Suns History

[Qwigglez]

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[Jarlaxle0204]

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This is incredibly depressing. Breaks my heart watching that.

We could have (should have) won it all.

[TheBobster]

1979 was the Suns best chance. They were up 3-2 in the Western Conference Finals, playing at home, and the winner of the Sun-Sonics series was going to play a hobbled Bullets team. Just about everybody felt the winner of the WCF would win the title (and the Sonic did, having no problem with Washington). All this with Alvan Adams out for three games in the middle of the series and Joel Kramer filling in for him.

The ended up losing game 6 at home 106-105 and then lost a close one on the road 114-110. They win either of those games and they're the favorites in the Finals.

[bwgood77]

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[GMATCallahan]

NBC featured some classic introductions for the Phoenix-Seattle games in the 1993 Western Conference Finals, so I thought that I would post them on the twenty-fifth anniversary of each relevant game. (TNT broadcast the series' first three contests.)

Here is the introduction for Game Four, held twenty-five years ago today on May 30, 1993.

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[GMATCallahan]

Here is the NBC introduction to Game Five of the 1993 Western Conference Finals, Seattle at Phoenix, twenty-five years ago this evening on June 1, 1993:

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[DirtyDez]

RIP Dick Enberg
RIP SuperSonics
RIP NBA on NBC

[GMATCallahan]

RIP Dick Enberg
RIP SuperSonics
RIP NBA on NBC

... also, Steve "Snapper" Jones, who was working these games as the NBC sideline reporter and then replaced Magic Johnson as the color commentator alongside Enberg in Game Seven when the Laker legend was attending a wedding.

[GMATCallahan]

Here is the NBC introduction to Game Six of the 1993 Western Conference Finals, Phoenix at Seattle, twenty-five years ago this evening on June 3, 1993:

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[GMATCallahan]

The NBC introduction to Game Seven of the 1993 Western Conference Finals is not currently available on Youtube, but one can see the introduction of the Suns' starting lineup here, from June 5, 1993:

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[GMATCallahan]

The NBC introduction to Game Seven of the 1993 Western Conference Finals is not currently available on Youtube, but one can see the introduction of the Suns' starting lineup here, from June 5, 1993:

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Something that just occurred to me is that none of Phoenix's five starters in that game played collegiately at a traditional basketball powerhouse, although Barkley and K.J. played in major conferences.

[GMATCallahan]

Here is the NBC introduction to Game One of the 1993 NBA Finals, Chicago at Phoenix, from the evening of June 9, 1993:

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You can see how excited the Suns happen to be when they are about to run onto the court for the first time. Years later, Barkley and K.J. would both say that the team was totally overwhelmed by the Finals stage in Game One (only Danny Ainge possessed previous Finals experience), and it showed, especially in how the two of them played. Barkley scored 21 points—on 9-25 field goal shooting. K.J. scored 11 points on 4-13 field goal shooting (although three of his misses were driving layup attempts that teammates immediately slammed back in—two by Richard Dumas, one by Mark West), with 2 assists against 5 turnovers. Worse, the Suns allowed B.J. Armstrong to pressure K.J. all the way up the court—before the Bulls then applied relentless and clinical traps on the pick-and-roll. (With far less three-point shooting and floor spacing in those days, teams outside of Seattle rarely switched on the pick-and-roll .)

But above all, those Finals would constitute a spectacle, both around the nation (where they established a new NBA Finals record for television ratings, to be matched or surpassed only once, five years later in 1998) and locally.

http://www.sports360az.com/2018/06/the-way-we-were/

[DirtyDez]

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[GMATCallahan]

Here is the NBC introduction to Game One of the 1993 NBA Finals, Chicago at Phoenix, from the evening of June 9, 1993:

Watch on YouTube

You can see how excited the Suns happen to be when they are about to run onto the court for the first time. Years later, Barkley and K.J. would both say that the team was totally overwhelmed by the Finals stage in Game One (only Danny Ainge possessed previous Finals experience), and it showed, especially in how the two of them played. Barkley scored 21 points—on 9-25 field goal shooting. K.J. scored 11 points on 4-13 field goal shooting (although three of his misses were driving layup attempts that teammates immediately slammed back in—two by Richard Dumas, one by Mark West), with 2 assists against 5 turnovers. Worse, the Suns allowed B.J. Armstrong to pressure K.J. all the way up the court—before the Bulls then applied relentless and clinical traps on the pick-and-roll. (With far less three-point shooting and floor spacing in those days, teams outside of Seattle rarely switched on the pick-and-roll .)

But above all, those Finals would constitute a spectacle, both around the nation (where they established a new NBA Finals record for television ratings, to be matched or surpassed only once, five years later in 1998) and locally.

http://www.sports360az.com/2018/06/the-way-we-were/

Here was one of those dunks (K.J.'s attempt here was actually a runner or floater rather than a layup):

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[GMATCallahan]

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I was recently reviewing the statistics for the 2005 Western Conference Finals, and I was amazed to notice that Nash only attempted 9 three-point field goals over the course of the five games—an average of 1.8 per contest.

https://www.basketball-reference.com/playoffs/2005-nba-western-conference-finals-spurs-vs-suns.html

Historically speaking, an average of 1.8 three-point field goal attempts per game would still be significant, especially for a point guard, but it seems like a pittance these days. You can also see that the Suns' other three-point shooters were not averaging astronomical volumes of attempts by current standards—1.4 per game for Shawn Marion, 3.8 for Jimmy Jackson, 4.3 for Joe Johnson, 4.8 for Quentin Richardson. These averages partly stemmed from the nature of San Antonio's defense. I have not reviewed the games recently, but from what I recall—and from what the statistics indicate, as well as any knowledge of Gregg Popopvich's preferred defensive strategies—the Spurs were largely sticking to the the Suns' off-ball three-point shooters (Marion, Jackson, Johnson, Richardson) in the half court, going over Stoudemire's picks, and forcing Nash or Stoudemire to score inside the arc in two-on-one (or quasi-two-on-one) situations. Thus Nash and Stoudemire posted excellent numbers, but even though Phoenix shot a very high percentage on threes (.413, probably stemming from transition opportunities), the Spurs depressed the Suns' three-point volume and held Phoenix to 95 points or fewer twice. Indeed, San Antonio actually attempted 32 more three-point field goals over the course of the series (107 to the Suns' 75) while shooting a nearly identical percentage (.411).

Of course, the greater reason for San Antonio's victory was its offense and the Suns' below-average defense. Regardless, the fact that Nash would drive inside the arc and pull up for jumpers from the right elbow-extended region, or from the right side of the top of the key—rather than forcing step-back threes likes so many of today's stars—made for a much better brand of basketball than what we saw in, say, this year's Western Conference Finals between Golden State and Houston. Phoenix's offense—.496 field goal percentage, .413 three-point field goal percentage, .570 True Shooting Percentage, 104.0 points per game—was still good enough to win that series, but its defense and rebounding were not. The Nash-Stoudemire duo might have constituted one of the greatest point guard-center offensive pairings in NBA history (at least within the context of Mike D'Antoni's spread-floor offense), but can anyone think of a significant star tandem at those 'positions' that proved worse defensively? Say what one will about Stoudemire not constituting a true center, but he was taller than Ben Wallace and Oliver Miller (both of whom were 6'7" in actual height) and the same height as Mark West and Bill Russell.

Then again, that San Antonio team proved terrific, and Tim Duncan and Tony Parker constituted tough covers for anyone. Still, the Suns' defense made matters a little too easy. Several years ago (circa 2011, perhaps), I was reviewing part of Game One of the series, and when the Suns tried to play Stoudemire and Steven Hunter together for added defense and rim protection, their offense just did not seem to function in the same manner amid the reduced floor spacing. If my perspective (which I would bet Mike D'Antoni shared, hence the nature of his usual lineups) was correct, does that mean that Nash was overrated historically—in the sense that he needed so much space to be so great offensively? Or does it mean that Phoenix's system could not work optimally without a big man who excelled defensively and on the glass? Or does it mean that D'Antoni did not give his players enough of an opportunity to learn how to function offensively with two true big men on the court simultaneously? Or is the latter question moot because such an opportunity would have never led to optimal offensive functionality, in the same way that the contemporary Houston Rockets were unlikely to dominate offensively had they played Clint Capela and Nenê simultaneously, as most teams would have done years ago?

Regardless, those vintage D'Antoni-Nash-Stoudemire teams sure were fun to watch offensively, in part because they used the three-pointer as a weapon and a threat rather than as a crutch (in contrast to the Rockets and Warriors in the 2018 Western Conference Finals, and so many current clubs). But those Phoenix squads also made the Spurs fun to watch—in contrast to San Antonio's general reputation in those days.

[DirtyDez]

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I was recently reviewing the statistics for the 2005 Western Conference Finals, and I was amazed to notice that Nash only attempted 9 three-point field goals over the course of the five games—an average of 1.8 per contest.

https://www.basketball-reference.com/playoffs/2005-nba-western-conference-finals-spurs-vs-suns.html

Historically speaking, an average of 1.8 three-point field goal attempts per game would still be significant, especially for a point guard, but it seems like a pittance these days. You can also see that the Suns' other three-point shooters were not averaging astronomical volumes of attempts by current standards—1.4 per game for Shawn Marion, 3.8 for Jimmy Jackson, 4.3 for Joe Johnson, 4.8 for Quentin Richardson. These averages partly stemmed from the nature of San Antonio's defense. I have not reviewed the games recently, but from what I recall—and from what the statistics indicate, as well as any knowledge of Gregg Popopvich's preferred defensive strategies—the Spurs were largely sticking to the the Suns' off-ball three-point shooters (Marion, Jackson, Johnson, Richardson) in the half court, going over Stoudemire's picks, and forcing Nash or Stoudemire to score inside the arc in two-on-one (or quasi-two-on-one) situations. Thus Nash and Stoudemire posted excellent numbers, but even though Phoenix shot a very high percentage on threes (.413, probably stemming from transition opportunities), the Spurs depressed the Suns' three-point volume and held Phoenix to 95 points or fewer twice. Indeed, San Antonio actually attempted 32 more three-point field goals over the course of the series (107 to the Suns' 75) while shooting a nearly identical percentage (.411).

Of course, the greater reason for San Antonio's victory was its offense and the Suns' below-average defense. Regardless, the fact that Nash would drive inside the arc and pull up for jumpers from the right elbow-extended region, or from the right side of the top of the key—rather than forcing step-back threes likes so many of today's stars—made for a much better brand of basketball than what we saw in, say, this year's Western Conference Finals between Golden State and Houston. Phoenix's offense—.496 field goal percentage, .413 three-point field goal percentage, .570 True Shooting Percentage, 104.0 points per game—was still good enough to win that series, but its defense and rebounding were not. The Nash-Stoudemire duo might have constituted one of the greatest point guard-center offensive pairings in NBA history (at least within the context of Mike D'Antoni's spread-floor offense), but can anyone think of a significant star tandem at those 'positions' that proved worse defensively? Say what one will about Stoudemire not constituting a true center, but he was taller than Ben Wallace and Oliver Miller (both of whom were 6'7" in actual height) and the same height as Mark West and Bill Russell.

Then again, that San Antonio team proved terrific, and Tim Duncan and Tony Parker constituted tough covers for anyone. Still, the Suns' defense made matters a little too easy. Several years ago (circa 2011, perhaps), I was reviewing part of Game One of the series, and when the Suns tried to play Stoudemire and Steven Hunter together for added defense and rim protection, their offense just did not seem to function in the same manner amid the reduced floor spacing. If my perspective (which I would bet Mike D'Antoni shared, hence the nature of his usual lineups) was correct, does that mean that Nash was overrated historically (in the sense that he needed so much space to be so great offensively)? Or does it mean that Phoenix's system could not work optimally without a big man who excelled defensively and on the glass? Or does it mean that D'Antoni did not give his players enough of an opportunity to learn how to function offensively with two true big men on the court simultaneously? Or is the latter question moot because such an opportunity would have never led to optimal offensive functionality, in the same way that the contemporary Houston Rockets were unlikely to dominate offensively had they played Clint Capela and Nene simultaneously, as most teams would have done years ago?

Regardless, those vintage D'Antoni-Nash-Stoudemire teams sure were fun to watch offensively, in part because they used the three-pointer as a weapon and a threat rather than as a crutch (in contrast to the Rockets and Warriors in the 2018 Western Conference Finals and so many current clubs). But those Phoenix clubs also made the Spurs fun to watch—in contrast to San Antonio's general reputation in those days.

The Suns lost that series in games 1-2. Joe was still out and the starters were drained late in both games. The Suns had 4th qtr leads in both but couldn’t close. Game 1 was Marion’s infamous 3 point performance in 38 minutes. Not sure if he was battling injury but the Spurs really took him out of the series.

It would’ve been a different series with Joe’s defense and ability to play some point. There was no way Nash, Barbosa and Jimmy Jackson were stopping their backcourt. Joe was having a lights out playoff run averaging 19/4/3 with a .606 TS%...

And then...

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[GMATCallahan]

The Suns lost that series in games 1-2. Joe was still out and the starters were drained late in both games. The Suns had 4th qtr leads in both but couldn’t close. Game 1 was Marion’s infamous 3 point performance in 38 minutes. Not sure if he was battling injury but the Spurs really took him out of the series.

It would’ve been a different series with Joe’s defense and ability to play some point. There was no way Nash, Barbosa and Jimmy Jackson were stopping their backcourt. Joe was having a lights out playoff run averaging 19/4/3 with a .606 TS%...

And then...

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The depth that Johnson would have provided may have made the difference. Would he have made a fundamental difference defensively? I am not sure, especially since slowing Parker and Ginobili demanded better defense on the pick-and-roll, which ultimately implicated Stoudemire and other front-court members at least as much as the guards. Of course, the Suns only went 1-2 in the series once Johnson returned, including another home loss in Game Five.

The greater disappointment is that Phoenix only ended up featuring him, Nash, Marion, and Stoudemire for that one playoff run—and actually only featured Nash, Marion, and Stoudemire for two playoff runs. Fluky injuries and (in the last couple of decades) suspensions occur regularly enough in the postseason, which means that a franchise needs to be patient in order to create a worthwhile sample size. Then again, to sustain a larger sample size, individual players also need to be willing to make sacrifices in terms of money and/or ego. Johnson and Marion were ultimately unwilling to do so, in part because of management's miscalculations and insensitivities (not real-world insensitivities, but insensititivies relative to multimillionaires with constantly-stoked and bloated egos).

[DirtyDez]

The Suns lost that series in games 1-2. Joe was still out and the starters were drained late in both games. The Suns had 4th qtr leads in both but couldn’t close. Game 1 was Marion’s infamous 3 point performance in 38 minutes. Not sure if he was battling injury but the Spurs really took him out of the series.

It would’ve been a different series with Joe’s defense and ability to play some point. There was no way Nash, Barbosa and Jimmy Jackson were stopping their backcourt. Joe was having a lights out playoff run averaging 19/4/3 with a .606 TS%...

And then...

Watch on YouTube

The depth that Johnson would have provided may have made the difference. Would he have made a fundamental difference defensively? I am not sure, especially since slowing Parker and Ginobili demanded better defense on the pick-and-roll, which ultimately implicated Stoudemire and other front-court members at least as much as the guards. Of course, the Suns only went 1-2 in the series once Johnson returned, including another home loss in Game Five.

The greater disappointment is that Phoenix only ended up featuring him, Nash, Marion, and Stoudemire for that one playoff run—and actually only featured Nash, Marion, and Stoudemire for two playoff runs. Fluky injuries and (in the last couple of decades) suspensions occur regularly enough in the postseason, which means that a franchise needs to be patient in order to create a worthwhile sample size. Then again, to sustain a larger sample size, individual players also need to be willing to make sacrifices in terms of money and/or ego. Johnson and Marion were ultimately unwilling to do so, in part because of management's miscalculations and insensitivities (not real-world insensitivities, but insensititivies relative to multimillionaires with constantly-stoked and bloated egos).

Yeah it wasn’t the disappointment of that year but what could have been. BC was a smart GM so I don’t think he was behind the JJ/Q summer debacle. Why you would turn around and give Q-Rich the contract you wouldn’t give JJ made no sense. Of course Joe was offended but they should’ve come out of that summer with a young wing; Iguodala or Deng. I get the Bulls pick was unprotected but you don’t give up a top-7 pick without getting something concrete.

Nash, Joe
Raja, LB
Joe, Iguodala/Deng
Marion/Amare
Amare/FA

Edit: KT cane from the Nate Robinson deal which came from the Deng deal so he wouldn’t have been here but without giving Q-Rich that deal you could afford a depth big better than Brian Grant or Pat Burke. And get a player instead of cash considerations for Sergio Rodriguez and Rudy Fernandez. Agh!

[GMATCallahan]

Game Three of the 1993 NBA Finals—one of the greatest games in NBA history, if not the greatest—occurred this evening twenty-five years ago on June 13, 1993. Here is the NBC introduction:

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One can see highlights from the first three games here, in this NBA Action video from 1993. Highlights from Game Three begin at 6:35:

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[gaspar]

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