Tiny ball

[GMATCallahan]

... amazing how small the Suns were willing to go in the last game (at Denver), featuring lineups in the second quarter and for awhile in the fourth with no player taller than 6'7" (maximum) in actual height, with T.J. Warren, Jared Dudley, or P.J. Tucker—mid-sized natural small forwards—guarding the opposing center. Phoenix received good results from that lineup in the second quarter, but not as much in the fourth, even after bringing Tyson Chandler back in to anchor a small lineup.

I am not saying that such a lineup is good or bad—you obviously cannot feature it for an entire game, but it can be advantageous in certain situations, sort of like Golden State's "death lineup" last season, minus the same degree of talent or a player as versatile as Draymond Green. But just the fact that a team is willing and able to go with that small a lineup in stretches speaks to the nature of today's NBA, for better or worse. Down the stretch of the '96-'97 season, when Phoenix went 20-6 to finish the year and nearly upset defending conference champion Seattle in the First Round, head coach Danny Ainge frequently played four guards (Kevin Johnson, Jason Kidd, Rex Chapman, Wesley Person) simultaneously, or three of those guards plus 6'6" small forward Cedric Ceballos, in addition to either 6'10" John "Hot Rod" Williams or 6'9" Danny Manning as the center. Writer Tom Friend, in the New York Times, flippantly or presciently stated that Ainge had designed "the offense of the 21st century."

http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/01/sports/sonics-sputtering-again-in-round-1.html

But those lineups always featured someone, in Williams or Manning, who could naturally function as a true big man—even if Williams had often guarded power forwards and sometimes small forwards in Cleveland, and even if Manning could function as a small forward as much as a center and would generally match up at small forward the next year for Phoenix. Williams and Manning could battle Shawn Kemp or Sam Perkins in the post, block a shot, plug the lane, protect the rim, corral a carom, and set strong ball screens and down screens on offense. If you switched your defensive coverage on the pick-and-roll and tried to guard Manning with a small guy in the post, you were toast. The equivalent to what Earl Watson is sometimes trotting out, conversely, would have been to use Ceballos at center—a lineup of, say, Kevin Johnson, Jason Kidd, Rex Chapman, Wesley Person, and Cedric Ceballos. That small of a lineup could not have worked in those days.

Again, I am not saying whether this kind of lineup is good or bad—the matter depends on the situation and the performance. But one way or the other, it is remarkable and a sign of how the NBA has changed.

[GMATCallahan]

Down the stretch of the '96-'97 season, when Phoenix went 20-6 to finish the year and nearly upset defending conference champion Seattle in the First Round, head coach Danny Ainge frequently played four guards (Kevin Johnson, Jason Kidd, Rex Chapman, Wesley Person) simultaneously, or three of those guards plus 6'6" small forward Cedric Ceballos, in addition to either 6'10" John "Hot Rod" Williams or 6'9" Danny Manning as the center. Writer Tom Friend, in the New York Times, flippantly or presciently stated that Ainge had designed "the offense of the 21st century."

http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/01/sports/sonics-sputtering-again-in-round-1.html

But those lineups did always feature someone, in Williams or Manning, who could naturally function as a true big man—even if Williams had often guarded power forwards and sometimes small forwards in Cleveland, and even if Manning could function as a small forward as much as a center and would generally match up at small forward the next year for Phoenix. Williams and Manning could battle Shawn Kemp or Sam Perkins in the post, block a shot, plug the lane, protect the rim, corral a carom, and set strong ball screens and down screens on offense. If you switched your defensive coverage on the pick-and-roll and tried to guard Manning with a small guy in the post, you were toast. The equivalent to what Earl Watson is sometimes trotting out, conversely, would have been to use Ceballos at center—a lineup of, say, Kevin Johnson, Jason Kidd, Rex Chapman, Wesley Person, and Cedric Ceballos. That small of a lineup could not have worked in those days.

Again, I am not saying whether this kind of lineup is good or bad—the matter depends on the situation and the performance. But one way or the other, it is remarkable and a sign of how the NBA has changed.

Indeed, in the second half of that season, there were two games where Williams did not play and three where Manning did not play. In those five games, Phoenix went 2-3; with both Williams and Manning in the second half, the Suns went 21-8. Of the three losses in the second half where Williams or Manning did not play, Phoenix's defense just could not hold up, with the Suns allowing an average of 119.7 points, yielding at least a .514 field goal percentage each time, and losing the three contests despite Johnson averaging 28.3 points, 10.3 assists, just 3.0 turnovers, a 3.44:1.00 assists-to-turnover ratio, a .604 field goal percentage (29-48, 16.0 FGA), a .563 three-point field goal percentage (9-16, 5.3 FGA), and a .900 free throw percentage (18-20, 6.7 FTA) in those games. The first two losses came on the road against a good Portland playoff club that would win 49 games and at home to a Utah team that would win 64 games, earn the top seed in the West, rank second in the NBA in Offensive Rating (points scored per possession), and reach the NBA Finals for the first of two successive seasons. But the last loss was an otherwise inexplicable debacle at home in the regular season finale against the second-year Vancouver Grizzlies when the Suns had a chance to finish at .500 after a 0-13 start (where Williams missed the first 12 games and Johnson missed the first 11; the Suns went 0-14 without Williams that season).

http://www.databasebasketball.com/teams/boxscore.htm?yr=1996&b=19970211&tm=POR

http://www.databasebasketball.com/teams/boxscore.htm?yr=1996&b=19970415&tm=PHO

http://www.databasebasketball.com/teams/boxscore.htm?yr=1996&b=19970419&tm=PHO

In the last two of those games, at home, Phoenix allowed over 120 points on better than .575 field goal shooting both times, without Williams in the first contest and Manning in the second.

So even when going extremely small for that era, the Suns basically needed Williams or Manning on the court for every competitive situation.

[OGBAH]

Nice work! I like the small ball

[GMATCallahan]

Nice work! I like the small ball

Curiously, the Suns never went to that lineup tonight—against the same opponent—and they still allowed 123 points and lost by double digits ...