Moderator: JaysRule15
dagger wrote:Signing is official - here is the contract structure
The Blue Jays remain on the hunt for more talent, with additional pitching and an infielder the priorities.
How the Blue Jays will account for his signing bonus wasn’t immediately clear, but assuming it’s all on the 2021 payroll tab, they now have just under $107 million committed to 12 players.
Budget in an additional $10 million or so for the club’s pre-arbitration players, and the team is sitting at roughly $117 million before making any additional adds.
The club’s limit for this year is unknown but club president and CEO Mark Shapiro said back in October that “we will conduct this off-season much like last off-season,” when the team added roughly $53.5 million to the 2020 payroll (before the pandemic caused pro-ration).
So far this winter, they’ve tacked on their 2021 tab $32 million for Springer (assuming again the full $10 million bonus is accounted for this year), $8 million for Robbie Ray, $5.5 million for Kirby Yates (with the potential for an additional $4.5 million in incentives) and $3 million for Tyler Chatwood (with the potential for an additional $2.5 million in incentives).
dagger wrote:Signing is official - here is the contract structure
$15m signing bonus that is paid out over the first two seasons. That'd get you effective figures of $29.5m/$29.5/$22/$22/$22
bturn2210 wrote:https://www.espn.com/mlb/insider/story/_/id/30765763 can anyone post this? Thanks!
Agents will tell you privately that a lot of free agents have no interest in playing in Toronto, because they don't like the idea of being in another country or passing through customs or because of their perception of Canada's tax system. It's not a coincidence that before this winter, the Jays' best-paid free agent was a native of Canada -- catcher Russell Martin.
Highest-paid Toronto free agents
1. Russell Martin, 5 years, $82 million (2015)
2. Hyun Jin Ryu, 4 years, $80 million (2020)
3. A.J. Burnett, 5 years, $55 million (2006)
4. B.J. Ryan, 5 years,$47 million (2006)
5. J.A. Happ, 3 years, $36 million (2016)
The Jays haven't typically had true access to the elite free agents such as Springer. Rather, Toronto would bid but be used as leverage, with targets eventually landing elsewhere. But this winter played out very differently.
Because the Houston Astros tactically delayed Springer's first promotion to the big leagues so that he would miss free agency in 2019 -- by one day, as it turned out -- the outfielder missed out on feasting in the greatest spending spree in MLB history last winter. Gerrit Cole got $324 million. Anthony Rendon and Stephen Strasburg each signed for $245 million. The biggest trade target of the winter, Mookie Betts, landed with the Dodgers and got the second-largest contract in MLB history.
As it turned out, the context for Springer's free agency could not have been more different: the coronavirus manifested, baseball was shut down for months, owners' profits were diminished and Springer found himself in a tepid market this winter, his options significantly limited. Agents and club executives have been able to identify only a small handful of teams that even intended to be aggressive this offseason: the Mets, under new owner Steve Cohen; the White Sox, who have made a big push; the Padres, who wound up dealing for three starting pitchers; and the Blue Jays.
After trading for Francisco Lindor, the Mets' efforts to sign Springer stalled, their last contract concept in the area of $120 million. The Padres and White Sox had other priorities. So the Jays had a unique opportunity -- to get a prolific star player with almost no serious competition in the bidding.
The Jays' pitch to him, beyond the money, was about what a great fit they thought he would be all the way around, with his vast experience on winning teams, his gregarious personality and his reputation for inclusiveness, and with all of his community outreach, including helping kids who stutter, something Springer has worked through himself.
In collapsing free-agent markets, there are incredible buy opportunities for anyone with even a little financial flexibility. That's how Toronto wound up taking a really good player off the board for markedly less than he probably would've cost last winter.
The Jays will make some more moves, sources say, but probably not big-ticket items; rather, in a free-agent market filled with options, Toronto could be looking to be more efficient in filling holes. More time is needed to build more infrastructure, for Bichette to establish himself, for Nate Pearson to build major league innings, and there will be more windows in which the Jays will look to make additions -- before next summer's trade deadline, and in free agency again next fall.
AthensBucks wrote:Lowry is done.
Nurse is below average at best.
Masai is overrated.
I dont get how so many people believe in the raptors,they have zero to chance to win it all.
If the player’s production collapses early in the contract, the team doesn’t get much of the near-term impact that contending buying near-term wins prize, and then get saddled with the backend. If the Jays only get one impact-type season from Springer before a major decline and then maybe a couple of decent years after that, they won’t have gained much above their existing baseline, while tying up a bunch of spending capacity. That fundamentally the big risk here, the risk of an early collapse.
That’s exactly what gave me pause about the Jays going after Springer: a poor history of free agent outfielders living up to large contracts, seemingly littered with early collapses shortly after signing. I keep thinking to four years ago when 31-year old Dexter Fowler seemed like a great fit with a six-year track record as a solid or better regular, the Jays severely deficient in outfielders and otherwise slim pickings on the free agent overall. The Cardinals stretched to five years, and while Fowler had a good 2017, off the cliff he went.
The takeaway above is that big free contracts don’t turn out very well, and almost uniformly worse than forecasting models based on the individual’s previous performance would suggest at the time. This reflects a broader problem of what’s called asymmetric information made famous in a Nobel-winning economics paper by George Akerlof, “The Market for Lemons” about used cars.
As applied to free agent baseball players, the idea is that the player’s previous team has more complete information about the player to make a valuation. They will tend to keep players they think will hold up and let those they don’t (lemons) go to the market, and thus the players on the market will on average underperform. It’s at least interesting in this regard that Houston didn’t really seem to make any serious effort to keep Springer.
raf1995 wrote:I just don’t think he has that kind of potential. I think we will regret not trading him for a haul in a few years when he’s a mid-tier starter with nice playmaking and defense and a shaky jumper.
Cyrus wrote:Interesting article that breaks down Springer deal:If the player’s production collapses early in the contract, the team doesn’t get much of the near-term impact that contending buying near-term wins prize, and then get saddled with the backend. If the Jays only get one impact-type season from Springer before a major decline and then maybe a couple of decent years after that, they won’t have gained much above their existing baseline, while tying up a bunch of spending capacity. That fundamentally the big risk here, the risk of an early collapse.
That’s exactly what gave me pause about the Jays going after Springer: a poor history of free agent outfielders living up to large contracts, seemingly littered with early collapses shortly after signing. I keep thinking to four years ago when 31-year old Dexter Fowler seemed like a great fit with a six-year track record as a solid or better regular, the Jays severely deficient in outfielders and otherwise slim pickings on the free agent overall. The Cardinals stretched to five years, and while Fowler had a good 2017, off the cliff he went.The takeaway above is that big free contracts don’t turn out very well, and almost uniformly worse than forecasting models based on the individual’s previous performance would suggest at the time. This reflects a broader problem of what’s called asymmetric information made famous in a Nobel-winning economics paper by George Akerlof, “The Market for Lemons” about used cars.
As applied to free agent baseball players, the idea is that the player’s previous team has more complete information about the player to make a valuation. They will tend to keep players they think will hold up and let those they don’t (lemons) go to the market, and thus the players on the market will on average underperform. It’s at least interesting in this regard that Houston didn’t really seem to make any serious effort to keep Springer.
https://www.bluebirdbanter.com/2021/1/26/10713104/thoughts-on-blue-jays-george-springer-signing
Toronto Blue Jays GM Ross Atkins tells us what George Springer brings to the franchise and why he was their main offseason target.