offered a "redundancy free environment" for Kidd's very particular skill-set to have a large impact on his dispersal (+/-) metrics, and that these environments aren't necessarily commonplace (i.e. Phoenix), while Paul is just such a phenomenal offensive player that his impact will (and has) always measure out to the degree it has, because he's apex-level at all of the "normal" point guard stuff, and since he will always be in that role, his results are more reproducible across all hypothetical condition sets?

I think I can get behind that. Even if I don't necessarily agree with it I understand it.

[Texas Chuck]

I find it interesting how little some guys value quality but not elite play. When looking at Hondo(and Kidd since that discussion is continuing as well) we are seeing a ton of longevity. Both Hondo and Kidd were relevant players their entire careers. And only 2 guys ever played more NBA minutes than Kidd.

But let's take Doc's idea that Kidd gives you a mere 4 more all-star years. Even if we remove that we are still looking another 12-15K, and Im being conservative here, minutes as an above average starting PG and another 5k+ as a quality role player above and beyond those 4 all-star years that are already being minimalized.

Im honestly stunned that people don't value these extra quality years Hondo and Kidd give you. Fine to say that Paul's peak is so high that you think he gives you an edge despite the massive longevity, but at least give the guys credit for playing forever at a high level. And Hondo in particular is still a very good player when he retires.

If this is a peaks project then Paul is already in and Hondo is still a good deal in the distance and Kidd isn't even on the horizon, but if this is a career ranking and that's what I was led to believe....I simply can't ignore the vast gulf in minutes especially at the level Hondo was playing.

[Doctor MJ]

What i was saying is that we didn't see Kidd sustain the level of impact that made him an MVP candidate other places. Or in other words, when his stature rose dramatically with his move to Jersey, the RAPM is agreeing with this. It's basically saying his first 4 years in Jersey represent something on a clearly higher tier than what a more encompassing "prime Kidd" actually was.

And this makes sense given what we already know about the Jersey situation. How everything clicked at the right time, and how the team had a very particular defensive focus. This is not something we can necessarily expect him to replicate just by letting him alpha on another team.

By contrast, Paul's impact in LA sure looks to be right in line with what we saw of him in NO. Seems like you can largely plug him in somewhere as long as you let him alpha, and he's not only a tier above Kidd at his best, but a couple tiers above Kidd outside of the place he really hit his stride.

Is the thinking then that NJ offered a "redundancy free environment" for Kidd's very particular skill-set to have a large impact on his dispersal (+/-) metrics, and that these environments aren't necessarily commonplace (i.e. Phoenix), while Paul is just such a phenomenal offensive player that his impact will (and has) always measure out to the degree it has, because he's apex-level at all of the "normal" point guard stuff, and since he will always be in that role, his results are more reproducible across all hypothetical condition sets?

I think I can get behind that. Even if I don't necessarily agree with it I understand it.

That's the particular point I'm making there yes.

To be clear, I'm not saying this to take the Jersey years away from Kidd, I'm just trying to put in when people say that Paul's peak impact wasn't much bigger than Kidd and Kidd has the longevity edge. I believe:

1) Paul's peak edge is pretty significant.
2) Paul in theory, and in practice, was better able to sustain his peak play across context.
3) Kidd's real longevity edge is based on his years as a Top 20-25 level player rather than him having a bigger edge in more impressive years.

With all of this, I don't see Paul > Kidd as any lock. I get the counterpoint of view generally, but I'm rebutting specific points.

[Jim Naismith]

From a 2006 article in Slam Magazine (http://www.slamonline.com/nba/original-old-school-iron-john/)

Iron John

by Bob Ryan

He could have played with Larry Bird, you know.

John “Hondo” Havlicek would have been 39, but so what? He didn’t quit because he could no longer play. He retired from basketball in ’78 because he didn’t like going to work everyday any longer.

He had been used to teammates like Bill Russell and Dave Cowens, and by the ’77-78 season, he was saddled with the likes of Sidney Wicks and Curtis Rowe. Part of the deal for him was living the life; when the life became a drag, he thought it was time to say good-bye. But if he had really known what Larry Bird was going to be all about, well, who knows? He could have played until he was 40 or 41 and told the grandchildren that he had played with both Bob Cousy and Larry Bird. He would have been the linkage for 41 years of Boston Celtics, and NBA, history. As it was, he didn’t miss by much. He scored 29 points in his dramatic final game, averaged 16.1 points per game for the season—no surprise, because, as you’ve already heard, the man could still play.

Playing with Bird would have been fun, and to some degree it would have represented a full circle. It would have borne some similarity to playing with Cousy, which Havlicek did in The Cooz’s final season. “All I did offensively in my rookie year,” Hondo once said, “was run around and make lay-ups on passes from Cousy.” He could have gotten passes from Bird in much the same way, and he knew it.

Of course, the truth is that he did play with Bird and against him. It’s just that the public was not privileged to bear witness to the annual April 8th ritual of the late 70’s and early 80’s. April 8th is Havlicek’s birthday, and every year, then-coach Bill Fitch took full advantage of the opportunity to bring Havlicek in for a workout with his team. At ages 39, 40, 41, and beyond, Havlicek demonstrated that he could still play. A terminally-awful left knee ended all that, but not before the point had been made to youngsters who might not have fully appreciated that John Havlicek remains one of the handful of greatest basketball players who ever lived.

It was fashionable in his time to anoint either Oscar Robertson or Jerry West as the game’s best all-around player, and in the early days there was also plenty of sentiment for Elgin Baylor. Havlicek was regarded as the game’s pre-eminent sixth man, no more—until he stopped being a sixth man and became the Bionic Man.

The fact that Havlicek was not a full-time starter during the first seven years he spent with the Celtics was utterly irrelevant. As legendary coach Red Auerbach was forever fond of saying, “It’s not who starts the game, it’s who finishes it.” And Auerbach knew what he had right from the start: as a rookie in ’62-63, Havlicek was third on the champion Celtics in minutes played. The next he advanced to second. And when it got to be what Magic Johnson called “Winnin’ Time,” Havlicek was on the floor, because he was one of the truly rare offensive players of note who is just as good on defense. Or maybe the other way around.

He did not exactly arrive in Boston amid great fanfare. Even though he had been a first-time All-American at Ohio State, Havlicek wasn’t even the most publicized player on his own team. That honor belonged to Jerry Lucas, a megastar in high school who was the acknowledged star of a Buckeye team that won the NCAA title in ’60 and finished second to Cincinnati in each of the next two years. Havlicek was the other guy.

He was the last man taken in the first round of the ’62 draft, and before he presented himself for Auerbach’s summertime inspection, he stopped in Cleveland to try out for the NFL Browns. They had drafted him as a quarterback even though he had not played since high school, but when he reported to their camp he was almost immediately converted into a wide receiver, a position he had never played. He performed in exhibition games and very likely could have made a weaker club. As it was, he was cut in favor of Gary Collins, a name any good football fan must recognize.

At 6-5 and around 210 pounds, John Havlicek had an ideally adaptable athletic body. His hands were large and exceptionally strong. He was amazingly flexible. And then there was that stamina.

That gift.

Other people got tired when they ran. John Havlicek didn’t. He attributed his exceptional stamina to his rural upbringing. He had grown up in the southeastern Ohio town of Lansing, where there wasn’t much to do besides play sports and play in the surrounding hills. Havlicek didn’t ride in a car—he ran from place to place. He didn’t bike. He ran. Everywhere. All the time. Just a way of life.

Of course, there was also the matter of the lungs. Jumbo-sized lungs so big they could not fit on a single X-ray plate. Havlicek always needed one and a half. True story.

John Havlicek was lucky to join the Boston Celtics, and he would be the first to tell you that. He walked onto a team that was in Year Six of an amazing 11-NBA-Championships-in-13-years run. Bill Russell was the sport’s reigning king. Cousy was still around. The Jones Boys, Sam and K.C., were ready to roar. Tom Heinsohn had three years left. Frank Ramsey was perfecting the sixth man art, and he would pass on his secrets to The Kid—starting with the practical suggestion that he take off his warm-up pants and drape the jacket around his shoulders, ready to spring into immediate action when his name was called.

Most of all there was Auerbach, who wasn’t just any coach because he didn’t think like other coaches. Looking at a player, he saw what was good and feasible, not the good and inefficient. He could deal with mismatched parts, always envisioning how they could be molded into a team.

When Havlicek entered the NBA, he wasn’t a terribly accomplished shooter. No problem—he was told to run lanes and move without the ball and subsist on leftover garbage points. He was told that if he played aggressive defense, the offense would take care of itself, and it did. The eager, athletic, thoroughly unpolished Havlicek averaged 14 points a game as a rookie.

When the ’62-63 season ended, he went home set on improving. He shot thousands of jump shots that summer, and returned a jump shooter with great range. He averaged 19.9 points a game his second season, and over the next 11 campaigns never averaged fewer than 18.3. It was classic Havlicek to identify a problem and address it so capably.

The defining moment of his career took place on April 15, ’65. He was in his third playoffs and already considered the game’s best sixth man. But by making one play at the end of one ballgame, he became a folk hero, and he would remain one until the end of his career.

___________

It was Game Seven of a grueling Eastern Conference Finals series with Philadelphia. The Celtics led 110-109, with four seconds left, but the 76ers had the ball out of bounds underneath their own basket, following a bizarre Russell turnover in which an inbounds pass hit a guide wire running from the backboard to the first balcony. It was a scary moment. The 76ers had options ranging from jump shots by Hal Greer or Chet Walker to a power move by Wilt Chamberlain to an offensive rebound. But Havlicek prevented all that, deflecting a Greer inbounds pass intended for Walker over to Sam Jones.

What transformed the play from timely feat to historic moment was the late Johnny Most’s broadcast description, the most famous call in Boston sports history—it consisted of more than a minute of frenzied screaming in Most’s unique, raspy voice. Re-played the following morning by radio station WHDH, it enraptured the town. “Havlicek Stole The Ball!” later became the title cut of a best-selling album.

“I was starting to make inroads” Havlicek recalls, “but after that play people realized I was going to be around for a while. And the album definitely influenced the way people thought of me.”

Phase I of his career ended in ’69 with another championship (his sixth) and the retirements of both Russell and Sam Jones. At this point Havlicek was a perennial All-Star and the unquestioned number-one sixth man in the game, but his name was absent from the Oscar-West discussions. That was about to change

Few remember that rookie coach Tom Heinsohn wished to maintain Havlicek’s role as the consummate sixth man when the ’69-70 began. That last about three games—until Heinsohn realized that a) the team was not good enough to enjoy that luxury, and b) Havlicek might as well start since he won’t get tired anyway. There have been other great players, but nearly 30 years later, it’s very easy to contend that no one has ever played basketball the way John Havlicek did for the next five years. He was the ultimate king on the chessboard, giving his coach an All-Star player at two positions for as long as he was needed.

During the ’69-70 season Havlicek led the Boston Celtics in scoring, rebounding and assists while averaging a league-high 45 minutes a night. Understand that 45 Havlicek minutes were unlike any other player’s 45, because in the John Havlicek scheme of things there was no standing around. It was pedal-to-the-metal all the time.

And that’s not even the half of it.

With Russell and Sam Jones gone, the Celtics were in transition. There were young players coming in, but they didn’t know anything about the NBA; suddenly Havlicek was left with precious few allies from the old days. There were Don Nelson and Satch Sanders, and then there were kids. Havlicek had to do the scoring, the rebounding, the passing and the thinking for just about everybody.

His ’70-71 season was a reasonable carbon copy of the ’69-70 season, in which he had elevated into the league’s ultra-elite. He gained rebounding help from 6-9 center Dave Cowens, but Havlicek was still responsible for the heavy-duty scoring (a career-high 28.9 ppg), defending and playmaking. He was regularly submitting triple-doubles, except that back then we didn’t know enough to label them as such (that honor goes to Bruce Jolesch, a Laker PR man in the Magic Johnson era). The record keeping was less sophisticated than today, and it’s impossible to reconstruct the box scores, so the actual number of Havlicek triple-doubles is lost. Suffice it to say that, along with Robertson and West, he had plenty.

Havlicek had moved into the category of legend, a man who could play heads-up with the finest forwards and guards in the game. A man who needed no rest. Other coaches had to find places for their stars to take a blow, but not Heinsohn. If Hondo played 48, he played 48. He might not practice that hard the next day, but if there was a game the following night, he could go 48 again. “I’d give my right arm to have his stamina,” says Matt Guokas, then a journeyman forward.

Nothing seemed to deter Havlicek. After suffering a painful injury to his right wrist, he developed his let hand more fully. This adaptability served him very well in the ’73 playoffs, when the Celtics had won 68 games and with the Lakers were co-favorites for the championship. But first they needed to get by ancient rival New York, and the Knicks matched up very well with them, physically and psychologically. The teams were tied at a game apiece, and in Game Three, Havlicek found himself wedged between Dave DeBusschere and Bill Bradley while fighting through a pick. He wound up injuring his right shoulder.

The Celtics lost that game, and worse yet were informed that Havlicek would not be able to play in Game Four at Madison Square Garden. Boston put up a sensational Havlicek-less effort but lost that game in double overtime. Havlicek made it back onto the floor for Game Five, despite the fact that he had limited use of his right arm and shoulder. He scored 18 points on six baskets—four of which were left-handed—as the Celtics kept the series alive. He was somewhat less effective in the sixth game, another Celtics triumph, and he was not functional at all in Game Seven, a 94-78 New York win. But that incomprehensible performance in Game Five had reinforced his legend.

Havlicek was simply unlike other men. He was inherently disciplined and organized to a frightening degree. He was the only NBA player, before or since, known to hang his knee-length socks on a hanger. He arranged his colognes, talcum powder, etc. by ascending height on the shelf. His locker always looked ready for an inspection.

Such a man looks at the world in its simplest, most logical terms, one reason why Havlicek never attempted to coach. He knew himself and that his thought processes were not like everyone else’s. He could never understand the woeful failings of mortal men—men who, unlike himself, could not play a single game against a team and figure out all of its plays. What was obvious to John Havlicek was quantum physics to many of his mates.

No man, not even John Havlicek, could have reasonably continued to carry the physical and mental load of the early 70’s for very long. Fortunately for him, the team did get better, and his overall burden was lessened. By the time the Celtics won their first post-Russell title in ’74, Havlicek was sharing the spotlight with Jo Jo White, Don Chaney, Paul Silas and most of all Dave Cowens, by then a three-time All-Star.

Havlicek was 34 and in his 12th season. Heinsohn was taking him out of ballgames every once in a while, but when he needed his big gun to go the full 48, it was no different from six or seven years earlier. Havlicek was Havlicek, still an elite player. He was upset when the team failed to win the title in ’75, after bouncing back from a 9-8 start to win 60 games. The ’75-76 team sputtered somewhat, but hopes were higher when the playoffs began; it was potentially devastating when Havlicek sustained a foot injury in the very first game.

Thanks to some Cowens fourth-quarter heroics, the team pulled out a dramatic Game One comeback win, but as the team assembled for practice at the Boston Garden the following day, it was greeted by the sight of John Havlicek being wheeled down the corridor on a dolly. He had a torn plantar fascia (the connective tissue in the arch) in his left foot, a very painful injury. The prescription was to soak the foot for three hours a day in ice. Havlicek being Havlicek, he reasoned that if three hours a day was good, six or seven hours a day would be twice as good. He was ready to do whatever it took to get himself back in the lineup. And so, for the rest of the playoffs, from Boston to Cleveland and finally to Phoenix, Havlicek carried around a turquoise dime store dishpan. Day and night he would shuffle to the ice machine and load the dishpan with what he laughingly referred to as “two Hondo handfuls” of ice, then soak his foot as he watched TV.

At no point in those playoffs was he ever really himself physically, but he played. He played his two-position game as hard as he could through the six-game conquest of the Buffalo Braves and the six-game conquest of Cleveland and into the Finals. He never practiced, just suited up for the games. Bad foot and all, he played 58 out of 63 minutes in the Celtics’ stirring, triple-overtime victory in Game Five. He hit what seemed to be the winning basket, a difficult bank shot with one second left in the second OT, only to see it trumped by Gar Heard’s buzzer-beater. Two nights later in Game Six, Boston locked up the championship.

Havlicek had always been a major playoff performer, whether he was stepping into the starting lineup in a pinch back in the Russell-Auerbach days, scoring a team playoff record 54 points in the first Atlanta game in ’73 or executing the back-breaking three-point play to put away Game Seven against Milwaukee. That would continue to be the case the following year, when he submitted what may be his most noble showing of all. The opponents were the rollicking, frolicking Philadelphia 76ers, and Havlicek’s task at age 37 was to do something about Dr. J—Julius Erving, then 27 and very much at the all-around peak of his game. For seven games, Havlicek devoted himself to defense, and the good Doctor never went off. He never even got so much as a step on Havlicek, and the underdog Celtics took the Sixers to a seventh game before the overall Philly superiority came to the fore.

Havlicek would play one more year, not a particularly happy one. The team won 32 games. The atmosphere was bad. The only real interest was his Farewell Tour, and the only game that got anyone aroused was his last. He always had a good sense of propriety, and so he arrived at the Boston Garden for his 1,270th and final NBA game in a tuxedo. In the game, he went out and had a little fun. Never afraid to put up shots (he once went 15-40), Havlicek fired away 33 times. The Celtics were in control throughout, and as the clock wound down the crowd really got into it. Ernie DeGregorio was in the game for Boston, and the only man on his radar screen was Havlicek. Hondo had begun his career catching passes from Bob Cousy, and now he was ending it by catching passes from the only player alive who saw the game the way The Cooz did. In one 11-second span, Ernie D twice found Havlicek on sneakaways. He scored nine lightning points to an amazing roar, finishing with 29—a phenomenal farewell.

Havlicek was a man of his own time and place, and he retired with no major regrets. “If I hadn’t hurt my shoulder in ’73, we definitely would have won that year,” he says. “And if we had held onto [Paul] Silas and [Paul] Westphal, we might have squeezed out one more at the end. Other than that, no regrets.”

He’s been gone for 20 years, and we have not seen his like since. The only multi-positional players anywhere near his level have been Michael Jordan and Scottie Pippen, and Jordan never really played much forward. Pippen, meanwhile, can only dream of possessing the legendary Havlicek stamina. As is the case with all special playres, people try much too hard to find equivalents. For a year or so, Dan Majerle was supposed to be the new Havlicek. He’s a nice player, but please.

If anything, Hondo would be even more effective in today’s game, if only because he had three-point range. He was every bit a “modern” ballplayer, and if you combine the sophistication and brainpower he brought to the game, it would really be something. On defense he’d be sinful—his lateral quickness and anticipation would fit perfectly into a modern scheme. But perhaps he’s better off not being around today. The NBA externals, the arena noise and the emphasis on irrelevant folderol would have irritated him.

No, John Havlicek played at the right time and was revered by his rivals, who knew him as both a great player and a great person. Playing against John Havlicek was a challenge and an honor, and Bill Bradley sums it up best in his wonderful book, Values of the Game.

“John Havlicek,” writes Bradley. “The guy drove my crazy. He drove everybody crazy. Covering John Havlicek was like trying to hold mercury in your hand. He worked harder than any player out there, constantly running, using screens, getting the ball at the right time, taking only the good shots. The ultimate competitor.”

True then, true now.

[drza]

Spoiler:

True but if Chris Paul wasn't allowed to be the alpha I'm guessing you'd see he same thing you see with Kidd (possibly to a larger degree since he isn't the pure passer Kidd is). If you are going off of "what they did" that's fine but I personally feel like taking from his career because for a decent period of his career he was misused is wrong. In that same light I won't assume a player could've been better than the best we've seen from him but if Kidd's best is slightly worse than Paul (I can get behind this) and his other years where he's misused are still in the All-NBA tier (I'd say they are), with his longevity advantage I can't see Paul winning this comparison. Paul has played less than half as many games as Kidd and comparing prime to prime (defining prime as all star level) Kidd was an all star 11 times in a 15 year period (I think he was all star level in all those years he missed but not in the last year he made it) and Chris Paul has been an all star for 7 years (including one year where he played 45 games due to injury and nearly half those games at a pretty low level). The longevity advantage is too great for me to be doubting how much better Paul is (honestly I'm close to regretting picking Walt Frazier over Kidd).

My only issue for Kidd is his playoff performances in Phoenix and 04

.

In what realistic scenario would it be wise to not let Paul be the alpha?

Spoiler:

Let's also note that it's not like what we're talking about here is that Kidd was otherwise not allowed to alpha. He was Phoenix' star without question. What changed in RAPM in Jersey is his defensive stuff, not his offense, and that almost certainly had to do with team clicking on defense and going through an improvement on that end far beyond just Kidd's impact.

Re: Kidd's other years at All-NBA level. Y'know, Paul already has as many All-NBA years as Kidd. Kidd has an all-star advantage of course, and if that's how he gets the edge for you that's cool. That is however, basically saying that Paul has the edge in Top 5 years, they have even numbers of Top 15 years, but Kidd gets the edge because has an 11-7 years as an all-star based on having 4 years as a fringe all-star level guy.

Focusing on this line, aren't there many circumstances where Paul's level of ball-dominance would lead to diminishing returns? For instance, if instead of playing on a team with all finishers (like in NO) or where his second star is a big man (like in LAC), what if his second star was a scoring wing? What if he was playing next to LeBron, or Wade, or Kobe?

Or even a ball-dominant scorer that isn't as good like Iverson or Steve Francis?

Or what if he were playing in an offense where he wasn't the clear-cut best option...what if he were playing in an offense with Dirk, and the team wanted to focus more around Dirk than around Paul? Couldn't one argue that's exactly what happened with Nash and part of why his impact changed so drastically from Dallas to Phoenix?

What about two talented scoring point guards playing together (like we saw in Phoenix last year)...would Paul compliment Goran Dragic on offense and defense?

What about in a team-share offense like the Spurs? Is Paul's approach going to be maximized there?

Might Kidd's impact, in fact, be more likely than Paul's to allow maximization in ANY of these scenarios? And are these scenarios really that unusual? Just the opposite, in fact, I'd argue that point guards that control their offense to the level than Nash (in Phoenix) or Paul or Stockton do/did is not in fact the norm.

There are a LOT of scenarios in basketball. I think it's a mistake to think that pretty much any ball-dominant player at any position should have carte blanche to definitely play in that style across all situations. And Kidd's size/defensive versatility also opens up the possibility of him playing next to smaller players and maximizing both of their impacts, in ways that Paul doesn't.

Paul's an excellent player, but I don't think his portability is necessarily a conclusive strength against Kidd.

[Doctor MJ]

I find it interesting how little some guys value quality but not elite play. When looking at Hondo(and Kidd since that discussion is continuing as well) we are seeing a ton of longevity. Both Hondo and Kidd were relevant players their entire careers. And only 2 guys ever played more NBA minutes than Kidd.

But let's take Doc's idea that Kidd gives you a mere 4 more all-star years. Even if we remove that we are still looking another 12-15K, and Im being conservative here, minutes as an above average starting PG and another 5k+ as a quality role player above and beyond those 4 all-star years that are already being minimalized.

Im honestly stunned that people don't value these extra quality years Hondo and Kidd give you. Fine to say that Paul's peak is so high that you think he gives you an edge despite the massive longevity, but at least give the guys credit for playing forever at a high level. And Hondo in particular is still a very good player when he retires.

If this is a peaks project then Paul is already in and Hondo is still a good deal in the distance and Kidd isn't even on the horizon, but if this is a career ranking and that's what I was led to believe....I simply can't ignore the vast gulf in minutes especially at the level Hondo was playing.

Put it this way, you have a choice to draft one of two guys as a GM.

Player A has higher peak, and a bigger average year edge as you expand your focus each year from simply 1 year peak to a 7 year peak.

Player B remains an all-star for 4 more years after the 7th year.

Who do you pick?

I understand being baffled when you feel like people dismiss years 8 through 11, but does any GM actually pick Player B?

[Doctor MJ]

Focusing on this line, aren't there many circumstances where Paul's level of ball-dominance would lead to diminishing returns? For instance, if instead of playing on a team with all finishers (like in NO) or where his second star is a big man (like in LAC), what if his second star was a scoring wing? What if he was playing next to LeBron, or Wade, or Kobe?

Or even a ball-dominant scorer that isn't as good like Iverson or Steve Francis?

Or what if he were playing in an offense where he wasn't the clear-cut best option...what if he were playing in an offense with Dirk, and the team wanted to focus more around Dirk than around Paul? Couldn't one argue that's exactly what happened with Nash and part of why his impact changed so drastically from Dallas to Phoenix?

What about two talented scoring point guards playing together (like we saw in Phoenix last year)...would Paul compliment Goran Dragic on offense and defense?

What about in a team-share offense like the Spurs? Is Paul's approach going to be maximized there?

Might Kidd's impact, in fact, be more likely than Paul's to allow maximization in ANY of these scenarios? And are these scenarios really that unusual? Just the opposite, in fact, I'd argue that point guards that control their offense to the level than Nash (in Phoenix) or Paul or Stockton do/did is not in fact the norm.

There are a LOT of scenarios in basketball. I think it's a mistake to think that pretty much any ball-dominant player at any position should have carte blanche to definitely play in that style across all situations. And Kidd's size/defensive versatility also opens up the possibility of him playing next to smaller players and maximizing both of their impacts, in ways that Paul doesn't.

Paul's an excellent player, but I don't think his portability is necessarily a conclusive strength against Kidd.

You've got a point, but I think you've got to ask what that portability amounts to.

We're not talking about Kidd being able to be a superstar in the scenarios you describe, we're talking about him losing less offensive impact...because he has less to lose in the first place. Yes, Kidd offers atypical dimensions on other front which benefits him with the combos you talk about...but of course you're specifically picking guys who has strengths that intersect with the areas that Paul is so much better than Kidd in. That's a lopsided way to look at portability.

[Texas Chuck]

But it doesnt stop at those 4 years. Kidd goes on and on and on and on. Assuming in your GM scenario that the player loves our organization and will stick around like Stockton, I'm getting 28K more minutes. And almost all of them Im getting a top 20-25 player. Thats pretty freaking valuable.

But 7 years of Mike only meant one title. So there are no guarantees and Paul, good as he is, is no Mike. Again I get you think Paul is several tiers above Kidd as a player and thus you would take him. But I don't think the gap is as big as you do and drza posted a bunch of stats that I know you put a lot of stock into that suggest Kidd's impact is greater than his box score suggests. And I know everywhere he went the team starting winning a lot more and everywhere he left they won a lot less.

I think the idea that a PG has to be an offensive savant really hurts Kidd. I think its simply impossible for people to leave that Kidd could be having the impact he had based on his ineffectiveness as a scorer.

[lorak]

I find it interesting how little some guys value quality but not elite play. When looking at Hondo(and Kidd since that discussion is continuing as well) we are seeing a ton of longevity. Both Hondo and Kidd were relevant players their entire careers. And only 2 guys ever played more NBA minutes than Kidd.

But let's take Doc's idea that Kidd gives you a mere 4 more all-star years. Even if we remove that we are still looking another 12-15K, and Im being conservative here, minutes as an above average starting PG and another 5k+ as a quality role player above and beyond those 4 all-star years that are already being minimalized.

Im honestly stunned that people don't value these extra quality years Hondo and Kidd give you. Fine to say that Paul's peak is so high that you think he gives you an edge despite the massive longevity, but at least give the guys credit for playing forever at a high level. And Hondo in particular is still a very good player when he retires.

If this is a peaks project then Paul is already in and Hondo is still a good deal in the distance and Kidd isn't even on the horizon, but if this is a career ranking and that's what I was led to believe....I simply can't ignore the vast gulf in minutes especially at the level Hondo was playing.

Would you rather have one 1977 Walton season or 10 all star Magloire seasons?

[Texas Chuck]

Paul isn't 77 Walton and Kidd is way better than Magloire was in his all-star year.

But you know that.

[tsherkin]

Paul isn't 77 Walton and Kidd is way better than Magloire was in his all-star year.

But you know that.

Kidd's value post-prine is closer to Magloire than Walton, but you knew that. And lorak's point sill stands; I'm personally not fond of using roleplayer season longevity as a salient argument in debates about focal star value. It's good pub, sure, but more value added to the legacy of the star they support than themselves, IMO. Roleplayers and aged stars are more easily found than peak/prime stars.

The thrust of the point is a question of how much stock you put into seasons without impact in accordance with franchise player-level impact.