bwgood77 wrote:GMATCallahan wrote:I do not believe that Westbrook could average 13-14 assists per game under any circumstances, however.
Well, he averaged 10.4 apg during the regular season (second behind Rondo), and 18.1 shots, and in the postseason he has averaged 10.9 apg and 20.9 shots.
I can't imagine if he just focused a little more on getting others involved, that he couldn't average an extra 2.6 apg. Heck, even if he had played in some type of SSOL offense, that increased Nash's assists numbers significantly, or on a run-n-gun showtime Lakers team like Magic had, I think he could easily bring up that average.
Many of his triple doubles, he scored 30-40 points, so a small change in focus seems like it could have quite an impact.
As for Iverson (who I can't compare to Westbrook at all...I consider Westbrook a FAR better player), and KJ, their assists went down with Melo and Barkley because those guys were not finishers as much as they were iso type players, which don't lead to assists for whoever got them the ball.
If Westbrook had a teammate such as Karl Malone or played in an offense that featured more pick n roll, and plays designed to be finished off a pass, or even a fast paces team offense, I think his results would change.
I would consider Westbrook a somewhat better player than Iverson, but their level of basketball intelligence and their offensive decision-making are similar. Over the last four seasons, from 2013-2016, Westbrook has averaged 24.3 points, 8.5 assists, 3.9 turnovers, a 2.15:1.00 assists-to-turnover ratio, 6.6 rebounds, 1.9 steals, 0.2 blocks, a .439 field goal percentage in 19.1 FGA, a .476 two-point field goal percentage in 14.9 FGA, a .308 three-point field goal percentage in 4.2 FGA, an .818 free throw percentage in 7.6 FTA, and a .541 True Shooting Percentage.
Over four seasons from 2005-2008, Iverson averaged 29.1 points, 7.4 assists, 3.8 turnovers, a 1.97:1.00 assists-to-turnover ratio, 3.3 rebounds, 2.1 steals, 0.1 blocks, a .442 field goal percentage in 22.1 FGA, a .465 two-point field goal percentage in 18.6 FGA, a .322 three-point field goal percentage in 3.5 FGA, an .814 free throw percentage in 10.3 FTA, and a .546 True Shooting Percentage.
In fact, in Iverson's one full season in Denver, '07-'08, he posted a .567 True Shooting Percentage, higher than Westbrook's career-best mark of .554, established this year.
So overall, I would say that they are fairly similar as players. Westbrook is a much better rebounder and a stronger, more versatile defender who is more willing to serve as a playmaker, but their overall level of offensive performance—and their basic strengths and weaknesses on that end of the floor—is about the same. Like Iverson, Westbrook is an explosive athlete who goes hard to the basket, draws fouls, can collapse a defense to free teammates, and can create his own jump-shot at any time. Like Iverson, Westbrook is neither a great shooter nor a great passer, he forces too many shots (especially threes), he fails to run an offense with much flow, and he lacks discretion and struggles with decision-making. Like Iverson, Westbrook can carry a team in the regular season and in certain playoff games, but he lacks the nuances, discipline, and consistent efficiency that are usually needed to win a championship.
Yes, Carmelo Anthony, like Charles Barkley, is largely a one-on-one, hold-the-ball type of player, but again, Steve Nash's assists averages proved unaffected by the departure of Amar'e Stoudemire (the consummate assisted finisher), and Nash never averaged 9.0 assists per game in six seasons playing with Dirk Nowitzki, who (like Kevin Durant) could integrate himself into a team's offense to a greater extent than Anthony or Barkley. In the NBA, a playmaker's assists averages are at least as much a product of controlling the offense as the caliber of surrounding talent. Gary Payton's assists averages, for instance, rose late in his career with Seattle after Shawn Kemp was gone and the Sonics' overall level of talent had diminished drastically. The primary reason was that Payton now dominated the ball more than before.
The Thunder runs a ton of high pick-and-roll with Westbrook, as most every team in today's NBA runs a ton of high pick-and-roll. As for pace, Oklahoma City has played at a fast pace for years—largely due to Westbrook and his ability to generate fast breaks (pace is not an abstract factor; particular players can influence it). This past season, the Thunder played at a Pace Factor of 96.7, the same as or faster than the Suns in all of Steve Nash’s seasons in Phoenix. That Pace Factor was also faster than that of the Lakers in ’89-’90 and significantly faster than that of the Lakers in ’90-’91, when Los Angeles played at the third-slowest pace in the NBA. Magic Johnson, however, averaged 11.5 assists in ’89-’90 and 12.5 assists in ’90-’91; from ’82-’83 through ’88-’89, when the Lakers played at a faster pace, he averaged 12.2 assists overall.
And that point leads me to another one: namely, one of the fallacies regarding basketball is that a star’s numbers rise or fall on a parallel basis to a team’s Pace Factors. When the game is played at a faster pace, there are more possessions, but a player cannot dominate, milk, or manipulate those possessions to the same extent. The ball is pushed up and around the court more quickly, spontaneously, and democratically, and no one or two players control the ball as much. At a slower pace, there are fewer possessions, but the game is more oriented toward the half-court, allowing one or two players on a team to milk and manipulate the possessions. As Isiah Thomas stated on NBA TV a few seasons ago, in the half-court, teams lean on their first and second options—after all, most teams only feature one or two players on the court who can break down or score against a set defense. Thus what a star player may lose in the quantity of possessions, he gains in his ability to control the possessions. Hence Magic Johnson’s assists and overall numbers did not suffer as the Lakers’ pace slowed. Hence Chris Paul posted the best numbers of his career when his Hornets teams were playing at extremely slow paces circa seven years ago, with the same being true of Tony Parker in San Antonio at that time. Hence Michael Jordan, John Stockton, and Karl Malone posted historic, league-dominating numbers while playing for some of the slowest-paced teams in the NBA. Had Jordan, Stockton, and Malone played for a fast-paced team, would their numbers have been even greater? Probably not, for what they would have gained in the volume of possessions where they may have theoretically touched the ball, they would have lost in their ability to dominate the possessions to such a high degree. Indeed, one could actually argue that a slower pace is more helpful for a star’s numbers—one reason why PER, as I have noted before, constitutes a junk metric. It presumes linearity when the relationship between individual performance and pace may be inverse or nonexistent.
Consider how Stockton and Malone played for Utah under Jerry Sloan. Although they constituted a lethal fast break duo, the Jazz was very selective about how and when it ran. For the most part, Utah played a methodical half-court game where Stockton would pound the ball, especially on the left side of the court, and Malone would come across the lane and either set a screen for him or set up on the block. Stockton would use the screen to try and draw two defenders and feed Malone for a roll to the hoop or a jump-shot (or else open up a cutter or shooter from the weak side), or he would enter the ball to Malone in the post, and the power forward would make a quick scoring move—typically a quick turnaround/fall away jumper, with or without a dribble.
Now if the Jazz had played at a faster pace, the team would have featured more possessions, and there may have been more possessions where Stockton and/or Malone touched the ball, but they would not have milked the possessions in that programmatic manner that led to so many points and assists. The net effect would have been neutral or possibly even a decline in Stockton’s and Malone’s numbers at that faster pace. Similarly, when the Lakers’ pace slowed, they featured fewer possessions, but Magic controlled the possessions to a higher extent (often through the post) as Los Angeles became a more programmatic and less spontaneous team.
One casual case study that I enjoy citing is these two Phoenix Suns box scores from the early 1990s. In the first one, from November 10, 1990, the Suns scored a record 107 points in the first half against Paul Westhead’s run-and-gun Nuggets and finished with 173 points, winning 173-143. Kevin Johnson recorded 23 points and 17 assists while the Suns passed for 50 assists total, including a career-high 13 for Dan Majerle, starting in Phoenix’s back-court alongside Johnson.
http://www.basketball-reference.com/boxscores/199011100PHO.html
In the second, from February 26, 1992, the Suns faced the Cleveland Cavaliers, a methodical Eastern Conference powerhouse with an enormous front-line and one of the slower Pace Factors in the league. The Suns won 103-100 and passed for 25 assists, only half as many as in the first game. But Kevin Johnson again recorded exactly 23 points and 17 assists, for after all, when the pace slowed, the guy who excelled at breaking down a set defense would—by default—need to exert greater control over the offensive possessions.
http://www.basketball-reference.com/boxscores/199202260PHO.html
Granted, K.J. played nine more minutes in the second game, but playing more minutes also tends to require players to pace themselves more rather than going full-bore as often.
And as I noted in the previous post, Steve Nash’s assists averages did not decline over his final two seasons in Phoenix, when the Suns had lost their most explosive scorers and their pace thus slowed mildly. For now, with fewer fast breaks and less speed, Phoenix possessed no choice except to place the ball in Nash’s hands in half-court pick-and-rolls to an even greater extent than before.
Those last 2.6 assists—for Westbrook to reach an average of 13.0—constitute an awfully large climb. Chris Paul, Steve Nash, Jason Kidd, and Kevin Johnson never averaged 13.0 assists in a season (the only one who even reached 12.0 assists was K.J., and Kidd never averaged 11.0 assists). Do you believe that Westbrook is a better passer, or as good of a passer, as those guys? I believe that Westbrook is a much worse passer and playmaker than those point guards. For his career, he has barely recorded twice as many assists as turnovers, and although he improved this past season, his turnover rate remains very high. He lacks the “cracks and corners” ability of those other guards, meaning the ability to make exceptional reads and find teammates at tight angles and in “cracks and corners,” which Kenny Smith talked about nearly a decade ago.
Smith battled many times against John Stockton, Mark Price and Kevin Johnson, three All-Star guards who played on winning teams and were very adept at both shooting and passing but never received serious MVP consideration.
I asked Smith what similarities and differences he sees when comparing those three players with Nash. Smith replied:
"I think that the one similarity that they share is the ability to find people, as I would say, in cracks and corners.”
http://20secondtimeout.blogspot.com/2007/03/kenny-smith-dvd-extras.html
Westbrook, to me, is a passer more along the lines of Allen Iverson, Stephon Marbury, Raymond Felton, Tony Parker, Mike Bibby, Chauncey Billups,and Sam Cassell. His assists average has increased significantly over the last two years and surpassed ten per game this past season, but that figure may represent Westbrook’s peak. He is fortunate to enjoy contemporary court spacing, or his assists-to-turnover ratio would probably be even worse, and his assists cannot be divorced from his scoring aggression. If Westbrook were to consistently adjust his focus and became more of a nuanced setup guard, as you are suggesting, he would probably lose as many assists as he would gain. What you are asking for, bw, is for Westbrook to walk a very fine line, to constitute an aggressive and explosive scorer while at the same time looking to feed teammates and display great court awareness and a sensitive radar. Personally, I do not believe that he is consistently capable of that nuanced combination. Tiny Archibald? Yes. Kevin Johnson? Yes. Chris Paul (although he is not as explosive)? Yes. Russell Westbrook? No.
In the end, the matter comes down to intelligence. Westbrook, in my view, is not a smart player. I am not suggesting that he is a stupid player, either, but his basketball intelligence is about the same as hoards of other guards across the league. He also oscillates between indecisiveness and over-aggressiveness, struggling to find a middle ground. What separates him is not his mind or even his skill level, but his combination of athleticism and competitiveness.
Game Five against San Antonio represented a perfect example. Westbrook committed a high number of turnovers (8) and only posted one more assist than he recorded turnovers. Meanwhile, some of his trigger-happy, discretion-be-damned shots made me cringe, as he could have been more patient and worked to create better shots for himself or a teammate. But he never stopped competing, and with his athleticism, he also delivered a host of great plays and led the Thunder to victory.
Westbrook represents a cliffhanger or a roll of the dice at point guard—thrilling and perilous in the same package. Again, I am not sure that a team can win a championship that way. As Charles Barkley stated at halftime of the game, he would have loved to have played with Westbrook, but the guard goes one hundred miles an hour all the time, and there are times when you are driving in city streets, not the Autobahn (Barkley's words). But the Thunder is one win away from achieving a major upset.
Curiously, for the second straight home game, San Antonio failed to execute in an optimal manner in pivotal situations. I have discussed the Spurs’ failures on the final possession of Game Two, and at the end of Game Five, the Spurs kept resorting to Tony Parker in the pick-and-roll down the stretch. Historically, this option has been a great one for San Antonio, but Parker does not generally play as prominent of a role as he did two or three years ago. Approaching the game’s final three minutes, Parker was 3-8 from the field and had not attempted a free throw. He was not in an offensive rhythm, yet the ball was repeatedly in his hands as the Spurs’ primary option. The result was that he missed a three-pointer, made a sixteen-foot jumper, missed a nineteen-footer, bricked the second of two free throws (after nearly missing the first), and missed a twenty-footer. On the last of those shots, Parker was being guarded by Kevin Durant on a transition cross-match, while Kawhi Leonard was being defended by the smaller Russell Westbrook. Instead of going to Leonard against Westbrook or just taking Durant himself, Parker seemed to hesitate and then used a Tim Duncan ball-screen to shoot the twenty-footer, but again, he was not in a rhythm. And although LaMarcus Aldridge shot just 6-21 from the field, Leonard was 12-20 from the field at that time. In a situation where Parker was struggling and not in a rhythm, I did not understand why the Spurs kept going to him in isolated pick-and-rolls when they now enjoy so many other options.
I will be curious to see if the Spurs lose three games in a row. Given their record, that should not happen, but Oklahoma City famously won four in a row versus San Antonio in the Western Conference Finals four years ago. This Spurs’ team should be better than that one, and this Thunder club seems worse than the version of four years ago, but San Antonio is going to need to sharpen its play and its fourth-quarter execution to avoid elimination.
