Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I then cover the three highest players in Usage% (assuming the season has those numbers), the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's nothing fancy; it's literally just me feeding the player's regular season numbers into Stathead and looking for player-seasons in the recent past (the more recent the better) that are reasonably comparable. This is *not* intended to be anything other than fun. I find it to be a neat way to re-conceive what a roster truly was when translated out of the trappings of their laundry and era. The method suffers when translating man defense, as steals/blocks/defensive rating are very approximate estimates of a player's defensive contributions. When I say something like:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I then cover the three highest players in Usage% (assuming the season has those numbers), the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's nothing fancy; it's literally just me feeding the player's regular season numbers into Stathead and looking for player-seasons in the recent past (the more recent the better) that are reasonably comparable. This is *not* intended to be anything other than fun. I find it to be a neat way to re-conceive what a roster truly was when translated out of the trappings of their laundry and era. The method suffers when translating man defense, as steals/blocks/defensive rating are very approximate estimates of a player's defensive contributions. When I say something like:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#65. The 2009 Denver Nuggets
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +9.40, Standard Deviations: +1.76, Lost in Conference Finals
Regular Season Record: 54-28, Regular Season SRS: +3.13 (98th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.1 (76th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.5 (82nd)
PG: Chauncey Billups (32), +3.4 / +6.1
SG: J.R. Smith (23), +2.2 / +1.9
SF: Carmelo Anthony (24), +0.5 / +5.0
PF: Kenyon Martin (31), +0.3 / -1.0
C: Nene Hilario (26), +2.0 / +0.2
6th: Chris Anderson (30), +2.2 / +3.0
Usage: Carmelo Anthony (31.5), J.R. Smith (24.2%), Chauncey Billups (21.8%)
Scoring/100: Carmelo Anthony (33.6 / -1.2%), J.R. Smith (28.0 / +3.2%), Chauncey Billups (25.8 / +5.1%)
Assists/100: Chauncey Billups (9.2), J.R. Smith (5.1), Carmelo Anthony (5.0)
Heliocentrism: 27.8% (63rd of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 37.6% (43rd)
Depth: 34.6% (23rd)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +10.23 (9th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -3.30 (71st)
Playoff SRS: +13.99 (14th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +6.27 (4th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.50 (42nd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.72 (57th)
Round 1: New Orleans Hornets (+1.4), won 4-1, by +24.2 points per game (+25.6 SRS eq)
Round 2: Dallas Mavericks (+4.0), won 4-1, by +7.8 points per game (+11.8 SRS eq)
Round 3: Los Angeles Lakers (+9.9), lost 4-2, by -3.7 points per game (+6.2 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2015 Mike Conley (but better on offense)
SG: 2016 Gordon Hayward (but slightly worse)
SF: 2019 Blake Griffin
PF: 2018 Robert Covington (slightly worse)
C: 2018 Rudy Gobert
6th: 2012 Tyson Chandler
Weird. So you’ve got a skilled scoring point guard, a do everything but not great small forward, a capable scoring two and then a bunch of defensive dunker types. This roster really doesn’t scream “One of the Top 75 Teams of All-Time”, but who knows?
So yeah. I’ll take my lumps on this team being on the list. There are a few teams whose rankings will generate some disagreement, and I 100% did not expect this team on the list. Their regular season was pretty weak, but their playoff performance was exceptional.
In 2003 the Nuggets took Carmelo Anthony with the #3 pick overall. The Nuggets going forward would feel a long series of capable teams but never anything dominant; usually slightly above average. In 2007 they added an aging Allen Iverson but the addition didn’t move the needle too much. 2008 ended with a 50-win season (but an eight-seed) and a first round exit. Three games into the ‘09 season the Nuggets traded Iverson to the Pistons for Chauncey Billups and Kenyon Martin. I’d love to say that the trade transformed the team but it really didn’t; the Nuggets ended up winning 54 games (a four-win improvement on the prior season) but their SRS was pretty much the same. Only, in 2009, winning 54 games got them the #2 seed.
Round 1 they faced the ‘09 Hornets (aka, Chris Paul and nobody else). The Nuggets were a two-point SRS favorite. They won Game 1 by 29 points. The rest of the games went: win by 15, loss by 2, win by 58, win by 21. The Nuggets simply dominated. The normally turnover-resistant Chris Paul turned it over 5 times a game and the Nuggets *as a team* shot +6.2%. Carmelo put up a mere 24-6-5 on +0%, but Chauncey Billups had a 23-4-7 on +19.2%. If you were looking for evidence of Chris Paul choking, you’d find it here. But this was a 24.2 point per game shellacking. This doesn’t happen unless the Nuggets were playing out of their minds, which they were. Now, you know that my formula loves playoff blowouts, so it certainly smiled on the Nuggets for this win.
But in the next round they faced a tougher test, the +4.0 Dallas Mavericks who were quite similar to their championship squad in 2011 (minus a few pieces). Again, the Nuggets shredded the opposition. It’s not that the Mavericks’ offense struggled; Dirk had a sensational 34-12-4 on +11.6% shooting and the Mavs ORating was north of their regular season average. But the Nuggets shot over +6% as a team again. In fact all of Carmelo, Billups, J.R. Smith and Nene shot at +6% or better (Billups’ 22-4-7 on +15.2% led the way). It wasn’t even that the Nuggets were shooting lights out from 3; as a team they only shot 37.3%. The Nuggets took the series by 7.8 points per game, an excellent result against a good team. At this point the Nuggets had proved that the first round was no fluke. They were a team (and more to the point, an offense) to be reckoned with.
But in the Conference Finals they faced the ‘09 Lakers. The Lakers (now with Pau Gasol for a full year) were on a revenge tour, aimed straight at the Finals where they’d been humiliated the year before. Their first two rounds were +11.5 SRS eq and +13.3 SRS eq. The Lakers’s wins may not have been quite as showy, but there was every reason to think that the Lakers would be a formidable foe. In Game 1 the Nuggets shot lights out again (though only +3.2%) but the Lakers crushed them on the boards, bagging 17 offensive rebounds (Pau collected 6) to Denver’s 7. Kobe got the credit for the game (40-6-4 on +4.9%) but the Lakers had 11 more shooting possessions and won by two. Carmelo’s outstanding 39-6-4 on +28.5% was in vain.
Game 2 was played hard by both teams, but the Nuggets edged out a win by 3 on a 27-2-4 on +6.9% from Chauncey Billups. Game 3 was the first time in the series that the Nuggets’ offense struggled. Billups shot below league average, Carmelo shot at +0.4% and the team shot 18.5% from three. Given that Kobe put up a 41-6-5 on +10.8%, it’s a wonder that the Lakers only won by 6. In Game 4 it was the Nuggets that controlled the glass, with Nene grabbing 7 offensive boards (and Chris Andersen grabbing 4 offensive and 10 defensive in only 24 minutes). The extra 11 shooting possessions paid off, because Carmelo struggled with a 15-3-5 on -18.4% shooting. And the Lakers themselves had an off-night (Kobe shot -0.8%) and the Nuggets ran away with the game by 19.
So. Four games, split down the middle, the Nuggets holding their own. The next game the Nuggets struggle to shoot again. They shoot 29.2% from three, Carmelo scores 31 on -0.4% efficiency while Billups shoots +26.2% but on only 7-8 shots. In the meantime all of Gasol, Bryant and Ariza shoot at +7% or better and the Lakers take the win by 9. Game 6 goes back to Denver, a chance to even up the series.
It was a massacre. The Lakers won all Four Factors. Billups turned the ball over five times, the Nuggets only got seven offensive boards all game and Carmelo shot best among the starters at -1.4%. Meanwhile Pau Gasol put up a 20-12-6 on +18.3% and Kobe had an even better game with a masterful 35-6-10 on +18.6%. The Lakers ran away with it by 27 points. So ended the Nuggets’ playoff run.
Now. You may well be thinking, “Of course they lost, we already knew the Nuggets shouldn’t be on this list, let’s move on.” But the Nuggets only lost by 3.7 points a game. In a postseason where the Lakers would stomp pretty much everybody, the Nuggets played them far tighter than anyone else (the other series were by 9.4, 9.2 and 7.3 points per game). The ‘09 Lakers have a legitimate argument as one of the best teams of the aughts, and the ‘09 Nuggets played them tight, while easily defeating everyone else. Do I really think that the ‘09 Nuggets were the 65th best team ever? Well . . . Probably not? The fact that the same team came back next year and was knocked out in the first round isn’t great. That said, teams catching fire and getting hot in the playoffs absolutely happens and, historically, teams are credited for it. I’ll end this with the following: I don’t know if they’re the 65th best team ever, but that ‘09 playoff run was excellent and really deserves to be remembered.
Regular Season Record: 54-28, Regular Season SRS: +3.13 (98th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.1 (76th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.5 (82nd)
PG: Chauncey Billups (32), +3.4 / +6.1
SG: J.R. Smith (23), +2.2 / +1.9
SF: Carmelo Anthony (24), +0.5 / +5.0
PF: Kenyon Martin (31), +0.3 / -1.0
C: Nene Hilario (26), +2.0 / +0.2
6th: Chris Anderson (30), +2.2 / +3.0
Usage: Carmelo Anthony (31.5), J.R. Smith (24.2%), Chauncey Billups (21.8%)
Scoring/100: Carmelo Anthony (33.6 / -1.2%), J.R. Smith (28.0 / +3.2%), Chauncey Billups (25.8 / +5.1%)
Assists/100: Chauncey Billups (9.2), J.R. Smith (5.1), Carmelo Anthony (5.0)
Heliocentrism: 27.8% (63rd of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 37.6% (43rd)
Depth: 34.6% (23rd)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +10.23 (9th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -3.30 (71st)
Playoff SRS: +13.99 (14th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +6.27 (4th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.50 (42nd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.72 (57th)
Round 1: New Orleans Hornets (+1.4), won 4-1, by +24.2 points per game (+25.6 SRS eq)
Round 2: Dallas Mavericks (+4.0), won 4-1, by +7.8 points per game (+11.8 SRS eq)
Round 3: Los Angeles Lakers (+9.9), lost 4-2, by -3.7 points per game (+6.2 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2015 Mike Conley (but better on offense)
SG: 2016 Gordon Hayward (but slightly worse)
SF: 2019 Blake Griffin
PF: 2018 Robert Covington (slightly worse)
C: 2018 Rudy Gobert
6th: 2012 Tyson Chandler
Weird. So you’ve got a skilled scoring point guard, a do everything but not great small forward, a capable scoring two and then a bunch of defensive dunker types. This roster really doesn’t scream “One of the Top 75 Teams of All-Time”, but who knows?
So yeah. I’ll take my lumps on this team being on the list. There are a few teams whose rankings will generate some disagreement, and I 100% did not expect this team on the list. Their regular season was pretty weak, but their playoff performance was exceptional.
In 2003 the Nuggets took Carmelo Anthony with the #3 pick overall. The Nuggets going forward would feel a long series of capable teams but never anything dominant; usually slightly above average. In 2007 they added an aging Allen Iverson but the addition didn’t move the needle too much. 2008 ended with a 50-win season (but an eight-seed) and a first round exit. Three games into the ‘09 season the Nuggets traded Iverson to the Pistons for Chauncey Billups and Kenyon Martin. I’d love to say that the trade transformed the team but it really didn’t; the Nuggets ended up winning 54 games (a four-win improvement on the prior season) but their SRS was pretty much the same. Only, in 2009, winning 54 games got them the #2 seed.
Round 1 they faced the ‘09 Hornets (aka, Chris Paul and nobody else). The Nuggets were a two-point SRS favorite. They won Game 1 by 29 points. The rest of the games went: win by 15, loss by 2, win by 58, win by 21. The Nuggets simply dominated. The normally turnover-resistant Chris Paul turned it over 5 times a game and the Nuggets *as a team* shot +6.2%. Carmelo put up a mere 24-6-5 on +0%, but Chauncey Billups had a 23-4-7 on +19.2%. If you were looking for evidence of Chris Paul choking, you’d find it here. But this was a 24.2 point per game shellacking. This doesn’t happen unless the Nuggets were playing out of their minds, which they were. Now, you know that my formula loves playoff blowouts, so it certainly smiled on the Nuggets for this win.
But in the next round they faced a tougher test, the +4.0 Dallas Mavericks who were quite similar to their championship squad in 2011 (minus a few pieces). Again, the Nuggets shredded the opposition. It’s not that the Mavericks’ offense struggled; Dirk had a sensational 34-12-4 on +11.6% shooting and the Mavs ORating was north of their regular season average. But the Nuggets shot over +6% as a team again. In fact all of Carmelo, Billups, J.R. Smith and Nene shot at +6% or better (Billups’ 22-4-7 on +15.2% led the way). It wasn’t even that the Nuggets were shooting lights out from 3; as a team they only shot 37.3%. The Nuggets took the series by 7.8 points per game, an excellent result against a good team. At this point the Nuggets had proved that the first round was no fluke. They were a team (and more to the point, an offense) to be reckoned with.
But in the Conference Finals they faced the ‘09 Lakers. The Lakers (now with Pau Gasol for a full year) were on a revenge tour, aimed straight at the Finals where they’d been humiliated the year before. Their first two rounds were +11.5 SRS eq and +13.3 SRS eq. The Lakers’s wins may not have been quite as showy, but there was every reason to think that the Lakers would be a formidable foe. In Game 1 the Nuggets shot lights out again (though only +3.2%) but the Lakers crushed them on the boards, bagging 17 offensive rebounds (Pau collected 6) to Denver’s 7. Kobe got the credit for the game (40-6-4 on +4.9%) but the Lakers had 11 more shooting possessions and won by two. Carmelo’s outstanding 39-6-4 on +28.5% was in vain.
Game 2 was played hard by both teams, but the Nuggets edged out a win by 3 on a 27-2-4 on +6.9% from Chauncey Billups. Game 3 was the first time in the series that the Nuggets’ offense struggled. Billups shot below league average, Carmelo shot at +0.4% and the team shot 18.5% from three. Given that Kobe put up a 41-6-5 on +10.8%, it’s a wonder that the Lakers only won by 6. In Game 4 it was the Nuggets that controlled the glass, with Nene grabbing 7 offensive boards (and Chris Andersen grabbing 4 offensive and 10 defensive in only 24 minutes). The extra 11 shooting possessions paid off, because Carmelo struggled with a 15-3-5 on -18.4% shooting. And the Lakers themselves had an off-night (Kobe shot -0.8%) and the Nuggets ran away with the game by 19.
So. Four games, split down the middle, the Nuggets holding their own. The next game the Nuggets struggle to shoot again. They shoot 29.2% from three, Carmelo scores 31 on -0.4% efficiency while Billups shoots +26.2% but on only 7-8 shots. In the meantime all of Gasol, Bryant and Ariza shoot at +7% or better and the Lakers take the win by 9. Game 6 goes back to Denver, a chance to even up the series.
It was a massacre. The Lakers won all Four Factors. Billups turned the ball over five times, the Nuggets only got seven offensive boards all game and Carmelo shot best among the starters at -1.4%. Meanwhile Pau Gasol put up a 20-12-6 on +18.3% and Kobe had an even better game with a masterful 35-6-10 on +18.6%. The Lakers ran away with it by 27 points. So ended the Nuggets’ playoff run.
Now. You may well be thinking, “Of course they lost, we already knew the Nuggets shouldn’t be on this list, let’s move on.” But the Nuggets only lost by 3.7 points a game. In a postseason where the Lakers would stomp pretty much everybody, the Nuggets played them far tighter than anyone else (the other series were by 9.4, 9.2 and 7.3 points per game). The ‘09 Lakers have a legitimate argument as one of the best teams of the aughts, and the ‘09 Nuggets played them tight, while easily defeating everyone else. Do I really think that the ‘09 Nuggets were the 65th best team ever? Well . . . Probably not? The fact that the same team came back next year and was knocked out in the first round isn’t great. That said, teams catching fire and getting hot in the playoffs absolutely happens and, historically, teams are credited for it. I’ll end this with the following: I don’t know if they’re the 65th best team ever, but that ‘09 playoff run was excellent and really deserves to be remembered.
#64. The 1997 Utah Jazz
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +9.13, Standard Deviations: +1.64, Lost in NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 64-18, Regular Season SRS: +7.97 (25th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +6.9 (8th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.7 (63rd)
PG: John Stockton (34), +6.6 / +7.8
SG: Jeff Hornacek (33), +3.9 / +2.7
SF: Bryon Russell (26), +1.9 / +2.1
PF: Karl Malone (33), +8.2 / +4.0
C: Greg Ostertag (23), -0.3 / +0.3
Usage: Karl Malone (32.7%), Jeff Hornacek (20.3%), John Stockton (18.4%)
Scoring/100: Karl Malone (40.0 / +6.4%), Jeff Hornacek (24.5 / +6.0), John Stockton (21.8 / +12.0%)
Assists/100: John Stockton (15.8), Jeff Hornacek (7.4), Karl Malone (6.5)
Heliocentrism: 38.9% (34th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 51.5% (3rd)
Depth: 9.6% (73rd)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.52 (35th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -3.10 (74th)
Playoff SRS: +9.81 (68th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.16 (77th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +3.10 (23rd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.72 (31st)
Round 1: Los Angeles Clippers (-2.7), won 3-0, by +12.7 points per game (+10.0 SRS eq)
Round 2: Los Angeles Lakers (+5.4), won 4-1, by +3.6 points per game (+9.0 SRS eq)
Round 3: Houston Rockets (+6.6), won 4-2, by +2.3 points per game (+8.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: Chicago Bulls (+11.9), lost 2-4, outscored by 0.6 points per game (+11.3 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2013 Chris Paul
SG: 2015 Klay Thompson (better passing, less shooting)
SF: 2013 Thabo Sefalosha (better scoring)
PF: 2018 Giannis Antetokounmpo (better scoring)
C: 2011 Emeka Okafor (fewer turnovers)
I love these comps. Bryon Russell being a better-shooting Sefalosha works for me just fine. Ostertag as Okafor is fine. And Hornacek as a better passing, less-shooting Klay Thompson is easy to work with. But I looooove the last two. Stockton to Paul isn’t something I’d have come to easily, but they have a lot of similarities. They rack up tons of assists but they risk very little and so generate very few turnovers. They don’t take a ton of shots, but what they do take, they make at a high rate. And they’re both positive defenders. I guess I really like it because they’re both very skilled but very cautious distributors, and both have a reputation for struggling in the playoffs. And I wasn’t sure who I’d get for Malone, but Giannis is *perfect*. Massive volume at good efficiency, great rebounding, not a ton of spacing, competent but not strong passing and quality defense (the ‘18 Giannis model is graded as a down year defensively for him). I'm not saying their style of play is terribly similar, but they show up in the box score very similarly. And both of them also have reputations for struggling in the playoffs. And yet, look at that roster. Wouldn’t that give you a monstrous offense? Giannis, plus ‘13 Chris Paul, plus Klay Thompson? Now *that* would be Lob City!
The Jazz put together the 8th best regular season offense on this list, which is no mean feat. The curious part is that they were only about average at ball control and offensive rebounding. Their domination was all in making shots and getting to the line; they ranked #1 in both categories for 1997. This was a well-oiled machine; all of their four leading shooters averaged +6% or better rTS% and all of them got to the line a lot (the lowest of the starters, Jeff Hornacek still had a FTr of 0.381). And their defense was also quite good. They fouled a ton (most in the league), but they owned their boards, generated a lot of steals (four starters averaged at least 2 Steal%) and played solid shot defense. But it was their offense that led the way.
The Utah Jazz had been metronomically excellent since forever, but with little to show for it. In ‘89 and ‘90 they’d put up 51 and 55 wins, but been knocked out in the first round both years. In ‘91 they won 54 games, but only made it to the semis. In ‘92 they put up a strong +5.7 SRS year and made it to the Conference Finals but got whipped by the Blazers. In ‘94 they won 53 games and made the Conference Finals again but were defeated by the Rockets. In ‘95 they posted a 60-win season with a +7.76 SRS only to be bounced in the first round by the future-champion Rockets. In ‘96 they made it to the Conference Finals again, only to be edged out by the Sonics. The ‘97 regular season had been better than any of these; but after over a decade of playoff disappointment (the Jazz hadn’t missed the playoffs since 1983), it would be easy to be skeptical. In the preseason odds the Jazz had been placed 10th, behind the Lakers, Sonics, Rockets and Spurs. The Jazz would get to face two of them.
In the first round they drew the Clippers (-2.7) who had no business in the playoffs and the Jazz made that very clear. Malone did his high-usage thing (31-11-2 on +1.6%) but Hornacek, Stockton, Russell, Carr and Eisley combined for 60.9 points a game all on +7.7% or better. The Jazz as a team shot +7.5%, they dominated the boards and posted a dominant 121.7 ORating for the series. It was a 12.7 point per game blowout, appropriate for a meeting between a title contender and a bad team.
In the second round easy street was over, as they faced the +5.4 Los Angeles Lakers. Shaq was only 24 at this time and Kobe was only 18, so they were at that time only a capable precursor to what they’d become. It was a tight contest. Shaq struggled with a 22-12-3 on -1.3% but Malone posted a 29-13-2 on -3.1%. The difference was that the wingmen for the Jazz shot quite well (Russell, Hornacek and Stockton combined for 45.4 points per game on +5.4% shooting or better) while those on the Lakers did not. And while Shaq grabbed a ton of offensive boards (5 a game) the Jazz’ team effort gave them a small edge. In the end, the Jazz prevailed by 3.6 points a game, a solid performance if not exciting on this list (anything below +10 SRS eq is below average on this list).
In the Conference Finals they faced the +6.6 Houston Rockets. Houston had been only good in the regular season, but (as was usual for them in the mid-90s) turned it on in the playoffs, wrecking the Timberwolves by 11.3 points a game and narrowly getting revenge on the +8.7 Seattle Supersonics by beating them in 7. They boasted Hakeem, Drexler *and* Barkley, though they were all in the 33-34 range, so that didn’t do them any favors. Nevertheless, it promised to be another tough series. And it was. Hakeem could not be contained, posting a 27/9/4 on a sexy +10.3% and adding 2 steals and 3.3 blocks a game. The rest of the Rockets couldn’t match that, but as a team they shot +2.6% above average. The Jazz shot slightly worse; and in a duel of first options Malone struggled, posting a 24/12/3 on -4.2%, but the rest of the roster did their usual efficient thing: Stockton averaged a 21/4/10 on +11.5% and the next five scorers all shot at +2.5% or better. The Jazz may have been outshot but they averaged five more shooting possessions a game. A little of it was turnovers, but most was on the boards. Greg Ostertag and Karl Malone both posted DRB%s of 26% or higher; Hakeem and Barkley were no longer the offensive rebounders that they had been. The Jazz pulled it out by 2.3 points per game and advanced to the inevitable, a showdown with the Chicago Bulls.
The ‘97 Bulls may not have been as good as the ‘96 edition, but they were good enough, posting prior series SRSs of +7.8, +13.9 and +15 (not to mention a +10.7 SRS regular season). Going into the game the Bulls were considered (by OSRS) a three point favorite. Game 1 was tight, with the Jazz leading by 2 going into the fourth quarter. Going down the stretch Malone and Stockton shot well (14 points on +6.5% shooting) but Antonine Carr shot 2 of 5 off the bench (the Jazz played Carr often in this series over Ostertag, apparently banking on Carr’s far greater experience (12 years older) and better passing at the expense of almost everything else - Ostertag’s scoring had been a non-factor in the playoffs and Carr had done better in that regard, but Ostertag’s rebounding and defense had been outstanding, so it’s an interesting decision). In contrast to the Jazz duo’s 14 on +6.5%, Pippen and Jordan combined for 16 points on +8.5%. Pretty comparable; the real difference in the quarter was Rodman’s two steals (off Stockton) which gave the Bulls the extra shot attempts necessary to pull off the two point win.
Game 2 was not so close, with the Bulls winning all Four Factors. Malone really struggled (20/13/1 on -14%), while Jordan had an exceptional 38/13/9 on +11.4% and the Bulls ran away with it by 12. When the series went to Utah the Jazz turned it up. In Game 3 the Bulls shot well (+1.6% as a team) with Pippen posting a 27/4/4 on +26%. But the Jazz got 12 extra shooting possessions (mostly on the boards, with Rodman only grabbing 3 while Ostertag got 5 offensive rebounds in only 23 minutes) and that was enough to carry the Jazz to an 11 point win. Hornacek really struggled, scoring four points on ten shooting possessions (Malone posted a 37/10/3 on +1.8% and Stockton a 17/7/12 on +11.4%). Game 4 was a defensive siege, where the Jazz suffocated the Bulls’ shooting. Pippen scored 16 on -7.2% and Jordan scored 22 on -12.9%. The Bulls got about 8 or so extra shots but it wasn’t enough; Malone put up a 23/10/6 on -0.5% and Stockton had a 17/3/12 on +13%. The game was tied going into the fourth but the Jazz closed it out in style, with Malone and Stockton combining for a 14/5/6 on +12% in the quarter. The Jazz took the game (and the quarter) by 5. They were tied with the Bulls.
Game 5 was another tight contest, the famous Flu Game. The Jazz played Ostertag most of the game and controlled the boards (as they always seemed to with both Malone and Ostertag on the court). The Jazz led by five going into the fourth. Jordan went on a tear, scoring 15 points on +15.3%, while the entire Jazz starting lineup combined to shoot 3 of 15 from the floor (11 points on -22.4%) and the Bulls pulled it out by two. Game 6 was back in Chicago. Once again, the Jazz led going into the fourth, this time by 6. Both teams went small, with the Jazz sitting Ostertag for Shandon Anderson and the Bulls sitting Longley and Harper for Kukoc and Kerr. The Jazz’ starters shot well (their big four scorers scored 14 on +8.9%) on the quarter. But the Bulls stormed back, coming from behind and winning by 4. Was it Jordan? The traditional narrative, that Jordan’s clutchy clutchness led the Bulls to the win doesn’t really hold; Jordan scored 10 on -11.9%. There were two subtle differences: the Jazz’ bench sucked (Shandon Anderson went 1 of 6) while Kerr and Kukoc combined for 11 points on +15%, and that the Bulls got 10 extra field goal attempts, on account of two steals (Pippen and Rodman, the Jazz generated none) and offensive rebounds (Jordan, Pippen and Rodman each grabbed one). The Bulls had pulled it off, and the Jazz had lost. Some notes on the series overall: the Bulls only outscored the Jazz by 0.6 points a game. Jordan averaged a 32/7/6 on -0.4%, while Malone averaged a 24/10/4 on -5.1%, Stockton averaged a 15/4/9 on +7.7% and Hornacek a 12/4/2 on -1.8%.
So where does this leave us? Well, first, the ‘97 Bulls were really good and the Jazz played them super-close. Skeptics may say “but they kept blowing fourth quarter leads” (actually, the Jazz did pull off a fourth quarter win in Game 4), but let’s put it this way: the Jazz were good enough to be leading the ‘97 Bulls after three quarters several times. That’s a big achievement. People hold up the ‘97 Jazz as an example of where they failed; I think it’s a great example of how damned good they were. Playing a great team almost to a draw is a great achievement.
And, honestly, the idea that the Jazz sucked in the playoffs clearly isn’t true. Their playoff offense and defense were really close to their regular season offense and defense. The knock on the Jazz, from what I can see, isn’t that they were bad in the playoffs (they were damned good), it’s that they didn’t have that extra gear. It’s not uncommon to see great teams get better in the playoffs: go from +5 SRS to +8 SRS, go from +10 SRS to +15 SRS, whatever. They play their better lineups, they strategize better, they go for the jugular and they play better. And the ‘97 Jazz didn’t seem to have that. Their regular season level of play was about as good as they got. And I wonder if this is tied to their roster makeup and lack of Bench rating. It’s not that Malone fell apart in the playoffs; the guy was a fantastic rebounder, decent passer and strong defender. The difference is that he jacked his usage rate into the stratosphere and didn’t have a robust enough offensive game for his efficiency to survive. But, looking at the rest of his team, it almost seems like the entire rest of the roster had little ability to create its own shot, which forced Malone to eat more possessions to prop the offense up. The more I look at this team (and how weak its bench was), the more I feel like Malone’s reputation as a playoff choker was a lot more a product of the fact that his team was too weak to carry its part of the postseason offense. It’s not that he couldn’t be a first option: Malone was a bomb-ass first option as long as it was only for 30% usage or something. But around 40%? Not a good scene.
Still. I don’t think people give the ‘97 Jazz the credit they deserve.
Regular Season Record: 64-18, Regular Season SRS: +7.97 (25th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +6.9 (8th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -2.7 (63rd)
PG: John Stockton (34), +6.6 / +7.8
SG: Jeff Hornacek (33), +3.9 / +2.7
SF: Bryon Russell (26), +1.9 / +2.1
PF: Karl Malone (33), +8.2 / +4.0
C: Greg Ostertag (23), -0.3 / +0.3
Usage: Karl Malone (32.7%), Jeff Hornacek (20.3%), John Stockton (18.4%)
Scoring/100: Karl Malone (40.0 / +6.4%), Jeff Hornacek (24.5 / +6.0), John Stockton (21.8 / +12.0%)
Assists/100: John Stockton (15.8), Jeff Hornacek (7.4), Karl Malone (6.5)
Heliocentrism: 38.9% (34th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 51.5% (3rd)
Depth: 9.6% (73rd)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.52 (35th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -3.10 (74th)
Playoff SRS: +9.81 (68th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +1.16 (77th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +3.10 (23rd), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.72 (31st)
Round 1: Los Angeles Clippers (-2.7), won 3-0, by +12.7 points per game (+10.0 SRS eq)
Round 2: Los Angeles Lakers (+5.4), won 4-1, by +3.6 points per game (+9.0 SRS eq)
Round 3: Houston Rockets (+6.6), won 4-2, by +2.3 points per game (+8.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: Chicago Bulls (+11.9), lost 2-4, outscored by 0.6 points per game (+11.3 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2013 Chris Paul
SG: 2015 Klay Thompson (better passing, less shooting)
SF: 2013 Thabo Sefalosha (better scoring)
PF: 2018 Giannis Antetokounmpo (better scoring)
C: 2011 Emeka Okafor (fewer turnovers)
I love these comps. Bryon Russell being a better-shooting Sefalosha works for me just fine. Ostertag as Okafor is fine. And Hornacek as a better passing, less-shooting Klay Thompson is easy to work with. But I looooove the last two. Stockton to Paul isn’t something I’d have come to easily, but they have a lot of similarities. They rack up tons of assists but they risk very little and so generate very few turnovers. They don’t take a ton of shots, but what they do take, they make at a high rate. And they’re both positive defenders. I guess I really like it because they’re both very skilled but very cautious distributors, and both have a reputation for struggling in the playoffs. And I wasn’t sure who I’d get for Malone, but Giannis is *perfect*. Massive volume at good efficiency, great rebounding, not a ton of spacing, competent but not strong passing and quality defense (the ‘18 Giannis model is graded as a down year defensively for him). I'm not saying their style of play is terribly similar, but they show up in the box score very similarly. And both of them also have reputations for struggling in the playoffs. And yet, look at that roster. Wouldn’t that give you a monstrous offense? Giannis, plus ‘13 Chris Paul, plus Klay Thompson? Now *that* would be Lob City!
The Jazz put together the 8th best regular season offense on this list, which is no mean feat. The curious part is that they were only about average at ball control and offensive rebounding. Their domination was all in making shots and getting to the line; they ranked #1 in both categories for 1997. This was a well-oiled machine; all of their four leading shooters averaged +6% or better rTS% and all of them got to the line a lot (the lowest of the starters, Jeff Hornacek still had a FTr of 0.381). And their defense was also quite good. They fouled a ton (most in the league), but they owned their boards, generated a lot of steals (four starters averaged at least 2 Steal%) and played solid shot defense. But it was their offense that led the way.
The Utah Jazz had been metronomically excellent since forever, but with little to show for it. In ‘89 and ‘90 they’d put up 51 and 55 wins, but been knocked out in the first round both years. In ‘91 they won 54 games, but only made it to the semis. In ‘92 they put up a strong +5.7 SRS year and made it to the Conference Finals but got whipped by the Blazers. In ‘94 they won 53 games and made the Conference Finals again but were defeated by the Rockets. In ‘95 they posted a 60-win season with a +7.76 SRS only to be bounced in the first round by the future-champion Rockets. In ‘96 they made it to the Conference Finals again, only to be edged out by the Sonics. The ‘97 regular season had been better than any of these; but after over a decade of playoff disappointment (the Jazz hadn’t missed the playoffs since 1983), it would be easy to be skeptical. In the preseason odds the Jazz had been placed 10th, behind the Lakers, Sonics, Rockets and Spurs. The Jazz would get to face two of them.
In the first round they drew the Clippers (-2.7) who had no business in the playoffs and the Jazz made that very clear. Malone did his high-usage thing (31-11-2 on +1.6%) but Hornacek, Stockton, Russell, Carr and Eisley combined for 60.9 points a game all on +7.7% or better. The Jazz as a team shot +7.5%, they dominated the boards and posted a dominant 121.7 ORating for the series. It was a 12.7 point per game blowout, appropriate for a meeting between a title contender and a bad team.
In the second round easy street was over, as they faced the +5.4 Los Angeles Lakers. Shaq was only 24 at this time and Kobe was only 18, so they were at that time only a capable precursor to what they’d become. It was a tight contest. Shaq struggled with a 22-12-3 on -1.3% but Malone posted a 29-13-2 on -3.1%. The difference was that the wingmen for the Jazz shot quite well (Russell, Hornacek and Stockton combined for 45.4 points per game on +5.4% shooting or better) while those on the Lakers did not. And while Shaq grabbed a ton of offensive boards (5 a game) the Jazz’ team effort gave them a small edge. In the end, the Jazz prevailed by 3.6 points a game, a solid performance if not exciting on this list (anything below +10 SRS eq is below average on this list).
In the Conference Finals they faced the +6.6 Houston Rockets. Houston had been only good in the regular season, but (as was usual for them in the mid-90s) turned it on in the playoffs, wrecking the Timberwolves by 11.3 points a game and narrowly getting revenge on the +8.7 Seattle Supersonics by beating them in 7. They boasted Hakeem, Drexler *and* Barkley, though they were all in the 33-34 range, so that didn’t do them any favors. Nevertheless, it promised to be another tough series. And it was. Hakeem could not be contained, posting a 27/9/4 on a sexy +10.3% and adding 2 steals and 3.3 blocks a game. The rest of the Rockets couldn’t match that, but as a team they shot +2.6% above average. The Jazz shot slightly worse; and in a duel of first options Malone struggled, posting a 24/12/3 on -4.2%, but the rest of the roster did their usual efficient thing: Stockton averaged a 21/4/10 on +11.5% and the next five scorers all shot at +2.5% or better. The Jazz may have been outshot but they averaged five more shooting possessions a game. A little of it was turnovers, but most was on the boards. Greg Ostertag and Karl Malone both posted DRB%s of 26% or higher; Hakeem and Barkley were no longer the offensive rebounders that they had been. The Jazz pulled it out by 2.3 points per game and advanced to the inevitable, a showdown with the Chicago Bulls.
The ‘97 Bulls may not have been as good as the ‘96 edition, but they were good enough, posting prior series SRSs of +7.8, +13.9 and +15 (not to mention a +10.7 SRS regular season). Going into the game the Bulls were considered (by OSRS) a three point favorite. Game 1 was tight, with the Jazz leading by 2 going into the fourth quarter. Going down the stretch Malone and Stockton shot well (14 points on +6.5% shooting) but Antonine Carr shot 2 of 5 off the bench (the Jazz played Carr often in this series over Ostertag, apparently banking on Carr’s far greater experience (12 years older) and better passing at the expense of almost everything else - Ostertag’s scoring had been a non-factor in the playoffs and Carr had done better in that regard, but Ostertag’s rebounding and defense had been outstanding, so it’s an interesting decision). In contrast to the Jazz duo’s 14 on +6.5%, Pippen and Jordan combined for 16 points on +8.5%. Pretty comparable; the real difference in the quarter was Rodman’s two steals (off Stockton) which gave the Bulls the extra shot attempts necessary to pull off the two point win.
Game 2 was not so close, with the Bulls winning all Four Factors. Malone really struggled (20/13/1 on -14%), while Jordan had an exceptional 38/13/9 on +11.4% and the Bulls ran away with it by 12. When the series went to Utah the Jazz turned it up. In Game 3 the Bulls shot well (+1.6% as a team) with Pippen posting a 27/4/4 on +26%. But the Jazz got 12 extra shooting possessions (mostly on the boards, with Rodman only grabbing 3 while Ostertag got 5 offensive rebounds in only 23 minutes) and that was enough to carry the Jazz to an 11 point win. Hornacek really struggled, scoring four points on ten shooting possessions (Malone posted a 37/10/3 on +1.8% and Stockton a 17/7/12 on +11.4%). Game 4 was a defensive siege, where the Jazz suffocated the Bulls’ shooting. Pippen scored 16 on -7.2% and Jordan scored 22 on -12.9%. The Bulls got about 8 or so extra shots but it wasn’t enough; Malone put up a 23/10/6 on -0.5% and Stockton had a 17/3/12 on +13%. The game was tied going into the fourth but the Jazz closed it out in style, with Malone and Stockton combining for a 14/5/6 on +12% in the quarter. The Jazz took the game (and the quarter) by 5. They were tied with the Bulls.
Game 5 was another tight contest, the famous Flu Game. The Jazz played Ostertag most of the game and controlled the boards (as they always seemed to with both Malone and Ostertag on the court). The Jazz led by five going into the fourth. Jordan went on a tear, scoring 15 points on +15.3%, while the entire Jazz starting lineup combined to shoot 3 of 15 from the floor (11 points on -22.4%) and the Bulls pulled it out by two. Game 6 was back in Chicago. Once again, the Jazz led going into the fourth, this time by 6. Both teams went small, with the Jazz sitting Ostertag for Shandon Anderson and the Bulls sitting Longley and Harper for Kukoc and Kerr. The Jazz’ starters shot well (their big four scorers scored 14 on +8.9%) on the quarter. But the Bulls stormed back, coming from behind and winning by 4. Was it Jordan? The traditional narrative, that Jordan’s clutchy clutchness led the Bulls to the win doesn’t really hold; Jordan scored 10 on -11.9%. There were two subtle differences: the Jazz’ bench sucked (Shandon Anderson went 1 of 6) while Kerr and Kukoc combined for 11 points on +15%, and that the Bulls got 10 extra field goal attempts, on account of two steals (Pippen and Rodman, the Jazz generated none) and offensive rebounds (Jordan, Pippen and Rodman each grabbed one). The Bulls had pulled it off, and the Jazz had lost. Some notes on the series overall: the Bulls only outscored the Jazz by 0.6 points a game. Jordan averaged a 32/7/6 on -0.4%, while Malone averaged a 24/10/4 on -5.1%, Stockton averaged a 15/4/9 on +7.7% and Hornacek a 12/4/2 on -1.8%.
So where does this leave us? Well, first, the ‘97 Bulls were really good and the Jazz played them super-close. Skeptics may say “but they kept blowing fourth quarter leads” (actually, the Jazz did pull off a fourth quarter win in Game 4), but let’s put it this way: the Jazz were good enough to be leading the ‘97 Bulls after three quarters several times. That’s a big achievement. People hold up the ‘97 Jazz as an example of where they failed; I think it’s a great example of how damned good they were. Playing a great team almost to a draw is a great achievement.
And, honestly, the idea that the Jazz sucked in the playoffs clearly isn’t true. Their playoff offense and defense were really close to their regular season offense and defense. The knock on the Jazz, from what I can see, isn’t that they were bad in the playoffs (they were damned good), it’s that they didn’t have that extra gear. It’s not uncommon to see great teams get better in the playoffs: go from +5 SRS to +8 SRS, go from +10 SRS to +15 SRS, whatever. They play their better lineups, they strategize better, they go for the jugular and they play better. And the ‘97 Jazz didn’t seem to have that. Their regular season level of play was about as good as they got. And I wonder if this is tied to their roster makeup and lack of Bench rating. It’s not that Malone fell apart in the playoffs; the guy was a fantastic rebounder, decent passer and strong defender. The difference is that he jacked his usage rate into the stratosphere and didn’t have a robust enough offensive game for his efficiency to survive. But, looking at the rest of his team, it almost seems like the entire rest of the roster had little ability to create its own shot, which forced Malone to eat more possessions to prop the offense up. The more I look at this team (and how weak its bench was), the more I feel like Malone’s reputation as a playoff choker was a lot more a product of the fact that his team was too weak to carry its part of the postseason offense. It’s not that he couldn’t be a first option: Malone was a bomb-ass first option as long as it was only for 30% usage or something. But around 40%? Not a good scene.
Still. I don’t think people give the ‘97 Jazz the credit they deserve.
#63. The 1984 Los Angeles Lakers
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +7.65, Standard Deviations: +2.20, Lost in NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 54-28, Regular Season SRS: +3.32 (96th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.3 (56th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -0.3 (95th)
PG: Magic Johnson (24), +6.6 / +7.6
SG: Michael Cooper (27), +2.5 / +2.4
SF: James Worthy (22), +0.9 / +2.9
PF: Bob McAdoo (32), -2.8 / -0.8
C: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (36), +3.0 / +6.3
6th: Mike McGee (24), -1.4 / -0.4
7th: Kurt Rambis (25), -1.5 / +0.2
8th: Byron Scott (22), -1.5 / -3.0
Usage: Bob McAdoo (27.4%), Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (25.1%), Byron Scott (21.3%)
Scoring/100: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (30.3 / +6.5%), Bob McAdoo (29.1 / -1.3%), Mike McGee (24.6 / +5.4%)
Assists/100: Magic Johnson (15.8), Michael Cooper (9.3), Byron Scott (5.0)
Heliocentrism: 42.1% (21st of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 45.1% (14th)
Depth: 12.8% (70th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +7.52 (24th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -1.49 (91st)
Playoff SRS: +10.06 (63rd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.33 (16th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.89 (60th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.42 (84th)
Round 1: Sacramento Kings (-1.6), won 3-0, by +8.0 points per game (+6.4 SRS eq)
Round 2: Dallas Mavericks (+0.1), won 4-1, by +14.4 points per game (+14.5 SRS eq)
Round 3: Phoenix Suns (+2.4), won 4-2, by +5.3 points per game (+7.7 SRS eq)
Round 4: Boston Celtics (+8.2), lost 3-4, by +2.3 points per game (+10.5 SRS eq)
In 1982 the Lakers had won the championship. But the next year they were humiliated in the Finals by the 76ers, swept by 10 points a game. Veterans Jamaal Wilkes and Bob McAdoo seemed to be slowing down. But there were two bright points: that the West didn’t have other strong teams, and that the Lakers had acquired James Worthy and Byron Scott through the draft. Scott was acquired in the 1983 Draft (#4 overall) in the trade that finally shipped Norm Nixon out of town and made Magic the new point guard. And Worthy was taken #1 overall the year before.
“Wait a minute!” You may say. “The Lakers had been good; how did they get the #1 overall pick?”
Let’s talk about the Stepien Rule.
You know that Bill Simmons quip about knowing that you’ve arrived when they make a rule to stop you (like the Lew Alcindor rule)? This is the Bizarro version of that. Ted Stepien was a short-duration owner of the Cleveland Cavaliers, who kept trading away future first rounders for overrated veterans (or more often, veterans who weren’t rated at all). Worthy was a future first rounder who was acquired for the #22 pick in the draft and Don Ford. Who is Don Ford you may ask? Exactly. Ted Stepien traded away six future first round picks in five consecutive years. These picks ended up selecting the following: James Worthy, Derek Harper, Sam Perkins, Detlef Schrempf, Roy Tarpley and Dennis Rodman. I’d imagine that Cleveland could have used those guys. Instead Stepien kept trading future picks for present assets (but assets that sucked) and basically gutted the franchise yea unto the seventh generation. The NBA instituted the Stepien rule to stop him all right; it existed to stop an incompetant GM from destroying their team by trading away back-to-back first rounders for nothing (and to this day, it’s why you’ll see first rounders sandwiched around pick swaps, because a pick swap is the most you can do after a traded first). So James Worthy was basically a Christmas present from Cleveland’s worst sports franchise owner (and that’s saying something) to the best team in the Western Conference. Sometimes there’s good, and sometimes there’s lucky. Jerry West getting James Worthy for his championship-caliber squad was both.
That said, 1984 was very much a foot in two canoes kind of season. James Worthy was in his second year and he wasn’t bad . . . but he wasn’t that good either. He was basically a strong-rebounding decent small forward. Which, yay, but it doesn’t really blow your skirt up. And Byron Scott got serious minutes, despite being a few years from being a decent player. They still had the struggling Jamaal Wilkes, and because they’d just traded Norm Nixon they moved Michael Cooper to the 2, even though Cooper was really more of a tweener point guard. And Magic’s usage stayed low (19.5%) because Bob McAdoo still got the most touches on the team, even though he struggled to shoot at league average efficiency. Basically, you could look into the future and think “Man, when Worthy and Scott develop, this team is going to be pretty sweet” but McAdoo (a classic overrated scorer who didn’t create and scored a lot by taking a lot of shots) held everyone back. Actually, that may not have been fair; at this point none of Worthy, Cooper, Kareem or Magic could handle the extra possessions needed to keep the offense running (whether or not Magic could is debatable, but the fact that his usage stayed the same even in the playoffs suggests that the 20% usage rate was the sweet spot for his game at this point in his development). So maybe McAdoo was a necessary inefficiency (not unlike Malone for the postseason ‘97 Jazz).
As befits a team that’s caught between regressing veterans and undeveloped prospects, the Lakers struggled in the regular season. That’s relative to other years; they still got the one seed (by six games) and posted the best SRS in the conference. The top four SRSs in the West were: +3.32, +3.13, +0.81 and +0.65 (the bottom of the West was almost a mirror of that). The East had stronger teams, the +3.52 Pistons, the +4.04 Bucks and most of all the +6.42 Celtics that looked like the team to beat. In the playoffs (as so often happened in the 80s), the Lakers found another gear. In the first round they faced the Kansas City Kings (-1.6) and swept them by 8 points a game, mostly on the back of dominant shooting: the Lakers top six scorers all shot at +2.8% or better. Not a great series (against a weak team) but certainly sufficient.
Next they faced the Dallas Mavericks (+0.1); did I mention that the West was really short on strong teams? The Lakers obliterated them by 14.4 points a game, once again led by dominant shooting (the entire team shot +5.5% which is really good). And in the Conference Finals, against the second best team in the Conference (the +2.4 Phoenix Suns) the Lakers executed another solid win, by 5.3 points a game. Kareem averaged a 24/9/4 on +14.8% and Magic averaged a 18/6/15 on +6.7%. It wasn’t sexy, but it got the job done. And the Lakers advanced to face the Boston Celtics. This iteration of the Celtics was still developing (Maxwell was still the starting 4 while McHale came off the bench)
The series went to seven, as all good Celtics/Lakers Finals should. In Game 1 the Celtics dominated the boards (to the tune of ten extra shooting possessions) but the Lakers *still* won by 6. And they won it the Magic Johnson way, by outshooting the other team by a ton. Four of the Celtics’ starters shot at -7.7% or worse (Bird being the exception) and the team overall shot -4.3%. The Lakers, in contrast, shot +4.9% as a team, led by Kareem’s 32/8/5 on +22% with 2 steals and 2 blocks and Magic’s 18/6/10 on +16.2% with four steals. In Game 2 the Lakers shot even better (+6.6%) but the Celtics had such an insane lead in possession (twenty freaking extra shooting possessions - Cedric Maxwell had eight offensive rebounds, Bird and Parish combined for another seven, while Kareem was the only Laker that had more than one) that the Celtics pulled it off by 3. Off to Los Angeles.
The Lakers absolutely wrecked the Celtics in Game 3. The dominated all Four Factors, and not by a little. Magic had a very Magic 14/11/21 on +13% shooting. I won’t go into more detail because I can’t afford these posts to have an R rating, but the Lakers won by thirty effing three. Against the best team in the East. Dayum. But it was only one game, and Game 4 was basically Game 2 over again (even down to going into overtime). The Celtics dominated the boards (Bird, Parish and McHale combined for 20) had seven more steals and generated 25 extra shooting possessions. And only won by 4, because the Lakers outshot them so hard. Giant raspberry to Bob McAdoo who managed to turn the ball over 5 times in 27 minutes off the bench (the Lakers were starting Rambis), and Magic turned the ball over seven times himself. And it wasted an outstanding scoring night from James Worthy, who scored 30 on +27.6% shooting.
Game 5 went back to Boston and the Celtics outshot the Lakers for the first time in the series, which, as you can imagine, led to a pretty rough outing for the Lakers (18 point loss). Normal stalwarts like Magic and Kareem both struggled, Magic shooting at -11.3%, Kareem going an unthinkable 7 of 25 from the field. It was not the Lakers’ finest hour, but at least the next game would be at home. It was a tough game: Larry Bird played out of his mind with a 28/14/8 on +29.4% and the Celtics led by 4 going into the final quarter. The Lakers scored 36 points in the final twelve minutes to end up winning by a considerable margin, 119-108. The Lakers actually managed to control the boards, with Rambis, Worthy and Kareem combining for 14 offensive rebounds while Michael Cooper pitched in with an efficient 23/6/8 on +12.6% shooting. Kareem moved the chains with a 30/10/5 on -1.9% and Magic had a solid 21/6/10 on +1.3%. Game 7 went back to the Garden.
Game 7 was the entire Finals redux except for one small change. The Lakers outshot the Celtics again, (50.0 eFG to 39.5 eFG) but the Lakers couldn’t keep the Celtics off the line. The hometown Celtics (I emphasize hometown) got 51 free throws compared to 28 for the Lakers. Am I implying that the officiating was influenced by a raucous Boston Garden crowd in Game 7 of the NBA Finals? Maybe, though I certainly couldn’t prove it. But with the Celtics at the line so often, the Lakers needed every advantage they could get, and of course the Celtics owned the glass. Robert Parish grabbed as many offensive boards (8) as the entire Lakers’ starting lineup. The Celtics pulled it off by 9 points. It was a great series, and the Lakers actually outscored the Celtics by 2.3 points per game, despite losing. Kareem had struggled (27/8/4 on -2.4%) but Magic had averaged an 18/8/14 on +6.9% and Worthy had proven a contributor with an average of 22/4/2 on +10.8%. Bob McAdoo was not an asset, averaging a 13/6/1 on -3.5% shooting. It was a tough loss, but the Lakers would come back harder than ever in ‘85.
Objectively, this may seem high for the ‘84 Lakers. A +3.32 regular season SRS and a +10.06 playoff SRS wouldn’t seem to earn a team such a high place. But you have to remember, 1984 was the way casuals remember the entire 80s: the Lakers, the Celtics and a tumbleweed rolling through a barren desert. Here are the Top 4 OSRSs of the year, in descending order: Lakers (+7.65), Celtics (+7.48), Bucks (+3.8) and Pistons (+3.78). The worst team that year? -4.69. Nobody was worse than -5. In other words, 21 teams were wedged between -4.7 and +3.8, and two teams were all the way out at +7.5. That is a *massive* amount of separation from the pack. The Lakers were an extremely dominant team for the year, even if their SRS seems low.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2018 Kyle Lowry (taking fewer shots, but better at everything)
SG: 2013 Mario Chalmers
SF: 2012 David West
PF: 2012 Luis Scola
C: 2011 Paul Millsap
6th: 2018 Robin Lopez (but a non-terrible scorer)
7th: 2016 Bismack Biyombo
8th: 2011 O.J. Mayo
When you feed strong scoring, strong passing, strong defense and solid rebounding but with a small usage rate, Kyle Lowry seems to come out. Magic is obviously better by a fair amount, but players with his numbers that use so few possessions are pretty rare. I like Chalmers as a Cooper comp; half point guard, half scorer, but not particularly good at either. Worthy as David West isn’t nuts, given that Worthy’s strength was rebounding. Old Bob McAdoo as Luis Scola is pretty funny, but fairly on point. Lots of usage, decent rebounding . . . but not much more. Kurt Rambis as Bismack Biyombo is interesting, and young Byron Scott as O.J. Mayo is hilarious, since that’s pretty much the prototypical “you used way more possessions than you should have” wing. I’ll be honest, this doesn’t look like a very strong lineup. Then again, the ‘84 Lakers weren’t that good in the regular season, so this experiment only goes so far.
Regular Season Record: 54-28, Regular Season SRS: +3.32 (96th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.3 (56th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -0.3 (95th)
PG: Magic Johnson (24), +6.6 / +7.6
SG: Michael Cooper (27), +2.5 / +2.4
SF: James Worthy (22), +0.9 / +2.9
PF: Bob McAdoo (32), -2.8 / -0.8
C: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (36), +3.0 / +6.3
6th: Mike McGee (24), -1.4 / -0.4
7th: Kurt Rambis (25), -1.5 / +0.2
8th: Byron Scott (22), -1.5 / -3.0
Usage: Bob McAdoo (27.4%), Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (25.1%), Byron Scott (21.3%)
Scoring/100: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (30.3 / +6.5%), Bob McAdoo (29.1 / -1.3%), Mike McGee (24.6 / +5.4%)
Assists/100: Magic Johnson (15.8), Michael Cooper (9.3), Byron Scott (5.0)
Heliocentrism: 42.1% (21st of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 45.1% (14th)
Depth: 12.8% (70th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +7.52 (24th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -1.49 (91st)
Playoff SRS: +10.06 (63rd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +4.33 (16th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.89 (60th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.42 (84th)
Round 1: Sacramento Kings (-1.6), won 3-0, by +8.0 points per game (+6.4 SRS eq)
Round 2: Dallas Mavericks (+0.1), won 4-1, by +14.4 points per game (+14.5 SRS eq)
Round 3: Phoenix Suns (+2.4), won 4-2, by +5.3 points per game (+7.7 SRS eq)
Round 4: Boston Celtics (+8.2), lost 3-4, by +2.3 points per game (+10.5 SRS eq)
In 1982 the Lakers had won the championship. But the next year they were humiliated in the Finals by the 76ers, swept by 10 points a game. Veterans Jamaal Wilkes and Bob McAdoo seemed to be slowing down. But there were two bright points: that the West didn’t have other strong teams, and that the Lakers had acquired James Worthy and Byron Scott through the draft. Scott was acquired in the 1983 Draft (#4 overall) in the trade that finally shipped Norm Nixon out of town and made Magic the new point guard. And Worthy was taken #1 overall the year before.
“Wait a minute!” You may say. “The Lakers had been good; how did they get the #1 overall pick?”
Let’s talk about the Stepien Rule.
You know that Bill Simmons quip about knowing that you’ve arrived when they make a rule to stop you (like the Lew Alcindor rule)? This is the Bizarro version of that. Ted Stepien was a short-duration owner of the Cleveland Cavaliers, who kept trading away future first rounders for overrated veterans (or more often, veterans who weren’t rated at all). Worthy was a future first rounder who was acquired for the #22 pick in the draft and Don Ford. Who is Don Ford you may ask? Exactly. Ted Stepien traded away six future first round picks in five consecutive years. These picks ended up selecting the following: James Worthy, Derek Harper, Sam Perkins, Detlef Schrempf, Roy Tarpley and Dennis Rodman. I’d imagine that Cleveland could have used those guys. Instead Stepien kept trading future picks for present assets (but assets that sucked) and basically gutted the franchise yea unto the seventh generation. The NBA instituted the Stepien rule to stop him all right; it existed to stop an incompetant GM from destroying their team by trading away back-to-back first rounders for nothing (and to this day, it’s why you’ll see first rounders sandwiched around pick swaps, because a pick swap is the most you can do after a traded first). So James Worthy was basically a Christmas present from Cleveland’s worst sports franchise owner (and that’s saying something) to the best team in the Western Conference. Sometimes there’s good, and sometimes there’s lucky. Jerry West getting James Worthy for his championship-caliber squad was both.
That said, 1984 was very much a foot in two canoes kind of season. James Worthy was in his second year and he wasn’t bad . . . but he wasn’t that good either. He was basically a strong-rebounding decent small forward. Which, yay, but it doesn’t really blow your skirt up. And Byron Scott got serious minutes, despite being a few years from being a decent player. They still had the struggling Jamaal Wilkes, and because they’d just traded Norm Nixon they moved Michael Cooper to the 2, even though Cooper was really more of a tweener point guard. And Magic’s usage stayed low (19.5%) because Bob McAdoo still got the most touches on the team, even though he struggled to shoot at league average efficiency. Basically, you could look into the future and think “Man, when Worthy and Scott develop, this team is going to be pretty sweet” but McAdoo (a classic overrated scorer who didn’t create and scored a lot by taking a lot of shots) held everyone back. Actually, that may not have been fair; at this point none of Worthy, Cooper, Kareem or Magic could handle the extra possessions needed to keep the offense running (whether or not Magic could is debatable, but the fact that his usage stayed the same even in the playoffs suggests that the 20% usage rate was the sweet spot for his game at this point in his development). So maybe McAdoo was a necessary inefficiency (not unlike Malone for the postseason ‘97 Jazz).
As befits a team that’s caught between regressing veterans and undeveloped prospects, the Lakers struggled in the regular season. That’s relative to other years; they still got the one seed (by six games) and posted the best SRS in the conference. The top four SRSs in the West were: +3.32, +3.13, +0.81 and +0.65 (the bottom of the West was almost a mirror of that). The East had stronger teams, the +3.52 Pistons, the +4.04 Bucks and most of all the +6.42 Celtics that looked like the team to beat. In the playoffs (as so often happened in the 80s), the Lakers found another gear. In the first round they faced the Kansas City Kings (-1.6) and swept them by 8 points a game, mostly on the back of dominant shooting: the Lakers top six scorers all shot at +2.8% or better. Not a great series (against a weak team) but certainly sufficient.
Next they faced the Dallas Mavericks (+0.1); did I mention that the West was really short on strong teams? The Lakers obliterated them by 14.4 points a game, once again led by dominant shooting (the entire team shot +5.5% which is really good). And in the Conference Finals, against the second best team in the Conference (the +2.4 Phoenix Suns) the Lakers executed another solid win, by 5.3 points a game. Kareem averaged a 24/9/4 on +14.8% and Magic averaged a 18/6/15 on +6.7%. It wasn’t sexy, but it got the job done. And the Lakers advanced to face the Boston Celtics. This iteration of the Celtics was still developing (Maxwell was still the starting 4 while McHale came off the bench)
The series went to seven, as all good Celtics/Lakers Finals should. In Game 1 the Celtics dominated the boards (to the tune of ten extra shooting possessions) but the Lakers *still* won by 6. And they won it the Magic Johnson way, by outshooting the other team by a ton. Four of the Celtics’ starters shot at -7.7% or worse (Bird being the exception) and the team overall shot -4.3%. The Lakers, in contrast, shot +4.9% as a team, led by Kareem’s 32/8/5 on +22% with 2 steals and 2 blocks and Magic’s 18/6/10 on +16.2% with four steals. In Game 2 the Lakers shot even better (+6.6%) but the Celtics had such an insane lead in possession (twenty freaking extra shooting possessions - Cedric Maxwell had eight offensive rebounds, Bird and Parish combined for another seven, while Kareem was the only Laker that had more than one) that the Celtics pulled it off by 3. Off to Los Angeles.
The Lakers absolutely wrecked the Celtics in Game 3. The dominated all Four Factors, and not by a little. Magic had a very Magic 14/11/21 on +13% shooting. I won’t go into more detail because I can’t afford these posts to have an R rating, but the Lakers won by thirty effing three. Against the best team in the East. Dayum. But it was only one game, and Game 4 was basically Game 2 over again (even down to going into overtime). The Celtics dominated the boards (Bird, Parish and McHale combined for 20) had seven more steals and generated 25 extra shooting possessions. And only won by 4, because the Lakers outshot them so hard. Giant raspberry to Bob McAdoo who managed to turn the ball over 5 times in 27 minutes off the bench (the Lakers were starting Rambis), and Magic turned the ball over seven times himself. And it wasted an outstanding scoring night from James Worthy, who scored 30 on +27.6% shooting.
Game 5 went back to Boston and the Celtics outshot the Lakers for the first time in the series, which, as you can imagine, led to a pretty rough outing for the Lakers (18 point loss). Normal stalwarts like Magic and Kareem both struggled, Magic shooting at -11.3%, Kareem going an unthinkable 7 of 25 from the field. It was not the Lakers’ finest hour, but at least the next game would be at home. It was a tough game: Larry Bird played out of his mind with a 28/14/8 on +29.4% and the Celtics led by 4 going into the final quarter. The Lakers scored 36 points in the final twelve minutes to end up winning by a considerable margin, 119-108. The Lakers actually managed to control the boards, with Rambis, Worthy and Kareem combining for 14 offensive rebounds while Michael Cooper pitched in with an efficient 23/6/8 on +12.6% shooting. Kareem moved the chains with a 30/10/5 on -1.9% and Magic had a solid 21/6/10 on +1.3%. Game 7 went back to the Garden.
Game 7 was the entire Finals redux except for one small change. The Lakers outshot the Celtics again, (50.0 eFG to 39.5 eFG) but the Lakers couldn’t keep the Celtics off the line. The hometown Celtics (I emphasize hometown) got 51 free throws compared to 28 for the Lakers. Am I implying that the officiating was influenced by a raucous Boston Garden crowd in Game 7 of the NBA Finals? Maybe, though I certainly couldn’t prove it. But with the Celtics at the line so often, the Lakers needed every advantage they could get, and of course the Celtics owned the glass. Robert Parish grabbed as many offensive boards (8) as the entire Lakers’ starting lineup. The Celtics pulled it off by 9 points. It was a great series, and the Lakers actually outscored the Celtics by 2.3 points per game, despite losing. Kareem had struggled (27/8/4 on -2.4%) but Magic had averaged an 18/8/14 on +6.9% and Worthy had proven a contributor with an average of 22/4/2 on +10.8%. Bob McAdoo was not an asset, averaging a 13/6/1 on -3.5% shooting. It was a tough loss, but the Lakers would come back harder than ever in ‘85.
Objectively, this may seem high for the ‘84 Lakers. A +3.32 regular season SRS and a +10.06 playoff SRS wouldn’t seem to earn a team such a high place. But you have to remember, 1984 was the way casuals remember the entire 80s: the Lakers, the Celtics and a tumbleweed rolling through a barren desert. Here are the Top 4 OSRSs of the year, in descending order: Lakers (+7.65), Celtics (+7.48), Bucks (+3.8) and Pistons (+3.78). The worst team that year? -4.69. Nobody was worse than -5. In other words, 21 teams were wedged between -4.7 and +3.8, and two teams were all the way out at +7.5. That is a *massive* amount of separation from the pack. The Lakers were an extremely dominant team for the year, even if their SRS seems low.
Modern Comps:
PG: 2018 Kyle Lowry (taking fewer shots, but better at everything)
SG: 2013 Mario Chalmers
SF: 2012 David West
PF: 2012 Luis Scola
C: 2011 Paul Millsap
6th: 2018 Robin Lopez (but a non-terrible scorer)
7th: 2016 Bismack Biyombo
8th: 2011 O.J. Mayo
When you feed strong scoring, strong passing, strong defense and solid rebounding but with a small usage rate, Kyle Lowry seems to come out. Magic is obviously better by a fair amount, but players with his numbers that use so few possessions are pretty rare. I like Chalmers as a Cooper comp; half point guard, half scorer, but not particularly good at either. Worthy as David West isn’t nuts, given that Worthy’s strength was rebounding. Old Bob McAdoo as Luis Scola is pretty funny, but fairly on point. Lots of usage, decent rebounding . . . but not much more. Kurt Rambis as Bismack Biyombo is interesting, and young Byron Scott as O.J. Mayo is hilarious, since that’s pretty much the prototypical “you used way more possessions than you should have” wing. I’ll be honest, this doesn’t look like a very strong lineup. Then again, the ‘84 Lakers weren’t that good in the regular season, so this experiment only goes so far.
#62. The 2000 Portland Trail Blazers
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +9.09, Standard Deviations: +1.93, Lost in Conference Finals, #1 Odds
Regular Season Record: 59-23, Regular Season SRS: +6.36 (62nd), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.8 (49th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.3 (56th)
PG: Damon Stoudamire (26), +0.9 / -0.3
SG: Steve Smith (30), +2.9 / +5.7
SF: Scottie Pippen (34), +3.6 / +5.3
PF: Rasheed Wallace (25), +2.2 / +4.3
C: Arvydas Sabonis (35), +3.6 / +1.9
6th: Brian Grant (27), -0.8 / -1.2
Usage: Rasheed Wallace (21.9), Damon Stoudamire (21.5), Arvydas Sabonis (21.4)
Scoring/100: Rasheed Wallace (24.9 / +3.3%), Arvydas Sabonis (24.6 / +4.5%), Steve Smith (24.3 / +6.1%)
Assists/100: Damon Stoudamire (9.1), Scottie Pippen (7.9), Steve Smith (4.2)
Heliocentrism: 21.3% (77th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 34.4% (55th)
Depth: 44.3% (8th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.92 (30th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.80 (54th)
Playoff SRS: +11.09 (42nd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.73 (46th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.90 (30th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.32 (22nd)
Round 1: Minnesota Timberwolves (+2.7), won 3-1, by +2.0 points per game (+4.7 SRS eq)
Round 2: Utah Jazz (+3.9), won 4-1, by +11.0 points per game (+14.9 SRS eq)
Round 3: Los Angeles Lakers (+10.2), lost 3-4, by +1.9 points per game (+12.1 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2013 Jarrett Jack
SG: 2009 Ray Allen
SF: 2012 Andre Iguodala (playing more and a little better)
PF: 2013 Chris Bosh (better on defense, worse on offense)
C: 2011 Tim Duncan
6th: 2015 Mason Plumlee
What a neat roster. None of these guys is a stud, but they’re all extremely scalable players. Jack/Stoudamire is a mediocre passer and sufficient shooter. Steve Smith / Allen is a very capable scorer. Pippen/Iguodala isn’t much of a scorer, but passes well, rebounds well and defends really well. Bosh may seem like a weird comp for Rasheed, but they’re both skilled bigs (when I’m talking about skilled/unskilled bigs I’m really talking about passing/turnovers) with some range. Bosh was a better scorer, ‘Sheed was a better defender, but as far as general ability it’s pretty comparable. And I was really curious who I’d get for Sabonis, but I wasn’t expecting Duncan. Then again, 34 year-old Duncan (regular season) used a fair number of possessions without being an efficient scorer, but was fairly skilled, had some range, rebounded a ton (especially on defense) and defended well. Which all sounds a lot like ‘00 Sabonis.
So what to make of this? They seem to have four players that would all be the third-best player on a Top 25 (for this list) team, or four players that would be the second-best player on a Top 100 team. None of those guys is a stud (apologies to old Duncan) but this is a high-defense, high passing team with a lot of options. I’d be a little concerned about playoff scoring against good defenses, but this is obviously a very strong team. Their two-point scoring was really good; they led the league in 2P%, with ‘Sheed, Saba and Pippen all posting outstanding rates. And they passed well, posting the 6th highest adjusted assist rate in the league (though it did lead to some turnovers). They won by shooting well and keeping the other team from doing the same, and they were very good at it. This team’s Depth rating is notable. That it’s so high doesn’t mean their bench was really good; rather, it means that a much lower share of their team value came from their best three players than most of the teams on this list. And looking at this roster that’s easy to see.
The year before, in 1999, the Blazers had gone 35-15 (short year) with the 2nd highest SRS in the league. In fact, they handled the playoffs fairly well, making it to the Conference Finals before being dispatched (hard) by the eventual champion San Antonio Spurs. Going into the 2000 season the Blazers were #1 in preseason odds to win the Title; what changed? In the offseason Portland executed two trades: first, they traded iso-heavy scorer Isaiah Rider and Jim Jackson to Atlanta for Steve Smith, and second they traded a grab-bag of mid-range players to Houston for an aging Scottie Pippen. Suddenly the Blazers had a more disciplined, better-defending, better-passing balanced roster. And those moves were enough to get Portland a lot of attention (for better or for worse).
In the regular season the Blazers went 59-23, posting the 2nd best record and SRS in the league, behind the Los Angeles Lakers who had gelled under new coach Phil Jackson. In the first round the Blazers drew the Timberwolves (+2.7) led by young superstar Kevin Garnett. The Wolves turned out to be quite a difficult matchup; Portland’s customary advantage on the boards dried up against Garnett. In the end the Blazers managed to barely out-shoot the opposition, with Smith and Wallace combining for 30 points on +4.8% or better. They won by two points a game; hardly a great start for a team with title aspirations.
They would acquit themselves better in the second round against the Jazz (+3.9). The Blazers dominated, controlling all Four Factors. No Jazz starter shot above +0.7%, while the Blazers were led by Steve Smith’s 16/1/4 on +21% and Sabonis’ 13/8/2 on +6.2%. Don’t discount those averages because they look low; Portland played a really slow style of ball that dropped the pace (and therefore, the counting stats) by a ton. In the end, the Blazers crushed the Jazz by 11 points a game. Which set them up against the Lakers, who were cruising with an OSRS of +10.2.
Over the series the Blazers and Lakers shot about even with each other. As was typical for the Blazers’ defense, nobody on the Lakers was able to break out. Shaq’s 26/12/4 on +2.7% was very good, but the Blazers had managed to keep his offensive rebounding relatively low (only four per game, which was low for Shaq at this time). In fact, no Laker shot above +3.5%. In comparison the Blazers’ effort was more mixed, with ‘Sheed averaging a 23/7/2 on +5.9% and Steve Smith averaging a 18/3/3 on +8.5%. Furthermore, the Blazers had small advantages on the boards and in turnovers, giving them an extra two shooting possessions a game. And thanks to this, they were able to outscore the Lakers by 1.9 points per contest. That said, the Blazers did lose. And it all came down to Game 7. In that final game, the Blazers went into the fourth quarter up by 13, only to get blown out 31-13 in the quarter and lose by 5. In that quarter Kobe and Shaq combined for 18 points on +10.2% shooting, while the Blazers as a team shot 5 of 23 from the floor, putting up 13 points on -26% shooting. A big factor was free throws; the Lakers got 18 and the Blazers got 4. Does this imply shenanigans? Maybe a tad; Fansided did a nice analysis of the game and finds that the calls went against the Blazers more than the Lakers, but not by a ton (https://ripcityproject.com/2020/04/18/portland-trail-blazers-2000-lakers-fixed/5/), though the point remains that in a five point loss, the calls may have been the margin. But let’s not forget, the Blazers really, really struggled to make their shots down the stretch.
Was this the product of Portland’s lack of strong isolation scorers? Let’s check the rest of the playoffs for any games where the fourth quarter started tight (Opponent, Game, Situation, Shooting, Turnovers and Point Differential for Quarter):
Minnesota, Game 1, Down 6, shot +3.1%, 1 Turnover, +9 differential
Minnesota, Game 3, Tied, shot -10.3%, 2 Turnovers, -7 differential
Minnesota, Game 4, Down 7, shot +15.9%, 2 Turnovers, +15 differential
Utah, Game 1, Up 4, shot +3.6%, 1 Turnover, +19 differential
Utah, Game 3, Up 5, shot +13.1%, 1 Turnover, +14 differential
Utah, Game 5, Down 2, shot -3.6%, 3 Turnovers, +4 differential
LAL, Game 3, Down 1, shot +4.4%, 4 Turnovers, -1 differential
So the trend from these tight fourth quarters is actually favorable to Portland. Here’s their average of those seven fourth quarters compared with their playoff average for all quarters:
Down by 2, shot +3.7%, 2 turnovers, +7.5 differential
-------------, shot +1.8%, 3.2 turnovers, +1.2 differential
Huh. So they actually got *better* in tight fourth quarters, shooting better, turning the ball over less, and clearly suffocating the other team’s offense (because the 6 point increase sure as heck isn’t all offensive). Those seven games include three come-from-behind victories, two successful close-outs, one blowing of a lead and one where they got closed out. So, in short, I don’t think that there’s any evidence that the Blazers couldn’t close out tight games.
You may want to know about defensive strength. Minnesota’s was slightly better than average (-0.8), Utah’s was decent (-1.8) and LA’s was excellent (-5.9). Clearly LA’s outstanding defense was a tougher nut to crack in the fourth, but that doesn’t explain the *massive* swing in performance. I’d write the Lakers’ victory to two things: fluky bad luck with shots not falling for Portland, and the Lakers’ offense being inelastic enough to withstand Portland’s defense.
So look. The Blazers lost. But they outscored the Lakers through the entire series, and if not for a very fluky fourth quarter of a game 7, they’d have won the series and advanced to face the Pacers (against whom they would rightly have been favored). It sucks that this is how it ended, but this was a great team, and very much worth remembering.
Regular Season Record: 59-23, Regular Season SRS: +6.36 (62nd), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.8 (49th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.3 (56th)
PG: Damon Stoudamire (26), +0.9 / -0.3
SG: Steve Smith (30), +2.9 / +5.7
SF: Scottie Pippen (34), +3.6 / +5.3
PF: Rasheed Wallace (25), +2.2 / +4.3
C: Arvydas Sabonis (35), +3.6 / +1.9
6th: Brian Grant (27), -0.8 / -1.2
Usage: Rasheed Wallace (21.9), Damon Stoudamire (21.5), Arvydas Sabonis (21.4)
Scoring/100: Rasheed Wallace (24.9 / +3.3%), Arvydas Sabonis (24.6 / +4.5%), Steve Smith (24.3 / +6.1%)
Assists/100: Damon Stoudamire (9.1), Scottie Pippen (7.9), Steve Smith (4.2)
Heliocentrism: 21.3% (77th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 34.4% (55th)
Depth: 44.3% (8th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +6.92 (30th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -4.80 (54th)
Playoff SRS: +11.09 (42nd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.73 (46th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.90 (30th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.32 (22nd)
Round 1: Minnesota Timberwolves (+2.7), won 3-1, by +2.0 points per game (+4.7 SRS eq)
Round 2: Utah Jazz (+3.9), won 4-1, by +11.0 points per game (+14.9 SRS eq)
Round 3: Los Angeles Lakers (+10.2), lost 3-4, by +1.9 points per game (+12.1 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2013 Jarrett Jack
SG: 2009 Ray Allen
SF: 2012 Andre Iguodala (playing more and a little better)
PF: 2013 Chris Bosh (better on defense, worse on offense)
C: 2011 Tim Duncan
6th: 2015 Mason Plumlee
What a neat roster. None of these guys is a stud, but they’re all extremely scalable players. Jack/Stoudamire is a mediocre passer and sufficient shooter. Steve Smith / Allen is a very capable scorer. Pippen/Iguodala isn’t much of a scorer, but passes well, rebounds well and defends really well. Bosh may seem like a weird comp for Rasheed, but they’re both skilled bigs (when I’m talking about skilled/unskilled bigs I’m really talking about passing/turnovers) with some range. Bosh was a better scorer, ‘Sheed was a better defender, but as far as general ability it’s pretty comparable. And I was really curious who I’d get for Sabonis, but I wasn’t expecting Duncan. Then again, 34 year-old Duncan (regular season) used a fair number of possessions without being an efficient scorer, but was fairly skilled, had some range, rebounded a ton (especially on defense) and defended well. Which all sounds a lot like ‘00 Sabonis.
So what to make of this? They seem to have four players that would all be the third-best player on a Top 25 (for this list) team, or four players that would be the second-best player on a Top 100 team. None of those guys is a stud (apologies to old Duncan) but this is a high-defense, high passing team with a lot of options. I’d be a little concerned about playoff scoring against good defenses, but this is obviously a very strong team. Their two-point scoring was really good; they led the league in 2P%, with ‘Sheed, Saba and Pippen all posting outstanding rates. And they passed well, posting the 6th highest adjusted assist rate in the league (though it did lead to some turnovers). They won by shooting well and keeping the other team from doing the same, and they were very good at it. This team’s Depth rating is notable. That it’s so high doesn’t mean their bench was really good; rather, it means that a much lower share of their team value came from their best three players than most of the teams on this list. And looking at this roster that’s easy to see.
The year before, in 1999, the Blazers had gone 35-15 (short year) with the 2nd highest SRS in the league. In fact, they handled the playoffs fairly well, making it to the Conference Finals before being dispatched (hard) by the eventual champion San Antonio Spurs. Going into the 2000 season the Blazers were #1 in preseason odds to win the Title; what changed? In the offseason Portland executed two trades: first, they traded iso-heavy scorer Isaiah Rider and Jim Jackson to Atlanta for Steve Smith, and second they traded a grab-bag of mid-range players to Houston for an aging Scottie Pippen. Suddenly the Blazers had a more disciplined, better-defending, better-passing balanced roster. And those moves were enough to get Portland a lot of attention (for better or for worse).
In the regular season the Blazers went 59-23, posting the 2nd best record and SRS in the league, behind the Los Angeles Lakers who had gelled under new coach Phil Jackson. In the first round the Blazers drew the Timberwolves (+2.7) led by young superstar Kevin Garnett. The Wolves turned out to be quite a difficult matchup; Portland’s customary advantage on the boards dried up against Garnett. In the end the Blazers managed to barely out-shoot the opposition, with Smith and Wallace combining for 30 points on +4.8% or better. They won by two points a game; hardly a great start for a team with title aspirations.
They would acquit themselves better in the second round against the Jazz (+3.9). The Blazers dominated, controlling all Four Factors. No Jazz starter shot above +0.7%, while the Blazers were led by Steve Smith’s 16/1/4 on +21% and Sabonis’ 13/8/2 on +6.2%. Don’t discount those averages because they look low; Portland played a really slow style of ball that dropped the pace (and therefore, the counting stats) by a ton. In the end, the Blazers crushed the Jazz by 11 points a game. Which set them up against the Lakers, who were cruising with an OSRS of +10.2.
Over the series the Blazers and Lakers shot about even with each other. As was typical for the Blazers’ defense, nobody on the Lakers was able to break out. Shaq’s 26/12/4 on +2.7% was very good, but the Blazers had managed to keep his offensive rebounding relatively low (only four per game, which was low for Shaq at this time). In fact, no Laker shot above +3.5%. In comparison the Blazers’ effort was more mixed, with ‘Sheed averaging a 23/7/2 on +5.9% and Steve Smith averaging a 18/3/3 on +8.5%. Furthermore, the Blazers had small advantages on the boards and in turnovers, giving them an extra two shooting possessions a game. And thanks to this, they were able to outscore the Lakers by 1.9 points per contest. That said, the Blazers did lose. And it all came down to Game 7. In that final game, the Blazers went into the fourth quarter up by 13, only to get blown out 31-13 in the quarter and lose by 5. In that quarter Kobe and Shaq combined for 18 points on +10.2% shooting, while the Blazers as a team shot 5 of 23 from the floor, putting up 13 points on -26% shooting. A big factor was free throws; the Lakers got 18 and the Blazers got 4. Does this imply shenanigans? Maybe a tad; Fansided did a nice analysis of the game and finds that the calls went against the Blazers more than the Lakers, but not by a ton (https://ripcityproject.com/2020/04/18/portland-trail-blazers-2000-lakers-fixed/5/), though the point remains that in a five point loss, the calls may have been the margin. But let’s not forget, the Blazers really, really struggled to make their shots down the stretch.
Was this the product of Portland’s lack of strong isolation scorers? Let’s check the rest of the playoffs for any games where the fourth quarter started tight (Opponent, Game, Situation, Shooting, Turnovers and Point Differential for Quarter):
Minnesota, Game 1, Down 6, shot +3.1%, 1 Turnover, +9 differential
Minnesota, Game 3, Tied, shot -10.3%, 2 Turnovers, -7 differential
Minnesota, Game 4, Down 7, shot +15.9%, 2 Turnovers, +15 differential
Utah, Game 1, Up 4, shot +3.6%, 1 Turnover, +19 differential
Utah, Game 3, Up 5, shot +13.1%, 1 Turnover, +14 differential
Utah, Game 5, Down 2, shot -3.6%, 3 Turnovers, +4 differential
LAL, Game 3, Down 1, shot +4.4%, 4 Turnovers, -1 differential
So the trend from these tight fourth quarters is actually favorable to Portland. Here’s their average of those seven fourth quarters compared with their playoff average for all quarters:
Down by 2, shot +3.7%, 2 turnovers, +7.5 differential
-------------, shot +1.8%, 3.2 turnovers, +1.2 differential
Huh. So they actually got *better* in tight fourth quarters, shooting better, turning the ball over less, and clearly suffocating the other team’s offense (because the 6 point increase sure as heck isn’t all offensive). Those seven games include three come-from-behind victories, two successful close-outs, one blowing of a lead and one where they got closed out. So, in short, I don’t think that there’s any evidence that the Blazers couldn’t close out tight games.
You may want to know about defensive strength. Minnesota’s was slightly better than average (-0.8), Utah’s was decent (-1.8) and LA’s was excellent (-5.9). Clearly LA’s outstanding defense was a tougher nut to crack in the fourth, but that doesn’t explain the *massive* swing in performance. I’d write the Lakers’ victory to two things: fluky bad luck with shots not falling for Portland, and the Lakers’ offense being inelastic enough to withstand Portland’s defense.
So look. The Blazers lost. But they outscored the Lakers through the entire series, and if not for a very fluky fourth quarter of a game 7, they’d have won the series and advanced to face the Pacers (against whom they would rightly have been favored). It sucks that this is how it ended, but this was a great team, and very much worth remembering.
#61. The 1962 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.40, Standard Deviations: +1.73, Won NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 60-20, Regular Season SRS: +8.25 (20th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -1.5 (95th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -8.5 (4th)
PG: Bob Cousy (33), 0.144 / 0.083
SG: Sam Jones (28), 0.193 / 0.143
SF: Tom Sanders (23), 0.149 / 0.123
PF: Tom Heinsohn (27), 0.187 / 0.111
C: Bill Russell (27), 0.217 / 0.257
6th: K.C. Jones (29), 0.115 / 0.173
Tom Heinsohn (PF): 27.2%, 30.2 MPG, 16.9 / 7.2 / 1.6 on +0.9%
Bob Cousy (PG): 25.3%, 28.2 MPG, 12.0 / 2.7 / 6.0 on -3.6%
Sam Jones (SG): 21.8%, 30.6 MPG, 14.1 / 4.5 / 2.3 on +2.8%
Bench (23.8% of minutes): 20.1%, 57.5 MPG, 21.7 / 9.7 / 3.0 on -3.3%
Bill Russell (C): 16.2%, 45.2 MPG, 14.4 / 18.0 / 3.4 on +1.0%
K.C. Jones (PG): 16.1%, 25.7 MPG, 7.0 / 2.8 / 3.3 on -3.3%
Tom Sanders (SF): 14.2%, 29.1 MPG, 8.6 / 7.3 / 0.7 on +0.9%
Bench 23.8% of minutes, 23.4% of points, 19.0% of rebounds and 15.1% of assists
Scoring/100: Tom Heinsohn (26.9 / +0.3%), Frank Ramsey (23.2 / +2.5%), Sam Jones (22.1 / +2.8%)
Assists/100: Bob Cousy (10.2), K.C. Jones (6.1), Bill Russell (3.7)
Playoff Offensive Rating: -4.23 (98th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -9.83 (6th)
Playoff SRS: +8.53 (88th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.15 (95th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.15 (78th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.75 (76th)
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3: Philadelphia Warriors (+4.4), won 4-3, by +5.5 points per game (+9.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+3.1), won 4-3, by +4.1 points per game (+7.2 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2004 Jalen Rose (slightly better)
SG: 2003 Stephen Jackson
SF: 2009 Anderson Varejao (slightly worse)
PF: 2011 David West
C: 2004 Ben Wallace (if he were almost twice as valuable on defense)
6th: 2012 Iman Shumpert
Well, I have to say, I can easily see how this team finished with a below average offense. At this point 33 year-old Cousy is matched with ‘04 Jalen Rose, which is to say he wasn’t much of an asset on defense, was a decent passer and took a lot more shots than his efficiency suggests that he should have. Comparing Sanders to Varejao may seem weird, but Sanders (defense, rebounding and nothing else) has a stat profile that screams “big” (and this was really common for early Celtics 3s until Havlicek came along). And Russell was only a mild asset on offense; his offensive rebounding and decent passing is almost cancelled out by his really low usage and fairly weak scoring. So the offense pretty much runs through Rose, David West and Stephen Jackson . . . that sounds like the offense of a 35-win team (and it probably was). But on defense? K.C. Jones was a very cerebral defender, Heinsohn was capable, Sanders was strong and Russell was, of course, the most valuable defender in history. It wouldn’t work in the modern game because you can’t pack that much defensive value into one player in the modern game. But in 1962? You could have a below average offense *and* a +8 SRS.
1962. The Celtics had just won the last three championships. The 1962 regular season had been yet another coronation for the Celtics; the best record (60-20) and the best SRS (+8.25). They got a bye into the Conference Finals where they were to face the Philadelphia Warriors, led by wunderkind Wilt Chamberlain. The series went to seven. The Celtics struggled to score (remember, they had a bad offense). They shot at -4.6% on the series; K.C. Jones and Frank Ramsey shot well off the bench but the starters all struggled, especially Bob Cousy on -8.4% (averaging a 15/5/8 for the series). The Warriors didn’t shoot well, but shot better, especially Wilt with a 34/27/3 on +3.6%. And yet the Celtics prevailed by 5.5 points per game. The difference? The Celtics averaged a whopping 11 extra shooting possessions per game. How much was turnovers and how much was rebounding? Well, the Celtics averaged 6-7 extra rebounds a game, despite shooting worse. So I’d say most of it was rebounding, and the rest was turnovers. But let the record show that the Celtics outrebounded the Warriors by a ton, despite Wilt averaging 27 a game (Russell averaged 26). If one team is going to get an extra 11 shots a game, the other team had better shoot way better, and the Warriors certainly did not. And let’s not let this fall into the “Plucky underdog Celtics prevailing against the Wilt-led juggernaut” narrative; the Celtics had an almost 4 SRS edge going into the matchup. Wilt’s team was the underdog, and performed like it.
In the Finals they would face the Lakers who had their own story. Elgin Baylor had finally received help, in the form of the 23 year-old Jerry West. The Logo was not yet at the height of his powers (finishing only 5th in Win Shares that year), but he was already one of the best scorers in the league (5th in points and 8th in efficiency), and was an excellent rebounder for a point guard. But Elgin Baylor’s year deserves special mention. He averaged a 38/19/5 (+1.3% efficiency) and led the Lakers in rebounding despite only playing in 48 games that year. He wasn’t injured; he was actually called up as an Army reservist, and played for the Lakers between required stints of service. This makes his year extra nuts. With Elgin Baylor the Lakers were 37-11, with a +4.27 point differential. Without Baylor they were 17-15, on a -0.91 point differential. This reveals just how dependent the team was on Baylor’s performance (and while we’re at it, how weak their frontcourt rebounding was). The Lakers were plucky up and comers (at that time, pairing a young West to Elgin’s outstanding play it was easy to imagine how good they would be in the years to come). But SRS still considered the Celtics to be the 5.8 points a game favorite (which admittedly underrated the Lakers on account of Baylor’s absence). But the Lakers (with a full-time Baylor) would take the Celtics to 7.
Elgin Baylor would go on to put up one of the greatest Finals stat lines in history. Over seven games, in 46 minutes a game, Baylor averaged a 41 / 18 / 4. He wasn’t super-efficient; he had +3.1% shooting and used about 35% of his team’s possessions (this is my quick and dirty usage calculator that includes assists). However, this isn’t quite is amazing as it looks; converted to a modern pace (say, that of the 2016 NBA Finals) it’s more like averaging a 32 / 14 / 3. Which is still great, but not as great as first glance (then you remember that this was against one of the best defenses ever and it becomes awesome again). Jerry West helped out with a 31/5/3 on +7.3% shooting. Every other Lakers’ starter shot below league average. The Celtics had a far more balanced attack, with four different players putting up 15+ points per game. The weakness of the Lakers’ front court was seriously exposed because Russell averaged a 23/27/6 (+12.6% and 16.2% possessions) on 48 minutes a game. I love Russell as much as the next guy, but when he’s averaging +12.6% against you and leads his team in scoring per game, your center probably isn’t any good. The Celtics ended up winning by 4.1 points per game. Baylor and West could only do so much. And the Celtics played well top to bottom.
The ‘62 Celtics had an +8 SRS and won the Finals easily, shouldn’t they be higher (given how competitive the 60s were)? Part is that their playoff run (at around 8 SRS) was really good but not great (for the 60s). And the other part is that ‘62 was weirdly skewed. There were two other decent teams (the Warriors and Lakers both just below +4 OSRS) and there was an expansion team, the -7.54 SRS Chicago Packers (who eventually became the Baltimore Bullets). Between these three teams, the year wasn’t as competitive as normal for the 60s, and the Celtics don’t get a ton of credit for dominating everything. So this is where they finish.
Regular Season Record: 60-20, Regular Season SRS: +8.25 (20th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -1.5 (95th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -8.5 (4th)
PG: Bob Cousy (33), 0.144 / 0.083
SG: Sam Jones (28), 0.193 / 0.143
SF: Tom Sanders (23), 0.149 / 0.123
PF: Tom Heinsohn (27), 0.187 / 0.111
C: Bill Russell (27), 0.217 / 0.257
6th: K.C. Jones (29), 0.115 / 0.173
Tom Heinsohn (PF): 27.2%, 30.2 MPG, 16.9 / 7.2 / 1.6 on +0.9%
Bob Cousy (PG): 25.3%, 28.2 MPG, 12.0 / 2.7 / 6.0 on -3.6%
Sam Jones (SG): 21.8%, 30.6 MPG, 14.1 / 4.5 / 2.3 on +2.8%
Bench (23.8% of minutes): 20.1%, 57.5 MPG, 21.7 / 9.7 / 3.0 on -3.3%
Bill Russell (C): 16.2%, 45.2 MPG, 14.4 / 18.0 / 3.4 on +1.0%
K.C. Jones (PG): 16.1%, 25.7 MPG, 7.0 / 2.8 / 3.3 on -3.3%
Tom Sanders (SF): 14.2%, 29.1 MPG, 8.6 / 7.3 / 0.7 on +0.9%
Bench 23.8% of minutes, 23.4% of points, 19.0% of rebounds and 15.1% of assists
Scoring/100: Tom Heinsohn (26.9 / +0.3%), Frank Ramsey (23.2 / +2.5%), Sam Jones (22.1 / +2.8%)
Assists/100: Bob Cousy (10.2), K.C. Jones (6.1), Bill Russell (3.7)
Playoff Offensive Rating: -4.23 (98th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -9.83 (6th)
Playoff SRS: +8.53 (88th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.15 (95th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +1.15 (78th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.75 (76th)
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3: Philadelphia Warriors (+4.4), won 4-3, by +5.5 points per game (+9.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: Los Angeles Lakers (+3.1), won 4-3, by +4.1 points per game (+7.2 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2004 Jalen Rose (slightly better)
SG: 2003 Stephen Jackson
SF: 2009 Anderson Varejao (slightly worse)
PF: 2011 David West
C: 2004 Ben Wallace (if he were almost twice as valuable on defense)
6th: 2012 Iman Shumpert
Well, I have to say, I can easily see how this team finished with a below average offense. At this point 33 year-old Cousy is matched with ‘04 Jalen Rose, which is to say he wasn’t much of an asset on defense, was a decent passer and took a lot more shots than his efficiency suggests that he should have. Comparing Sanders to Varejao may seem weird, but Sanders (defense, rebounding and nothing else) has a stat profile that screams “big” (and this was really common for early Celtics 3s until Havlicek came along). And Russell was only a mild asset on offense; his offensive rebounding and decent passing is almost cancelled out by his really low usage and fairly weak scoring. So the offense pretty much runs through Rose, David West and Stephen Jackson . . . that sounds like the offense of a 35-win team (and it probably was). But on defense? K.C. Jones was a very cerebral defender, Heinsohn was capable, Sanders was strong and Russell was, of course, the most valuable defender in history. It wouldn’t work in the modern game because you can’t pack that much defensive value into one player in the modern game. But in 1962? You could have a below average offense *and* a +8 SRS.
1962. The Celtics had just won the last three championships. The 1962 regular season had been yet another coronation for the Celtics; the best record (60-20) and the best SRS (+8.25). They got a bye into the Conference Finals where they were to face the Philadelphia Warriors, led by wunderkind Wilt Chamberlain. The series went to seven. The Celtics struggled to score (remember, they had a bad offense). They shot at -4.6% on the series; K.C. Jones and Frank Ramsey shot well off the bench but the starters all struggled, especially Bob Cousy on -8.4% (averaging a 15/5/8 for the series). The Warriors didn’t shoot well, but shot better, especially Wilt with a 34/27/3 on +3.6%. And yet the Celtics prevailed by 5.5 points per game. The difference? The Celtics averaged a whopping 11 extra shooting possessions per game. How much was turnovers and how much was rebounding? Well, the Celtics averaged 6-7 extra rebounds a game, despite shooting worse. So I’d say most of it was rebounding, and the rest was turnovers. But let the record show that the Celtics outrebounded the Warriors by a ton, despite Wilt averaging 27 a game (Russell averaged 26). If one team is going to get an extra 11 shots a game, the other team had better shoot way better, and the Warriors certainly did not. And let’s not let this fall into the “Plucky underdog Celtics prevailing against the Wilt-led juggernaut” narrative; the Celtics had an almost 4 SRS edge going into the matchup. Wilt’s team was the underdog, and performed like it.
In the Finals they would face the Lakers who had their own story. Elgin Baylor had finally received help, in the form of the 23 year-old Jerry West. The Logo was not yet at the height of his powers (finishing only 5th in Win Shares that year), but he was already one of the best scorers in the league (5th in points and 8th in efficiency), and was an excellent rebounder for a point guard. But Elgin Baylor’s year deserves special mention. He averaged a 38/19/5 (+1.3% efficiency) and led the Lakers in rebounding despite only playing in 48 games that year. He wasn’t injured; he was actually called up as an Army reservist, and played for the Lakers between required stints of service. This makes his year extra nuts. With Elgin Baylor the Lakers were 37-11, with a +4.27 point differential. Without Baylor they were 17-15, on a -0.91 point differential. This reveals just how dependent the team was on Baylor’s performance (and while we’re at it, how weak their frontcourt rebounding was). The Lakers were plucky up and comers (at that time, pairing a young West to Elgin’s outstanding play it was easy to imagine how good they would be in the years to come). But SRS still considered the Celtics to be the 5.8 points a game favorite (which admittedly underrated the Lakers on account of Baylor’s absence). But the Lakers (with a full-time Baylor) would take the Celtics to 7.
Elgin Baylor would go on to put up one of the greatest Finals stat lines in history. Over seven games, in 46 minutes a game, Baylor averaged a 41 / 18 / 4. He wasn’t super-efficient; he had +3.1% shooting and used about 35% of his team’s possessions (this is my quick and dirty usage calculator that includes assists). However, this isn’t quite is amazing as it looks; converted to a modern pace (say, that of the 2016 NBA Finals) it’s more like averaging a 32 / 14 / 3. Which is still great, but not as great as first glance (then you remember that this was against one of the best defenses ever and it becomes awesome again). Jerry West helped out with a 31/5/3 on +7.3% shooting. Every other Lakers’ starter shot below league average. The Celtics had a far more balanced attack, with four different players putting up 15+ points per game. The weakness of the Lakers’ front court was seriously exposed because Russell averaged a 23/27/6 (+12.6% and 16.2% possessions) on 48 minutes a game. I love Russell as much as the next guy, but when he’s averaging +12.6% against you and leads his team in scoring per game, your center probably isn’t any good. The Celtics ended up winning by 4.1 points per game. Baylor and West could only do so much. And the Celtics played well top to bottom.
The ‘62 Celtics had an +8 SRS and won the Finals easily, shouldn’t they be higher (given how competitive the 60s were)? Part is that their playoff run (at around 8 SRS) was really good but not great (for the 60s). And the other part is that ‘62 was weirdly skewed. There were two other decent teams (the Warriors and Lakers both just below +4 OSRS) and there was an expansion team, the -7.54 SRS Chicago Packers (who eventually became the Baltimore Bullets). Between these three teams, the year wasn’t as competitive as normal for the 60s, and the Celtics don’t get a ton of credit for dominating everything. So this is where they finish.
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