Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I then cover the three highest players in Usage% (assuming the season has those numbers), the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's nothing fancy; it's literally just me feeding the player's regular season numbers into Stathead and looking for player-seasons in the recent past (the more recent the better) that are reasonably comparable. This is *not* intended to be anything other than fun. I find it to be a neat way to re-conceive what a roster truly was when translated out of the trappings of their laundry and era. The method suffers when translating man defense, as steals/blocks/defensive rating are very approximate estimates of a player's defensive contributions. When I say something like:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I then cover the three highest players in Usage% (assuming the season has those numbers), the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's nothing fancy; it's literally just me feeding the player's regular season numbers into Stathead and looking for player-seasons in the recent past (the more recent the better) that are reasonably comparable. This is *not* intended to be anything other than fun. I find it to be a neat way to re-conceive what a roster truly was when translated out of the trappings of their laundry and era. The method suffers when translating man defense, as steals/blocks/defensive rating are very approximate estimates of a player's defensive contributions. When I say something like:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#100. The 1991 Los Angeles Lakers
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +7.67, Standard Deviations: +1.47, Lost in Finals
Regular Season Record: 58-24, Regular Season SRS: +6.73 (52nd), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.2 (42nd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.9 (60th)
PG: Magic Johnson (31), +9.0 / +7.6
SG: Byron Scott (29), +0.9 / +1.0
SF: James Worthy (29), +2.5 / +0.2
PF: Sam Perkins (29), +0.9 / +3.8
C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3
6th: A.C. Green (27), +0.0 / -0.6
Usage%: James Worthy (24.6%), Magic Johnson (22.9%), Byron Scott (19.9%)
Scoring/100: James Worthy (28.3 / -0.3%), Magic Johnson (26.6 / +8.9%), Byron Scott (23.1 / +0%)
Assists/100: Magic Johnson (17.2), James Worthy (4.7), Byron Scott (3.4)
Heliocentrism: 44.8% (16th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 32.6% (63rd)
Depth: 22.6% (54th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +5.65 (49th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -1.58 (90th)
Playoff SRS: +8.25 (94th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.94 (83rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +4.28 (6th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.85 (54th)
Round 1: Houston Rockets (+3.3), won 3-0 by +5.7 points per game (+9.0 SRS eq)
Semis: Golden State Warriors (+3.7), won 4-1 by +6.6 points per game (+10.3 SRS eq)
WCF: Portland Trail Blazers (+8.3), won 4-2 by +3.2 points per game (+11.5 SRS eq)
Finals: Chicago Bulls (+11.7), lost 4-1 by -9.8 points per game (+1.9 SRS eq)
This was the last year of Magic’s prime, before his HIV diagnosis prematurely ended his career, and while we’re at it, this was James Worthy’s last decent year. After this year the Lakers would fall off the map until the acquisition of Shaquille O’Neal in the late 90s reinvigorated the franchise. But as with all of Magic’s teams by the mid-80s, it was an excellent offense (42nd regular season and 49th playoff is nothing to sneeze at on this list) combined with a good enough defense. Despite Magic being a crazy-efficient scorer he eschewed the role of primary scorer, preferring instead to be the best distributor in NBA history (unless you prefer Nash) and his offenses consistently performed well in the playoffs - his Lakers have three of my top 11 playoff offenses from this list.
The year prior the Pistons had won their second title, while the Lakers had been unceremoniously dumped by Phoenix in the conference semifinals. In the offseason the Lakers added Sam Perkins in free agency. Between that addition and Magic’s championship pedigree the Lakers were given the second highest odds of winning the championship that year, 2 in 11 (behind the Pistons). They went on to have an almost identical regular season, down to the excellent but not dominant regular season SRS.
In the first round the Lakers took the Rockets by a decent margin, despite James Worthy’s struggles (-5.5% shooting). In the second round they faced the Warriors and won in a track meet, posting a 120.7 offensive rating and winning by 6.6 points per game. The smaller Warriors were dominated on the glass, as Worthy, Perkins and Green combined for 7.6 offensive boards a game. And waiting for them in the Western Conference Finals were the one seed and defending Western Conference Champions, the Portland Trail Blazers. The Blazers crashed the boards relentlessly, generating an extra five shooting possessions a game as three of them posted Offensive Rebound percentages of 10% or higher. But the Blazers struggled to score on those possessions; Drexler, Kersey and Porter all shot within a few percent of league average. The Lakers’ starters, in contrast, all shot at 6% or better (except for Worthy at -5%). And that shooting advantage carried the day as the Lakers edged past them in six. Winning by 3.2 points a game may not seem like much, but against an 8 SRS team it’s a damned fine showing. And so the Lakers had won the West and advanced to the Finals to face the defending champion Detroit Pistons . . .
Wait, what? The Chicago Bulls had beaten the Pistons? Michael Jordan is in his first NBA Finals? Bah, it’s probably nothing. Jordan may have good individual numbers (I’ll give him that), but he isn’t a proven winner. For all of his box score stats, how much had his teams won? In contrast, Magic was a five-time NBA champion. On the world’s biggest stage, there are winners and then there are guys that only know how to stuff the stat sheet. And in game 1 Magic led the Lakers to victory with an extremely Magic triple-double: 19-10-11 on 5 FGA. Put this one in the books; never mess with Magic when it’s winning time.
Or not.
Of course, we all know what happened. Phil Jackson started having Pippen pick Magic up full court, Magic turned the ball over 4 times a game, Jordan averaged a 31/7/11 on +8% shooting (with 2.8 steals and 1.4 blocks) and the Lakers lost the rest of the series by a revolting 13.8 points per game. You know all that talk about Jordan not being a winner (which I didn’t make up)? I think it’s safe to say that Jordan took it personal. The Bulls *smoked* the Lakers. There’s no other way to say it. There were warning signs of course. The Bulls had the highest regular season SRS by several points (not that people knew what SRS was back then), Pippen and Grant had been getting increasingly good (providing Jordan with the supporting cast he lacked in the 80s) and the Bulls didn’t just beat the ‘91 Pistons, they swept them by 11.5 points per game.
There’s no shame in having lost to the Bulls. Once every blue moon you put together a strong team and then you run into a Top Ten All-Time team in the Finals; ask LeBron how that feels. So my sheet isn’t holding the loss against the Lakers. But it’s definitely punishing them for how badly they lost. Top 100 teams simply shouldn’t lose playoff series by 10 points per game. And so the Lakers sneak into this list at the very end. They were a pretty good team, but they happened to be on the tracks when the freight train labelled “90s Bulls” came barreling through.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
SG: 2016 J.R. Smith (slightly better passer, way fewer threes)
SF: 2018 Tobias Harris (better passer, worse rebounder)
PF: 2017 Myles Turner (smaller offensive footprint)
C: 2019 Steven Adams (slightly better scorer, way more turnovers)
6th: 2011 Greg Monroe (more turnovers, worse rebounder, worse passer)
On one hand, that’s not a bad top 6. Each of those can serve a valuable function; there aren’t any weak links. On the other hand . . . holy heck is that roster dependent on LeBron to generate the offense. But in this edition, LeBron doesn’t actually shoot that much (26.6 ppx instead of 34.9) but spends more time creating shots for his teammates. How confident would I feel about this roster? They’d certainly compete, but I’m not sold. It’s a really neat roster construction.
Regular Season Record: 58-24, Regular Season SRS: +6.73 (52nd), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +4.2 (42nd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.9 (60th)
PG: Magic Johnson (31), +9.0 / +7.6
SG: Byron Scott (29), +0.9 / +1.0
SF: James Worthy (29), +2.5 / +0.2
PF: Sam Perkins (29), +0.9 / +3.8
C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3
6th: A.C. Green (27), +0.0 / -0.6
Usage%: James Worthy (24.6%), Magic Johnson (22.9%), Byron Scott (19.9%)
Scoring/100: James Worthy (28.3 / -0.3%), Magic Johnson (26.6 / +8.9%), Byron Scott (23.1 / +0%)
Assists/100: Magic Johnson (17.2), James Worthy (4.7), Byron Scott (3.4)
Heliocentrism: 44.8% (16th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 32.6% (63rd)
Depth: 22.6% (54th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +5.65 (49th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -1.58 (90th)
Playoff SRS: +8.25 (94th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.94 (83rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +4.28 (6th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.85 (54th)
Round 1: Houston Rockets (+3.3), won 3-0 by +5.7 points per game (+9.0 SRS eq)
Semis: Golden State Warriors (+3.7), won 4-1 by +6.6 points per game (+10.3 SRS eq)
WCF: Portland Trail Blazers (+8.3), won 4-2 by +3.2 points per game (+11.5 SRS eq)
Finals: Chicago Bulls (+11.7), lost 4-1 by -9.8 points per game (+1.9 SRS eq)
This was the last year of Magic’s prime, before his HIV diagnosis prematurely ended his career, and while we’re at it, this was James Worthy’s last decent year. After this year the Lakers would fall off the map until the acquisition of Shaquille O’Neal in the late 90s reinvigorated the franchise. But as with all of Magic’s teams by the mid-80s, it was an excellent offense (42nd regular season and 49th playoff is nothing to sneeze at on this list) combined with a good enough defense. Despite Magic being a crazy-efficient scorer he eschewed the role of primary scorer, preferring instead to be the best distributor in NBA history (unless you prefer Nash) and his offenses consistently performed well in the playoffs - his Lakers have three of my top 11 playoff offenses from this list.
The year prior the Pistons had won their second title, while the Lakers had been unceremoniously dumped by Phoenix in the conference semifinals. In the offseason the Lakers added Sam Perkins in free agency. Between that addition and Magic’s championship pedigree the Lakers were given the second highest odds of winning the championship that year, 2 in 11 (behind the Pistons). They went on to have an almost identical regular season, down to the excellent but not dominant regular season SRS.
In the first round the Lakers took the Rockets by a decent margin, despite James Worthy’s struggles (-5.5% shooting). In the second round they faced the Warriors and won in a track meet, posting a 120.7 offensive rating and winning by 6.6 points per game. The smaller Warriors were dominated on the glass, as Worthy, Perkins and Green combined for 7.6 offensive boards a game. And waiting for them in the Western Conference Finals were the one seed and defending Western Conference Champions, the Portland Trail Blazers. The Blazers crashed the boards relentlessly, generating an extra five shooting possessions a game as three of them posted Offensive Rebound percentages of 10% or higher. But the Blazers struggled to score on those possessions; Drexler, Kersey and Porter all shot within a few percent of league average. The Lakers’ starters, in contrast, all shot at 6% or better (except for Worthy at -5%). And that shooting advantage carried the day as the Lakers edged past them in six. Winning by 3.2 points a game may not seem like much, but against an 8 SRS team it’s a damned fine showing. And so the Lakers had won the West and advanced to the Finals to face the defending champion Detroit Pistons . . .
Wait, what? The Chicago Bulls had beaten the Pistons? Michael Jordan is in his first NBA Finals? Bah, it’s probably nothing. Jordan may have good individual numbers (I’ll give him that), but he isn’t a proven winner. For all of his box score stats, how much had his teams won? In contrast, Magic was a five-time NBA champion. On the world’s biggest stage, there are winners and then there are guys that only know how to stuff the stat sheet. And in game 1 Magic led the Lakers to victory with an extremely Magic triple-double: 19-10-11 on 5 FGA. Put this one in the books; never mess with Magic when it’s winning time.
Or not.
Of course, we all know what happened. Phil Jackson started having Pippen pick Magic up full court, Magic turned the ball over 4 times a game, Jordan averaged a 31/7/11 on +8% shooting (with 2.8 steals and 1.4 blocks) and the Lakers lost the rest of the series by a revolting 13.8 points per game. You know all that talk about Jordan not being a winner (which I didn’t make up)? I think it’s safe to say that Jordan took it personal. The Bulls *smoked* the Lakers. There’s no other way to say it. There were warning signs of course. The Bulls had the highest regular season SRS by several points (not that people knew what SRS was back then), Pippen and Grant had been getting increasingly good (providing Jordan with the supporting cast he lacked in the 80s) and the Bulls didn’t just beat the ‘91 Pistons, they swept them by 11.5 points per game.
There’s no shame in having lost to the Bulls. Once every blue moon you put together a strong team and then you run into a Top Ten All-Time team in the Finals; ask LeBron how that feels. So my sheet isn’t holding the loss against the Lakers. But it’s definitely punishing them for how badly they lost. Top 100 teams simply shouldn’t lose playoff series by 10 points per game. And so the Lakers sneak into this list at the very end. They were a pretty good team, but they happened to be on the tracks when the freight train labelled “90s Bulls” came barreling through.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
SG: 2016 J.R. Smith (slightly better passer, way fewer threes)
SF: 2018 Tobias Harris (better passer, worse rebounder)
PF: 2017 Myles Turner (smaller offensive footprint)
C: 2019 Steven Adams (slightly better scorer, way more turnovers)
6th: 2011 Greg Monroe (more turnovers, worse rebounder, worse passer)
On one hand, that’s not a bad top 6. Each of those can serve a valuable function; there aren’t any weak links. On the other hand . . . holy heck is that roster dependent on LeBron to generate the offense. But in this edition, LeBron doesn’t actually shoot that much (26.6 ppx instead of 34.9) but spends more time creating shots for his teammates. How confident would I feel about this roster? They’d certainly compete, but I’m not sold. It’s a really neat roster construction.
#99. The 2015 Cleveland Cavaliers
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +7.80, Standard Deviations: +1.51, Lost in Finals
Regular Season Record: 53-29, Regular Season SRS: +4.08 (91st), Earned a 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +5.5 (24th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: +0.7 (97th)
PG: Kyrie Irving (22), +4.1 / +5.2
SG: JR Smith (29), +2.2 / +2.1
SF: LeBron James (30), +7.1 / 7.9
PF: Tristan Thompson (23), -1.2 / +0.2
C: Kevin Love (26), +2.7 / +4.3
6th: Matthew Dellavedova (24), -2.8 / -3.8
Usage%: LeBron James (32.3), Kyrie Irving (26.2), Kevin Love (21.7)
Scoring/100: LeBron James (36.3 / +4.3%), Kyrie Irving (31.0 / +4.9%), Kevin Love (25.2 / +2.8%)
Assists/100: LeBron James (10.7), Matthew Dellavedova (7.7), Kyrie Irving (7.4)
Heliocentrism: 37.5% (35th of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 47.4% (7th)
Depth: 15.1% (66th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +4.2 (63rd), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.4 (44th)
Playoff SRS: +9.98 (65th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +3.72 (26th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.85 (32nd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.37 (41st)
Round 1: Boston Celtics (-0.4), won 4-0 by +9.2 points per game (+8.8 SRS eq)
Round 2: Chicago Bulls (+5.8), won 4-2 by +5.5 points per game (+11.3 SRS eq)
Round 3: Atlanta Hawks (+4.8), won 4-0 by +13.3 points per game (+18.1 SRS eq)
Round 4: Golden State Warriors (+11.2), lost 4-2 by -7.2 points per game (+4.0 SRS eq)
The 2014 season ended with LeBron’s Heat being smacked up and down the court to the tune of 14 points per game. Dwyane Wade was a shadow of his former self; LeBron found himself carrying a roster that could no longer compete. At the same time, LeBron had left things in Cleveland unresolved, with his hometown love affair with the Cavs set on fire and left to burn (Cuyahoga style, like Gangnam style but hotter) thanks to his incredibly tone-deaf Decision. During his time in Miami, Cleveland had improved its roster some by adding talented youngster Kyrie Irving and creating a lot more maneuvering room with their cap. So LeBron returned to Cleveland for the 2015 season, joining Kyrie and . . . encouraging a trade for stud power forward Kevin Love from the Timberwolves. Love went the way of every ball-dominant player (especially that needs the post to operate) that has joined LeBron; his offensive role reduced and he basically became a rebounding stretch 5, which was a perfect fit for LeBron but wasn’t consistent with what gave him value in Minnesota.
Anyhow. If karma was to smile on LeBron for returning to Cleveland, 2015 would not be the year it happened. Despite getting top odds to win a championship the ‘15 Cavs sputtered in the regular season posting the 91st SRS and the 97th regular season defense on this list. LeBron only played 69 games, and the thin roster had only six players marked with BPMs above zero. In the playoffs the Cavs stepped it up, but were to be smashed down by injuries. In the first round the Celtics were only an average team, but the Cavs dominated in each of the Four Factors and won by 9.2 points per game, a nice little showing but marred by Kevin Love being knocked out for the rest of the playoffs.
In the second round the Cavs had a strong win over the Bulls, beating a very good team by 5.5 points per game (LeBron stat line (26/11/9) was marred by -7.4% shooting). In the Eastern Conference Finals they faced the one-seed Hawks (who hadn’t played particularly well in the playoffs, posting +2.4 and +7.1 SRS series). I’m sure that the Cavs were favored, but instead of a tasteful victory the Cavs vaporized the Hawks, sweeping by 13.3 points per game. Excellent offensive rebounding from Tristan Thompson and Timofey Mozgov (7.5 per game between them) bought the Cavs a 6 shots per game advantage and the Cavs shot well (39.8% from three) and LeBron posted another gaudy but inefficient stat line (30-11-9 at -2.8%). But their dominant win had a cost; Kyrie Irving went down after game 2.
In the Finals they faced the Warriors. Golden State had put up an outstanding +10 SRS in the regular season and had put up three straight series where they won by 8 points per game (against teams of +1.1, +5.9 and +4.5 SRS). So the Cavs, while coming through the East fairly well, were missing Kyrie and Love, and the Warriors were rated at +11.2 going into the Finals. (As an aside, I remember a conversation with my boss going into this series. He knew I followed the NBA and he asked me what I thought about the upcoming Finals. I said something to the effect of, “Golden State, and it won’t be close.” He sneered a little and said, “It’s LeBron, he can take them.” I laughed and said, “With Kyrie and Love healthy, maybe. But Golden State is *really* good. Just LeBron isn’t enough. I’d be surprised if the series makes it past five games.”)
Well, it made it to six games but they weren’t close, with the Warriors winning by 7.2 points per game. LeBron posted another eye-bleeding stat-line (36/13/9 with -5.7% shooting) but the Cavs shot 29% from three and that was that. Cleveland’s wins were by 2 and 5 points, Golden State’s wins were by 8, 21, 13 and 8 points. Cleveland actually played excellent defense in this series (and through the playoffs), but their offense really struggled in the playoffs (compared to the regular season). I have to say, how badly LeBron shot through these playoffs is hard to ignore, though I’m sure that the lack of spacing with Love out didn’t do him any favors.
You may think that #99 is pretty low for the ‘15 Cavs (or you may not). The problem is that while my formula assumes that games themselves may play differently, the margins of victory are stable. So it is basically grading the ‘15 Cavs *with* Love going down in the first round and Irving out for 7 of the final 8 games. And with that caveat we have a +4.1 SRS regular season team and a +10 SRS playoff team (the loss to the Warriors was somewhat cancelled out by the extremely dominant win over the Hawks). Put those together and #99 is reasonable.
And the good news is that we got to see what a healthy Cavs could do against the Warriors in the 2016 Finals.
Regular Season Record: 53-29, Regular Season SRS: +4.08 (91st), Earned a 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +5.5 (24th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: +0.7 (97th)
PG: Kyrie Irving (22), +4.1 / +5.2
SG: JR Smith (29), +2.2 / +2.1
SF: LeBron James (30), +7.1 / 7.9
PF: Tristan Thompson (23), -1.2 / +0.2
C: Kevin Love (26), +2.7 / +4.3
6th: Matthew Dellavedova (24), -2.8 / -3.8
Usage%: LeBron James (32.3), Kyrie Irving (26.2), Kevin Love (21.7)
Scoring/100: LeBron James (36.3 / +4.3%), Kyrie Irving (31.0 / +4.9%), Kevin Love (25.2 / +2.8%)
Assists/100: LeBron James (10.7), Matthew Dellavedova (7.7), Kyrie Irving (7.4)
Heliocentrism: 37.5% (35th of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 47.4% (7th)
Depth: 15.1% (66th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +4.2 (63rd), Playoff Defensive Rating: -5.4 (44th)
Playoff SRS: +9.98 (65th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +3.72 (26th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.85 (32nd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.37 (41st)
Round 1: Boston Celtics (-0.4), won 4-0 by +9.2 points per game (+8.8 SRS eq)
Round 2: Chicago Bulls (+5.8), won 4-2 by +5.5 points per game (+11.3 SRS eq)
Round 3: Atlanta Hawks (+4.8), won 4-0 by +13.3 points per game (+18.1 SRS eq)
Round 4: Golden State Warriors (+11.2), lost 4-2 by -7.2 points per game (+4.0 SRS eq)
The 2014 season ended with LeBron’s Heat being smacked up and down the court to the tune of 14 points per game. Dwyane Wade was a shadow of his former self; LeBron found himself carrying a roster that could no longer compete. At the same time, LeBron had left things in Cleveland unresolved, with his hometown love affair with the Cavs set on fire and left to burn (Cuyahoga style, like Gangnam style but hotter) thanks to his incredibly tone-deaf Decision. During his time in Miami, Cleveland had improved its roster some by adding talented youngster Kyrie Irving and creating a lot more maneuvering room with their cap. So LeBron returned to Cleveland for the 2015 season, joining Kyrie and . . . encouraging a trade for stud power forward Kevin Love from the Timberwolves. Love went the way of every ball-dominant player (especially that needs the post to operate) that has joined LeBron; his offensive role reduced and he basically became a rebounding stretch 5, which was a perfect fit for LeBron but wasn’t consistent with what gave him value in Minnesota.
Anyhow. If karma was to smile on LeBron for returning to Cleveland, 2015 would not be the year it happened. Despite getting top odds to win a championship the ‘15 Cavs sputtered in the regular season posting the 91st SRS and the 97th regular season defense on this list. LeBron only played 69 games, and the thin roster had only six players marked with BPMs above zero. In the playoffs the Cavs stepped it up, but were to be smashed down by injuries. In the first round the Celtics were only an average team, but the Cavs dominated in each of the Four Factors and won by 9.2 points per game, a nice little showing but marred by Kevin Love being knocked out for the rest of the playoffs.
In the second round the Cavs had a strong win over the Bulls, beating a very good team by 5.5 points per game (LeBron stat line (26/11/9) was marred by -7.4% shooting). In the Eastern Conference Finals they faced the one-seed Hawks (who hadn’t played particularly well in the playoffs, posting +2.4 and +7.1 SRS series). I’m sure that the Cavs were favored, but instead of a tasteful victory the Cavs vaporized the Hawks, sweeping by 13.3 points per game. Excellent offensive rebounding from Tristan Thompson and Timofey Mozgov (7.5 per game between them) bought the Cavs a 6 shots per game advantage and the Cavs shot well (39.8% from three) and LeBron posted another gaudy but inefficient stat line (30-11-9 at -2.8%). But their dominant win had a cost; Kyrie Irving went down after game 2.
In the Finals they faced the Warriors. Golden State had put up an outstanding +10 SRS in the regular season and had put up three straight series where they won by 8 points per game (against teams of +1.1, +5.9 and +4.5 SRS). So the Cavs, while coming through the East fairly well, were missing Kyrie and Love, and the Warriors were rated at +11.2 going into the Finals. (As an aside, I remember a conversation with my boss going into this series. He knew I followed the NBA and he asked me what I thought about the upcoming Finals. I said something to the effect of, “Golden State, and it won’t be close.” He sneered a little and said, “It’s LeBron, he can take them.” I laughed and said, “With Kyrie and Love healthy, maybe. But Golden State is *really* good. Just LeBron isn’t enough. I’d be surprised if the series makes it past five games.”)
Well, it made it to six games but they weren’t close, with the Warriors winning by 7.2 points per game. LeBron posted another eye-bleeding stat-line (36/13/9 with -5.7% shooting) but the Cavs shot 29% from three and that was that. Cleveland’s wins were by 2 and 5 points, Golden State’s wins were by 8, 21, 13 and 8 points. Cleveland actually played excellent defense in this series (and through the playoffs), but their offense really struggled in the playoffs (compared to the regular season). I have to say, how badly LeBron shot through these playoffs is hard to ignore, though I’m sure that the lack of spacing with Love out didn’t do him any favors.
You may think that #99 is pretty low for the ‘15 Cavs (or you may not). The problem is that while my formula assumes that games themselves may play differently, the margins of victory are stable. So it is basically grading the ‘15 Cavs *with* Love going down in the first round and Irving out for 7 of the final 8 games. And with that caveat we have a +4.1 SRS regular season team and a +10 SRS playoff team (the loss to the Warriors was somewhat cancelled out by the extremely dominant win over the Hawks). Put those together and #99 is reasonable.
And the good news is that we got to see what a healthy Cavs could do against the Warriors in the 2016 Finals.
#98. The 1975 Washington Bullets
Spoiler:
Final SRS: +6.85, Standard Deviations: +1.85, Lost in Finals
Regular Season Record: 60-22, Regular Season SRS: +6.53 (53rd), Earned a 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +0.3 (87th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -6.4 (14th)
PG: Kevin Porter (24), +0.7 / -0.1
SG: Phil Chenier (24), +2.9 / +2.9
SF: Mike Riordan (24), +0.3 / -2.6
PF: Elvin Hayes (29), +3.3 / +2.9
C: Wes Unseld (28), +4.0 / +4.7
6th: Jimmy Jones (30), +0.3 / +2.3
Scoring/100: Phil Chenier (26.5 / -0.6%), Elvin Hayes (24.6 / -0.6%), Mike Riordan (23.5 / +1.1%)
Assists/100: Kevin Porter (11.4), Jimmy Jones (5.1), Wes Unseld (4.6)
Heliocentrism: 27.5% (64th of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 47.3% (8th)
Depth: 25.1% (44th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +1.41 (87th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.61 (60th)
Playoff SRS: +7.07 (99th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.32 (93rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.31 (52nd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.11 (69th)
Round 1: Bye
Round 2: Buffalo Braves (+2.2), won 4-3 by +4.1 points per game (+6.3 SRS eq)
Round 3: Boston Celtics (+6.6), won 4-2 by +5.3 points per game (+11.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: Golden State Warriors (+5.3), lost 4-0 by -4.0 points per game (+1.3 SRS eq)
Can I take a moment to point out how interesting it is that a regular season SRS of +6.53 is around the middle of this list (53rd) but a slightly better playoff SRS of +7.07 is 99th on this list. Part of that is that my formula selects for playoff performance, but part of it is simply that most good teams play better in the playoffs (SRS-wise) and merely playing the same is a letdown (unless you’re a +10 or better regular season team . . .)
The Bullets were a bruising team. They had the best defense in the league by a mile - the gap between them and the 2nd best defense was almost the distance between that 2nd best defense and league average. It wasn’t that they had a dominant shot blocker; Wes Unseld (their center) was 6’7” and had a higher steal% than block% (let that sink in). Elvin Hayes (6’9”) had quality block numbers (2.9%) but nothing crazy. And despite both players (both Hall of Famers) being 20+% defensive rebounders, the Bullets' rebounding was actually about league average. Their defense was built on 1) excellent shot defense (lowest allowed eFG% by a decent margin) and 2) forcing a ton of turnovers. The Bullets generated the 2nd most steals per 100 of anyone in the league. It wasn’t led by any one player; they had five different players getting serious minutes averaging 2+% steals, and even Unseld (who had a body that didn’t exactly scream “cat-like reflexes”) averaged almost 2 steals per 100.
Despite having a great defense, their offense was pretty average. With the understanding that 1975 wasn’t exactly the paragon of shot-taking efficiency, all the offensive hubs that the Bullets ran through were little more efficient than league average (if at all). This was a team built on playing outstanding team defense and having a solid bench (a 23-year old Truck Robinson was a contributor). And that was enough to give them the highest SRS in the league and tied for the most wins.
Their playoff run was nothing to brag about. A solid (if unremarkable) win over the Braves, a fairly dominant win over the Celtics (the #2 SRS team in the league) and a weak showing against the Warriors (swept by 4 points per game). It wasn’t their defense that failed them in the Finals; the Warriors had a 100.4 offensive rating through the regular season (+2.7 above league average) and in the Finals had an offensive rating of 91.4. The Bullets’ defense did an *amazing* job stopping Rick Barry and the Warriors. Unfortunately, the Bullets’ offense completely collapsed, posting an offensive rating of 87.7 (ten points below league average). Both teams struggled to score and both teams turned the ball over a lot. The difference was on the boards; Golden State dominated that area (led by George Johnson’s 16 offensive rebounds in 73 minutes) and it gave them an extra 4-5 shots a game, enough for a 4 point per game margin of victory.
So a +6.53 regular season SRS and a +7.07 SRS playoffs (capped by a sweep in the Finals). Does this team deserve to be in the Top 100? The problem is, they were very likely the best team in the league (Finals results notwithstanding). They had the best regular season SRS, and the one team within 3.5 points of them (the Celtics) they beat decisively in the Eastern Conference Finals. The Warriors played better in the playoffs, but were only decent in the regular season. For their all-around quality in a fairly competitive league/era (only one team of 18 below -4 SRS) the Bullets squeak into the Top 100.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2012 Mike Conley, with more efficient scoring but worse defense
SG: 2018 Paul George, with worse scoring
SF: 2016 George Hill
PF: 2016 Derrick Favors (worse shot blocking) or 2002 Jermaine O'Neal (more agile, less blocks)
C: 2015 Andrew Bogut but healthier with very limited shot blocking, better intangibles
6th: 2020 Brad Wanamaker, with better shooting but worse shot blocking
I don’t really know what I was expecting for comps - the ‘75 Bullets are an unusual team. But it paints an interesting picture: two bigs who rebound a lot, one of whom scores (but not efficiently), and the other works well in an offense. And beyond that, a series of young, athletic guards/wings with high steal rates and one ball-dominant scorer. I look at this lineup and think: “Not a great offense, maybe not even good, but they’d be a nightmare to score on.” And that certainly describes the ‘75 Bullets.
Regular Season Record: 60-22, Regular Season SRS: +6.53 (53rd), Earned a 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +0.3 (87th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -6.4 (14th)
PG: Kevin Porter (24), +0.7 / -0.1
SG: Phil Chenier (24), +2.9 / +2.9
SF: Mike Riordan (24), +0.3 / -2.6
PF: Elvin Hayes (29), +3.3 / +2.9
C: Wes Unseld (28), +4.0 / +4.7
6th: Jimmy Jones (30), +0.3 / +2.3
Scoring/100: Phil Chenier (26.5 / -0.6%), Elvin Hayes (24.6 / -0.6%), Mike Riordan (23.5 / +1.1%)
Assists/100: Kevin Porter (11.4), Jimmy Jones (5.1), Wes Unseld (4.6)
Heliocentrism: 27.5% (64th of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 47.3% (8th)
Depth: 25.1% (44th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +1.41 (87th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.61 (60th)
Playoff SRS: +7.07 (99th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.32 (93rd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.31 (52nd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.11 (69th)
Round 1: Bye
Round 2: Buffalo Braves (+2.2), won 4-3 by +4.1 points per game (+6.3 SRS eq)
Round 3: Boston Celtics (+6.6), won 4-2 by +5.3 points per game (+11.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: Golden State Warriors (+5.3), lost 4-0 by -4.0 points per game (+1.3 SRS eq)
Can I take a moment to point out how interesting it is that a regular season SRS of +6.53 is around the middle of this list (53rd) but a slightly better playoff SRS of +7.07 is 99th on this list. Part of that is that my formula selects for playoff performance, but part of it is simply that most good teams play better in the playoffs (SRS-wise) and merely playing the same is a letdown (unless you’re a +10 or better regular season team . . .)
The Bullets were a bruising team. They had the best defense in the league by a mile - the gap between them and the 2nd best defense was almost the distance between that 2nd best defense and league average. It wasn’t that they had a dominant shot blocker; Wes Unseld (their center) was 6’7” and had a higher steal% than block% (let that sink in). Elvin Hayes (6’9”) had quality block numbers (2.9%) but nothing crazy. And despite both players (both Hall of Famers) being 20+% defensive rebounders, the Bullets' rebounding was actually about league average. Their defense was built on 1) excellent shot defense (lowest allowed eFG% by a decent margin) and 2) forcing a ton of turnovers. The Bullets generated the 2nd most steals per 100 of anyone in the league. It wasn’t led by any one player; they had five different players getting serious minutes averaging 2+% steals, and even Unseld (who had a body that didn’t exactly scream “cat-like reflexes”) averaged almost 2 steals per 100.
Despite having a great defense, their offense was pretty average. With the understanding that 1975 wasn’t exactly the paragon of shot-taking efficiency, all the offensive hubs that the Bullets ran through were little more efficient than league average (if at all). This was a team built on playing outstanding team defense and having a solid bench (a 23-year old Truck Robinson was a contributor). And that was enough to give them the highest SRS in the league and tied for the most wins.
Their playoff run was nothing to brag about. A solid (if unremarkable) win over the Braves, a fairly dominant win over the Celtics (the #2 SRS team in the league) and a weak showing against the Warriors (swept by 4 points per game). It wasn’t their defense that failed them in the Finals; the Warriors had a 100.4 offensive rating through the regular season (+2.7 above league average) and in the Finals had an offensive rating of 91.4. The Bullets’ defense did an *amazing* job stopping Rick Barry and the Warriors. Unfortunately, the Bullets’ offense completely collapsed, posting an offensive rating of 87.7 (ten points below league average). Both teams struggled to score and both teams turned the ball over a lot. The difference was on the boards; Golden State dominated that area (led by George Johnson’s 16 offensive rebounds in 73 minutes) and it gave them an extra 4-5 shots a game, enough for a 4 point per game margin of victory.
So a +6.53 regular season SRS and a +7.07 SRS playoffs (capped by a sweep in the Finals). Does this team deserve to be in the Top 100? The problem is, they were very likely the best team in the league (Finals results notwithstanding). They had the best regular season SRS, and the one team within 3.5 points of them (the Celtics) they beat decisively in the Eastern Conference Finals. The Warriors played better in the playoffs, but were only decent in the regular season. For their all-around quality in a fairly competitive league/era (only one team of 18 below -4 SRS) the Bullets squeak into the Top 100.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2012 Mike Conley, with more efficient scoring but worse defense
SG: 2018 Paul George, with worse scoring
SF: 2016 George Hill
PF: 2016 Derrick Favors (worse shot blocking) or 2002 Jermaine O'Neal (more agile, less blocks)
C: 2015 Andrew Bogut but healthier with very limited shot blocking, better intangibles
6th: 2020 Brad Wanamaker, with better shooting but worse shot blocking
I don’t really know what I was expecting for comps - the ‘75 Bullets are an unusual team. But it paints an interesting picture: two bigs who rebound a lot, one of whom scores (but not efficiently), and the other works well in an offense. And beyond that, a series of young, athletic guards/wings with high steal rates and one ball-dominant scorer. I look at this lineup and think: “Not a great offense, maybe not even good, but they’d be a nightmare to score on.” And that certainly describes the ‘75 Bullets.
#97. The 1988 Detroit Pistons
Spoiler:
Final SRS: +7.63, Standard Deviations: +1.59, Lost in Finals
Regular Season Record: 54-28, Regular Season SRS: +5.46 (77th), Earned a 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.5 (69th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.7 (65th)
PG: Isiah Thomas (26), +3.0 / +7.5
SG: Joe Dumars (24), +0.6 / +0.1
SF: Adrian Dantley (32), +3.5 / +3.4
PF: Dennis Rodman (26), +1.6 / -0.9
C: Bill Laimbeer (30), +2.2 / +2.2
6th: John Salley (23), +2.2 / +2.7
Usage: Vinnie Johnson (25.9%), Isiah Thomas (25.4%), Adrian Dantley (24.2%)
Scoring/100: Adrian Dantley (31.4 / +8.1%), Isiah Thomas (26.3 / -1.7%), Vinnie Johnson (25.3 / -6.3%)
Assists/100: Isiah Thomas (11.3), Joe Dumars (6.9), Vinnie Johnson (6.7)
Heliocentrism: 22.4% (73rd of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 36.4% (46th)
Depth: 41.2% (10th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +0.17 (93rd), Playoff Defensive Rating: -8.67 (13th)
Playoff SRS: +8.73 (84th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.17 (56th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +3.37 (16th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.57 (79th)
Round 1: Washington Bullets (-0.2), won 4-1 by +4.0 points per game (+3.8 SRS eq)
Round 2: Chicago Bulls (+3.5), won 4-1 by +9.8 points per game (+13.3 SRS eq)
Round 3: Boston Celtics (+5.8), won 4-2 by +3.0 points per game (+8.8 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+6.3), lost 4-3 by +2.6 points per game (+8.9 SRS eq)
The late 80s Pistons were a fascinating team. They were really the poster child for depth over star power - while Isiah Thomas turned into an all-star in the playoffs, in the regular season their roster was top to bottom solid (10th in "Depth"). And more interestingly, premised on very specific role players. Vinnie Johnson (who Box Plus Minus *hates* for his inefficient scoring, at least this season) was a weird off-the-bench spurt of offense, whose use allowed for the deployment of more defensive specialists like Dumars and Rodman. Note that BPM loves Adrian Dantley for his efficiency (he was pretty much James Harden for the 80s, a free throw generating machine), but in practice Dantley tended to be a ball-stopper which screwed with offensive flow so he was never quite as good as his metrics suggested. Either way, looking at this roster, no part of this reads “best team in the league”.
But they probably were.
They had the 2nd best regular season SRS by a hair (to the Celtics), they had the best total SRS, they had the best Playoff SRS by a lot and they had the biggest improvement from regular season to playoffs.
And yet, you may note, their offense (which was good in the regular season) became average in the playoffs (adjusted for opposing defenses). So what was their secret?
The 1988 Pistons in the playoffs were defensive shutdown artists of the highest order. Let’s fast forward past the series against the Bullets (an overmatched team dispatched quickly, if not well). In Round 2 the Pistons faced Michael Jordan and the Bulls (who in three years would win the championship). In ‘88, Pippen and Grant were still developing but in spite of that they still had a pretty solid offensive rating of 109 (1% above league average). Against the Pistons the Bulls averaged an O-Rating of 95.8, a 13.2% drop. Jordan’s true shooting dropped from +6.5% to +1.1%, which doesn’t sound amazing, but let’s remember that this is Jordan, who is notorious for getting better in the playoffs (I can't tell if I'm more impressed that the Pistons reduced Jordan to league average efficiency, or that Jordan facing the Pistons *only* dropped to league average). The Bulls had two players *total* with true shooting above -3.8% that series. The Bulls were a solid team and the Pistons whipped them by almost ten points a game. In the next round they faced the Celtics, the best regular season SRS team and the best offense in the league, averaging 115.4 (+7.4 from league average). Against the Pistons they dropped 14.4 points to 101. Larry Bird shot -9% (compared to +7% regular season average) and the rest of the Celtics uniformly struggled to score (except for McHale who played great).
Everyone knows about the “Jordan Rules”, but it’s obviously more complicated than that. If all it took to stop Jordan was to be really physical with him, everyone would have done it. The Pistons weren’t just physical, they were incredibly athletic and played outstanding defense on everyone. We’re talking two of the greatest playoff performers ever (in Jordan and Bird) getting either seriously slowed down or outright shut down by the Pistons’ defense. They were the real deal.
In the Finals they faced the Lakers, who were clearly the best team in the West but still looking like a one-point underdog to the Pistons. Through five games the Pistons were up 3-2, leading by 4.4 points per game. In the third quarter of game 6, Isiah Thomas sprained his ankle. He played on it the rest of the game and for most of game 7, but in both cases was clearly hobbled. The Lakers won those games by 1 and 3 points respectively, leaving the Lakers as the winners, but being outscored by 2.6 points per game, and with clear questions as to whether they’d have won without Thomas’ injury. The ‘88 Pistons were almost certainly the best team in the NBA in 1988, and but for some bad luck they probably would have won the title. Alas.
Fortunately for Detroit, the squad would come back even better in 1989.
Why are they ranked only #97? Because their playoff run (despite featuring wins over many storied players/franchises) was pretty low SRS - there's a limit to what you can do with a league-average offense. A playoff SRS below +10 on this list is going to keep you pretty low.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2014 John Wall in the regular season, 2015 Russell Westbrook (way lower usage and rebounding)
SG: 2012 Darren Collison, if he were a much better man defender
SF: 2016 Danilo Gallinari (worse rebounding and better scoring)
PF: 2018 Jayson Tatum (way more turnovers, way more rebounding)
C: 2014 Serge Ibaka (way worse shot blocking, much better passing)
6th: 2008 Kendrick Perkins
7th: 2015 DeMar DeRozan
Take a second with me on the Rodman comp - Jayson Tatum may seem like a stretch. First, remember that Tatum was 19 at the time, so I’m not comparing Rodman to this year’s Tatum. Second, Rodman at age 26 was actually a decent scorer: +3.3% efficiency on 19.2% Usage. I didn’t bother feeding Rodman’s rebounding in because you could say anything and add “oh yeah, and 15% rebounding or higher” and it’ll be all centers, which I didn’t want.
This is a weird roster. The roster has some dynamic creators (Wall and DeRozan), some offense (mostly Gallinari) and a lot of defense and rebounding (Wall, Collison, super-Tatum, Ibaka, Perkins). It doesn’t really jump out as a dominant team. It’s my favorite part of the Pistons title runs (both iterations): for most title teams the casual narrative of best player -> team and therefor team success = great best player works. But for these Pistons . . . not as much.
You know what’s interesting? Why does Isiah Thomas have such a better reputation that Chauncey Billups? Thomas *may* have been the best player on these Pistons squads, and he did get better in the playoffs, but his stat footprint doesn’t really leap off the page. And yet he’s remembered by many as the leader of those teams (with the inevitable credit for their success) while Billups seems like more of a historical afterthought. Weird.
Also, is it just me or are the '88 Pistons a weirdly modern defense? They had a 6'7" power forward, but it worked because 1) Rodman was capable of banging low if needed and 2) it gave them top-to-bottom mobile athleticism. It just seems like dominant defenses of their era were centered around dominant bigs; the "we're long and athletic and you can't get the shots you want" seems like a far more modern design. Could be wrong.
Regular Season Record: 54-28, Regular Season SRS: +5.46 (77th), Earned a 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.5 (69th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.7 (65th)
PG: Isiah Thomas (26), +3.0 / +7.5
SG: Joe Dumars (24), +0.6 / +0.1
SF: Adrian Dantley (32), +3.5 / +3.4
PF: Dennis Rodman (26), +1.6 / -0.9
C: Bill Laimbeer (30), +2.2 / +2.2
6th: John Salley (23), +2.2 / +2.7
Usage: Vinnie Johnson (25.9%), Isiah Thomas (25.4%), Adrian Dantley (24.2%)
Scoring/100: Adrian Dantley (31.4 / +8.1%), Isiah Thomas (26.3 / -1.7%), Vinnie Johnson (25.3 / -6.3%)
Assists/100: Isiah Thomas (11.3), Joe Dumars (6.9), Vinnie Johnson (6.7)
Heliocentrism: 22.4% (73rd of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 36.4% (46th)
Depth: 41.2% (10th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +0.17 (93rd), Playoff Defensive Rating: -8.67 (13th)
Playoff SRS: +8.73 (84th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.17 (56th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +3.37 (16th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.57 (79th)
Round 1: Washington Bullets (-0.2), won 4-1 by +4.0 points per game (+3.8 SRS eq)
Round 2: Chicago Bulls (+3.5), won 4-1 by +9.8 points per game (+13.3 SRS eq)
Round 3: Boston Celtics (+5.8), won 4-2 by +3.0 points per game (+8.8 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+6.3), lost 4-3 by +2.6 points per game (+8.9 SRS eq)
The late 80s Pistons were a fascinating team. They were really the poster child for depth over star power - while Isiah Thomas turned into an all-star in the playoffs, in the regular season their roster was top to bottom solid (10th in "Depth"). And more interestingly, premised on very specific role players. Vinnie Johnson (who Box Plus Minus *hates* for his inefficient scoring, at least this season) was a weird off-the-bench spurt of offense, whose use allowed for the deployment of more defensive specialists like Dumars and Rodman. Note that BPM loves Adrian Dantley for his efficiency (he was pretty much James Harden for the 80s, a free throw generating machine), but in practice Dantley tended to be a ball-stopper which screwed with offensive flow so he was never quite as good as his metrics suggested. Either way, looking at this roster, no part of this reads “best team in the league”.
But they probably were.
They had the 2nd best regular season SRS by a hair (to the Celtics), they had the best total SRS, they had the best Playoff SRS by a lot and they had the biggest improvement from regular season to playoffs.
And yet, you may note, their offense (which was good in the regular season) became average in the playoffs (adjusted for opposing defenses). So what was their secret?
The 1988 Pistons in the playoffs were defensive shutdown artists of the highest order. Let’s fast forward past the series against the Bullets (an overmatched team dispatched quickly, if not well). In Round 2 the Pistons faced Michael Jordan and the Bulls (who in three years would win the championship). In ‘88, Pippen and Grant were still developing but in spite of that they still had a pretty solid offensive rating of 109 (1% above league average). Against the Pistons the Bulls averaged an O-Rating of 95.8, a 13.2% drop. Jordan’s true shooting dropped from +6.5% to +1.1%, which doesn’t sound amazing, but let’s remember that this is Jordan, who is notorious for getting better in the playoffs (I can't tell if I'm more impressed that the Pistons reduced Jordan to league average efficiency, or that Jordan facing the Pistons *only* dropped to league average). The Bulls had two players *total* with true shooting above -3.8% that series. The Bulls were a solid team and the Pistons whipped them by almost ten points a game. In the next round they faced the Celtics, the best regular season SRS team and the best offense in the league, averaging 115.4 (+7.4 from league average). Against the Pistons they dropped 14.4 points to 101. Larry Bird shot -9% (compared to +7% regular season average) and the rest of the Celtics uniformly struggled to score (except for McHale who played great).
Everyone knows about the “Jordan Rules”, but it’s obviously more complicated than that. If all it took to stop Jordan was to be really physical with him, everyone would have done it. The Pistons weren’t just physical, they were incredibly athletic and played outstanding defense on everyone. We’re talking two of the greatest playoff performers ever (in Jordan and Bird) getting either seriously slowed down or outright shut down by the Pistons’ defense. They were the real deal.
In the Finals they faced the Lakers, who were clearly the best team in the West but still looking like a one-point underdog to the Pistons. Through five games the Pistons were up 3-2, leading by 4.4 points per game. In the third quarter of game 6, Isiah Thomas sprained his ankle. He played on it the rest of the game and for most of game 7, but in both cases was clearly hobbled. The Lakers won those games by 1 and 3 points respectively, leaving the Lakers as the winners, but being outscored by 2.6 points per game, and with clear questions as to whether they’d have won without Thomas’ injury. The ‘88 Pistons were almost certainly the best team in the NBA in 1988, and but for some bad luck they probably would have won the title. Alas.
Fortunately for Detroit, the squad would come back even better in 1989.
Why are they ranked only #97? Because their playoff run (despite featuring wins over many storied players/franchises) was pretty low SRS - there's a limit to what you can do with a league-average offense. A playoff SRS below +10 on this list is going to keep you pretty low.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2014 John Wall in the regular season, 2015 Russell Westbrook (way lower usage and rebounding)
SG: 2012 Darren Collison, if he were a much better man defender
SF: 2016 Danilo Gallinari (worse rebounding and better scoring)
PF: 2018 Jayson Tatum (way more turnovers, way more rebounding)
C: 2014 Serge Ibaka (way worse shot blocking, much better passing)
6th: 2008 Kendrick Perkins
7th: 2015 DeMar DeRozan
Take a second with me on the Rodman comp - Jayson Tatum may seem like a stretch. First, remember that Tatum was 19 at the time, so I’m not comparing Rodman to this year’s Tatum. Second, Rodman at age 26 was actually a decent scorer: +3.3% efficiency on 19.2% Usage. I didn’t bother feeding Rodman’s rebounding in because you could say anything and add “oh yeah, and 15% rebounding or higher” and it’ll be all centers, which I didn’t want.
This is a weird roster. The roster has some dynamic creators (Wall and DeRozan), some offense (mostly Gallinari) and a lot of defense and rebounding (Wall, Collison, super-Tatum, Ibaka, Perkins). It doesn’t really jump out as a dominant team. It’s my favorite part of the Pistons title runs (both iterations): for most title teams the casual narrative of best player -> team and therefor team success = great best player works. But for these Pistons . . . not as much.
You know what’s interesting? Why does Isiah Thomas have such a better reputation that Chauncey Billups? Thomas *may* have been the best player on these Pistons squads, and he did get better in the playoffs, but his stat footprint doesn’t really leap off the page. And yet he’s remembered by many as the leader of those teams (with the inevitable credit for their success) while Billups seems like more of a historical afterthought. Weird.
Also, is it just me or are the '88 Pistons a weirdly modern defense? They had a 6'7" power forward, but it worked because 1) Rodman was capable of banging low if needed and 2) it gave them top-to-bottom mobile athleticism. It just seems like dominant defenses of their era were centered around dominant bigs; the "we're long and athletic and you can't get the shots you want" seems like a far more modern design. Could be wrong.
#96. The 1990 Phoenix Suns
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.26, Standard Deviations: +1.63, Lost in Conference Finals
Regular Season Record: 54-28, Regular Season SRS: +7.09 (44th), Earned a 5 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +5.0 (30th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.9 (74th)
PG: Kevin Johnson (23), +5.0 / +6.1
SG: Jeff Hornacek (26), +4.6 / +4.1
SF: Dan Majerle (24), +1.3 / +4.5
PF: Tom Chambers (30), +2.3 / -0.5
C: Mark West (29), +1.4 / +1.0
6th: Eddie Johnson (30), -0.9 / +2.3
Usage: Tom Chambers (28.8%), Eddie Johnson (25.2%), Kevin Johnson (25.0%)
Scoring/100: Tom Chambers (34.5 / +4.2%), Kevin Johnson (28.5 / +4.8%), Eddie Johnson (28.4 / +0.5%)
Assists/100: Kevin Johnson (14.5), Jeff Hornacek (7.1), Dan Majerle (4.0)
Heliocentrism: 27.1% (66th of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 39.2% (35th)
Depth: 34.7% (22nd)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +4.97 (55th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.23 (67th)
Playoff SRS: +9.12 (79th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.17 (77th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +3.43 (14th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.57 (37th)
Round 1: Utah Jazz (+4.8), won 3-2 by +1.4 points per game (+6.2 SRS eq)
Round 2: Los Angeles Lakers (+7.4), won 4-1 by +1.6 points per game (+9.0 SRS eq)
Round 3: Portland Trail Blazers (+5.9), lost 4-2 by +5.7 points per game (+11.6 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Bet this wasn’t the edition of the early 90s Suns you expected to see make this list, huh?
This roster (the ‘90 edition) didn’t have Charles Barkley but it did have Kevin Johnson at his peak (which was only two years, ‘90 and ‘91 - injuries derailed a potentially amazing career). KJ didn’t have much shooting range but he attacked the basket like a boss, finishing in the top ten of free throws attempted frequently and shooting 84% while he was there. The 1990 Suns had an excellent offense (which continued to be excellent in the postseason) and KJ was the main cog in that machine, backing up his penetration with excellent passing (if fairly high turnovers). Tom Chambers did most of the scoring for the team (and was pretty good at it too) though he didn’t add a lot past scoring. Mark West provided a solid shot blocker and rebounder (4.3 Block%, 10.4 OReb%) who only took efficient shots (+11.9% true shooting on only 17.1 points per 100). In that he didn’t shoot much but rebounded and defended very well, West was the ideal complement to Chambers (literally the opposite in every way). Jeff Hornacek provided efficient shooting with good passing for a shooting guard, while Dan Majerle (not yet “Thunder” Dan who Jordan would take very personal in 1993) mostly added offensive rebounding and defense. This was a really good offensive team, with the 5th best shooting in the league (out of 27) and 2nd best at getting to the line, but also played strong defense (6th in opposing shooting and 2nd in preventing free throws). Their record may have been underwhelming, but they had the best regular season SRS in the entire league, and the 2nd best playoff (and overall) SRS behind only the eventual champion Pistons.
Note, by the way, that the Suns’ playoff run was littered with strong teams (the weakest was +4.8 Utah). After making it past Utah (for a team with two infamous “chokers” Utah sure had a habit of playing teams tough in the postseason) on a marginal +1.4 points per game the Suns matched up with Magic Johnson’s Lakers (who were the 1 seed, and won the West both the year before and the year after this matchup, both teams on this list). And the year before, the ‘89 Lakers had bounced the Suns in the Conference Finals to the tune of 5.5 points per game. It was time for a rematch.
If series were determined by the play of their best player then the Lakers would have won, as Magic spun a masterful 30/6/12 at +7.9% efficiency; KJ’s 22/6/11 at +2.5% with 3 steals didn’t really compete. But Byron Scott shot just below league average and Worthy shot far worse (-8.5%), while Jeff Hornacek had a quietly excellent series of 21/3/4 at +9.2% efficiency and the Suns snuck by the Lakers by 1.6 points per game. The Suns advanced to face the Blazers in the Conference Finals.
In that matchup Portland racked up a massive advantage in shots, taking more than 6 shooting possessions a game more than the Suns; the Blazers had almost 4 more steals a game and had a solid advantage on the boards, despite having nobody with minutes post double-digit OReb%. Can I just point out how weird it is that the Blazers, a team whose best known players are guards (Drexler and Porter) always seem to beat other teams on the glass?
Anyhow. The Suns countered with considerably superior shooting. While Kersey shot at league average Drexler shot at -5.3%; for the Suns, Tom Chambers got to the line almost at will and most of their offense shot comfortably above league average. The shooting advantage was enough that the Suns were able to outscore the Blazers by a considerable margin, 5.5 points per game. And so in the NBA Finals . . .
Wait, the Suns *lost* despite a 5.5 point margin of victory? What the crap? The Suns two wins were by 34 and 12 points, while the Blazers four wins were by 6, 3, 2 and 1 point. I’m sorry, I’m fairly sure that the Suns were the better team there. But sometimes the better team loses, the Suns’ season ended and the Blazers went on to get clowned by the ‘90 Pistons. So that’s something.
Sometimes you get teams like the ‘95 Rockets, that have a low seed but battle through it to win the Finals. But most of the time it’s like the ‘90 Suns; your average opponent is +6 SRS and you end up falling to a good team, despite being the best team in the conference. This was one of Kevin Johnson’s two great years running the offense before starting to slow down. I wish he’d gotten to do more.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2013 Kyle Lowry (worse on defense, better on offense)
SG: 2015 Danny Green
SF: 2011 Luc Mbah a Moute
PF: 2010 Amare Stoudamire, better passer, worse shooter
C: 2020 Dwight Howard, with worse rebounding but starting all year
6th: 2017 Harrison Barnes
No star piece here, but it’s a nice roster. 2020 Howard is the quintessential dunker that West was (high rebounding, high blocks, super-high efficiency, super-low number of shots). The offense runs through Lowry and Amare with Danny Green being the really nice third option on both sides. I have to say, this project has made me come to appreciate Jeff Hornacek (and those of his ilk). If he’s your #1 you’re in trouble, but if he’s your #3 you’re going to have a very nice offense. He had nice spacing, nice scoring, quality passing (above 20% assists for every year but one) for a third option and racked up impressive steals numbers for most of his career. I just feel like Hornacek keeps showing up as the third option on some really good offenses, sort of like Danny Green was one of San Antonio’s roster of old-man Duncan, young-Kawhi and no-names that quietly crushed everyone in the middle of the decade.
Regular Season Record: 54-28, Regular Season SRS: +7.09 (44th), Earned a 5 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +5.0 (30th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.9 (74th)
PG: Kevin Johnson (23), +5.0 / +6.1
SG: Jeff Hornacek (26), +4.6 / +4.1
SF: Dan Majerle (24), +1.3 / +4.5
PF: Tom Chambers (30), +2.3 / -0.5
C: Mark West (29), +1.4 / +1.0
6th: Eddie Johnson (30), -0.9 / +2.3
Usage: Tom Chambers (28.8%), Eddie Johnson (25.2%), Kevin Johnson (25.0%)
Scoring/100: Tom Chambers (34.5 / +4.2%), Kevin Johnson (28.5 / +4.8%), Eddie Johnson (28.4 / +0.5%)
Assists/100: Kevin Johnson (14.5), Jeff Hornacek (7.1), Dan Majerle (4.0)
Heliocentrism: 27.1% (66th of 81 teams)
Wingmen: 39.2% (35th)
Depth: 34.7% (22nd)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +4.97 (55th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.23 (67th)
Playoff SRS: +9.12 (79th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.17 (77th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +3.43 (14th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.57 (37th)
Round 1: Utah Jazz (+4.8), won 3-2 by +1.4 points per game (+6.2 SRS eq)
Round 2: Los Angeles Lakers (+7.4), won 4-1 by +1.6 points per game (+9.0 SRS eq)
Round 3: Portland Trail Blazers (+5.9), lost 4-2 by +5.7 points per game (+11.6 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Bet this wasn’t the edition of the early 90s Suns you expected to see make this list, huh?
This roster (the ‘90 edition) didn’t have Charles Barkley but it did have Kevin Johnson at his peak (which was only two years, ‘90 and ‘91 - injuries derailed a potentially amazing career). KJ didn’t have much shooting range but he attacked the basket like a boss, finishing in the top ten of free throws attempted frequently and shooting 84% while he was there. The 1990 Suns had an excellent offense (which continued to be excellent in the postseason) and KJ was the main cog in that machine, backing up his penetration with excellent passing (if fairly high turnovers). Tom Chambers did most of the scoring for the team (and was pretty good at it too) though he didn’t add a lot past scoring. Mark West provided a solid shot blocker and rebounder (4.3 Block%, 10.4 OReb%) who only took efficient shots (+11.9% true shooting on only 17.1 points per 100). In that he didn’t shoot much but rebounded and defended very well, West was the ideal complement to Chambers (literally the opposite in every way). Jeff Hornacek provided efficient shooting with good passing for a shooting guard, while Dan Majerle (not yet “Thunder” Dan who Jordan would take very personal in 1993) mostly added offensive rebounding and defense. This was a really good offensive team, with the 5th best shooting in the league (out of 27) and 2nd best at getting to the line, but also played strong defense (6th in opposing shooting and 2nd in preventing free throws). Their record may have been underwhelming, but they had the best regular season SRS in the entire league, and the 2nd best playoff (and overall) SRS behind only the eventual champion Pistons.
Note, by the way, that the Suns’ playoff run was littered with strong teams (the weakest was +4.8 Utah). After making it past Utah (for a team with two infamous “chokers” Utah sure had a habit of playing teams tough in the postseason) on a marginal +1.4 points per game the Suns matched up with Magic Johnson’s Lakers (who were the 1 seed, and won the West both the year before and the year after this matchup, both teams on this list). And the year before, the ‘89 Lakers had bounced the Suns in the Conference Finals to the tune of 5.5 points per game. It was time for a rematch.
If series were determined by the play of their best player then the Lakers would have won, as Magic spun a masterful 30/6/12 at +7.9% efficiency; KJ’s 22/6/11 at +2.5% with 3 steals didn’t really compete. But Byron Scott shot just below league average and Worthy shot far worse (-8.5%), while Jeff Hornacek had a quietly excellent series of 21/3/4 at +9.2% efficiency and the Suns snuck by the Lakers by 1.6 points per game. The Suns advanced to face the Blazers in the Conference Finals.
In that matchup Portland racked up a massive advantage in shots, taking more than 6 shooting possessions a game more than the Suns; the Blazers had almost 4 more steals a game and had a solid advantage on the boards, despite having nobody with minutes post double-digit OReb%. Can I just point out how weird it is that the Blazers, a team whose best known players are guards (Drexler and Porter) always seem to beat other teams on the glass?
Anyhow. The Suns countered with considerably superior shooting. While Kersey shot at league average Drexler shot at -5.3%; for the Suns, Tom Chambers got to the line almost at will and most of their offense shot comfortably above league average. The shooting advantage was enough that the Suns were able to outscore the Blazers by a considerable margin, 5.5 points per game. And so in the NBA Finals . . .
Wait, the Suns *lost* despite a 5.5 point margin of victory? What the crap? The Suns two wins were by 34 and 12 points, while the Blazers four wins were by 6, 3, 2 and 1 point. I’m sorry, I’m fairly sure that the Suns were the better team there. But sometimes the better team loses, the Suns’ season ended and the Blazers went on to get clowned by the ‘90 Pistons. So that’s something.
Sometimes you get teams like the ‘95 Rockets, that have a low seed but battle through it to win the Finals. But most of the time it’s like the ‘90 Suns; your average opponent is +6 SRS and you end up falling to a good team, despite being the best team in the conference. This was one of Kevin Johnson’s two great years running the offense before starting to slow down. I wish he’d gotten to do more.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2013 Kyle Lowry (worse on defense, better on offense)
SG: 2015 Danny Green
SF: 2011 Luc Mbah a Moute
PF: 2010 Amare Stoudamire, better passer, worse shooter
C: 2020 Dwight Howard, with worse rebounding but starting all year
6th: 2017 Harrison Barnes
No star piece here, but it’s a nice roster. 2020 Howard is the quintessential dunker that West was (high rebounding, high blocks, super-high efficiency, super-low number of shots). The offense runs through Lowry and Amare with Danny Green being the really nice third option on both sides. I have to say, this project has made me come to appreciate Jeff Hornacek (and those of his ilk). If he’s your #1 you’re in trouble, but if he’s your #3 you’re going to have a very nice offense. He had nice spacing, nice scoring, quality passing (above 20% assists for every year but one) for a third option and racked up impressive steals numbers for most of his career. I just feel like Hornacek keeps showing up as the third option on some really good offenses, sort of like Danny Green was one of San Antonio’s roster of old-man Duncan, young-Kawhi and no-names that quietly crushed everyone in the middle of the decade.
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