Spoiler:
Overall SRS: My combo-SRS from the regular season and playoffs as discussed in the master thread
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In later entries I also add the Offensive and Defensive Ratings for each playoff series. This is just how well the team did, adjusted by the opponent's regular season average (if you play a team with an average Defensive Rating of 102, and you play them with an offensive rating of 106, you get credited with a +4). Pace for teams below 1973 or so is estimated based on regular season numbers, so it could easily be wrong by some.
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
Standard Deviations: Standard Deviations of Overall SRS from the league mean.
When I post the roster makeup of the team, I try and do it by playoff minutes. The numbers are age, regular season BPM and Playoff BPM (basketball-reference's BPM is being used here).
So if I say: "C: Vlade Divac (22), +2.3 / +4.3" I mean that Vlade Divac was their center, he was 22, he had a BPM of +2.3 in the regular season and a +4.3 in the playoffs. Yes, BPM misses out on a lot of subtle stuff but I thought it a good quick-hits indicator of the skills of the players.
I also list the playoff players (20+ MPG) in order of OLoad (which is usage that integrates assists) and it has everyone's per game average for minutes, points, rebounds, assists and stocks (steals plus blocks), but all of those (including minutes) are adjusted for pace.
I then cover the three highest players in scoring per 100 (with their true shooting relative to league average) and the three highest players in Assists per 100. I realize that these are arbitrary, but I wanted a quick-hits reference for how these teams' offenses ran.
I then talk about Heliocentrism, Wingmen and Depth. Basically I add up all of the team's VORP (again, basketball-reference) and then figure out what percentage of that VORP comes from the #1 player (Heliocentrism), from the #2 and 3 players combined (Wingmen) and Depth (everyone else). I include the ranking among the top 100 for reference. There are only 82 of these rankings, because 18 teams pre-date BPM/VORP, so I only have 82 to work with. I'm not saying that these are particularly meaningful, I just thought they were cool.
Playoff Offensive Rating: Amount by which your playoff offensive rating exceeds the offensive rating you'd expect given the regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents. If you would be expected to post a 99 given your opponents but you post a 104, that's graded as +5. This way we can compare across eras.
Playoff Defensive Rating is the same as Offensive Rating, just the opposite.
Playoff SRS: Is SRS measured *only* in the playoffs. Overall SRS is a mix of both playoffs and regular season.
Total SRS Increase Through Playoffs: Basically their Overall SRS minus their Regular Season SRS. This is basically how much better a team did in the playoffs than you'd guess, relative to their regular season performance.
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: The average regular season offensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Average Playoff Opponent Defense: The average regular season defensive rating of your playoff opponents.
Rankings of any kind are out of my list. So if I say that the '91 Lakers had the 42nd best regular season offense, I don't mean "42nd best of All-Time", I mean "42nd best of my Top 100 Teams of All_Time". Which will be pretty comparable, but I want to be clear about this.
I also walk through the playoffs at each round, covering their opponent their SRS (at that time), how many games the series was, the margin of victory (and a "+" is always in the favor of the discussed team; losing a series by +2.0 means that you outscored the other team by two points a game on average despite losing) and for reference I put in an SRS equivalency (beat a +5 SRS team by 5 points a game, that's an equivalent +10 SRS series).
In later entries I also add the Offensive and Defensive Ratings for each playoff series. This is just how well the team did, adjusted by the opponent's regular season average (if you play a team with an average Defensive Rating of 102, and you play them with an offensive rating of 106, you get credited with a +4). Pace for teams below 1973 or so is estimated based on regular season numbers, so it could easily be wrong by some.
In writeups, if I ever say a player shot at "-8%" or something, that means "his true shooting was 8% lower than the league average that year". Any time I say "a player shot" and follow it by a percent, I am *always* using true shooting percentage unless otherwise indicated.
I also have a modern comps section for any teams pre-2011. It's basically me weighting each statistical characteristic and feeding each player's stats into the BackPicks database and choosing the best-rated comp from the list. I might list something like this:
PG: 2017 LeBron James (worse rebounding, better passing, way fewer shots)
What I mean is, "This team's point guard was basically 2017 LeBron James, but make his passing better, make his rebounding worse and make him take way fewer shots).
Anyhow. I don't know how clear any of this will be, so please let me know what does and doesn't work from these writeups. And thanks for reading!
#9. The 2015 Golden State Warriors
Spoiler:
Overall SRS: +12.09, Standard Deviations: +2.34, Won NBA Finals (Preseason 8th)
PG: Steph Curry, +9.9 / +8.8
SG: Klay Thompson, +4.4 / +1.9
SF: Harrison Barnes, +0.1 / +0.7
PF: Draymond Green, +3.5 / +4.5
C: Andrew Bogut, +2.4 / +1.8
6th: Andre Iguodala, +0.9 / +4.5
Regular Season Metrics:
Regular Season Record: 67-15, Regular Season SRS: +10.01 (10th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +6.0 (18th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.2 (39th)
Shooting Advantage: +5.8%, Possession Advantage: -1.0 shooting possessions per game
Stephen Curry (PG, 26): 33 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 24 / 4 / 8 / 2 on +10.4%
Klay Thompson (SG, 24): 32 MPPG, 26% OLoad, 22 / 3 / 3 / 2 on +5.7%
Draymond Green (PF, 24): 32 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 12 / 8 / 4 / 3 on +0.6%
Andre Iguodala (SF, 31): 27 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 8 / 3 / 3 / 2 on +1.9%
Harrison Barnes (SF, 22): 29 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 10 / 6 / 1 / 1 on +3.9%
Andrew Bogut (C, 30): 24 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 6 / 8 / 3 / 2 on +3.1%
Scoring/100: Stephen Curry (35.5 / +10.4%), Klay Thompson (33.2 / +5.7%), Draymond Green (18.1 / +0.6%)
Assists/100: Stephen Curry (11.6), Draymond Green (5.7), Andrew Bogut (5.6)
Heliocentrism: 37.1% (40th of 84 teams) - Curry
Wingmen: 35.2% (51st) - Thompson & Green
Depth: 27.7% (39th)
Playoff Metrics:
Playoff Offensive Rating: +4.1 (64th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -7.5 (23rd)
Playoff SRS: +13.26 (22nd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.08 (58th)
Shooting Advantage: +4.6%, Possession Advantage: -0.9 shooting possessions per game
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.43 (47th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.97 (74th)
Stephen Curry (PG, 26): 41 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 29 / 5 / 7 / 2 on +7.3%
Klay Thompson (SG, 24): 38 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 19 / 4 / 3 / 2 on +1.9%
Draymond Green (PF, 24): 39 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 14 / 11 / 5 / 3 on -1.7%
Andre Iguodala (SF, 31): 31 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 11 / 5 / 4 / 2 on +1.2%
Harrison Barnes (SF, 22): 34 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 11 / 5 / 2 / 1 on -1.5%
Andrew Bogut (C, 30): 24 MPPG, 11% OLoad, 5 / 8 / 2 / 3 on +1.7%
Scoring/100: Stephen Curry (36.9 / +7.3%), Klay Thompson (26.3 / +1.9%), Draymond Green (18.8 / -1.7%)
Assists/100: Stephen Curry (8.3), Draymond Green (7.1), Andre Iguodala (6.1)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 34.9% (47th of 84 teams) - Curry
Playoff Wingmen: 36.5% (59th) - Green & Iguodala
Playoff Depth: 28.6% (29th)
Round 1: New Orleans Pelicans (+1.1), won 4-0, by +8.0 points per game (+9.1 SRS eq)
Round 2: Memphis Grizzlies (+5.9), won 4-2, by +8.0 points per game (+13.9 SRS eq)
Round 3: Houston Rockets (+4.5), won 4-1, by +8.2 points per game (+12.7 SRS eq)
Round 4: Cleveland Cavaliers (+8.7), won 4-2, by +7.2 points per game (+15.9 SRS eq)
Offensive / Defensive Ratings from Opposition Regular Season Average:
New Orleans Pelicans: +8.5 / -0.9
Memphis Grizzlies: +4.8 / -7.5
Houston Rockets: +7.3 / -4.6
Cleveland Cavaliers: +1.0 / -11.5
Shooting Advantage / Possession Advantage per game (unadjusted):
New Orleans Pelicans: +1.2% / +5.1
Memphis Grizzlies: +8.3% / -6.4
Houston Rockets: +1.8% / +3.7
Cleveland Cavaliers: +5.8% / -3.8
Postseason Usage/Efficiency Change adjusted for Opposition:
Stephen Curry: +2.1% / -2.7%
Klay Thompson: -4.3% / -3.4%
Harrison Barnes: +0.7% / -5.0%
Draymond Green: +2.0% / -1.9%
Andrew Bogut: -2.3% / -1.0%
Andre Iguodala: +1.8% / -0.3%
The 2015 Golden State Warriors put together one of the greatest regular seasons ever, going 67-15 and posting a +10 RSRS. There was only one team in the league that could reasonably challenge them, and they were felled by injuries. They won their Finals decisively, and kicked off a five-year stretch where they won the West every single year. The Warriors’ 2015-2019 has to be considered one of the best five-year stretches in NBA history, if not the best. And going into the 2015 season the Warriors’ pre-season odds had them . . . 8th.
Eighth!? I don’t think there has ever been a dynasty that has more blindsided the league. In ‘91 people were skeptical of Jordan . . . but the Bulls were still ranked 4th (which was obviously too low, but it was better than 8th). The 2000 Lakers were ranked 2nd. Most other ‘dynasties’ were ranked higher. The only one I can think of that’s comparable is the 2012-16 Spurs who ranked 12th going into the beginning of that stretch, but had a less successful run than the Warriors.
So, as my three-year old would say, “Let’s talk about it.”
Normally I start my retelling of a team’s history to when the team was last dominant.
That crap never happened for the Warriors (with the '75 and '76 teams). Post-Rick Barry they had some good teams but never great. They were like the Gervin Spurs; just good enough to show up in the history books as “that team that got stomped in the playoffs by the eventual champion”. So we’ll start in 2009.
The ‘09 Warriors were the hottest of garbage, winning 29 games. Their offense, led by Stephen Jackson, Monta Ellis and Jamal Crawford was actually above average, but their defense was 3rd worst in the league. Ellis was 23 and Andris Biedrins was 22, so there was some hope for improvement, but neither were doing much. With the 7th pick in the draft they selected a guard from Davidson named Stephen Curry, the son of former NBA player Dell Curry. Curry in college was a small guard who could shoot threes at an unprecedented level. His Junior season he used 38.0% of Davidson’s possessions when he was on the court (the highest rate in the NCAA). He took almost as many threes as twos, taking almost ten threes a game and making them a 38.7% clip. And he wasn’t like a J.J. Reddick who took tons of spot-up threes in the flow of the offense (not that Curry couldn’t make spot-up threes well); Curry could launch threes off the dribble just as well. But it wasn’t all peaches and cream. He was small and, frankly, there was zero precedent for a guard like him being an NBA-level game-changer.
Then again, there’d never really been a player like Steph Curry before.
In 2010 the Warriors, now with Curry . . . won 26 games. Even as a rookie Curry was the best player on the team according to BPM, but that wasn’t saying much. He was one of two players with a positive BPM (Curry was estimated at +2.0, but his lackluster AuRPM of +0.5 suggests his contribution was overrated) that played minutes. It was a garbage year, and with the 6th pick in the draft they took Ekpe Udoh from Baylor. Udoh was a gangly center who would block a lot of shots, but couldn’t score, couldn’t rebound, couldn’t pass . . . so yeah, that didn’t really work out.
In 2011 the Warriors, with a better Monta Ellis, won 36 games. Curry continued to improve, posting both solid box-score metrics (+2.3 BPM) and solid impact numbers (+3.0 AuRPM). But the rest of the team was fairly weak, and Curry also injured his ankle late in the season (an injury which would recur frequently). In the draft, with the 11th pick, they took a shooting guard from Washington State, Klay Thompson. Klay was an interesting blend, shooting threes in volume (making them at 39.8%) but also generating a lot of his own offense (33.4% of his team’s shots), getting to the rim decently, passing decently and playing solid box-score defense. There were reasons for concern; he made twos at a low rate (46.6% compared to 51.9% from Curry) and he lacked high-end athleticism. And he was the second three-point specialist from a small school that the Warriors had drafted in three years.
The Warriors in 2012 won only 23 games (it was the strike-shortened season, it was a 29-win pace). Curry repeatedly reinjured his ankle, only playing 26 games. The team continued to struggle, Klay Thompson was barely replacement level . . . it was a bad scene. But when Curry *did* play he was looking good, posting a +4.3 BPM and a +4.7 AuRPM. There was reason to be a little hopeful if Curry could ever stay healthy. In the draft the Warriors went in with *two* first round picks. With the #7 overall they took a strong all-around small forward from UNC named Harrison Barnes, and with the #30 they took a project big from Vanderbilt named Festus Ezeli. And yet, it turned out to be one of their second rounders that would be the difference maker. Draymond Green was a weird blend of stuff. He’d led Michigan State to the Sweet Sixteen and won the coveted KenPom Player of the Year. He was a limited scorer even in college (taking 28.4% of his team’s shots, but only posting a 54.2% TS, his strength was primarily passing, defense and incredible basketball IQ. But he lacked lateral quickness and athleticism and was only 6’7”. He had no real chance of containing NBA small forwards, but was short for a big. In a way he was reminiscent of DeJuan Blair, another KenPom winner who found that his skillset needed another several inches to function in the NBA. Nevertheless, the Warriors took a flier on Green, knowing that there were worse things than a brainy, switchy defender for a team that was awful on defense.
In 2013 the Warriors were, unsurprisingly, ranked 22nd in the league. Much to everyone’s surprise they went 47-35. And in the playoffs they upset the 3-seeded Denver Nuggets, and played the ‘13 Spurs to a tight loss (the Spurs beat the Warriors by only 3.8 points, but won their other two Western Conference series by 18.7 and 11.0 points per game). What changed? Mostly Curry being healthy. Playing 78 games in 2013 Curry posted a +5.4 BPM (+3.6 AuRPM) and a 47.9% Helio score (for a 47-win team not super-impressive in an ATG sense, but a huge deal to a struggling team). But there was another important thread; many suspected that the Warriors could never succeed pairing a small defensively limited guard (Monta Ellis) with another small defensively-limited guard (Steph Curry). So Warriors had traded Ellis to the Bucks for defensive anchor (but oft-injured) Andrew Bogut. Bogut only played half the season for the Warriors, but all of the playoffs (a subtle part of their improvement in the second season). Forward David Lee emerged as a solid rebounder/scorer (if not a defender). Klay Thompson still couldn’t shoot above league average but he was a decent contributor, and Draymond was a dumpster fire on offense his rookie year (shooting at -13.1%). Still. With a healthy Curry, a defensive anchor and a developing supporting cast, the Warriors were suddenly a playoff team.
Going into 2014 the Warriors were ranked 10th, a massive improvement. And they followed through, winning 51 games and posting a +5.15 SRS. Much to everyone’s surprise, defense led the way, showing 4th in the league (compared to 12th on offense). Part of it was Bogut being healthy for 67 games. Part of it was Draymond improving on offense such that he was playable, and contributing seriously on the defensive end (a surprising +4.6 AuRPM). And part of it was an incredibly ballsy (or impatient) move on the part of the front office. Pretty much gutting their next several drafts, the Warriors traded for Andre Iguodala. Iggy wasn’t a strong scorer, but he was a heady passer and an outstanding glue guy on defense. That doesn’t sound like much but he was a proven difference maker. The Nuggets acquired him to round out their diverse cast and suddenly were a 57-win team. The Warriors thought they needed flexibility on both sides of the ball combined with veteran leadership, so they shelled out for Iguodala, who certainly earned his keep. And Curry was healthy again, posting a +7.4 BPM (+6.5 AuRPM) and a 42% Helio score. But ultimately the season ended in disappointment, with Bogut missing the playoffs and the Warriors fell in seven to the Clippers.
So *that’s* where the Warriors were at the end of 2014. An intriguing team, with a stud offensive player (Curry), smart capable defenders/playmakers (Draymond and Iguodala) and a defensive anchor (Bogut). But Bogut missed time left and right, and without him the Warriors simply weren’t contenders.
Frankly, under the circumstances, I can understand ranking them 8th going into the 2015 season. And there was another thing. The Warriors fired coach Mark Jackson and replaced him with rookie coach Steve Kerr.
Normally I think that teams jump the gun on these things. They get irrationally high expectations of the team, and then when those expectations aren’t met they get impatient and fire the coach. And bringing in a rookie? Come on!
Of course, it worked out.
Let’s talk about the Mark Jackson -> Steve Kerr (2014 to 2015) changes:
Offensive Rating: 107.5 -> 111.6 = +4.1 better
Defensive Rating: 102.6 -> 101.4 = -1.2 better
Pace: 96.2 -> 98.3 = 2.1 possessions per game faster
eFG%: 51.7% -> 54.0% = +2.3%
Assist Share: 59.1% -> 65.9% = +6.8% higher
3PA/FGA: 29.1% -> 31.1% = +2.0% more
So Kerr shows up and the very next year the defense improves, but the offense explodes. I want to draw your attention to that assist rate. 66% of made shots being assisted is Showtime Lakers-level assists. Sub-60% is less common with strong offenses, and means you’re a little more ISO driven. So assist shares go way up, threes go up, shooting jumps way up, the team plays a little faster (taking good looks in transition) . . . wowza. Now let’s look at some players, usage / TS%:
Curry: 28.3% / 61.0% -> 28.9% / 63.8% = same usage, but a 2.8% efficiency jump
Klay: 22.6% / 55.5% -> 27.6% / 59.1% = 5% usage jump *and* 3.6% efficiency jump
Draymond: 14.8% / 49.8% -> 17.2% / 54.0% = 2.4% usage jump *and* 4.2% efficiency jump
It’s unsurprising that Kerr, an outstanding spot-up shooter in his day, so successfully unlocked Klay Thompson. But look at that! In 2014 Klay was a solid spot-up specialist (42% of his shots were threes). And in 2015 he took the exact same percent of threes (42%) but got way more of them and hit them at a better rate! The Warriors’ offense had become a well-oiled machine, designed to free up deadly shooters with elaborate off-ball action. And the success of this effort led to a lot of gravity toward those shooters, which freed up everybody else.
Look. Curry was turning 26. Klay and Draymond were turning 24. These are young players. We would expect them to improve. But not like that. It is unthinkable that Kerr’s offense *wasn’t* the primary driving force here. The players themselves almost certainly got better. But Kerr, for whatever reason, had intuited the perfect offense to blend all-time-level shooters with a roster of smart passers. And the Warriors went from intriguing fringe team to all-time great in one season.
I went into this article ready to criticize the odds-makers for missing something that should have been eminently foreseeable. And now, having done the legwork, I’m telling you that there was no way to see this coming. An improvement? Sure. But a jump to ATG? No freaking way.
Do you know how many teams *ever* have put up an SRS above 10+? Eleven. 67+ wins? Thirteen. Both? Eight. Those eight are the ‘97 Bulls, ‘92 Bulls, ‘72 Lakers, ‘16 Warriors and three teams that we haven’t gotten to yet. I can’t emphasize enough that this team’s regular season was nuts. They had the 2nd best offense in the league (behind the Clippers) but the best defense. Fun question; where do you think that the ‘15 Warriors ranked in blocks? Picture Draymond, Klay, Curry . . . ready? They finished second (to be clear they played at a fast pace, so adjusted for that they were 5th). Again, don’t forget that in Andrew Bogut they had a legitimate rim protector. Golden State opponents had the lowest 2P% in the league. Based on the numbers, it seems that their defense was designed to prevent three-pointers and funnel shooters into midrange looks. And according to the numbers, it worked well. They allowed the 5th lowest number of threes (which were made at the 5th lowest rate) but allowed the 6th *most* two pointers attempted. So, to be clear, the ‘15 Warriors’ defense was actually quite excellent.
And their regular season was incredibly dominant. They had the best record in the NBA by 7 wins and the best SRS by 3.21 points per game, but people may still have been leery. After all, by the regular season numbers the best team in the East was the 60-22 (+4.75 SRS) Atlanta Hawks, who practiced a style of selfless team-ball that lacked any ISO stars. Most people suspected that, for all of their regular season success, that they weren’t real contenders (and it turns out that they were right). How would Golden State hold up?
In the first round they drew the Anthony Davis Pelicans (+1.1). And, despite both Bogut and Draymond, they couldn’t really contain Davis (32/11/2 on +7.9% with 3 blocks a game). The Warriors still swept them by 8 points a game. Curry averaged a 34/5/7 on +8% and Klay a 25/3/2 on +8.3%. The Warriors not only outshot the Pellies but also controlled possession, getting an extra 5 shots a game. By the standards of this list, it wasn’t a dominant win over an average team, but it was still an unqualified victory. Those watching for signs of whether or not the Warriors were legit would have to wait for more evidence.
In the second round was a tough matchup, the +5.9 late grit-n-grind Memphis Grizzlies, with one of the best defenses in the league. Surely they could halt the Warriors’ high-flying attack? They kind of did. The Warriors’ offense was barely above league average (unadjusted) for the series. The Grizzlies forced 10 steals a game; Curry turned the ball over 4 times a game while Draymond and Klay averaged just over 3. And the Warriors’ shooting was slowed considerably, as a team shooting at only +3.5%. Curry averaged a 25/5/7 on a limited +2.5%. So, close series right? Not really. The Grizzlies won two games, by 10 and 7, but the Warriors won their games by 15, 17, 20 and 13. So what happened? Don’t forget, as good as the Grizzlies’ defense was, the Warriors’ was better, and the Grizzlies’ offense was vastly more fragile. The Grizzlies as a team were held to a putrid -4.8% shooting; both Marc Gasol and Mike Conley were held to 4 points below league average or more. The Warriors’ *defense* completely shut down the Grizzlies’ attack, and won them the series by 8 points a game. And against a strong (if not contender-level) team like the Grizzlies, an 8 point win is extremely solid.
In the Conference Finals they faced the +4.5 Houston Rockets, who had somehow made it past the Clippers despite being the worse team and being outscored by more than 3.2 points per game. Predictably, it wasn’t close. The Warriors rolled over them in five games, by 8.2 points per game. James Harden had a strong series with a 28/8/6 on +9.3% (2.4 steals per game) but Curry averaged a comparable 31/5/6 on +14.6% with 2 steals a game. In addition to outshooting the Rockets (+1.2% to -0.6%) the Warriors dominated the glass. A disappointing matchup for a modern Conference Finals, but it was still a strong win.
And so the Warriors advanced to the Finals to face LeBron James and the Cleveland Ca - what’s that? The Cavaliers are all injured? It’s just LeBron? Right-O!
Jokes aside, Kevin Love went down four games into the playoffs, and Kyrie missed 2 of the 4 games against the Hawks, and only played the first game against Golden State. So the Cavs’ Big Three was more like the Cavs’ Big One in the Finals. But that doesn’t mean that the Cavs were weak. In the second round, without Kevin Love, they beat the +5.8 Bulls by 5.5 points a game, a strong (but not awesome) showing. In the Conference Finals, missing Love (and Kyrie for 2 of the 4 games) they beat the 60-win Hawks by 13.3 points a game in a clean sweep. Were the Hawks something of a paper tiger? Definitely. By the Finals the Cavs were rated at +8.7 OSRS. Even missing Love and some of Kyrie, playoff LeBron was another thing entirely. The ‘15 Warriors hadn’t really run into any serious opposition so far; would they fare well against the King?
The answer was emphatically yes. The Warriors won Game 1 by eight (the only game where the Cavs had Kyrie) but then the Cavs snuck out the next two games by 2 and 5 points (LeBron posted a 39/16/11 on -8% and a 40/12/8 on -2.5% (with 4 steals) respectively). Then the Warriors’ defense clamped down in Game 4, holding the Cavs to -12.5% shooting as a team (I can’t emphasize enough how low that is) and holding LeBron to an ugly 20/12/8 on -15.5%. The Warriors won that game by 21, and they closed out the series with 13 and 8 point wins. It felt closer than it was; the two narrowest wins of the series were by Cleveland. The Warriors averaged a 7.2 point per game win. The Warriors’ attack had been blunted. As a team they shot only +0.2%, and Curry averaged a 26/5/6 on +5.1%. But their defense shut down the hamstrung Cavs, holding the Cavs to -5.6% shooting as a team. The Warriors had won an NBA title, and put the league on notice that they wouldn’t be going anywhere.
12 | Warriors
11 |
10 |
9 |
8 |
7 | Cavs
6 | Clippers, Spurs
5 |
4 | Bulls, Rockets, Grizzlies
3 | Hawks, Wizards
2 | Blazers, Mavs, Thunder
1 | Pelicans
0 | Jazz
-0 | Pacers, Suns
-1 | Raptors, Celtics, Pistons
-2 | Nets, Heat
-3 | Bucks, Hornets, Nuggets, Kings
-4 |
-5 | Magic
-6 | Lakers
-7 |
-8 | TWolves
-9 | 76ers, Knicks
-10|
What to make of this team? Well, their regular season was top-notch. It’s hard to shake a stick at an RSRS above +10. But their playoffs were quite good as well. Detractors will say that their opponent quality was low, and that’s fair (33rd of 55 champion teams on my list). But it wasn’t thaaaat low. Compared to the ‘87 Lakers or the ‘71 Bucks the ‘15 Warriors played a string of juggernauts. Did they play any contender-level teams? Probably not by 2011-2020 standards, but the 2015 Cavs (even minus Kyrie and Love) would probably have been solid title contenders in 25% of the past 20 seasons or so. And the Grizzlies, while not being contenders, were a respectably tough matchup. And it wasn’t like the Warriors came close to losing. Ever. They were almost like metronomes; they played four series and they won each of them by between 7.2 and 8.2 points per game. Those are strong margins of victory against good to very good teams (Pelicans excepted). Was it a dominant playoffs? Not ATG dominant, but really really good; their PSRS is 22nd on this list.
If the Warriors had been a 57-win +6 RSRS team that had those playoffs, I’d think they were pretty good. But when you have a team that posts far and away the highest RSRS and win total in the season, and then blows through the playoffs without a ton of effort, maybe they were just that good. Look at that stem and leaf plot. The ‘15 Warriors *dominated* their year.
What could you say negative about them? You could say that their high-flying offense slowed in the playoffs, and that’d be fair. Klay Thompson’s regression (big drops in both usage and efficiency) suggests that their movement-based offense could be slowed down by playoff defenses. And Curry, while still being excellent, did see his stats drop slightly. But remember, the strength of the ‘15 Warriors was their *defense*. And their defense was pretty damned dominant in the playoffs. So I’m not too fussed about that.
Some argue that the ‘15 Warriors got lucky that they didn’t have to face the healthy Cavs. That’s totally true; the Cavs when healthy were almost certainly comparably good to the Warriors that year (as was implied by how close the ‘16 Finals were). But you know what?
It still freakin’ counts. Injuries swing playoffs all the time. It’s not ideal, but it’s a real thing. All we can do is evaluate the ‘15 Warriors against the teams they played. They played decent (but not great) teams for a champion and beat them all pretty soundly. No shame in that game.
Can they be taken seriously despite the fact that they didn’t actually beat an ATG team to win their rings (as they’d have had to with a healthy Cavs)? Absolutely! Beating an ATG team is simply not a realistic requirement for being an ATG team yourself. I mean, I love the ‘96 Sonics as much as the next guy, but the ‘96 Bulls definitely don’t meet the “beat an ATG team to prove your greatness” standard. Very, very few ATG teams have an ATG team in their year. It is a small freaking list (though decidedly more common in recent years). The only team that really comes to mind pre-2010 is the ‘72 Lakers beating the ‘72 Bucks (and if you wanted, the ‘67 Sixers beating the ‘67 Celtics). That the ‘15 Warriors *could* have had one but were saved by the RNG has got nothing to do with anything.
And yeah, they lost in 2016. But that series was a butterfly’s fart from going the other way. With respect to LeBron and one of the greatest NBA Finals performances ever, anyone who acts like that series was anything other than a coin flip between two ATG teams is imposing a narrative upon the reality of the series.
Narrative is a funny thing. Going into the 2015 season, nobody expected the Warriors to be contenders. Which lent their entire season a bit of a fluky feeling to it. And then when they beat the Cavs several players down, it was easy to put the fluky feeling of their dominance together with their unquestioned luck at facing a short-handed Cavs team and say "They didn't really deserve that championship."
But they freakin' did. The 2015 Warriors had one of the best regular seasons ever and then convincingly mowed through the playoffs while facing decent (but not great) opposition. I don’t feel bad at all that they ranked here.
PG: Steph Curry, +9.9 / +8.8
SG: Klay Thompson, +4.4 / +1.9
SF: Harrison Barnes, +0.1 / +0.7
PF: Draymond Green, +3.5 / +4.5
C: Andrew Bogut, +2.4 / +1.8
6th: Andre Iguodala, +0.9 / +4.5
Regular Season Metrics:
Regular Season Record: 67-15, Regular Season SRS: +10.01 (10th), Earned the 1 Seed
Regular Season Offensive Rating: +6.0 (18th), Regular Season Defensive Rating: -4.2 (39th)
Shooting Advantage: +5.8%, Possession Advantage: -1.0 shooting possessions per game
Stephen Curry (PG, 26): 33 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 24 / 4 / 8 / 2 on +10.4%
Klay Thompson (SG, 24): 32 MPPG, 26% OLoad, 22 / 3 / 3 / 2 on +5.7%
Draymond Green (PF, 24): 32 MPPG, 18% OLoad, 12 / 8 / 4 / 3 on +0.6%
Andre Iguodala (SF, 31): 27 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 8 / 3 / 3 / 2 on +1.9%
Harrison Barnes (SF, 22): 29 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 10 / 6 / 1 / 1 on +3.9%
Andrew Bogut (C, 30): 24 MPPG, 14% OLoad, 6 / 8 / 3 / 2 on +3.1%
Scoring/100: Stephen Curry (35.5 / +10.4%), Klay Thompson (33.2 / +5.7%), Draymond Green (18.1 / +0.6%)
Assists/100: Stephen Curry (11.6), Draymond Green (5.7), Andrew Bogut (5.6)
Heliocentrism: 37.1% (40th of 84 teams) - Curry
Wingmen: 35.2% (51st) - Thompson & Green
Depth: 27.7% (39th)
Playoff Metrics:
Playoff Offensive Rating: +4.1 (64th), Playoff Defensive Rating: -7.5 (23rd)
Playoff SRS: +13.26 (22nd), Total SRS Increase through Playoffs: +2.08 (58th)
Shooting Advantage: +4.6%, Possession Advantage: -0.9 shooting possessions per game
Average Playoff Opponent Offense: +2.43 (47th), Average Playoff Opponent Defense: -0.97 (74th)
Stephen Curry (PG, 26): 41 MPPG, 31% OLoad, 29 / 5 / 7 / 2 on +7.3%
Klay Thompson (SG, 24): 38 MPPG, 22% OLoad, 19 / 4 / 3 / 2 on +1.9%
Draymond Green (PF, 24): 39 MPPG, 21% OLoad, 14 / 11 / 5 / 3 on -1.7%
Andre Iguodala (SF, 31): 31 MPPG, 16% OLoad, 11 / 5 / 4 / 2 on +1.2%
Harrison Barnes (SF, 22): 34 MPPG, 15% OLoad, 11 / 5 / 2 / 1 on -1.5%
Andrew Bogut (C, 30): 24 MPPG, 11% OLoad, 5 / 8 / 2 / 3 on +1.7%
Scoring/100: Stephen Curry (36.9 / +7.3%), Klay Thompson (26.3 / +1.9%), Draymond Green (18.8 / -1.7%)
Assists/100: Stephen Curry (8.3), Draymond Green (7.1), Andre Iguodala (6.1)
Playoff Heliocentrism: 34.9% (47th of 84 teams) - Curry
Playoff Wingmen: 36.5% (59th) - Green & Iguodala
Playoff Depth: 28.6% (29th)
Round 1: New Orleans Pelicans (+1.1), won 4-0, by +8.0 points per game (+9.1 SRS eq)
Round 2: Memphis Grizzlies (+5.9), won 4-2, by +8.0 points per game (+13.9 SRS eq)
Round 3: Houston Rockets (+4.5), won 4-1, by +8.2 points per game (+12.7 SRS eq)
Round 4: Cleveland Cavaliers (+8.7), won 4-2, by +7.2 points per game (+15.9 SRS eq)
Offensive / Defensive Ratings from Opposition Regular Season Average:
New Orleans Pelicans: +8.5 / -0.9
Memphis Grizzlies: +4.8 / -7.5
Houston Rockets: +7.3 / -4.6
Cleveland Cavaliers: +1.0 / -11.5
Shooting Advantage / Possession Advantage per game (unadjusted):
New Orleans Pelicans: +1.2% / +5.1
Memphis Grizzlies: +8.3% / -6.4
Houston Rockets: +1.8% / +3.7
Cleveland Cavaliers: +5.8% / -3.8
Postseason Usage/Efficiency Change adjusted for Opposition:
Stephen Curry: +2.1% / -2.7%
Klay Thompson: -4.3% / -3.4%
Harrison Barnes: +0.7% / -5.0%
Draymond Green: +2.0% / -1.9%
Andrew Bogut: -2.3% / -1.0%
Andre Iguodala: +1.8% / -0.3%
The 2015 Golden State Warriors put together one of the greatest regular seasons ever, going 67-15 and posting a +10 RSRS. There was only one team in the league that could reasonably challenge them, and they were felled by injuries. They won their Finals decisively, and kicked off a five-year stretch where they won the West every single year. The Warriors’ 2015-2019 has to be considered one of the best five-year stretches in NBA history, if not the best. And going into the 2015 season the Warriors’ pre-season odds had them . . . 8th.
Eighth!? I don’t think there has ever been a dynasty that has more blindsided the league. In ‘91 people were skeptical of Jordan . . . but the Bulls were still ranked 4th (which was obviously too low, but it was better than 8th). The 2000 Lakers were ranked 2nd. Most other ‘dynasties’ were ranked higher. The only one I can think of that’s comparable is the 2012-16 Spurs who ranked 12th going into the beginning of that stretch, but had a less successful run than the Warriors.
So, as my three-year old would say, “Let’s talk about it.”
Normally I start my retelling of a team’s history to when the team was last dominant.
That crap never happened for the Warriors (with the '75 and '76 teams). Post-Rick Barry they had some good teams but never great. They were like the Gervin Spurs; just good enough to show up in the history books as “that team that got stomped in the playoffs by the eventual champion”. So we’ll start in 2009.
The ‘09 Warriors were the hottest of garbage, winning 29 games. Their offense, led by Stephen Jackson, Monta Ellis and Jamal Crawford was actually above average, but their defense was 3rd worst in the league. Ellis was 23 and Andris Biedrins was 22, so there was some hope for improvement, but neither were doing much. With the 7th pick in the draft they selected a guard from Davidson named Stephen Curry, the son of former NBA player Dell Curry. Curry in college was a small guard who could shoot threes at an unprecedented level. His Junior season he used 38.0% of Davidson’s possessions when he was on the court (the highest rate in the NCAA). He took almost as many threes as twos, taking almost ten threes a game and making them a 38.7% clip. And he wasn’t like a J.J. Reddick who took tons of spot-up threes in the flow of the offense (not that Curry couldn’t make spot-up threes well); Curry could launch threes off the dribble just as well. But it wasn’t all peaches and cream. He was small and, frankly, there was zero precedent for a guard like him being an NBA-level game-changer.
Then again, there’d never really been a player like Steph Curry before.
In 2010 the Warriors, now with Curry . . . won 26 games. Even as a rookie Curry was the best player on the team according to BPM, but that wasn’t saying much. He was one of two players with a positive BPM (Curry was estimated at +2.0, but his lackluster AuRPM of +0.5 suggests his contribution was overrated) that played minutes. It was a garbage year, and with the 6th pick in the draft they took Ekpe Udoh from Baylor. Udoh was a gangly center who would block a lot of shots, but couldn’t score, couldn’t rebound, couldn’t pass . . . so yeah, that didn’t really work out.
In 2011 the Warriors, with a better Monta Ellis, won 36 games. Curry continued to improve, posting both solid box-score metrics (+2.3 BPM) and solid impact numbers (+3.0 AuRPM). But the rest of the team was fairly weak, and Curry also injured his ankle late in the season (an injury which would recur frequently). In the draft, with the 11th pick, they took a shooting guard from Washington State, Klay Thompson. Klay was an interesting blend, shooting threes in volume (making them at 39.8%) but also generating a lot of his own offense (33.4% of his team’s shots), getting to the rim decently, passing decently and playing solid box-score defense. There were reasons for concern; he made twos at a low rate (46.6% compared to 51.9% from Curry) and he lacked high-end athleticism. And he was the second three-point specialist from a small school that the Warriors had drafted in three years.
The Warriors in 2012 won only 23 games (it was the strike-shortened season, it was a 29-win pace). Curry repeatedly reinjured his ankle, only playing 26 games. The team continued to struggle, Klay Thompson was barely replacement level . . . it was a bad scene. But when Curry *did* play he was looking good, posting a +4.3 BPM and a +4.7 AuRPM. There was reason to be a little hopeful if Curry could ever stay healthy. In the draft the Warriors went in with *two* first round picks. With the #7 overall they took a strong all-around small forward from UNC named Harrison Barnes, and with the #30 they took a project big from Vanderbilt named Festus Ezeli. And yet, it turned out to be one of their second rounders that would be the difference maker. Draymond Green was a weird blend of stuff. He’d led Michigan State to the Sweet Sixteen and won the coveted KenPom Player of the Year. He was a limited scorer even in college (taking 28.4% of his team’s shots, but only posting a 54.2% TS, his strength was primarily passing, defense and incredible basketball IQ. But he lacked lateral quickness and athleticism and was only 6’7”. He had no real chance of containing NBA small forwards, but was short for a big. In a way he was reminiscent of DeJuan Blair, another KenPom winner who found that his skillset needed another several inches to function in the NBA. Nevertheless, the Warriors took a flier on Green, knowing that there were worse things than a brainy, switchy defender for a team that was awful on defense.
In 2013 the Warriors were, unsurprisingly, ranked 22nd in the league. Much to everyone’s surprise they went 47-35. And in the playoffs they upset the 3-seeded Denver Nuggets, and played the ‘13 Spurs to a tight loss (the Spurs beat the Warriors by only 3.8 points, but won their other two Western Conference series by 18.7 and 11.0 points per game). What changed? Mostly Curry being healthy. Playing 78 games in 2013 Curry posted a +5.4 BPM (+3.6 AuRPM) and a 47.9% Helio score (for a 47-win team not super-impressive in an ATG sense, but a huge deal to a struggling team). But there was another important thread; many suspected that the Warriors could never succeed pairing a small defensively limited guard (Monta Ellis) with another small defensively-limited guard (Steph Curry). So Warriors had traded Ellis to the Bucks for defensive anchor (but oft-injured) Andrew Bogut. Bogut only played half the season for the Warriors, but all of the playoffs (a subtle part of their improvement in the second season). Forward David Lee emerged as a solid rebounder/scorer (if not a defender). Klay Thompson still couldn’t shoot above league average but he was a decent contributor, and Draymond was a dumpster fire on offense his rookie year (shooting at -13.1%). Still. With a healthy Curry, a defensive anchor and a developing supporting cast, the Warriors were suddenly a playoff team.
Going into 2014 the Warriors were ranked 10th, a massive improvement. And they followed through, winning 51 games and posting a +5.15 SRS. Much to everyone’s surprise, defense led the way, showing 4th in the league (compared to 12th on offense). Part of it was Bogut being healthy for 67 games. Part of it was Draymond improving on offense such that he was playable, and contributing seriously on the defensive end (a surprising +4.6 AuRPM). And part of it was an incredibly ballsy (or impatient) move on the part of the front office. Pretty much gutting their next several drafts, the Warriors traded for Andre Iguodala. Iggy wasn’t a strong scorer, but he was a heady passer and an outstanding glue guy on defense. That doesn’t sound like much but he was a proven difference maker. The Nuggets acquired him to round out their diverse cast and suddenly were a 57-win team. The Warriors thought they needed flexibility on both sides of the ball combined with veteran leadership, so they shelled out for Iguodala, who certainly earned his keep. And Curry was healthy again, posting a +7.4 BPM (+6.5 AuRPM) and a 42% Helio score. But ultimately the season ended in disappointment, with Bogut missing the playoffs and the Warriors fell in seven to the Clippers.
So *that’s* where the Warriors were at the end of 2014. An intriguing team, with a stud offensive player (Curry), smart capable defenders/playmakers (Draymond and Iguodala) and a defensive anchor (Bogut). But Bogut missed time left and right, and without him the Warriors simply weren’t contenders.
Frankly, under the circumstances, I can understand ranking them 8th going into the 2015 season. And there was another thing. The Warriors fired coach Mark Jackson and replaced him with rookie coach Steve Kerr.
Normally I think that teams jump the gun on these things. They get irrationally high expectations of the team, and then when those expectations aren’t met they get impatient and fire the coach. And bringing in a rookie? Come on!
Of course, it worked out.
Let’s talk about the Mark Jackson -> Steve Kerr (2014 to 2015) changes:
Offensive Rating: 107.5 -> 111.6 = +4.1 better
Defensive Rating: 102.6 -> 101.4 = -1.2 better
Pace: 96.2 -> 98.3 = 2.1 possessions per game faster
eFG%: 51.7% -> 54.0% = +2.3%
Assist Share: 59.1% -> 65.9% = +6.8% higher
3PA/FGA: 29.1% -> 31.1% = +2.0% more
So Kerr shows up and the very next year the defense improves, but the offense explodes. I want to draw your attention to that assist rate. 66% of made shots being assisted is Showtime Lakers-level assists. Sub-60% is less common with strong offenses, and means you’re a little more ISO driven. So assist shares go way up, threes go up, shooting jumps way up, the team plays a little faster (taking good looks in transition) . . . wowza. Now let’s look at some players, usage / TS%:
Curry: 28.3% / 61.0% -> 28.9% / 63.8% = same usage, but a 2.8% efficiency jump
Klay: 22.6% / 55.5% -> 27.6% / 59.1% = 5% usage jump *and* 3.6% efficiency jump
Draymond: 14.8% / 49.8% -> 17.2% / 54.0% = 2.4% usage jump *and* 4.2% efficiency jump
It’s unsurprising that Kerr, an outstanding spot-up shooter in his day, so successfully unlocked Klay Thompson. But look at that! In 2014 Klay was a solid spot-up specialist (42% of his shots were threes). And in 2015 he took the exact same percent of threes (42%) but got way more of them and hit them at a better rate! The Warriors’ offense had become a well-oiled machine, designed to free up deadly shooters with elaborate off-ball action. And the success of this effort led to a lot of gravity toward those shooters, which freed up everybody else.
Look. Curry was turning 26. Klay and Draymond were turning 24. These are young players. We would expect them to improve. But not like that. It is unthinkable that Kerr’s offense *wasn’t* the primary driving force here. The players themselves almost certainly got better. But Kerr, for whatever reason, had intuited the perfect offense to blend all-time-level shooters with a roster of smart passers. And the Warriors went from intriguing fringe team to all-time great in one season.
I went into this article ready to criticize the odds-makers for missing something that should have been eminently foreseeable. And now, having done the legwork, I’m telling you that there was no way to see this coming. An improvement? Sure. But a jump to ATG? No freaking way.
Do you know how many teams *ever* have put up an SRS above 10+? Eleven. 67+ wins? Thirteen. Both? Eight. Those eight are the ‘97 Bulls, ‘92 Bulls, ‘72 Lakers, ‘16 Warriors and three teams that we haven’t gotten to yet. I can’t emphasize enough that this team’s regular season was nuts. They had the 2nd best offense in the league (behind the Clippers) but the best defense. Fun question; where do you think that the ‘15 Warriors ranked in blocks? Picture Draymond, Klay, Curry . . . ready? They finished second (to be clear they played at a fast pace, so adjusted for that they were 5th). Again, don’t forget that in Andrew Bogut they had a legitimate rim protector. Golden State opponents had the lowest 2P% in the league. Based on the numbers, it seems that their defense was designed to prevent three-pointers and funnel shooters into midrange looks. And according to the numbers, it worked well. They allowed the 5th lowest number of threes (which were made at the 5th lowest rate) but allowed the 6th *most* two pointers attempted. So, to be clear, the ‘15 Warriors’ defense was actually quite excellent.
And their regular season was incredibly dominant. They had the best record in the NBA by 7 wins and the best SRS by 3.21 points per game, but people may still have been leery. After all, by the regular season numbers the best team in the East was the 60-22 (+4.75 SRS) Atlanta Hawks, who practiced a style of selfless team-ball that lacked any ISO stars. Most people suspected that, for all of their regular season success, that they weren’t real contenders (and it turns out that they were right). How would Golden State hold up?
In the first round they drew the Anthony Davis Pelicans (+1.1). And, despite both Bogut and Draymond, they couldn’t really contain Davis (32/11/2 on +7.9% with 3 blocks a game). The Warriors still swept them by 8 points a game. Curry averaged a 34/5/7 on +8% and Klay a 25/3/2 on +8.3%. The Warriors not only outshot the Pellies but also controlled possession, getting an extra 5 shots a game. By the standards of this list, it wasn’t a dominant win over an average team, but it was still an unqualified victory. Those watching for signs of whether or not the Warriors were legit would have to wait for more evidence.
In the second round was a tough matchup, the +5.9 late grit-n-grind Memphis Grizzlies, with one of the best defenses in the league. Surely they could halt the Warriors’ high-flying attack? They kind of did. The Warriors’ offense was barely above league average (unadjusted) for the series. The Grizzlies forced 10 steals a game; Curry turned the ball over 4 times a game while Draymond and Klay averaged just over 3. And the Warriors’ shooting was slowed considerably, as a team shooting at only +3.5%. Curry averaged a 25/5/7 on a limited +2.5%. So, close series right? Not really. The Grizzlies won two games, by 10 and 7, but the Warriors won their games by 15, 17, 20 and 13. So what happened? Don’t forget, as good as the Grizzlies’ defense was, the Warriors’ was better, and the Grizzlies’ offense was vastly more fragile. The Grizzlies as a team were held to a putrid -4.8% shooting; both Marc Gasol and Mike Conley were held to 4 points below league average or more. The Warriors’ *defense* completely shut down the Grizzlies’ attack, and won them the series by 8 points a game. And against a strong (if not contender-level) team like the Grizzlies, an 8 point win is extremely solid.
In the Conference Finals they faced the +4.5 Houston Rockets, who had somehow made it past the Clippers despite being the worse team and being outscored by more than 3.2 points per game. Predictably, it wasn’t close. The Warriors rolled over them in five games, by 8.2 points per game. James Harden had a strong series with a 28/8/6 on +9.3% (2.4 steals per game) but Curry averaged a comparable 31/5/6 on +14.6% with 2 steals a game. In addition to outshooting the Rockets (+1.2% to -0.6%) the Warriors dominated the glass. A disappointing matchup for a modern Conference Finals, but it was still a strong win.
And so the Warriors advanced to the Finals to face LeBron James and the Cleveland Ca - what’s that? The Cavaliers are all injured? It’s just LeBron? Right-O!
Jokes aside, Kevin Love went down four games into the playoffs, and Kyrie missed 2 of the 4 games against the Hawks, and only played the first game against Golden State. So the Cavs’ Big Three was more like the Cavs’ Big One in the Finals. But that doesn’t mean that the Cavs were weak. In the second round, without Kevin Love, they beat the +5.8 Bulls by 5.5 points a game, a strong (but not awesome) showing. In the Conference Finals, missing Love (and Kyrie for 2 of the 4 games) they beat the 60-win Hawks by 13.3 points a game in a clean sweep. Were the Hawks something of a paper tiger? Definitely. By the Finals the Cavs were rated at +8.7 OSRS. Even missing Love and some of Kyrie, playoff LeBron was another thing entirely. The ‘15 Warriors hadn’t really run into any serious opposition so far; would they fare well against the King?
The answer was emphatically yes. The Warriors won Game 1 by eight (the only game where the Cavs had Kyrie) but then the Cavs snuck out the next two games by 2 and 5 points (LeBron posted a 39/16/11 on -8% and a 40/12/8 on -2.5% (with 4 steals) respectively). Then the Warriors’ defense clamped down in Game 4, holding the Cavs to -12.5% shooting as a team (I can’t emphasize enough how low that is) and holding LeBron to an ugly 20/12/8 on -15.5%. The Warriors won that game by 21, and they closed out the series with 13 and 8 point wins. It felt closer than it was; the two narrowest wins of the series were by Cleveland. The Warriors averaged a 7.2 point per game win. The Warriors’ attack had been blunted. As a team they shot only +0.2%, and Curry averaged a 26/5/6 on +5.1%. But their defense shut down the hamstrung Cavs, holding the Cavs to -5.6% shooting as a team. The Warriors had won an NBA title, and put the league on notice that they wouldn’t be going anywhere.
12 | Warriors
11 |
10 |
9 |
8 |
7 | Cavs
6 | Clippers, Spurs
5 |
4 | Bulls, Rockets, Grizzlies
3 | Hawks, Wizards
2 | Blazers, Mavs, Thunder
1 | Pelicans
0 | Jazz
-0 | Pacers, Suns
-1 | Raptors, Celtics, Pistons
-2 | Nets, Heat
-3 | Bucks, Hornets, Nuggets, Kings
-4 |
-5 | Magic
-6 | Lakers
-7 |
-8 | TWolves
-9 | 76ers, Knicks
-10|
What to make of this team? Well, their regular season was top-notch. It’s hard to shake a stick at an RSRS above +10. But their playoffs were quite good as well. Detractors will say that their opponent quality was low, and that’s fair (33rd of 55 champion teams on my list). But it wasn’t thaaaat low. Compared to the ‘87 Lakers or the ‘71 Bucks the ‘15 Warriors played a string of juggernauts. Did they play any contender-level teams? Probably not by 2011-2020 standards, but the 2015 Cavs (even minus Kyrie and Love) would probably have been solid title contenders in 25% of the past 20 seasons or so. And the Grizzlies, while not being contenders, were a respectably tough matchup. And it wasn’t like the Warriors came close to losing. Ever. They were almost like metronomes; they played four series and they won each of them by between 7.2 and 8.2 points per game. Those are strong margins of victory against good to very good teams (Pelicans excepted). Was it a dominant playoffs? Not ATG dominant, but really really good; their PSRS is 22nd on this list.
If the Warriors had been a 57-win +6 RSRS team that had those playoffs, I’d think they were pretty good. But when you have a team that posts far and away the highest RSRS and win total in the season, and then blows through the playoffs without a ton of effort, maybe they were just that good. Look at that stem and leaf plot. The ‘15 Warriors *dominated* their year.
What could you say negative about them? You could say that their high-flying offense slowed in the playoffs, and that’d be fair. Klay Thompson’s regression (big drops in both usage and efficiency) suggests that their movement-based offense could be slowed down by playoff defenses. And Curry, while still being excellent, did see his stats drop slightly. But remember, the strength of the ‘15 Warriors was their *defense*. And their defense was pretty damned dominant in the playoffs. So I’m not too fussed about that.
Some argue that the ‘15 Warriors got lucky that they didn’t have to face the healthy Cavs. That’s totally true; the Cavs when healthy were almost certainly comparably good to the Warriors that year (as was implied by how close the ‘16 Finals were). But you know what?
It still freakin’ counts. Injuries swing playoffs all the time. It’s not ideal, but it’s a real thing. All we can do is evaluate the ‘15 Warriors against the teams they played. They played decent (but not great) teams for a champion and beat them all pretty soundly. No shame in that game.
Can they be taken seriously despite the fact that they didn’t actually beat an ATG team to win their rings (as they’d have had to with a healthy Cavs)? Absolutely! Beating an ATG team is simply not a realistic requirement for being an ATG team yourself. I mean, I love the ‘96 Sonics as much as the next guy, but the ‘96 Bulls definitely don’t meet the “beat an ATG team to prove your greatness” standard. Very, very few ATG teams have an ATG team in their year. It is a small freaking list (though decidedly more common in recent years). The only team that really comes to mind pre-2010 is the ‘72 Lakers beating the ‘72 Bucks (and if you wanted, the ‘67 Sixers beating the ‘67 Celtics). That the ‘15 Warriors *could* have had one but were saved by the RNG has got nothing to do with anything.
And yeah, they lost in 2016. But that series was a butterfly’s fart from going the other way. With respect to LeBron and one of the greatest NBA Finals performances ever, anyone who acts like that series was anything other than a coin flip between two ATG teams is imposing a narrative upon the reality of the series.
Narrative is a funny thing. Going into the 2015 season, nobody expected the Warriors to be contenders. Which lent their entire season a bit of a fluky feeling to it. And then when they beat the Cavs several players down, it was easy to put the fluky feeling of their dominance together with their unquestioned luck at facing a short-handed Cavs team and say "They didn't really deserve that championship."
But they freakin' did. The 2015 Warriors had one of the best regular seasons ever and then convincingly mowed through the playoffs while facing decent (but not great) opposition. I don’t feel bad at all that they ranked here.
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