Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I then cover the three highest players in Usage% (assuming the season has those numbers), the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's nothing fancy; it's literally just me feeding the player's regular season numbers into Stathead and looking for player-seasons in the recent past (the more recent the better) that are reasonably comparable. This is *not* intended to be anything other than fun. I find it to be a neat way to re-conceive what a roster truly was when translated out of the trappings of their laundry and era. The method suffers when translating man defense, as steals/blocks/defensive rating are very approximate estimates of a player's defensive contributions. When I say something like:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I then cover the three highest players in Usage% (assuming the season has those numbers), the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's nothing fancy; it's literally just me feeding the player's regular season numbers into Stathead and looking for player-seasons in the recent past (the more recent the better) that are reasonably comparable. This is *not* intended to be anything other than fun. I find it to be a neat way to re-conceive what a roster truly was when translated out of the trappings of their laundry and era. The method suffers when translating man defense, as steals/blocks/defensive rating are very approximate estimates of a player's defensive contributions. When I say something like:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#60. The 1990 Detroit Pistons
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.61, Standard Deviations: +1.70, Won NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 59-23, Regular Season SRS: +5.41 (80th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +1.8 (80th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.6 (31st)
Isiah Thomas (PG, 28): 26.0%, 37.0 MPG, 18.4 / 3.8 / 9.4 on -3.6%, +2.9 / +7.6
Mark Aguirre (SF, 30): 24.3%, 25.7 MPG, 14.1 / 3.9 / 1.9 on +0.7%, +1.0 / +1.4
James Edwards (C, 34): 22.9%, 27.8 MPG, 14.5 / 4.2 / 0.8 on +1.2%, -1.7 / -1.7
Joe Dumars (SG, 26): 22.5%, 34.4 MPG, 17.8 / 2.8 / 4.9 on +1.8%, +2.2 / +1.8
Vinnie Johnson (SG, 26): 21.5%, 24.0 MPG, 9.8 / 3.1 / 3.1 on -7.0%, -0.1 / +1.0
Bill Laimbeer (C, 32): 15.6%, 33.0 MPG, 12.1 / 9.6 / 2.1 on +2.7%, +3.3 / +3.6
John Salley (PF, 25): 13.8%, 23.3 MPG, 7.2 / 5.4 / 0.8 on +3.8%, +1.5 / +2.6
Dennis Rodman (SF, 28): 12.3%, 29.0 MPG, 8.8 / 9.7 / 0.9 on +7.1%, +1.6 / +0.0
Scoring/100: Mark Aguirre (27.9), James Edwards (26.5), Joe Dumars (26.3)
Assists/100: Isiah Thomas (13.0), Joe Dumars (7.3), Vinnie Johnson (6.6)
Heliocentrism: 22.4% (75th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 38.2% (41st)
Depth: 39.4% (14th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +1.74 (85th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -8.80 (11th)
Playoff SRS: +10.48 (52nd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +3.20 (37th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.91 (29th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.14 (89th)
Round 1: Indiana Pacers (-0.2), won 3-0, by +12.3 points per game (+12.1 SRS eq)
Round 2: New York Knicks (+1.3), won 4-1, by +11.4 points per game (+12.7 SRS eq)
Round 3: Chicago Bulls (+5.5), won 4-3, by +3.0 points per game (+8.5 SRS eq)
Round 4: Portland Trail Blazers (+5.0), won 4-1, by +5.0 points per game (10.0 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2015 John Wall
SG: 2016 Tony Parker (better scoring)
SF: 2016 Tristan Thompson (better defense)
PF: 2008 Kendrick Perkins
C: 2010 Lamar Odom (better scoring, worse passing)
6th: 2009 Travis Outlaw
7th: 2017 Cory Joseph
8th: 2018 Jamal Murray
Eesh. What a weird roster. Wall is a fair regular season Isiah comp; lots of flash but not a lot of efficiency. Dumars as old-man Tony Parker is interesting. I like Laimbeer as 2010 Lamar Odom. It’s so hard to project this lineup because it’s built so strangely. The weird part is their starting lineup is mostly passing (Wall, Parker and Odom), defense (Thompson, Perkins and Odom) and only a little scoring. Much of their scoring comes off the bench. In a way they remind me of the 60s Celtics, in that their defensive studs start, and their bench is where the defensively-compromised shooters live. The lineup is obviously light on star power, but it’s very deep. And the passing is diverse enough that they could likely keep themselves going. But it’s notable that this mish-mash of offensive talent was only enough to be slightly above average. It’s on defense where the ‘90 Pistons (and all the ‘88-’90 Pistons teams) really shined. And that isn’t hard to imagine. It’s also worth noticing how many Pistons have high offensive rebounding; it’s strongly implied that Laimbeer’s spacing kept him away from the hoop so the rest of the team had to pick up the slack.
Also, I know Isiah Thomas gets most of the credit for the success of these teams, but Laimbeer should get some serious attention. He’s a solid passer (and this team needs all the passing it can get with its slew of non-creators), and sure his defensive rebounding and defense are both excellent, but his ability to space the floor for the rest of the team (there were a *lot* of players who scored mostly near the rim for a 1990 team) can’t be overstated. This assembly of players needed a lot of things to run right to work, and Laimbeer was a big part of that.
Anyhow. In 1990 the Pistons waltzed through the regular season, posting a strong but not remarkable 59 wins and +5.41 SRS, which were enough for the one seed in the East (the Lakers, Blazers and Suns all posted higher SRSs, but in the West). In the first round the Pistons drew the -0.2 Indiana Pacers and thrashed them hard. Isiah Thomas averaged a 19/6/9 on +4.3% with two steals a game while Bill Laimbeer averaged a 14/15/2 on +4.6%. The Pistons won by 12.3 points per game; not remotely close. In the second round the Pistons drew the New York Knicks (+1.3). Do you think this trend of facing opponents that would go on to be really good later in the decade continues after the Knicks? Nah. The Pistons thrashed them too. James Edwards (the score-only seven footer) averaged a 19/3/1 on +8% and the Knicks’ shooting was smothered, with the entire team shooting at -2.9%. Laimbeer also posted a DRB% of 28.1% (8 a game), and the Pistons won in five by 11.4 points a game. Dominant.
In the Conference Finals they drew the Bulls, who were coming off of +8.4 and +9.9 SRS series. Not earth-shaking, but a lot better than the +2.7 SRS they’d been in the regular season. And the Bulls played them hard. And it wasn’t the Bulls’ offense that kept it close. The Bulls were held to an O-Rating eleven points lower than their regular season average. Jordan averaged a 32/7/6 on +2.9%; it was a fantastic series for him. But like ‘09 LeBron, Jordan not only led his team in scoring, but also in efficiency. Pippen only shot at -1.7%, and the entire rest of the roster that played at least 100 minutes shot at -6% or worse. The Bulls’ offense, besides Jordan, ground to a bloody halt against the Pistons. But the Pistons’ offense didn’t do much better. Jordan and Pippen combined for four steals a game and the Pistons only shot around league average (-0.4%). No one player really carried the Pistons’ offense (Dumars averaged a 20/2/4 on +4.1%) but all of their usual role players (especially Aguirre and Salley) delivered on efficient scoring. And the Pistons carried past the Bulls by a solid 3 points a game.
In the Finals they faced the +5.0 Portland Trail Blazers (who somehow made it past the Suns despite being outscored by 5.7 points per game). It wasn’t particularly close. While the Blazers’ athletic wings really slowed the Pistons’ role players, Isiah Thomas averaged a 28/5/7 on +9.2% (not dissimilar from Drexler’s 26/8/6 on +6.2%). The difference may have been rebounding: the Blazers historic advantages there were to no avail; Laimbeer averaged 11 defensive rebounds a game and the Pistons held control of the boards. The Pistons took the series in five games by five points a game.
As dominant teams go, the ‘90 Pistons were really good. But they coasted a bit in the regular season, and their offense in the playoffs was only slightly above average. Their playoff defense was outstanding; the eleventh best on the list with Bill Russell teams in the discussion is pretty great. In many ways these Pistons remind me of the opposite of the ‘07 Suns. They were geared overwhelmingly for defense, and had just enough pieces to make it work on the other end. So it’s fun to say “if only they could have combined their defense with a strong offense, they’d have been murderous”. But that just wasn’t how they were built. Like the early aughts Pistons, they were designed to shut the other team down hard, and score enough to win. And the ‘90 Pistons did just that.
Regular Season Record: 59-23, Regular Season SRS: +5.41 (80th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +1.8 (80th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.6 (31st)
Isiah Thomas (PG, 28): 26.0%, 37.0 MPG, 18.4 / 3.8 / 9.4 on -3.6%, +2.9 / +7.6
Mark Aguirre (SF, 30): 24.3%, 25.7 MPG, 14.1 / 3.9 / 1.9 on +0.7%, +1.0 / +1.4
James Edwards (C, 34): 22.9%, 27.8 MPG, 14.5 / 4.2 / 0.8 on +1.2%, -1.7 / -1.7
Joe Dumars (SG, 26): 22.5%, 34.4 MPG, 17.8 / 2.8 / 4.9 on +1.8%, +2.2 / +1.8
Vinnie Johnson (SG, 26): 21.5%, 24.0 MPG, 9.8 / 3.1 / 3.1 on -7.0%, -0.1 / +1.0
Bill Laimbeer (C, 32): 15.6%, 33.0 MPG, 12.1 / 9.6 / 2.1 on +2.7%, +3.3 / +3.6
John Salley (PF, 25): 13.8%, 23.3 MPG, 7.2 / 5.4 / 0.8 on +3.8%, +1.5 / +2.6
Dennis Rodman (SF, 28): 12.3%, 29.0 MPG, 8.8 / 9.7 / 0.9 on +7.1%, +1.6 / +0.0
Scoring/100: Mark Aguirre (27.9), James Edwards (26.5), Joe Dumars (26.3)
Assists/100: Isiah Thomas (13.0), Joe Dumars (7.3), Vinnie Johnson (6.6)
Heliocentrism: 22.4% (75th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 38.2% (41st)
Depth: 39.4% (14th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +1.74 (85th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -8.80 (11th)
Playoff SRS: +10.48 (52nd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +3.20 (37th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.91 (29th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.14 (89th)
Round 1: Indiana Pacers (-0.2), won 3-0, by +12.3 points per game (+12.1 SRS eq)
Round 2: New York Knicks (+1.3), won 4-1, by +11.4 points per game (+12.7 SRS eq)
Round 3: Chicago Bulls (+5.5), won 4-3, by +3.0 points per game (+8.5 SRS eq)
Round 4: Portland Trail Blazers (+5.0), won 4-1, by +5.0 points per game (10.0 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2015 John Wall
SG: 2016 Tony Parker (better scoring)
SF: 2016 Tristan Thompson (better defense)
PF: 2008 Kendrick Perkins
C: 2010 Lamar Odom (better scoring, worse passing)
6th: 2009 Travis Outlaw
7th: 2017 Cory Joseph
8th: 2018 Jamal Murray
Eesh. What a weird roster. Wall is a fair regular season Isiah comp; lots of flash but not a lot of efficiency. Dumars as old-man Tony Parker is interesting. I like Laimbeer as 2010 Lamar Odom. It’s so hard to project this lineup because it’s built so strangely. The weird part is their starting lineup is mostly passing (Wall, Parker and Odom), defense (Thompson, Perkins and Odom) and only a little scoring. Much of their scoring comes off the bench. In a way they remind me of the 60s Celtics, in that their defensive studs start, and their bench is where the defensively-compromised shooters live. The lineup is obviously light on star power, but it’s very deep. And the passing is diverse enough that they could likely keep themselves going. But it’s notable that this mish-mash of offensive talent was only enough to be slightly above average. It’s on defense where the ‘90 Pistons (and all the ‘88-’90 Pistons teams) really shined. And that isn’t hard to imagine. It’s also worth noticing how many Pistons have high offensive rebounding; it’s strongly implied that Laimbeer’s spacing kept him away from the hoop so the rest of the team had to pick up the slack.
Also, I know Isiah Thomas gets most of the credit for the success of these teams, but Laimbeer should get some serious attention. He’s a solid passer (and this team needs all the passing it can get with its slew of non-creators), and sure his defensive rebounding and defense are both excellent, but his ability to space the floor for the rest of the team (there were a *lot* of players who scored mostly near the rim for a 1990 team) can’t be overstated. This assembly of players needed a lot of things to run right to work, and Laimbeer was a big part of that.
Anyhow. In 1990 the Pistons waltzed through the regular season, posting a strong but not remarkable 59 wins and +5.41 SRS, which were enough for the one seed in the East (the Lakers, Blazers and Suns all posted higher SRSs, but in the West). In the first round the Pistons drew the -0.2 Indiana Pacers and thrashed them hard. Isiah Thomas averaged a 19/6/9 on +4.3% with two steals a game while Bill Laimbeer averaged a 14/15/2 on +4.6%. The Pistons won by 12.3 points per game; not remotely close. In the second round the Pistons drew the New York Knicks (+1.3). Do you think this trend of facing opponents that would go on to be really good later in the decade continues after the Knicks? Nah. The Pistons thrashed them too. James Edwards (the score-only seven footer) averaged a 19/3/1 on +8% and the Knicks’ shooting was smothered, with the entire team shooting at -2.9%. Laimbeer also posted a DRB% of 28.1% (8 a game), and the Pistons won in five by 11.4 points a game. Dominant.
In the Conference Finals they drew the Bulls, who were coming off of +8.4 and +9.9 SRS series. Not earth-shaking, but a lot better than the +2.7 SRS they’d been in the regular season. And the Bulls played them hard. And it wasn’t the Bulls’ offense that kept it close. The Bulls were held to an O-Rating eleven points lower than their regular season average. Jordan averaged a 32/7/6 on +2.9%; it was a fantastic series for him. But like ‘09 LeBron, Jordan not only led his team in scoring, but also in efficiency. Pippen only shot at -1.7%, and the entire rest of the roster that played at least 100 minutes shot at -6% or worse. The Bulls’ offense, besides Jordan, ground to a bloody halt against the Pistons. But the Pistons’ offense didn’t do much better. Jordan and Pippen combined for four steals a game and the Pistons only shot around league average (-0.4%). No one player really carried the Pistons’ offense (Dumars averaged a 20/2/4 on +4.1%) but all of their usual role players (especially Aguirre and Salley) delivered on efficient scoring. And the Pistons carried past the Bulls by a solid 3 points a game.
In the Finals they faced the +5.0 Portland Trail Blazers (who somehow made it past the Suns despite being outscored by 5.7 points per game). It wasn’t particularly close. While the Blazers’ athletic wings really slowed the Pistons’ role players, Isiah Thomas averaged a 28/5/7 on +9.2% (not dissimilar from Drexler’s 26/8/6 on +6.2%). The difference may have been rebounding: the Blazers historic advantages there were to no avail; Laimbeer averaged 11 defensive rebounds a game and the Pistons held control of the boards. The Pistons took the series in five games by five points a game.
As dominant teams go, the ‘90 Pistons were really good. But they coasted a bit in the regular season, and their offense in the playoffs was only slightly above average. Their playoff defense was outstanding; the eleventh best on the list with Bill Russell teams in the discussion is pretty great. In many ways these Pistons remind me of the opposite of the ‘07 Suns. They were geared overwhelmingly for defense, and had just enough pieces to make it work on the other end. So it’s fun to say “if only they could have combined their defense with a strong offense, they’d have been murderous”. But that just wasn’t how they were built. Like the early aughts Pistons, they were designed to shut the other team down hard, and score enough to win. And the ‘90 Pistons did just that.
#59. The 1974 Milwaukee Bucks
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.24, Standard Deviations: +2.05, Lost in NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 59-23, Regular Season SRS: +7.61 (28th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.5 (52nd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.1 (41st)
PG: Oscar Robertson (35), -0.1 / +0.8
SG: Jon McGlocklin (30), -1.4 / -1.1
SF: Bob Dandridge (26), +1.5 / +1.5
PF: Curtis Perry (25), +0.5 / -0.6
C: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (26), +8.6 / +9.9
6th: Lucius Allen (26), +2.5 /
Scoring/100: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (28.1 / +6.1%), Bob Dandridge (24.2 / +3.2%), Lucius Allen (24.2 / +3.3%)
Assists/100: Oscar Robertson (8.2), Lucius Allen (7.1), Jon McGlockin (5.7)
Heliocentrism: 47.5% (12th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 27.6% (77th)
Depth: 24.9% (46th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +5.11 (55th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.95 (76th)
Playoff SRS: +8.70 (85th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.63 (90th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.05 (97th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.51 (39th)
Round 1:
Round 2: Los Angeles Lakers (+0.9), won 4-1, by +13.0 points per game (+13.9 SRS eq)
Round 3: Chicago Bulls (+2.7), won 4-0, by +14.2 points per game (+16.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: Boston Celtics (+5.1), lost 3-4, outscored by 4.7 points per game (+0.4 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2005 Andre Miller
SG: 2012 Luke Ridnour
SF: 2011 Luol Deng
PF: 2016 Amir Johnson (better on defense)
C: 2008 Kevin Garnett (playing way more minutes, and shooting better)
6th: 2016 Goran Dragic (better on offense)
Don’t get it twisted about the ‘08 Kevin Garnett. First Kevin Garnett was the centerpiece of the ‘08 Celtics, one of the best regular season teams ever. And second, Kareem played a lot more minutes than Garnett did. In terms of carry-jobs (Heliocentrism and regular season SRS) Kareem’s stint with the ‘74 Bucks is most comparable to Curry on the ‘15 Warriors, LeBron on the ‘13 Heat and Jordan on the ‘93 Bulls. All of these are ATG players having ATG seasons carrying teams that weren’t unstoppable, but wouldn’t have sniffed contention without them. Look at those comps. That’s not exactly a supporting cast that you’d brag about. Old-man Oscar as Andre Miller is rough, McGlocklin was like a bad tweener guard (as was Luke Ridnour), Amir Johnson isn’t really moving the needle much . . . You’re pretty much looking at uber-Garnett carrying the defense *and* the offense, with Deng/Dandridge and Dragic/Lucius Allen playing capable supporting roles. I know that Dandridge has a good reputation, but his stat footprint in ‘74 looks like Jamaal Wilkes, Deng, or any other solid but not great 3. If you’re trying to figure out how this team finished with a +7.61 SRS in the regular season (a really good mark) your answer begins and ends with Kareem.
Some Milwaukee history. They popped into existence for the ‘69 season and were predictably terrible. But they earned the #1 pick in the draft, which ended up being one of the three greatest players ever. In ‘70 they fell in the Conference Finals to the ‘70 Knicks (who were quite good). In ‘71 they acquired a veteran Oscar Robertson and wrecked everyone on the way to the Finals (and easily made the top ten of this list). In ‘72 their team was extremely good again, but came up short against the ‘72 Lakers who were also extremely good. In ‘73 the Bucks were really good again, but were upset in the semis against Nate Thurmond and the ‘73 Warriors. Now, in 1974, the Bucks were hoping for another title. They still had (by far) the best player in the league in Kareem. And the Lakers’ duo of West and Chamberlain mostly gone; Chamberlain had retired and West was injured much of the year. The Knicks had faded a bit and the championship seemed ripe for the taking. Sure the Bucks didn’t have a lot going for them besides Kareem (Dandridge and Allen were good, but neither was at the level you’d think of for a second-best player on a title team). Then again, when you have the best player in the league at the height of his powers, in a 17 team league, not a lot has to go your way to have a real shot.
The Bucks tore through the regular season, posting the best record in the league and the best SRS by an astounding 4.19 points (the 2nd best team was closer to an average SRS than to the Bucks). They weren’t a particularly good rebounding team: on average they only rebounded their opposition to a draw. And they actually turned the ball over more than their opponents. But they led the league in shooting by a lot and they led the league in shooting defense by a lot. Just before the end of the season they lost Lucius Allen to a bad injury. So they’d be going into the playoffs without one of their three best players. The Bucks were still the favorite, but nobody really knew how well the playoffs would go for them. If the first round was any indication, the Bucks were going to be fine. They faced the +0.9 Lakers and mauled them by 13 points per game. Kareem averaged a 30/18/5 on +5.7% with 2.4 steals and 3.2 blocks. And the Lakers’ shooters were smothered, shooting -6.4% as a team. The Lakers actually both outrebounded the Bucks and forced more turnovers. It’s just that the Bucks outshot them by so much that it didn’t matter.
In the Western Conference Finals it was the same story. The Bulls averaged an extra 6-7 shooting possessions a game. And the Bucks outscored them by 14.2 points a game. Do you realize how insanely you need to outshoot the other team to pull that off? Kareem averaged a 35/20/4 on +17% (that’s about as good a playoff series as you’ll see from anyone). Bob Dandridge averaged a 21/8/5 on +9%. The Bulls? As a team they shot -8.5%. So already the Bucks’ opponents were getting a huge edge in shooting possessions, but nowhere near enough to cancel out Milwaukee’s shooting advantage.
Enter the ‘74 Boston Celtics, opposite in most ways. The Celtics didn’t shoot particularly well, but they controlled the ball and played excellent defense. And they were an ideal foil in many ways. Their center, Dave Cowens, was so good at defense that leaving him on an island against Kareem was only moderately stupid. And Cowens’ respectable midrange game could keep Kareem away from the hoop on the other end. And there was another wrinkle: the Celtics unleashed a brutal full court press, intending to hound Oscar from end to end and exploit both the Bucks’ lack of secondary playmakers (with Allen out) and their proclivity toward turnovers.
Almost out of the gate it became clear that the Celtics were going to give the Bucks everything they could handle. The Celtics took a 3-2 lead, and just to stay in the series the Bucks had to pull off a heroic double-overtime victory. The Celtics controlled the rock to the tune of ten extra shooting possessions per game and the difference was all turnovers. John Havlicek, Jo Jo White and Don Chaney combined to average almost 6 steals a game; the Bucks had 36% the steals that the Celtics did. The full court press had been executed near flawlessly and exposed the Bucks’ weaknesses. But let’s not forget, the Bucks massive shooting advantage had been their trump card to date. And they did slow, but not stop, the Celtics’ shooting. As a team they shot -2.9% but nobody shot badly. Havlicek’s 26/8/5 on -1.3% may look like a weak line, but against the Bucks’ shooting defense, that was a respectable achievement. And the Bucks’ offense? Kareem averaged a 33/12/5, but only on +4.9% shooting. That’s still an excellent line, but not overwhelming. And the rest of the Bucks struggled: Dandridge shot -4.1% and Oscar -2.7%. Bucks not named Kareem-Abdul Jabbar shot -2.9%. The Bucks outshot the Celtics, but by nowhere near enough; the Celtics took the series in seven by 4.7 points per game.
So, if the Celtics beat the Bucks convincingly (which they did), why are the Bucks ranked higher? Well, first the Celtics *are* credited with the better postseason SRS. But their regular season SRS was only so-so, while the Bucks’ was excellent. And here’s the thing. I don’t want to say that the Celtics’ victory was a fluke; it wasn’t. The Celtics won fair and square. I believe that if you replayed that series ten times the Celtics would win most of them. But I think the Celtics were the perfect team to stop the Bucks. If you wanted to stop the ‘74 Bucks in the playoffs, you needed a banger of a center to slow down Kareem (who ideally also had a midrange game) and you needed a fierce enough defense to exploit the Bucks’ lack of playmakers and weak ball-handling. The Celtics were the Bucks’ kryptonite, just like the ‘09 Magic were the perfect foil to the ‘09 Cavs.
The Celtics won, and deserved to win. But it is probable that the Bucks were the best team in the NBA in 1974. Either way. We got one of the best NBA Finals *ever*. Regardless of who lost, the fans won.
Regular Season Record: 59-23, Regular Season SRS: +7.61 (28th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +3.5 (52nd), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.1 (41st)
PG: Oscar Robertson (35), -0.1 / +0.8
SG: Jon McGlocklin (30), -1.4 / -1.1
SF: Bob Dandridge (26), +1.5 / +1.5
PF: Curtis Perry (25), +0.5 / -0.6
C: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (26), +8.6 / +9.9
6th: Lucius Allen (26), +2.5 /
Scoring/100: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (28.1 / +6.1%), Bob Dandridge (24.2 / +3.2%), Lucius Allen (24.2 / +3.3%)
Assists/100: Oscar Robertson (8.2), Lucius Allen (7.1), Jon McGlockin (5.7)
Heliocentrism: 47.5% (12th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 27.6% (77th)
Depth: 24.9% (46th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +5.11 (55th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -2.95 (76th)
Playoff SRS: +8.70 (85th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.63 (90th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.05 (97th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.51 (39th)
Round 1:
Round 2: Los Angeles Lakers (+0.9), won 4-1, by +13.0 points per game (+13.9 SRS eq)
Round 3: Chicago Bulls (+2.7), won 4-0, by +14.2 points per game (+16.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: Boston Celtics (+5.1), lost 3-4, outscored by 4.7 points per game (+0.4 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2005 Andre Miller
SG: 2012 Luke Ridnour
SF: 2011 Luol Deng
PF: 2016 Amir Johnson (better on defense)
C: 2008 Kevin Garnett (playing way more minutes, and shooting better)
6th: 2016 Goran Dragic (better on offense)
Don’t get it twisted about the ‘08 Kevin Garnett. First Kevin Garnett was the centerpiece of the ‘08 Celtics, one of the best regular season teams ever. And second, Kareem played a lot more minutes than Garnett did. In terms of carry-jobs (Heliocentrism and regular season SRS) Kareem’s stint with the ‘74 Bucks is most comparable to Curry on the ‘15 Warriors, LeBron on the ‘13 Heat and Jordan on the ‘93 Bulls. All of these are ATG players having ATG seasons carrying teams that weren’t unstoppable, but wouldn’t have sniffed contention without them. Look at those comps. That’s not exactly a supporting cast that you’d brag about. Old-man Oscar as Andre Miller is rough, McGlocklin was like a bad tweener guard (as was Luke Ridnour), Amir Johnson isn’t really moving the needle much . . . You’re pretty much looking at uber-Garnett carrying the defense *and* the offense, with Deng/Dandridge and Dragic/Lucius Allen playing capable supporting roles. I know that Dandridge has a good reputation, but his stat footprint in ‘74 looks like Jamaal Wilkes, Deng, or any other solid but not great 3. If you’re trying to figure out how this team finished with a +7.61 SRS in the regular season (a really good mark) your answer begins and ends with Kareem.
Some Milwaukee history. They popped into existence for the ‘69 season and were predictably terrible. But they earned the #1 pick in the draft, which ended up being one of the three greatest players ever. In ‘70 they fell in the Conference Finals to the ‘70 Knicks (who were quite good). In ‘71 they acquired a veteran Oscar Robertson and wrecked everyone on the way to the Finals (and easily made the top ten of this list). In ‘72 their team was extremely good again, but came up short against the ‘72 Lakers who were also extremely good. In ‘73 the Bucks were really good again, but were upset in the semis against Nate Thurmond and the ‘73 Warriors. Now, in 1974, the Bucks were hoping for another title. They still had (by far) the best player in the league in Kareem. And the Lakers’ duo of West and Chamberlain mostly gone; Chamberlain had retired and West was injured much of the year. The Knicks had faded a bit and the championship seemed ripe for the taking. Sure the Bucks didn’t have a lot going for them besides Kareem (Dandridge and Allen were good, but neither was at the level you’d think of for a second-best player on a title team). Then again, when you have the best player in the league at the height of his powers, in a 17 team league, not a lot has to go your way to have a real shot.
The Bucks tore through the regular season, posting the best record in the league and the best SRS by an astounding 4.19 points (the 2nd best team was closer to an average SRS than to the Bucks). They weren’t a particularly good rebounding team: on average they only rebounded their opposition to a draw. And they actually turned the ball over more than their opponents. But they led the league in shooting by a lot and they led the league in shooting defense by a lot. Just before the end of the season they lost Lucius Allen to a bad injury. So they’d be going into the playoffs without one of their three best players. The Bucks were still the favorite, but nobody really knew how well the playoffs would go for them. If the first round was any indication, the Bucks were going to be fine. They faced the +0.9 Lakers and mauled them by 13 points per game. Kareem averaged a 30/18/5 on +5.7% with 2.4 steals and 3.2 blocks. And the Lakers’ shooters were smothered, shooting -6.4% as a team. The Lakers actually both outrebounded the Bucks and forced more turnovers. It’s just that the Bucks outshot them by so much that it didn’t matter.
In the Western Conference Finals it was the same story. The Bulls averaged an extra 6-7 shooting possessions a game. And the Bucks outscored them by 14.2 points a game. Do you realize how insanely you need to outshoot the other team to pull that off? Kareem averaged a 35/20/4 on +17% (that’s about as good a playoff series as you’ll see from anyone). Bob Dandridge averaged a 21/8/5 on +9%. The Bulls? As a team they shot -8.5%. So already the Bucks’ opponents were getting a huge edge in shooting possessions, but nowhere near enough to cancel out Milwaukee’s shooting advantage.
Enter the ‘74 Boston Celtics, opposite in most ways. The Celtics didn’t shoot particularly well, but they controlled the ball and played excellent defense. And they were an ideal foil in many ways. Their center, Dave Cowens, was so good at defense that leaving him on an island against Kareem was only moderately stupid. And Cowens’ respectable midrange game could keep Kareem away from the hoop on the other end. And there was another wrinkle: the Celtics unleashed a brutal full court press, intending to hound Oscar from end to end and exploit both the Bucks’ lack of secondary playmakers (with Allen out) and their proclivity toward turnovers.
Almost out of the gate it became clear that the Celtics were going to give the Bucks everything they could handle. The Celtics took a 3-2 lead, and just to stay in the series the Bucks had to pull off a heroic double-overtime victory. The Celtics controlled the rock to the tune of ten extra shooting possessions per game and the difference was all turnovers. John Havlicek, Jo Jo White and Don Chaney combined to average almost 6 steals a game; the Bucks had 36% the steals that the Celtics did. The full court press had been executed near flawlessly and exposed the Bucks’ weaknesses. But let’s not forget, the Bucks massive shooting advantage had been their trump card to date. And they did slow, but not stop, the Celtics’ shooting. As a team they shot -2.9% but nobody shot badly. Havlicek’s 26/8/5 on -1.3% may look like a weak line, but against the Bucks’ shooting defense, that was a respectable achievement. And the Bucks’ offense? Kareem averaged a 33/12/5, but only on +4.9% shooting. That’s still an excellent line, but not overwhelming. And the rest of the Bucks struggled: Dandridge shot -4.1% and Oscar -2.7%. Bucks not named Kareem-Abdul Jabbar shot -2.9%. The Bucks outshot the Celtics, but by nowhere near enough; the Celtics took the series in seven by 4.7 points per game.
So, if the Celtics beat the Bucks convincingly (which they did), why are the Bucks ranked higher? Well, first the Celtics *are* credited with the better postseason SRS. But their regular season SRS was only so-so, while the Bucks’ was excellent. And here’s the thing. I don’t want to say that the Celtics’ victory was a fluke; it wasn’t. The Celtics won fair and square. I believe that if you replayed that series ten times the Celtics would win most of them. But I think the Celtics were the perfect team to stop the Bucks. If you wanted to stop the ‘74 Bucks in the playoffs, you needed a banger of a center to slow down Kareem (who ideally also had a midrange game) and you needed a fierce enough defense to exploit the Bucks’ lack of playmakers and weak ball-handling. The Celtics were the Bucks’ kryptonite, just like the ‘09 Magic were the perfect foil to the ‘09 Cavs.
The Celtics won, and deserved to win. But it is probable that the Bucks were the best team in the NBA in 1974. Either way. We got one of the best NBA Finals *ever*. Regardless of who lost, the fans won.
#58. The 1960 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.53, Standard Deviations: +1.73, Won NBA Finals
Regular Season Record: 59-16, Regular Season SRS: +7.62 (27th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -0.1 (90th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -6.2 (16th)
So. I've put a lot of thought into this, and I wanted a better way to present the roster. So below is the first official final version of this. This is the roster sorted by role on offense (anyone who averaged more than 20 minutes per game in the playoffs). OLoad is basically usage, except that I feel like Usage measures finishing more than role on offense, so I basically credit assists as using half a shot, and downgrade the value of made shots to make usage even out at 20% on average. So OLoad is basically usage, but with passing more weighted. The other stats (MPPG, Pts/Reb/Ast/Stcks) are *all* pace adjusted. Odinn has helped to persuade me that per game stats are more representative of total contributions than rate stats, but I still think that pace is important for context. So these are per-game stats, but scaled to a pace of 100. And that means that "MPPG" isn't minutes, it's minute-possessions per game. So below, Russell is treated as only playing 43 MPPG, because he played about as many possessions as a 100 Pace player who plays 43 minutes a game. Anyhow. That's what's up.
Bob Cousy (PG, 31): 34.5 MPG, 26.3% OLoad, 19.4 / 4.7 / 9.5 on -2.4% shooting
Tom Heinsohn (PF, 25): 32.3 MPG, 25.0% OLoad, 21.7 / 10.6 / 2.3 on +0.0% shooting
Bill Sharman (SG, 33): 27.0 MPG, 24.2% OLoad, 19.3 / 3.7 / 2.0 on +4.3% shooting
Frank Ramsey (SF, 28): 27.5 MPG, 20.5% OLoad, 15.3 / 6.9 / 1.9 on -0.3% shooting
Gene Conley (PF, 29): 18.7 MPG, 15.2% OLoad, 6.7 / 8.3 / 0.5 on -5.7% shooting
Bill Russell (C, 25): 42.5 MPG, 15.2% OLoad, 18.2 / 24.0 / 3.7 on +3.3% shooting
Scoring/100: Bill Sharman (25.2 / +4.3%), Tom Heinsohn (23.7 / +0.0%), Bob Cousy (19.8 / -2.4%)
Assists/100: Bob Cousy (9.7), Bill Russell (3.1), Bill Sharman (2.7)
Playoff Offensive Rating: -5.09 (99th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -11.48 (4th)
Playoff SRS: +9.28 (76th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.91 (84th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.45 (90th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.61 (62nd)
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3: Philadelphia Warriors (+5.5), won 4-2, by +3.4 points per game (+8.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: St. Louis Hawks (+1.8), won 4-3, by +7.8 points per game (+9.6 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2013 Jeremy Lin
SG: 2001 Reggie Miller (without the spacing or postseason explosions)
SF: 2018 Jaylen Brown
PF: 2011 Rudy Gay (less spacing)
C: 2004 Marcus Camby (playing 50% more, much better defender, which is saying something)
6th: 2018 Al-Farouq Aminu
Those comps may not suggest a championship team. But there’s no way to comp Russell in the modern game. Imagine Marcus Camby: an outstanding big man defender who owned the boards and brought low volume but decent scoring and sufficient passing. Not a bad asset, right? Now imagine that he’s half again as valuable on defense. I don’t know how you get that in the modern game; let’s just pretend that he can teleport and shoot out his arms like Plastic Man. Or imagine that he’s somehow the equivalent of replacing your poor defensive center and wing with Draymond Green and Tony Allen (or imagine the per-minute value you get from an ‘07 Nash or a ‘13 Durant on offense, but you get that on defense). Now imagine that instead of effectively playing 26 minutes a game, he plays more like 40 minutes a game. So he’s the same super-freak defender, but he plays all but four minutes a half and doesn’t miss games. So at this point we’re talking about one of the most valuable players in the league.
Complimentary pieces? A really nice all-around shooting guard (Sharman/Miller), a high-ish usage athletic wing/big in Heinsohn/Gay, an athletic but raw wing in Ramsey/rookie Jaylen Brown, a high usage but underperforming point guard and a nice athletic defender off the bench (with K.C. Jones and Sam Jones still getting 15 minutes a game). In other words, it’s a world-beating defender, a very limited offense built around rebounds, Reggie Miller and Lin’s passing, and a lot of defenders with a deep bench. It’s hard to imagine this offense being good (because it wasn’t). But it was a historically excellent defense.
The really nuts thing about these Celtics teams is how long they carried their future starters on the roster. Sam Jones came off the bench for three years, because Bill Sharman was still too good to displace. K.C. Jones came off the bench for three years because Bob Cousy was too venerated to displace. By 1959 they already had most of their future starters on the roster. It’s such a credit to Red Auerbach that he was able to acquire talent so reliably. He snatched up Russell who turned out to be (arguably) the best player of the decade. But he also got Heinsohn, a quality high-ish usage player the same year. Now I’m no huge fan of Heinsohn, but to execute the high-defense lineups that the Celtics ran (with Russell and the 3 both being quite low usage) you need to supplement with players that can carry the offense without hurting it, and Heinsohn fit that bill. And then he picks up Sam Jones (one of the better shooting guards of the decade), K.C. Jones (not great, but a smart player who played strong defense) while continuing to acquire the “not great on offense but strong defender” role players that the Celtics seemed continuously stocked with. And of course in ‘62 he got Havlicek at the end of the first round. I’m just saying, Auerbach did a really good job building his rosters. Of course, there was no salary cap (and not much of a competitive market), so a team could simply carry both a Bill Sharman and a Sam Jones without complication. Still.
Anyhow. In 1960 the Celtics stomped their way through the regular season, finishing with the best record in the NBA (by 10 games) and the best SRS in the NBA (by 4.9 points per game). And the Celtics first matchup of the playoffs (which was in the Eastern Conference Finals because, you know, eight team leagues)? The second best team in the league, Wilt’s Philadelphia Warriors. It was a tough matchup; the Celtics struggled to shoot (though that wasn’t really a strength of theirs to begin with). Cousy struggled with a 16/4/8 on -11.9% shooting. Russell and Heinsohn combined for 42 points a game on +1.3% shooting or better. But the Celtics overall shot at -3.5%. And the Warriors shot better (-2.2%) led by Wilt’s 31/28/2 on +4.7% shooting (though Arizin also had a good series with a 24/10/3 on +1.6%). Yet the Celtics won by 3.4 points per game. The difference? The Celtics controlled the ball. They got an extra 7.5 shots per game, mostly on the strength of their rebounding. They outrebounded the Warriors by 10 rebounds a game, which is remarkable given the fact that they were outshot. Russell and Wilt cancelled each other out rebound-wise, but the Celtics’ supporting players (notably 6th man Gene Conley) made a big difference. It’s notable that Russell had a strong offensive series, scoring the second most points for the team on positive efficiency, and with Wilt defending him. Russell was never an offensive giant, but at 25 he was clearly plenty capable.
In the NBA Finals were Bob Pettit’s St. Louis Hawks, the common Western Division winner back then. And it was the exact same thing. The Celtics were outshot. Cousy struggled again (14/4/10 on -10.8%), while Russell, Ramsey and the Joneses (Sam and K.C.) combined for 51 points a game on +4.6% shooting or better. The team overall shot at -0.6%, which wasn’t bad for the Celtics. But the Hawks shot better, led by Pettit’s 26/15/4 on +6.5% and Hagan’s 24/10/3 on +4.0%. And yet the Celtics won by 7.8 points a game. The secret? You guessed it, they took way more shots, 13 per game to be exact. And this wasn’t all rebounding - the Celtics only got 6-7 more boards a game. So clearly turnovers were a big factor (wouldn’t it be nice if we actually had those stats)? But yeah, when you get 13 more shots a game, you really won’t lose unless the other team outshoots you by a ton, and the Hawks didn’t. So the Celtics won their third title with Russell. Their postseason wasn’t crazy dominant, but then, it usually didn’t need to be. You might expect with a +8.53 OSRS in 1960 that the competition would lead to them finishing higher, but 1960 was weirdly imbalanced. The Royals were awful (this was the year before they got Oscar). The Celtics may have finished at +8.53, but the Warriors were at +5.08, the Royals at -5.92 and the Pistons at -4.82. When literally half the league is farther than 4.8 points from average, you’re actually looking at a low competition environment (not like 2020, but more like 2010). So the Celtics get credit for being a really good team, but they don’t get the tight competition bonus.
Also, isn’t it interesting how the Celtics’ dominance seemed to arise, not from outshooting the other team, but from taking more shots via rebounding and turnovers? I guess it’s not unlike the early aughts Pistons, except that they did it well enough to be the best team in the league for over a decade. But it’s worth noting that, compared to now, shooting variation was much lower, shooting efficiency was low which meant that there were more rebounds to fight for, and turnovers generally were higher so being better at them was a greater advantage. So they did the same thing as the aughts Pistons, just better and in an era that was more ideal for it. Like Babe Ruth compared to Gavvy Cravath.
Regular Season Record: 59-16, Regular Season SRS: +7.62 (27th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: -0.1 (90th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -6.2 (16th)
So. I've put a lot of thought into this, and I wanted a better way to present the roster. So below is the first official final version of this. This is the roster sorted by role on offense (anyone who averaged more than 20 minutes per game in the playoffs). OLoad is basically usage, except that I feel like Usage measures finishing more than role on offense, so I basically credit assists as using half a shot, and downgrade the value of made shots to make usage even out at 20% on average. So OLoad is basically usage, but with passing more weighted. The other stats (MPPG, Pts/Reb/Ast/Stcks) are *all* pace adjusted. Odinn has helped to persuade me that per game stats are more representative of total contributions than rate stats, but I still think that pace is important for context. So these are per-game stats, but scaled to a pace of 100. And that means that "MPPG" isn't minutes, it's minute-possessions per game. So below, Russell is treated as only playing 43 MPPG, because he played about as many possessions as a 100 Pace player who plays 43 minutes a game. Anyhow. That's what's up.
Bob Cousy (PG, 31): 34.5 MPG, 26.3% OLoad, 19.4 / 4.7 / 9.5 on -2.4% shooting
Tom Heinsohn (PF, 25): 32.3 MPG, 25.0% OLoad, 21.7 / 10.6 / 2.3 on +0.0% shooting
Bill Sharman (SG, 33): 27.0 MPG, 24.2% OLoad, 19.3 / 3.7 / 2.0 on +4.3% shooting
Frank Ramsey (SF, 28): 27.5 MPG, 20.5% OLoad, 15.3 / 6.9 / 1.9 on -0.3% shooting
Gene Conley (PF, 29): 18.7 MPG, 15.2% OLoad, 6.7 / 8.3 / 0.5 on -5.7% shooting
Bill Russell (C, 25): 42.5 MPG, 15.2% OLoad, 18.2 / 24.0 / 3.7 on +3.3% shooting
Scoring/100: Bill Sharman (25.2 / +4.3%), Tom Heinsohn (23.7 / +0.0%), Bob Cousy (19.8 / -2.4%)
Assists/100: Bob Cousy (9.7), Bill Russell (3.1), Bill Sharman (2.7)
Playoff Offensive Rating: -5.09 (99th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -11.48 (4th)
Playoff SRS: +9.28 (76th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +0.91 (84th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.45 (90th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -1.61 (62nd)
Round 1:
Round 2:
Round 3: Philadelphia Warriors (+5.5), won 4-2, by +3.4 points per game (+8.9 SRS eq)
Round 4: St. Louis Hawks (+1.8), won 4-3, by +7.8 points per game (+9.6 SRS eq)
Modern Comps:
PG: 2013 Jeremy Lin
SG: 2001 Reggie Miller (without the spacing or postseason explosions)
SF: 2018 Jaylen Brown
PF: 2011 Rudy Gay (less spacing)
C: 2004 Marcus Camby (playing 50% more, much better defender, which is saying something)
6th: 2018 Al-Farouq Aminu
Those comps may not suggest a championship team. But there’s no way to comp Russell in the modern game. Imagine Marcus Camby: an outstanding big man defender who owned the boards and brought low volume but decent scoring and sufficient passing. Not a bad asset, right? Now imagine that he’s half again as valuable on defense. I don’t know how you get that in the modern game; let’s just pretend that he can teleport and shoot out his arms like Plastic Man. Or imagine that he’s somehow the equivalent of replacing your poor defensive center and wing with Draymond Green and Tony Allen (or imagine the per-minute value you get from an ‘07 Nash or a ‘13 Durant on offense, but you get that on defense). Now imagine that instead of effectively playing 26 minutes a game, he plays more like 40 minutes a game. So he’s the same super-freak defender, but he plays all but four minutes a half and doesn’t miss games. So at this point we’re talking about one of the most valuable players in the league.
Complimentary pieces? A really nice all-around shooting guard (Sharman/Miller), a high-ish usage athletic wing/big in Heinsohn/Gay, an athletic but raw wing in Ramsey/rookie Jaylen Brown, a high usage but underperforming point guard and a nice athletic defender off the bench (with K.C. Jones and Sam Jones still getting 15 minutes a game). In other words, it’s a world-beating defender, a very limited offense built around rebounds, Reggie Miller and Lin’s passing, and a lot of defenders with a deep bench. It’s hard to imagine this offense being good (because it wasn’t). But it was a historically excellent defense.
The really nuts thing about these Celtics teams is how long they carried their future starters on the roster. Sam Jones came off the bench for three years, because Bill Sharman was still too good to displace. K.C. Jones came off the bench for three years because Bob Cousy was too venerated to displace. By 1959 they already had most of their future starters on the roster. It’s such a credit to Red Auerbach that he was able to acquire talent so reliably. He snatched up Russell who turned out to be (arguably) the best player of the decade. But he also got Heinsohn, a quality high-ish usage player the same year. Now I’m no huge fan of Heinsohn, but to execute the high-defense lineups that the Celtics ran (with Russell and the 3 both being quite low usage) you need to supplement with players that can carry the offense without hurting it, and Heinsohn fit that bill. And then he picks up Sam Jones (one of the better shooting guards of the decade), K.C. Jones (not great, but a smart player who played strong defense) while continuing to acquire the “not great on offense but strong defender” role players that the Celtics seemed continuously stocked with. And of course in ‘62 he got Havlicek at the end of the first round. I’m just saying, Auerbach did a really good job building his rosters. Of course, there was no salary cap (and not much of a competitive market), so a team could simply carry both a Bill Sharman and a Sam Jones without complication. Still.
Anyhow. In 1960 the Celtics stomped their way through the regular season, finishing with the best record in the NBA (by 10 games) and the best SRS in the NBA (by 4.9 points per game). And the Celtics first matchup of the playoffs (which was in the Eastern Conference Finals because, you know, eight team leagues)? The second best team in the league, Wilt’s Philadelphia Warriors. It was a tough matchup; the Celtics struggled to shoot (though that wasn’t really a strength of theirs to begin with). Cousy struggled with a 16/4/8 on -11.9% shooting. Russell and Heinsohn combined for 42 points a game on +1.3% shooting or better. But the Celtics overall shot at -3.5%. And the Warriors shot better (-2.2%) led by Wilt’s 31/28/2 on +4.7% shooting (though Arizin also had a good series with a 24/10/3 on +1.6%). Yet the Celtics won by 3.4 points per game. The difference? The Celtics controlled the ball. They got an extra 7.5 shots per game, mostly on the strength of their rebounding. They outrebounded the Warriors by 10 rebounds a game, which is remarkable given the fact that they were outshot. Russell and Wilt cancelled each other out rebound-wise, but the Celtics’ supporting players (notably 6th man Gene Conley) made a big difference. It’s notable that Russell had a strong offensive series, scoring the second most points for the team on positive efficiency, and with Wilt defending him. Russell was never an offensive giant, but at 25 he was clearly plenty capable.
In the NBA Finals were Bob Pettit’s St. Louis Hawks, the common Western Division winner back then. And it was the exact same thing. The Celtics were outshot. Cousy struggled again (14/4/10 on -10.8%), while Russell, Ramsey and the Joneses (Sam and K.C.) combined for 51 points a game on +4.6% shooting or better. The team overall shot at -0.6%, which wasn’t bad for the Celtics. But the Hawks shot better, led by Pettit’s 26/15/4 on +6.5% and Hagan’s 24/10/3 on +4.0%. And yet the Celtics won by 7.8 points a game. The secret? You guessed it, they took way more shots, 13 per game to be exact. And this wasn’t all rebounding - the Celtics only got 6-7 more boards a game. So clearly turnovers were a big factor (wouldn’t it be nice if we actually had those stats)? But yeah, when you get 13 more shots a game, you really won’t lose unless the other team outshoots you by a ton, and the Hawks didn’t. So the Celtics won their third title with Russell. Their postseason wasn’t crazy dominant, but then, it usually didn’t need to be. You might expect with a +8.53 OSRS in 1960 that the competition would lead to them finishing higher, but 1960 was weirdly imbalanced. The Royals were awful (this was the year before they got Oscar). The Celtics may have finished at +8.53, but the Warriors were at +5.08, the Royals at -5.92 and the Pistons at -4.82. When literally half the league is farther than 4.8 points from average, you’re actually looking at a low competition environment (not like 2020, but more like 2010). So the Celtics get credit for being a really good team, but they don’t get the tight competition bonus.
Also, isn’t it interesting how the Celtics’ dominance seemed to arise, not from outshooting the other team, but from taking more shots via rebounding and turnovers? I guess it’s not unlike the early aughts Pistons, except that they did it well enough to be the best team in the league for over a decade. But it’s worth noting that, compared to now, shooting variation was much lower, shooting efficiency was low which meant that there were more rebounds to fight for, and turnovers generally were higher so being better at them was a greater advantage. So they did the same thing as the aughts Pistons, just better and in an era that was more ideal for it. Like Babe Ruth compared to Gavvy Cravath.
#57. The 1982 Boston Celtics
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +8.98, Standard Deviations: +2.06, Lost in Conference Finals
Regular Season Record: 63-19, Regular Season SRS: +6.35 (63rd), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.9 (61st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.4 (55th)
PG: Tiny Archibald, +0.1 / -1.3
SG: Gerald Henderson, -0.6 / -0.2
SF: Larry Bird, +6.6 / +5.4
PF: Cedric Maxwell, +2.2 / +5.4
C: Robert Parish, +3.8 / +4.0
6th: Kevin McHale, +1.5 / +6.1
7th: M.L. Carr, +0.5 / -3.0
So. I've put a lot of thought into this, and I wanted a better way to present the roster. So below is an official final version of this. This is the roster sorted by role on offense (anyone who averaged more than 20 minutes per game in the playoffs). OLoad is basically usage, except that I feel like Usage measures finishing more than role on offense, so I basically credit assists as using half a shot, and downgrade the value of made shots to make usage even out at 20% on average. So OLoad is basically usage, but with passing more weighted. The other stats (MPPG, Pts/Reb/Ast/Stcks) are *all* pace adjusted. Odinn has helped to persuade me that per game stats are more representative of total contributions than rate stats, but I still think that pace is important for context. So these are per-game stats, but scaled to a pace of 100. And that means that "MPPG" isn't minutes, it's minute-possessions per game. So above, Russell is treated as only playing 43 MPPG, because he played about as many possessions as a 100 Pace player who plays 43 minutes a game. Anyhow. That's what's up.
Larry Bird (SF, 25): 37 MPPG, 25.5% OLoad, 23 / 11 / 6 / 3 on +1.8%,
Robert Parish (C, 28): 31 MPPG, 23.6% OLoad, 20 / 11 / 2 / 3 on +3.2%,
Tiny Archibald (PG, 33): 31 MPPG, 21.3% OLoad, 12 / 2 / 8 / 1 on +0.3%,
Gerald Henderson (PG, 26): 22 MPPG, 20.8% OLoad, 10 / 2 / 3 / 1 on -0.5%
Kevin McHale (PF, 24): 28 MPPG, 17.8% OLoad, 13 / 7 / 1 / 3 on +2.9%
Cedric Maxwell (PF, 26): 33 MPPG, 16.8% OLoad, 15 / 6 / 2 on +7.7%
M.L. Carr (SF, 31): 23 MPPG, 16.5% OLoad, 8 / 3 / 2 / 2 on -4.4%
Scoring/100: Robert Parish (29.8 / +3.2%), Larry Bird (28.5 / +1.8%), Kevin McHale (22.7 / +2.9%)
Assists/100: Tiny Archibald (11.8), Larry Bird (7.2), Gerald Henderson (6.5)
Heliocentrism: 38.1% (35th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 38.1% (42nd)
Depth: 23.8% (48th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +2.08 (79th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -7.17 (28th)
Playoff SRS: +11.56 (38th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.63 (47th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.07 (96th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.58 (18th)
Round 1:
Round 2: Washington Bullets (+2.8), won 4-1, by +7.0 points per game (+9.8 SRS eq)
Round 3: Philadelphia 76ers (+8.1), lost 3-4, by +4.7 points per game (+12.8 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2006 Jason Williams (better on offense)
SG: 2019 Fred VanVleet (worse in every way)
SF: 2015 Marc Gasol (better on offense)
PF: 2002 Andrei Kirilenko (worse on defense and more at the rim)
C: 2015 Zach Randolph (much better defender)
6th: 2013 Thaddeus Young
Another weird set of comps. The numbers aren’t huge fans of old Tiny Archibald (quality passing but not much else) or Gerald Henderson (a tweener guard who wasn’t particularly good at anything). Kirilenko is a garbage comp for Maxwell, but Maxwell is hard to find comps for. He’s a super-efficient, low usage player that rebounds decently, plays good defense but turns it over a lot and doesn’t pass much. Robert Parish as Z-Bo was a big surprise . . . but they line up amazingly well. They’re both monster rebounders, both took a lot of shots (Parish was more efficient), but neither could really pass and both had turnover issues. Thaddeus Young for McHale is off, but then, McHale wasn’t yet an efficiency machine, so he boils down to a near-the-basket good defender, good shooter and good rebounder. And Bird . . . his comps early on always seem to come out as great bigs. Gasol is a nice comp; good midrange game, good passer, decent usage, decent efficiency, great rebounding (particularly on defense) and big defensive presence. It’s really weird to see this construction. I associate the Bird Celtics with lots of passing, but this roster (between McHale, Parish and Maxwell) is actually not great at passing. You know who it gives me an appreciation for? Danny Ainge. Not a great shooter, not a great passer, not great at anything really, but he was solid across the board. And he added a lot of versatility to the roster. And he was a rookie in ‘82, still developing. Looking at this roster, I’m not particularly surprised that the Celtics’ offense wasn’t that great in the playoffs. It was their defense that carried them.
In 1981 (the year before), the Celtics had had a strong season, defeating the nemesis 76ers in a seven-game Conference Finals before whipping the Moses Malone Rockets in the Finals to win their first title of the Bird era (these two foes, the 76ers and Moses Malone, would unite in ‘83 with great effect, but that was still in the future). In 1982, as per usual, the three best regular season teams in the NBA were all in the Eastern Conference. Or, to be more accurate, the top three SRSs in the league were in the East (+6.35 for Boston, +5.74 for the 76ers and +5.38 for the Bucks) and three of the top four records were in the East. The Celtics (by every reasonable metric) were the best team in the regular season, but they weren’t particularly dominant. Thanks to their high seeding they drew the Bullets (who were still decent) where the 76ers and Bucks had to play each other.
The Bullets were no challenge to the Celtics; it was a quick five-game win by 7 points a game. Bird struggled a bit (17/10/3 on -2.3%), Parish moved the chains with a 23/12/1 on +0.2% and McHale had a great game off the bench with a 17/6/1 on +6.1%. It wasn’t a possession-win; the Celtics outshot the Bullets pretty decisively (mostly by playing great shot defense, the Celtics’ actually shot at =1.2% as a team). So the Celtics advanced to the Conference Finals, to face the formidable +8.1 76ers (of course).
In Game 1 the Celtics ripped the Sixers apart. The Celtics offense fired on all cylinders but the real victory was the defense they played; the Sixers shot 32.3% from the field. The Celtics won by 40. Game 2 didn’t go quite as nicely; Andrew Toney had a fantastic 30/4/5 on +7% and Larry Bird really struggled (18/14/4 on -9.9% with 6 turnovers). The Celtics lost by 8. Game 3 was incredibly tight. Bird played a good game but once again struggled to score (15/13/11 on -14.6%) while the Sixers starters all scored well (combining for 71 all on average or above efficiency). The Celtics barely lost by 2, and Tiny Archibald was lost for the series. Down 2-1, the Celtics had their worst game of the series. No Celtics starters shot better than +2% while Andrew Toney had another insane game at 39/4/6 on +20.3%, and the Sixers ran the Celtics off the court by 25.
Down 3-1, the Celtics redoubled their efforts in Game 5. Bird had yet another strong game with bad shooting (20/20/8 on -5.7%) but the Sixers’ offense was smothered. Every Sixer starter shot below average: Erving shot at -4.2% while Toney and Bobby Jones shot below -10%. The Celtics rumbled their way to a 29 point victory. Game 6 was closer: Bird and Parish had similar games, Bird with a 14/17/4 on -18.7% and Parish with a 14/13/3 on -14.8%. But the Sixers shot worse. Julius Erving had a 24/11/4 on -3.8% but Cheeks shot a -17.8% and Toney a -41.3%. The Celtics won by 13 and the series went back to the Garden for Game 7.
Every Celtics starter shot below average. Bird averaged a 20/11/9 on -7.4% and Parish a 23/14/0 on -7.0% and the 76ers prevailed by 14. The 76ers would advance to tangle with the Lakers; the Celtics were out. The loss was surely disappointing. Bird shot -9% on the series, only able to add value through rebounding and assists. And the injury to Archibald stung; Tiny Archibald wasn’t great, but Henderson wasn’t any better. In fact, the Celtics guard play was weak all-around, and an injury to Archibald exacerbated that problem (though the Celtics still outscored the Sixers in the games that Archibald missed). But there was a bright side, after a fashion. The Celtics did outscore the Sixers by 4.7 points a game. So, even though they lost, the Celtics would go on to finish the season with both the best regular season SRS and the best postseason SRS. They’re dinged for losing in the Conference Finals, but they were still probably the best team in 1982, and they’re rated appropriately here.
Regular Season Record: 63-19, Regular Season SRS: +6.35 (63rd), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +2.9 (61st), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -3.4 (55th)
PG: Tiny Archibald, +0.1 / -1.3
SG: Gerald Henderson, -0.6 / -0.2
SF: Larry Bird, +6.6 / +5.4
PF: Cedric Maxwell, +2.2 / +5.4
C: Robert Parish, +3.8 / +4.0
6th: Kevin McHale, +1.5 / +6.1
7th: M.L. Carr, +0.5 / -3.0
So. I've put a lot of thought into this, and I wanted a better way to present the roster. So below is an official final version of this. This is the roster sorted by role on offense (anyone who averaged more than 20 minutes per game in the playoffs). OLoad is basically usage, except that I feel like Usage measures finishing more than role on offense, so I basically credit assists as using half a shot, and downgrade the value of made shots to make usage even out at 20% on average. So OLoad is basically usage, but with passing more weighted. The other stats (MPPG, Pts/Reb/Ast/Stcks) are *all* pace adjusted. Odinn has helped to persuade me that per game stats are more representative of total contributions than rate stats, but I still think that pace is important for context. So these are per-game stats, but scaled to a pace of 100. And that means that "MPPG" isn't minutes, it's minute-possessions per game. So above, Russell is treated as only playing 43 MPPG, because he played about as many possessions as a 100 Pace player who plays 43 minutes a game. Anyhow. That's what's up.
Larry Bird (SF, 25): 37 MPPG, 25.5% OLoad, 23 / 11 / 6 / 3 on +1.8%,
Robert Parish (C, 28): 31 MPPG, 23.6% OLoad, 20 / 11 / 2 / 3 on +3.2%,
Tiny Archibald (PG, 33): 31 MPPG, 21.3% OLoad, 12 / 2 / 8 / 1 on +0.3%,
Gerald Henderson (PG, 26): 22 MPPG, 20.8% OLoad, 10 / 2 / 3 / 1 on -0.5%
Kevin McHale (PF, 24): 28 MPPG, 17.8% OLoad, 13 / 7 / 1 / 3 on +2.9%
Cedric Maxwell (PF, 26): 33 MPPG, 16.8% OLoad, 15 / 6 / 2 on +7.7%
M.L. Carr (SF, 31): 23 MPPG, 16.5% OLoad, 8 / 3 / 2 / 2 on -4.4%
Scoring/100: Robert Parish (29.8 / +3.2%), Larry Bird (28.5 / +1.8%), Kevin McHale (22.7 / +2.9%)
Assists/100: Tiny Archibald (11.8), Larry Bird (7.2), Gerald Henderson (6.5)
Heliocentrism: 38.1% (35th of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 38.1% (42nd)
Depth: 23.8% (48th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +2.08 (79th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -7.17 (28th)
Playoff SRS: +11.56 (38th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.63 (47th)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +0.07 (96th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -3.58 (18th)
Round 1:
Round 2: Washington Bullets (+2.8), won 4-1, by +7.0 points per game (+9.8 SRS eq)
Round 3: Philadelphia 76ers (+8.1), lost 3-4, by +4.7 points per game (+12.8 SRS eq)
Round 4:
Modern Comps:
PG: 2006 Jason Williams (better on offense)
SG: 2019 Fred VanVleet (worse in every way)
SF: 2015 Marc Gasol (better on offense)
PF: 2002 Andrei Kirilenko (worse on defense and more at the rim)
C: 2015 Zach Randolph (much better defender)
6th: 2013 Thaddeus Young
Another weird set of comps. The numbers aren’t huge fans of old Tiny Archibald (quality passing but not much else) or Gerald Henderson (a tweener guard who wasn’t particularly good at anything). Kirilenko is a garbage comp for Maxwell, but Maxwell is hard to find comps for. He’s a super-efficient, low usage player that rebounds decently, plays good defense but turns it over a lot and doesn’t pass much. Robert Parish as Z-Bo was a big surprise . . . but they line up amazingly well. They’re both monster rebounders, both took a lot of shots (Parish was more efficient), but neither could really pass and both had turnover issues. Thaddeus Young for McHale is off, but then, McHale wasn’t yet an efficiency machine, so he boils down to a near-the-basket good defender, good shooter and good rebounder. And Bird . . . his comps early on always seem to come out as great bigs. Gasol is a nice comp; good midrange game, good passer, decent usage, decent efficiency, great rebounding (particularly on defense) and big defensive presence. It’s really weird to see this construction. I associate the Bird Celtics with lots of passing, but this roster (between McHale, Parish and Maxwell) is actually not great at passing. You know who it gives me an appreciation for? Danny Ainge. Not a great shooter, not a great passer, not great at anything really, but he was solid across the board. And he added a lot of versatility to the roster. And he was a rookie in ‘82, still developing. Looking at this roster, I’m not particularly surprised that the Celtics’ offense wasn’t that great in the playoffs. It was their defense that carried them.
In 1981 (the year before), the Celtics had had a strong season, defeating the nemesis 76ers in a seven-game Conference Finals before whipping the Moses Malone Rockets in the Finals to win their first title of the Bird era (these two foes, the 76ers and Moses Malone, would unite in ‘83 with great effect, but that was still in the future). In 1982, as per usual, the three best regular season teams in the NBA were all in the Eastern Conference. Or, to be more accurate, the top three SRSs in the league were in the East (+6.35 for Boston, +5.74 for the 76ers and +5.38 for the Bucks) and three of the top four records were in the East. The Celtics (by every reasonable metric) were the best team in the regular season, but they weren’t particularly dominant. Thanks to their high seeding they drew the Bullets (who were still decent) where the 76ers and Bucks had to play each other.
The Bullets were no challenge to the Celtics; it was a quick five-game win by 7 points a game. Bird struggled a bit (17/10/3 on -2.3%), Parish moved the chains with a 23/12/1 on +0.2% and McHale had a great game off the bench with a 17/6/1 on +6.1%. It wasn’t a possession-win; the Celtics outshot the Bullets pretty decisively (mostly by playing great shot defense, the Celtics’ actually shot at =1.2% as a team). So the Celtics advanced to the Conference Finals, to face the formidable +8.1 76ers (of course).
In Game 1 the Celtics ripped the Sixers apart. The Celtics offense fired on all cylinders but the real victory was the defense they played; the Sixers shot 32.3% from the field. The Celtics won by 40. Game 2 didn’t go quite as nicely; Andrew Toney had a fantastic 30/4/5 on +7% and Larry Bird really struggled (18/14/4 on -9.9% with 6 turnovers). The Celtics lost by 8. Game 3 was incredibly tight. Bird played a good game but once again struggled to score (15/13/11 on -14.6%) while the Sixers starters all scored well (combining for 71 all on average or above efficiency). The Celtics barely lost by 2, and Tiny Archibald was lost for the series. Down 2-1, the Celtics had their worst game of the series. No Celtics starters shot better than +2% while Andrew Toney had another insane game at 39/4/6 on +20.3%, and the Sixers ran the Celtics off the court by 25.
Down 3-1, the Celtics redoubled their efforts in Game 5. Bird had yet another strong game with bad shooting (20/20/8 on -5.7%) but the Sixers’ offense was smothered. Every Sixer starter shot below average: Erving shot at -4.2% while Toney and Bobby Jones shot below -10%. The Celtics rumbled their way to a 29 point victory. Game 6 was closer: Bird and Parish had similar games, Bird with a 14/17/4 on -18.7% and Parish with a 14/13/3 on -14.8%. But the Sixers shot worse. Julius Erving had a 24/11/4 on -3.8% but Cheeks shot a -17.8% and Toney a -41.3%. The Celtics won by 13 and the series went back to the Garden for Game 7.
Every Celtics starter shot below average. Bird averaged a 20/11/9 on -7.4% and Parish a 23/14/0 on -7.0% and the 76ers prevailed by 14. The 76ers would advance to tangle with the Lakers; the Celtics were out. The loss was surely disappointing. Bird shot -9% on the series, only able to add value through rebounding and assists. And the injury to Archibald stung; Tiny Archibald wasn’t great, but Henderson wasn’t any better. In fact, the Celtics guard play was weak all-around, and an injury to Archibald exacerbated that problem (though the Celtics still outscored the Sixers in the games that Archibald missed). But there was a bright side, after a fashion. The Celtics did outscore the Sixers by 4.7 points a game. So, even though they lost, the Celtics would go on to finish the season with both the best regular season SRS and the best postseason SRS. They’re dinged for losing in the Conference Finals, but they were still probably the best team in 1982, and they’re rated appropriately here.
#56. The 2012 Oklahoma City Thunder
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +9.28, Standard Deviations: +1.74, Lost in NBA Finals (Preseason 4th)
Regular Season Record: 47-19, Regular Season SRS: +6.44 (58th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +5.2 (29th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.4 (85th)
PG: Russell Westbrook, +3.0 / +3.4
SG: James Harden, +4.3 / +3.5
SF: Kevin Durant, +7.0 / +8.1
PF: Serge Ibaka, +2.3 / +2.4
C: Kendrick Perkins, -2.1 / -3.2
6th: Derek Fisher, -4.9 / -0.4
7th: Thabo Sefolosha, +0.4 / +2.2
Russell Westbrook (PG, 23): 38.0 MPG, 33.6%, 25 / 45 / 6 / 2 on +1.1%
Kevin Durant (SF, 23): 41.5 MPG, 30.7%, 30 / 9 / 4 / 3 on +8.3%
James Harden (SG, 22): 33.7 MPG, 22.5%, 18 / 4 / 4 / 1 on +13.3%
Derek Fisher (PG, 37): 21.9 MPG, 14.9%, 5 / 2 / 2 / 1 on -9.8%
Serge Ibaka (PF, 22): 29.2 MPG, 14.4%, 10 / 8 / 1 / 5 on +2.9%
Kendrick Perkins (27): 28.9 MPG, 11.4%, 5 / 7 / 1 / 2 on +0.1%
Thabo Sefolosha (27): 23.4 MPG, 11.0%, 5 / 3 / 1 / 1 on +5.7%
Scoring/100: Kevin Durant (37.5 / +8.3%), Russell Westbrook (34.5 / +1.1%), James Harden (27.7 / +13.3%)
Assists/100: Russell Westbrook (8.0), James Harden (6.1), Kevin Durant (4.7)
Heliocentrism: 40.0% (32nd of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 42.1% (23rd)
Depth: 17.9% (64th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +7.73 (19th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -3.19 (73rd)
Playoff SRS: +10.62 (49th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.84 (42nd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.48 (44th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.03 (50th)
Round 1: Dallas Mavericks (+1.8), won 4-0, by +5.5 points per game (+7.3 SRS eq)
Round 2: Los Angeles Lakers (+2.3), won 4-1, by +9.4 points per game (+11.7 SRS eq)
Round 3: San Antonio Spurs (+11.0), won 4-2, by +4.5 points per game (+15.5 SRS eq)
Round 4: Miami Heat (+10.3), lost 1-4, outscored by 4 points per game (+6.3 SRS eq)
The 2012 Thunder . . . I don’t know where to start. So, basically, the 2005 SuperSonics were the last winning Seattle team. The next two years they were quite bad. In the 2007 draft they ended up with the #2 overall pick. The choice of the team above them (Portland) was between two players: Greg Oden (the stud big for Ohio State that had played fantastically in the NCAA title game) or Kevin Durant (a super-skilled, super-tall, super-long string bean from Texas). The Blazers went with Oden (who was the consensus best pick) and the Sonics settled for Durant. In the 2008 draft they had the #4 pick (the Sonics were awful again) and the #24 pick. With the #4 they took a fireball point guard from UCLA (Russell Westbrook) and with the #24 they took a flier on a Congolese big, Serge Ibaka. At this time the Sonics were up and moved to Oklahoma City to become the Thunder. And in the next draft they had the #3 pick (because they were awful again) and got a one-man offense shooting guard from Arizona, James Harden. I go into detail here, because the 2012 Thunder were defined by these draft picks. There may never have been a team (and if somebody wants to chime in) that had such a density of its value come from players who were 23 or younger. In 2010 the Thunder won 50 games with a +3.6 SRS, losing to the ‘10 Lakers in the first round (no shame there). In 2011 they finished 55-27 with a +3.8 SRS, advancing all the way to the Conference Finals before losing in five to the eventual champion Dallas Mavericks. In 2012 they were rated the second best team in the West (behind the Lakers for some reason). And they proceeded to tear through the league, posting the 3rd best record (behind the Bulls and Spurs) and the 3rd best SRS (behind the Bulls and Spurs). But in spite of the teams ahead of them, the money for a championship was overwhelmingly on the Miami Heat, who everyone expected to revenge themselves upon the league for their surprising loss in 2011.
The Thunder are often characterized as led by a trio of stars but that’s slightly disingenuous. Kevin Durant was, by far, the best player on that team. He posted an OLoad above 30%, averaged above 30 points per game (pace adjusted) and did it on +8.3% efficiency. He was a fantastic shooter but he could also get to the line with ease. He was 23 and he was already probably the best scorer in the league (at least for the regular season). He also rebounded a ton, especially on defense. He wasn’t perfect; his awareness needed work (his positioning on defense and passing were not strengths) and his handle wasn’t perfect (his turnovers were a little high). Scary as this may sound, Durant would grow considerably better than this, but in 2012 he was still damned good. Russell Westbrook was the other 30+% OLoad player, but his strengths were much more . . . nebulous. He was a bit of a floor-raiser; his strength was that he could use tons of possessions at near league average efficiency (not unlike Allen Iverson), and he was a very good rebounder for a 1, but his passing wasn’t great - he was yet to grow into a triple-double monster. And James Harden, who would become one of the biggest stars in the league, was basically an average usage player who came off the bench and scored with crazy efficiency (even higher than Durant).
And that was the offense; everyone else used very low numbers of possessions on offense. Perkins could be counted on for solid post defense and toughness, but not much else. Thabo Sefolosha was a gifted defensive stopper and solid spot-up shooter but needed others to set up his looks. Serge Ibaka was a long and gifted defender who could score okay, but was still raw. Basically, it was Durant and Westbrook using tons of possessions and everyone else in the starting lineup was some form of defensive specialist, and Harden would come off the bench for firepower. The thing is, despite having a ton of defensive specialists, the Thunder’s defense wasn’t actually that good (I mean, it was good, but nowhere near as good as their offense). This was basically a team with buttloads of talent (at least in its best three players) but it suffered from two problems: 1) the relative inexperience of their stars which led to worse passing and creation, but higher turnovers and 2) a somewhat weak supporting cast. I’m not overplaying the passing weakness; the Thunder were 11th in the league in shots made, but dead last in assists. They were really dependent on iso scoring from their big 3 for their offense. Westbrook’s insane usage, even at the expense of low efficiency, isn’t too bad as long as effective specialists are used to fill in those slots. Given that the Thunder’s offense was murderous, but their defense was not, I’d say that the specialists brought in weren’t that great. Or maybe Durant/Harden/Westbrook just weren’t that good on defense. But again, their offense was really good. Top 30 regular season for the list, Top 20 postseason on the list . . . The other teams that fit that criteria? The ‘13 Heat, the ‘16 Thunder, the ‘85, ‘87 and ‘89 Lakers, the ‘91 Bulls, the ‘17 Warriors, the ‘01 Lakers and the ‘05 Suns. That’s a pretty sweet list to be part of.
The Thunder, earning a two seed, faced the defending champion Mavericks (+1.8) who were definitely nowhere near the team they’d been the year before. The Thunder swept them by a respectable but underwhelming 5.5 points per game. The Thunder got beaten on the boards but they still shot so well that they weren’t likely to lose. Durant averaged a 27/8/4 on +5.2% while Harden, Ibaka and Fisher combined for 37.6 a game (Harden was half of that) on +14% or better.
The next round was against the preseason favorite Lakers (+2.3). The Thunder outshot them (of course) but they also won the turnover battle, forcing 3 more steals a game than the Lakers and hounding Ramon Sessions, Steve Blake and Matt Barnes into tons of turnovers. Durant averaged a 27/9/3 on +9.4% and Westbrook had a solid game with a 26/5/5 on +2.7%. Kobe, in contrast, had a 31/5/3 on -1.2% (nearly 40% usage for the series). The Thunder took the Lakers in five games, by 9.4 points per game. The Lakers had now been whipped in two straight playoffs; their time was at an end. And the last team to do so had won the championship. The Thunder had reason to be optimistic, but first, they had to face the San Antonio Spurs. The Spurs hadn’t gotten much attention going into the season, but they’d posted a fantastic record and won both of their playoff series by large margins. As good as the Thunder had been, OSRS favored the Spurs by 3 points a game going into the series. It would be a serious test.
The Thunder struggled to stop the Spurs’ shooting; the Spurs shot 40.9% from three and shot +3.7% as a team. And the Spurs did an excellent job containing Westbrook on a 18/6/7 with -7.7% shooting (a penetrating guard who couldn’t shoot from three was the sort of player that the Spurs never struggled to contain). But there were a few things that went the Thunder’s way. First, they generated a lot of steals (Sefolosha averaged more than 2 per game and the Thunder averaged 4 more per game than the Spurs). And second, the Spurs couldn’t stop Durant and Harden (30/8/5 on +13.5% and 19/6/4 on +11.4%). In the end the Thunder moved past the Spurs in six by 4.5 points per game. The Thunder had won the Conference Finals. The team of young phenoms had only one more team to beat.
The 2012 Miami Heat.
They’d lost the Finals the year before, and this year they’d played with a fury, posting 10+ SRS in each of their three prior playoff series. And full disclosure, this was the first year I really started paying attention to the NBA. I was swept up in LeBron’s quest to redeem himself and I wanted to see what happened. I was impressed that the Thunder had beaten the Spurs so convincingly, and I wasn’t convinced that the Heat could beat them.
In Game 1 the Thunder won all Four Factors. The Thunder only had a 1 point lead going into the fourth, but Kevin Durant ripped through the Heat for 17 points in the fourth quarter alone. Durant put up a 36/8/4 on +22.4% shooting. I remember watching it and thinking, “Oh my gosh, nobody can stop Durant”. He made everything look easy. And the Thunder won Game 1 by 11 points. And remember, Game 1 was played slow; at 100 possessions a game Durant would have averaged a 41/9/5. Nuts.
The rest of the series didn’t go that way. The Heat swept the next four games by 4, 6, 6 and 15 points. And the Heat outshot the Thunder, by a good amount. The Heat shot at +4.8% as a team, and 42.9% from three. The Heat had gone to a small spacing lineup with Bosh at the 5 and the Thunder couldn’t keep up. The league average O-Rating in 2012 was 104.6, the highest regular season rating was 110.9, in this series the Heat put up a 115.1. Oklahoma’s defense was not their strength, but it got completely exposed in these Finals. And it’s a shame, because the Thunder’s offense played really well, at a 110.6. Kevin Durant averaged a 31/6/2 on +12.3%, Westbrook averaged a 27/6/7 on -2.7% and Harden a 12/5/4 on +0.2%. Basically, the non-Durant Thunder shot at -2.7%. The Thunder’s offense overall was very effective, because Durant shot fantastically. They just couldn’t put up points as fast as the Heat.
The easy narrative here is that this is an ‘89 Bulls or ‘09 Cavs situation, where Durant played amazingly but his teammates couldn’t keep up. And there is *something* to that. Durant was unquestionably the best scorer on the court for this series:
Durant 30.6 on +12.3%
LeBron 28.6 on +3.1%
But did Durant outplay LeBron?
Durant 30.6 / 6.0 / 2.2 and 3.8 turnovers on +12.3% shooting
LeBron 28.6 / 10.2 / 7.4 and 3.8 turnovers on +3.1% shooting
By game level BPM (bbr), LeBron was the better player for the series (if not by much). The assist numbers really jump out. With the load Durant was carrying, assists that low make him pretty much a pure finisher. I was curious; which players have had the most playoff games with 30+ points but 2 or less assists?
Durant has had 19 of those games. 17 players have had at least ten. But this doesn’t necessarily mean much; Durant has had 43 games where he averaged 30+ and at least 3 assists. How does this compare to the other players? Here’s the full list, sorted by the players most likely to have 30+ point playoff performances that qualify as a “Black Hole Game” with 30+ playoff game and assists (2 or less):
Amar’e Stoudemire: 15 Black Hole Games, 0 other, 100% Black Hole Rating
Moses Malone: 14 BHG, 3 other, 82.4% BHR
Bob McAdoo: 12 BHG, 3 other, 80.0% BHR
Bob Love, Klay Thompson: 10 BHG, 3 other, 76.9% BHR
Reggie Miller: 16 BHG, 13 other, 55.2% BHR
Dirk Nowitzki: 22 BHG, 24 other, 47.8% BHR
George Gervin: 12 BHG, 14 other, 46.2% BHR
Shaquille O’Neal: 23 BHG, 32 other, 41.8% BHR
Tim Duncan: 14 BHG, 22 other, 38.9% BHR
Hakeem Olajuwon: 20 BHG, 33 other, 37.7% BHR
Wilt Chamberlain: 15 BHG, 27 other, 35.7% BHR
Karl Malone: 19 BHG, 35 other, 35.2% BHR
Kevin Durant: 19 BHG, 43 other, 30.6% BHR
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar: 22 BHG, 53 other, 29.3% BHR
Kobe Bryant: 16 BHG, 72 other, 18.2% BHR
Michael Jordan: 17 BHG, 92 other, 15.6% BHR
Again, this is only players who have had at least ten “Black Hole Games”; LeBron isn’t on this list for obvious reasons. And clearly pace/minutes skew this: Kareem and Wilt playing tons of possessions drive their numbers up a bit. Still. The point is that Durant is alarmingly likely to have such games; obviously his BHR is lower than Klay Thompson, Reggie Miller or George Gervin, but this is a list dominated by Bigs. He’s twice as likely to have a 30+ point playoff game be a Black Hole Game as Jordan, and almost 70% more likely to have one than Kobe. The point is, Durant was a sensational scorer (and still is), but his lack of passing does put an implicit cap in his value.
So the 2012 Finals between Durant and LeBron was basically the comparison between the two in a nutshell. Scoring? Durant. But anything else? LeBron.
So the Thunder lost the Finals by 4 points a game to a +10 OSRS team. Their regular season SRS was 58th, their postseason SRS was 49th. So finishing 56th overall seems appropriate. Why does this seem low to me then? Probably because three of the Top 10 players of the 2010s were on the same team at the same time (well, maybe not three depending on how value Westbrook) and this was their coming out party. They had a great offense but a defense that, while good, still needed work (LeBron exploited their defensive rotations pretty ruthlessly). That said, all of their stars were still 23 or younger: they had nowhere to go but up.
Except they didn’t. The Thunder were heading toward a complicated situation where they had four young studs in Durant, Westbrook, Harden and Ibaka. And by 2014, they’d need to commit to which of the three they’d keep or else get hit with the Luxury Tax. So at the end of the 2012 season they flipped James Harden to the Rockets for Kevin Martin, Jeremy Lamb and Steven Adams (actually there were a bunch of picks and Adams was the only piece that mattered out of those picks - I’m simplifying). So basically 85 cents on the dollar for the player Harden was *right then* and about 25 cents on the dollar for the player that Harden grew into. I don’t necessarily fault the Thunder for choosing to lose Harden: fitting three 30%+ usage players into one lineup is nuts. And Harden was, at that time, merely a very gifted mid-usage 6th man. That he’d grow into a legit MVP candidate wasn’t entirely anticipated.
That said. First, the Thunder could have just, you know, paid the luxury tax and then wrecked the league. But second, even if they weren’t going to do that, the Thunder did the trade in 2012, but didn’t need to do it until 2014 to avoid the tax hit. And in 2013 they were a +9 SRS team (without Harden) and then lost Westbrook in the playoffs and fell apart (do you think Harden might have helped?) And more so, by 2014 the league financial structure had changed so much, Harden could have absolutely been kept with no cost and even Ibaka probably could have been retained (as the next few years would likely have shown that Harden was the one to keep). So the Thunder basically turned themselves from the probable best team in the league for the next 3-5 years to a team that kept coming up just short. Which ended up costing them Durant and eventually Westbrook.
And they never needed to do it. I don’t mean “they could have kept everyone together and it would have worked out magically” (like, say, the ‘99 Bulls might have been), I mean, legit, they had pocket aces, the flop was ace, two seven off-suit, and they folded only to find out that the the river was the fourth ace. Bismark once compared preemptive war to “committing suicide out of fear of death”, the idea that you fear something so much that you bring it about yourself simply to obviate the fear. The Thunder feared that the tax implications of keeping their stars in the future might damage their ability to keep the team together. So they broke it up themselves. And almost certainly cost the franchise multiple titles.
The 2012 Thunder are like the ‘77 Blazers or the ‘02 Lakers, or any of those teams that on paper should have continued wrecking the league for a while, but for reasons that had nothing to do with the on-court product, it never happened. Bill Walton’s feet broke the Blazers, Kobe and Shaq’s personal dysfunctionality broke the Lakers and Sam Presti (with unquestioned pressure from his owner) broke the Thunder. And it’s a damned shame.
Regular Season Record: 47-19, Regular Season SRS: +6.44 (58th), Earned the 2 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +5.2 (29th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -1.4 (85th)
PG: Russell Westbrook, +3.0 / +3.4
SG: James Harden, +4.3 / +3.5
SF: Kevin Durant, +7.0 / +8.1
PF: Serge Ibaka, +2.3 / +2.4
C: Kendrick Perkins, -2.1 / -3.2
6th: Derek Fisher, -4.9 / -0.4
7th: Thabo Sefolosha, +0.4 / +2.2
Russell Westbrook (PG, 23): 38.0 MPG, 33.6%, 25 / 45 / 6 / 2 on +1.1%
Kevin Durant (SF, 23): 41.5 MPG, 30.7%, 30 / 9 / 4 / 3 on +8.3%
James Harden (SG, 22): 33.7 MPG, 22.5%, 18 / 4 / 4 / 1 on +13.3%
Derek Fisher (PG, 37): 21.9 MPG, 14.9%, 5 / 2 / 2 / 1 on -9.8%
Serge Ibaka (PF, 22): 29.2 MPG, 14.4%, 10 / 8 / 1 / 5 on +2.9%
Kendrick Perkins (27): 28.9 MPG, 11.4%, 5 / 7 / 1 / 2 on +0.1%
Thabo Sefolosha (27): 23.4 MPG, 11.0%, 5 / 3 / 1 / 1 on +5.7%
Scoring/100: Kevin Durant (37.5 / +8.3%), Russell Westbrook (34.5 / +1.1%), James Harden (27.7 / +13.3%)
Assists/100: Russell Westbrook (8.0), James Harden (6.1), Kevin Durant (4.7)
Heliocentrism: 40.0% (32nd of 82 teams)
Wingmen: 42.1% (23rd)
Depth: 17.9% (64th)
Playoff Offensive Rating: +7.73 (19th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -3.19 (73rd)
Playoff SRS: +10.62 (49th), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.84 (42nd)
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.48 (44th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -2.03 (50th)
Round 1: Dallas Mavericks (+1.8), won 4-0, by +5.5 points per game (+7.3 SRS eq)
Round 2: Los Angeles Lakers (+2.3), won 4-1, by +9.4 points per game (+11.7 SRS eq)
Round 3: San Antonio Spurs (+11.0), won 4-2, by +4.5 points per game (+15.5 SRS eq)
Round 4: Miami Heat (+10.3), lost 1-4, outscored by 4 points per game (+6.3 SRS eq)
The 2012 Thunder . . . I don’t know where to start. So, basically, the 2005 SuperSonics were the last winning Seattle team. The next two years they were quite bad. In the 2007 draft they ended up with the #2 overall pick. The choice of the team above them (Portland) was between two players: Greg Oden (the stud big for Ohio State that had played fantastically in the NCAA title game) or Kevin Durant (a super-skilled, super-tall, super-long string bean from Texas). The Blazers went with Oden (who was the consensus best pick) and the Sonics settled for Durant. In the 2008 draft they had the #4 pick (the Sonics were awful again) and the #24 pick. With the #4 they took a fireball point guard from UCLA (Russell Westbrook) and with the #24 they took a flier on a Congolese big, Serge Ibaka. At this time the Sonics were up and moved to Oklahoma City to become the Thunder. And in the next draft they had the #3 pick (because they were awful again) and got a one-man offense shooting guard from Arizona, James Harden. I go into detail here, because the 2012 Thunder were defined by these draft picks. There may never have been a team (and if somebody wants to chime in) that had such a density of its value come from players who were 23 or younger. In 2010 the Thunder won 50 games with a +3.6 SRS, losing to the ‘10 Lakers in the first round (no shame there). In 2011 they finished 55-27 with a +3.8 SRS, advancing all the way to the Conference Finals before losing in five to the eventual champion Dallas Mavericks. In 2012 they were rated the second best team in the West (behind the Lakers for some reason). And they proceeded to tear through the league, posting the 3rd best record (behind the Bulls and Spurs) and the 3rd best SRS (behind the Bulls and Spurs). But in spite of the teams ahead of them, the money for a championship was overwhelmingly on the Miami Heat, who everyone expected to revenge themselves upon the league for their surprising loss in 2011.
The Thunder are often characterized as led by a trio of stars but that’s slightly disingenuous. Kevin Durant was, by far, the best player on that team. He posted an OLoad above 30%, averaged above 30 points per game (pace adjusted) and did it on +8.3% efficiency. He was a fantastic shooter but he could also get to the line with ease. He was 23 and he was already probably the best scorer in the league (at least for the regular season). He also rebounded a ton, especially on defense. He wasn’t perfect; his awareness needed work (his positioning on defense and passing were not strengths) and his handle wasn’t perfect (his turnovers were a little high). Scary as this may sound, Durant would grow considerably better than this, but in 2012 he was still damned good. Russell Westbrook was the other 30+% OLoad player, but his strengths were much more . . . nebulous. He was a bit of a floor-raiser; his strength was that he could use tons of possessions at near league average efficiency (not unlike Allen Iverson), and he was a very good rebounder for a 1, but his passing wasn’t great - he was yet to grow into a triple-double monster. And James Harden, who would become one of the biggest stars in the league, was basically an average usage player who came off the bench and scored with crazy efficiency (even higher than Durant).
And that was the offense; everyone else used very low numbers of possessions on offense. Perkins could be counted on for solid post defense and toughness, but not much else. Thabo Sefolosha was a gifted defensive stopper and solid spot-up shooter but needed others to set up his looks. Serge Ibaka was a long and gifted defender who could score okay, but was still raw. Basically, it was Durant and Westbrook using tons of possessions and everyone else in the starting lineup was some form of defensive specialist, and Harden would come off the bench for firepower. The thing is, despite having a ton of defensive specialists, the Thunder’s defense wasn’t actually that good (I mean, it was good, but nowhere near as good as their offense). This was basically a team with buttloads of talent (at least in its best three players) but it suffered from two problems: 1) the relative inexperience of their stars which led to worse passing and creation, but higher turnovers and 2) a somewhat weak supporting cast. I’m not overplaying the passing weakness; the Thunder were 11th in the league in shots made, but dead last in assists. They were really dependent on iso scoring from their big 3 for their offense. Westbrook’s insane usage, even at the expense of low efficiency, isn’t too bad as long as effective specialists are used to fill in those slots. Given that the Thunder’s offense was murderous, but their defense was not, I’d say that the specialists brought in weren’t that great. Or maybe Durant/Harden/Westbrook just weren’t that good on defense. But again, their offense was really good. Top 30 regular season for the list, Top 20 postseason on the list . . . The other teams that fit that criteria? The ‘13 Heat, the ‘16 Thunder, the ‘85, ‘87 and ‘89 Lakers, the ‘91 Bulls, the ‘17 Warriors, the ‘01 Lakers and the ‘05 Suns. That’s a pretty sweet list to be part of.
The Thunder, earning a two seed, faced the defending champion Mavericks (+1.8) who were definitely nowhere near the team they’d been the year before. The Thunder swept them by a respectable but underwhelming 5.5 points per game. The Thunder got beaten on the boards but they still shot so well that they weren’t likely to lose. Durant averaged a 27/8/4 on +5.2% while Harden, Ibaka and Fisher combined for 37.6 a game (Harden was half of that) on +14% or better.
The next round was against the preseason favorite Lakers (+2.3). The Thunder outshot them (of course) but they also won the turnover battle, forcing 3 more steals a game than the Lakers and hounding Ramon Sessions, Steve Blake and Matt Barnes into tons of turnovers. Durant averaged a 27/9/3 on +9.4% and Westbrook had a solid game with a 26/5/5 on +2.7%. Kobe, in contrast, had a 31/5/3 on -1.2% (nearly 40% usage for the series). The Thunder took the Lakers in five games, by 9.4 points per game. The Lakers had now been whipped in two straight playoffs; their time was at an end. And the last team to do so had won the championship. The Thunder had reason to be optimistic, but first, they had to face the San Antonio Spurs. The Spurs hadn’t gotten much attention going into the season, but they’d posted a fantastic record and won both of their playoff series by large margins. As good as the Thunder had been, OSRS favored the Spurs by 3 points a game going into the series. It would be a serious test.
The Thunder struggled to stop the Spurs’ shooting; the Spurs shot 40.9% from three and shot +3.7% as a team. And the Spurs did an excellent job containing Westbrook on a 18/6/7 with -7.7% shooting (a penetrating guard who couldn’t shoot from three was the sort of player that the Spurs never struggled to contain). But there were a few things that went the Thunder’s way. First, they generated a lot of steals (Sefolosha averaged more than 2 per game and the Thunder averaged 4 more per game than the Spurs). And second, the Spurs couldn’t stop Durant and Harden (30/8/5 on +13.5% and 19/6/4 on +11.4%). In the end the Thunder moved past the Spurs in six by 4.5 points per game. The Thunder had won the Conference Finals. The team of young phenoms had only one more team to beat.
The 2012 Miami Heat.
They’d lost the Finals the year before, and this year they’d played with a fury, posting 10+ SRS in each of their three prior playoff series. And full disclosure, this was the first year I really started paying attention to the NBA. I was swept up in LeBron’s quest to redeem himself and I wanted to see what happened. I was impressed that the Thunder had beaten the Spurs so convincingly, and I wasn’t convinced that the Heat could beat them.
In Game 1 the Thunder won all Four Factors. The Thunder only had a 1 point lead going into the fourth, but Kevin Durant ripped through the Heat for 17 points in the fourth quarter alone. Durant put up a 36/8/4 on +22.4% shooting. I remember watching it and thinking, “Oh my gosh, nobody can stop Durant”. He made everything look easy. And the Thunder won Game 1 by 11 points. And remember, Game 1 was played slow; at 100 possessions a game Durant would have averaged a 41/9/5. Nuts.
The rest of the series didn’t go that way. The Heat swept the next four games by 4, 6, 6 and 15 points. And the Heat outshot the Thunder, by a good amount. The Heat shot at +4.8% as a team, and 42.9% from three. The Heat had gone to a small spacing lineup with Bosh at the 5 and the Thunder couldn’t keep up. The league average O-Rating in 2012 was 104.6, the highest regular season rating was 110.9, in this series the Heat put up a 115.1. Oklahoma’s defense was not their strength, but it got completely exposed in these Finals. And it’s a shame, because the Thunder’s offense played really well, at a 110.6. Kevin Durant averaged a 31/6/2 on +12.3%, Westbrook averaged a 27/6/7 on -2.7% and Harden a 12/5/4 on +0.2%. Basically, the non-Durant Thunder shot at -2.7%. The Thunder’s offense overall was very effective, because Durant shot fantastically. They just couldn’t put up points as fast as the Heat.
The easy narrative here is that this is an ‘89 Bulls or ‘09 Cavs situation, where Durant played amazingly but his teammates couldn’t keep up. And there is *something* to that. Durant was unquestionably the best scorer on the court for this series:
Durant 30.6 on +12.3%
LeBron 28.6 on +3.1%
But did Durant outplay LeBron?
Durant 30.6 / 6.0 / 2.2 and 3.8 turnovers on +12.3% shooting
LeBron 28.6 / 10.2 / 7.4 and 3.8 turnovers on +3.1% shooting
By game level BPM (bbr), LeBron was the better player for the series (if not by much). The assist numbers really jump out. With the load Durant was carrying, assists that low make him pretty much a pure finisher. I was curious; which players have had the most playoff games with 30+ points but 2 or less assists?
Durant has had 19 of those games. 17 players have had at least ten. But this doesn’t necessarily mean much; Durant has had 43 games where he averaged 30+ and at least 3 assists. How does this compare to the other players? Here’s the full list, sorted by the players most likely to have 30+ point playoff performances that qualify as a “Black Hole Game” with 30+ playoff game and assists (2 or less):
Amar’e Stoudemire: 15 Black Hole Games, 0 other, 100% Black Hole Rating
Moses Malone: 14 BHG, 3 other, 82.4% BHR
Bob McAdoo: 12 BHG, 3 other, 80.0% BHR
Bob Love, Klay Thompson: 10 BHG, 3 other, 76.9% BHR
Reggie Miller: 16 BHG, 13 other, 55.2% BHR
Dirk Nowitzki: 22 BHG, 24 other, 47.8% BHR
George Gervin: 12 BHG, 14 other, 46.2% BHR
Shaquille O’Neal: 23 BHG, 32 other, 41.8% BHR
Tim Duncan: 14 BHG, 22 other, 38.9% BHR
Hakeem Olajuwon: 20 BHG, 33 other, 37.7% BHR
Wilt Chamberlain: 15 BHG, 27 other, 35.7% BHR
Karl Malone: 19 BHG, 35 other, 35.2% BHR
Kevin Durant: 19 BHG, 43 other, 30.6% BHR
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar: 22 BHG, 53 other, 29.3% BHR
Kobe Bryant: 16 BHG, 72 other, 18.2% BHR
Michael Jordan: 17 BHG, 92 other, 15.6% BHR
Again, this is only players who have had at least ten “Black Hole Games”; LeBron isn’t on this list for obvious reasons. And clearly pace/minutes skew this: Kareem and Wilt playing tons of possessions drive their numbers up a bit. Still. The point is that Durant is alarmingly likely to have such games; obviously his BHR is lower than Klay Thompson, Reggie Miller or George Gervin, but this is a list dominated by Bigs. He’s twice as likely to have a 30+ point playoff game be a Black Hole Game as Jordan, and almost 70% more likely to have one than Kobe. The point is, Durant was a sensational scorer (and still is), but his lack of passing does put an implicit cap in his value.
So the 2012 Finals between Durant and LeBron was basically the comparison between the two in a nutshell. Scoring? Durant. But anything else? LeBron.
So the Thunder lost the Finals by 4 points a game to a +10 OSRS team. Their regular season SRS was 58th, their postseason SRS was 49th. So finishing 56th overall seems appropriate. Why does this seem low to me then? Probably because three of the Top 10 players of the 2010s were on the same team at the same time (well, maybe not three depending on how value Westbrook) and this was their coming out party. They had a great offense but a defense that, while good, still needed work (LeBron exploited their defensive rotations pretty ruthlessly). That said, all of their stars were still 23 or younger: they had nowhere to go but up.
Except they didn’t. The Thunder were heading toward a complicated situation where they had four young studs in Durant, Westbrook, Harden and Ibaka. And by 2014, they’d need to commit to which of the three they’d keep or else get hit with the Luxury Tax. So at the end of the 2012 season they flipped James Harden to the Rockets for Kevin Martin, Jeremy Lamb and Steven Adams (actually there were a bunch of picks and Adams was the only piece that mattered out of those picks - I’m simplifying). So basically 85 cents on the dollar for the player Harden was *right then* and about 25 cents on the dollar for the player that Harden grew into. I don’t necessarily fault the Thunder for choosing to lose Harden: fitting three 30%+ usage players into one lineup is nuts. And Harden was, at that time, merely a very gifted mid-usage 6th man. That he’d grow into a legit MVP candidate wasn’t entirely anticipated.
That said. First, the Thunder could have just, you know, paid the luxury tax and then wrecked the league. But second, even if they weren’t going to do that, the Thunder did the trade in 2012, but didn’t need to do it until 2014 to avoid the tax hit. And in 2013 they were a +9 SRS team (without Harden) and then lost Westbrook in the playoffs and fell apart (do you think Harden might have helped?) And more so, by 2014 the league financial structure had changed so much, Harden could have absolutely been kept with no cost and even Ibaka probably could have been retained (as the next few years would likely have shown that Harden was the one to keep). So the Thunder basically turned themselves from the probable best team in the league for the next 3-5 years to a team that kept coming up just short. Which ended up costing them Durant and eventually Westbrook.
And they never needed to do it. I don’t mean “they could have kept everyone together and it would have worked out magically” (like, say, the ‘99 Bulls might have been), I mean, legit, they had pocket aces, the flop was ace, two seven off-suit, and they folded only to find out that the the river was the fourth ace. Bismark once compared preemptive war to “committing suicide out of fear of death”, the idea that you fear something so much that you bring it about yourself simply to obviate the fear. The Thunder feared that the tax implications of keeping their stars in the future might damage their ability to keep the team together. So they broke it up themselves. And almost certainly cost the franchise multiple titles.
The 2012 Thunder are like the ‘77 Blazers or the ‘02 Lakers, or any of those teams that on paper should have continued wrecking the league for a while, but for reasons that had nothing to do with the on-court product, it never happened. Bill Walton’s feet broke the Blazers, Kobe and Shaq’s personal dysfunctionality broke the Lakers and Sam Presti (with unquestioned pressure from his owner) broke the Thunder. And it’s a damned shame.
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