Suns remaining committed to the rebuild

[GMATCallahan]

Another example would be Ring of Honor member Tom Chambers, who still holds the Suns' all-time records for highest seasonal scoring average (27.2 in '89-'90) and most points scored in a game (60, also from that season, about a month after scoring 56 in a game). For the majority of Chambers' first season in Phoenix, '88-'89, he matched up at small forward, with Armon Gilliam at power forward. Then, seeking more defense and better balance, head coach Cotton Fitzsimmons shifted Gilliam to the bench and inserted the athletic Tyrone Corbin at small forward, with Chambers becoming the Suns' starting power forward. Sometimes, in offensive-oriented lineups with Gilliam off the bench, Chambers would play center, occasionally guarding Kareem Abdul-Jabbar in the 1989 Western Conference Finals, as you can see at one point in the fourth quarter of this highlight video from Game Four:

Watch on YouTube

But then, later in the quarter, Chambers is still ostensibly the center in a small lineup with Corbin and Eddie Johnson at forward, only Corbin is covering Laker center Mychal Thompson and Chambers is on James Worthy, whom he had often matched up with at small forward. Versatility creates a plethora of options.

After Phoenix exposed Corbin in the 1989 expansion draft (a decision that the Suns quickly came to rue after Minnesota selected him), the Suns eventually traded Gilliam to Charlotte for another defensive-minded (albeit far less athletic) forward, Kurt Rambis. With Rambis and Chambers starting together for the majority of the '89-'90 season, Chambers again became Phoenix's starting small forward (even though he was at least two inches taller than Rambis). However, when the Suns went to their bench and inserted Eddie Johnson or Dan Majerle at small forward, Chambers would often serve as Phoenix's power forward. Sometimes, in smaller, more offensive-oriented lineups consisting of multiple reserves, Chambers would become the Suns' center. His versatility and unusual combination of attributes (a legitimate 6'10" player with speed and leaping ability in the open court and easy twenty-foot shooting range) meant that Chambers could match up at all three front-court spots, especially in an era where small forwards often constituted tall post-up players such as Worthy on the rival Lakers.

The following season, after Phoenix dealt Eddie Johnson to Seattle for Xavier McDaniel, Chambers again matched up as the Suns' starting power forward. Then, prior to the '91-'92 campaign, Phoenix dealt McDaniel to New York. By late November, 1988 lottery pick Tim Perry was starting alongside the thirty-two-year old Chambers at forward. But who was the small forward and who was the power forward? The agile, twenty-six-year old Perry was certainly more athletic than Chambers by that point, and he could occasionally stick an eighteen-foot jumper, but Chambers definitely provided more floor spacing and perimeter shooting with his ability to bury twenty-footers and even threes, as he shot an above-average .367 from beyond the arc in 0.7 attempts per game that season. Yet Chambers was also taller than Perry by a couple of inches (Perry's listed height was 6'9", but he was probably 6'8") and less capable of defending quick small forwards, especially by that point in his career. When the Suns played at Chicago on January 21, 1992, Perry defended the Bulls' Scottie Pippen, while Chambers took Horace Grant. (I have viewed this game twice since 2009.) Certainly, at that point in his career, there was little way that Chambers could defend Pippen. On the other hand, Perry was also much more of a shot blocker than Chambers and he could defend the rim and the post, too, so there were probably other games where Perry defended the opposing power forward—often times, Perry probably just defended the opponents' best offensive forward, regardless of whether he was a small forward or a power forward. So who, again, was the Suns small forward and who was their power forward that year? The only clarity came very late in the regular season and in the postseason when Fitzsimmons moved Chambers to the bench and inserted a twenty-two-year old, second-year Cedric Ceballos into the Suns' staring lineup. At that point, Ceballos constituted Phoenix's starting small forward, Perry was the Suns' starting power forward, and Chambers came off the bench either as a power forward or a center in almost all situations.

In '92-'93, Chambers came off the bench for every game except one, serving as the Suns' power forward in place of the newly acquired Charles Barkley or as their center in offensive-oriented, floor-spacing lineups alongside Barkley. But in his one start that year, Game Seven of the 1993 Western Conference Finals, Chambers started at small forward to match up with Seattle's 6'9" Derrick McKey, who could easily post up Phoenix's Richard Dumas (even if Dumas was a long 6'7"). Chambers' height rendered McKey, a former teammate with the Sonics, less effective (6 points on 3-7 FG for the game) as the Suns won.

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After that season, Phoenix declined Chambers' option and replaced him by inking younger free agent A.C. Green, formerly of the Lakers. Green had won two championships as Los Angeles' starting power forward, but as soon as he arrived in Phoenix—with Dumas suspended due to a drug relapse and Ceballos out with a broken foot—Green became the Suns' starting small forward alongside Barkley for the first two months of the '93-'94 season. In time, he would either continue to start at small forward alongside Barkley, come off the bench to play power forward in place of Barkley, come off the bench at small forward alongside Barkley, or come off the bench as a small center alongside Barkley in more offensive-oriented, floor-spacing lineups (although at 6'8" in terms of actual height, as opposed to his listed 6'9", the Suns were very small with Green at center). When playing with Barkley, Green's offensive role fell more into the conventions of a small forward or what we would now call a "stretch" center, someone who spaced the floor for catch-and-shoot outside jumpers or cut to the basket, down the middle or from the weak side, while Barkley posted up on the block. But defensively, his versatility gave the Suns more options. For instance, for the final two games of the 1994 Western Conference Semifinals versus Houston, Phoenix head coach Paul Westphal returned Green to the Suns' starting lineup in place of Ceballos at small forward. But in addition to wanting to create more floor spacing, Westphal inserted Green so that he could defend Houston's power forward, Otis Thorpe, who had been devouring Barkley in the post. Green could now shoulder the hard work of banging around with Thorpe, while Barkley defended Robert Horry, who tended to float around the perimeter and thus constituted an easier assignment. (However, Barkley's defensive inattentiveness and lethargy helped Horry bury some open threes early in Game Seven, creating what may well have made the difference in the outcome.) On the other hand, Green also possessed enough quickness and energy to defend an athletic, perimeter-oriented small forward such as Horry, as he had often done earlier in the series. Once again, versatility transcends positional designations.

When the Suns inked Manning as a free agent in the summer of 1994 (while re-signing Green, who has exercised an opt-out clause in his contract), they basically received an upgraded version of Green's flexibility, as Manning was more of a natural small forward than Green, skills-wise, while also possessing a little more height and more shot-blocking ability, better enabling him to serve as a a small center. Prior to the '94-'95 season, the Suns also signed wide-bodied free agent Wayman Tisdale, who at 6'7" in actual height (and his earlier listed NBA height, before he somehow became listed at 6'9") would match up at power forward in place of Barkley or would serve as a small, floor-spacing, offensive-oriented center alongside Barkley. Earlier in his career, with Indiana, Tisdale had often played small forward.

Moreover, when players are interchangeable defensively and versatile offensively, positional designations become especially irrelevant. I wrote earlier about Manning and Clifford Robinson on the '97-'98 Suns, and as I noted in another post, Phoenix featured five big men on that team who were all good—and largely interchangeable—defensively. (The others were Antonio McDyess, Mark Bryant, and John "Hot Rod" Williams.) They could all defend the post, they could all defend the pick-and-roll, they could all defend multiple positions, and they were all within two inches of each other, height-wise. For the most part, the positional distinctions proved trivial.

Really, positions in basketball are contrivances. What counts is whether players can function together and what kinds of players they can guard. We know about the Warriors' "death lineup," but people forget that the Chicago Bulls featured something similar during their second three-peat in the 1990s, when they would utilize a front-court of Scottie Pippen, Toni Kukoc, and Dennis Rodman. Although he was only about 6'6" in actual height, Rodman would guard the opposing center in those instances due to his strength and savvy. As I indicated earlier, the Suns had tried something similar in '93-'94 with a lineup of Kevin Johnson, Danny Ainge, Dan Majerle, Charles Barkley, and A.C. Green. The problem was that they had to deal with Hakeem Olajuwon, someone whom Chicago never needed to face in the playoffs. During their first three-peat in the early nineties, the Bulls went 1-5 versus the Rockets, losing by double digits four times. In the middle of the '92-'93 season, Michael Jordan privately told Eddie Sefko of the Houston Chronicle that he was glad that that the Rockets would not reach the NBA Finals. When Sefko asked him why, Jordan said that the Bulls possessed no answers for "that monster." Of course, Houston would make the NBA Finals in 1994 and 1995, but in those years, Jordan was either playing minor league baseball or just coming off his baseball sabbatical and failing to win the East.

[Dirk]

Another example

GMATCallahan, incredible posts. They are fun to read and a breath of fresh air.

[Frank Lee]

Let the smoke clear and rename this thread..... SUNS Continue REBUILD, No other Choice.

Let's face it, McDuh has painted himself into a corner with his accumulation of marginally talented Vets and long term hopefuls guided by a shrink coach who is feelgooding his way to unwatchable basketball. May be McDuh can deal his way out of this quagmire, but it is unlikely. If he has something up his sleeve, he'd better throw it out now. Sad thing is it needs to have a lit fuse for any real impact. I get the feeling he is far too stubborn to do that.

Even with two extra picks, this is the shabbiest collection of misfits and assets to date. Aside from Booker and Warren essentially no one has much value and you'd almost certainly have to attach a pick to them to get anyone positive back. I suppose the real benefit with some of these proposed trades is the ol addition/subtraction game.

McDuh has let too much talent leave this team, without replacing it. His dismal record with free agency does not off set the exodus of bonafide talent...starting talent in some cases. Y'all can backslap getting future picks, but they have no effect now or even in the near future. His wheel spinning learning curve has planted us fender high in a muddy ditch. It's time to acknowledge his reactionary dealings has crippled this team. Yes, crippled. We are supposed to be OK with the future of this franchise depending on lotto ball luck, two teens, and Booker?... because there really isn't much else.... one step forward,two back. It's going to be harder to rebuild the fan base than it is the team.

[DirtyDez]

Thanks GMAT - always wondered by the Suns got wrecked in 89' yet pummeled them the next year.