The General Manager Analysis Project

[jman2585]

Don Nelson

Don Nelson is one of the most interesting and difficult to evaluate GM’s for so many reasons. Firstly he was in the unusual position of being both the GM and the coach (for 3 different teams he coached in fact), and this enabled him to take total responsibility for how the roster turned out. The guy didn’t even have a contract for a lot of his career, just a handshake agreement, meaning he could be let go at any point it wasn’t working out (or he could leave of his own accord for the same reason). This curious fact is just one of the many unique aspects to Don Nelson’s career as a GM and coach, and in particular his first ever stint in Milwaukee.

Don Nelson is a weird GM to rank for other reasons too. He was a bad drafter, almost unprecedentedly bad compared to other good GMs. He could tread on toes as well, and while these problems became more obvious in later years (such as his feud and lawsuit with Cuban- while his son was still working there as GM- talk about awkward!, or his well-documented problems with Webber), by all accounts he was much the same take it or leave it guy through his whole career. He was pretty good at trades, but he made his share of bad decisions too. What he excelled at was being an innovator, and being a coach/GM put him in an ideal position to try things no coach/GM could normally try. He was able to develop a clear vision of what sort of team he wanted, and this vision made him one of the better GM’s in the NBA’s history despite all his faults.

Don Nelson the Drafter
There are a lot of aspects of Don Nelson’s tenure in Milwaukee to consider, and it makes sense to start with the area he was weakest at. Don Nelson was not a good drafter. Maybe it was his difficulty in delegating/trusting other staff, or maybe he just didn’t have a good eye for the players he hadn’t seen in the NBA a lot, but clearly whatever he was doing was not working. Check out his drafts:
1977- The very first pick Don Nelson made was with the #1 pick of the draft, and he took mega bust Kent Benson. This was a draft littered with all-stars who Nelson could have taken, like Sikma, Walter Davis, Bernard King, heck even one of the lesser guys like Norm Nixon or Cedric Maxwell would have been better. Now in fairness he also had the #3 pick from a trade he made, and drafted Marques Johnson who was a fabulous pick (even if his career was hurt by personal issues later on). His selection of Ernie Grunfeld at #11 this year (yes, he had this pick too!) wasn’t a good pick either, given he could have taken Maxwell, Nixon, Rickey Green, etc. There were a lot of better players here. Guys like Grunfeld and Benson were gone from the Bucks a few seasons later, so these were squandered picks.
1978- Nelson took the George Johnson at #12 (gone 1 year later), a nothing player, while passing on all-star Mike Mitchell a few picks later, not to mention guys like Mo Cheeks, or solid vets such as big man Dave Corzine. Another bad pick. Nellie actually had the pick which was used on all-star Mike Mitchell, but traded it for a 1979 pick which would become the #4 pick in that draft. That transaction was alot smarter, since it let him get Moncrief.
1979- He got Moncrief at #5, a good pick, via a trade in which he sent off the #4 pick Kesler on draft day (who was a huge bust). He also had the #10 pick, which he had traded away 2 years earlier for John Gianelli. This was a poor return by any measure, especially since Nelson traded Gianelli on draft day in 1979! Nelson had the #8 pick as well, which he had obtained as compensation for Alex English leaving. He sent it and Gianelli for Harvey Catchings, a trivial bench player. Big fail there as he basically gave the #8 and #10 picks away.
Nelson traded away the 1980 pick (who became Larry Drew) in a sensible deal to turn Benson into Lanier.
1981- At #21 Alton Lister was an ok pick, he passed on better guys (Ainge, Eddie Johnson, etc), but it was good for where he picked.
1982- He got Pressey at #20, definitely a good pick (especially for how Nelson planned to use him)
1983- Randy Breuer was a decent enough role player, but much better players were passed over to get him, from John Paxson (the next pick) to Hinson to Doc Rivers to Mark West. It wasn’t the worst pick, but it sure wasn’t very good either.
1984- Kenny Fields was a bust at #21, but then a lot of guys in this range were. There weren’t many good guys he could have found here.
1985-#22 pick Jerry Reynolds was a bust. The next 2 guys were A.C Green and Terry Porter. Ouch. A lot of good guys he could have found after this too.
1986- Skiles was a good role player to get at #22. Unfortunately 3 of the next 5 guys picked were Sabonis, Mark Price, and Dennis Rodman. The 2nd round also featured guys like all-star Jeff Hornacek, and good role players like Nate McMillan, Johnny Newman and Kevin Duckworth. Given Skiles played 13 games for the Bucks before being traded a year later for peanuts, it doesn’t speak to Nelson’s insight as to Skiles talents.

When you scroll through these draft selections you’re left wondering how Nelson put together a powerhouse playoff team when he added relatively little talent via the draft (and the numerous high picks he had). The 2 stars he did hit on (Moncrief and Marques) also ran into injury and personal problems later in their career too. Well, fortunately for Nelson he innovated in a lot of others ways, collecting players who weren’t valued and using them in unorthodox ways, as we’ll cover next.

Don Nelson- team builder and innovator

Don Nelson came into a franchise in turmoil. Kareem had just left, and one of the larger shareholders wanted to sell as he had opposed trading Kareem (then known as Lew Alcindor of course). The team had won 38 games in Kareem’s last season there, and Nelson took over midway through the 1977 season with the team a grim 3-15. Nelson managed to help the team finish the season with 30 wins, and began his rebuild of the team. To begin with, Nelson had relatively few assets. The Bucks had a handful of overrated assets like 29 year all-star old Bob Dandridge, middling guard Junior Bridgeman, and all-star guard Brian Winters, the latter two whom he kept. He also had 27 year old big man Swen Nater, who was an enticing asset, and he had a number of good draft picks coming up. Alex English was an unknown young player on the Bucks at the time, but he left after 2 seasons to a team who would play him more and give him playing time. The Bucks missed out on that one. Anyway, Nelson had few decent assets to turn this team back into a contender (outside the #1 and #11 draft picks in 1977, which Nelson basically wasted).

His first move was to trade Swen plus the 13th pick in the 1977 draft (yes, Nelson actually had this pick in the 77 draft too!) for the #3 pick that he then used on Marques Johnson. This was a very good move indeed, Marques was a superstar while Swen (although an all-star big) only had 4 more productive seasons. He then let Dandridge go in exchange for cash. This was kind of forced on him by ownership, who didn’t have the money to pay him, and Dandridge was overrated. On the other hand it looked pretty bad in the short term when Dandridge was an all-star the next 2 seasons for the Bullets (who won the title, then narrowly lost the finals the following year). Dandridge is a guy basketball historians are pretty polarised on; one perspective is he was an overrated black hole (Rick Barry criticised him during his career for not passing enough), the other is he was an ideal 3rd man on a title team who knew his role (to score). I already covered who he squandered a lot of draft picks early on, so he didn’t add too much talent that way. In the short term though he managed to turn the Bucks around for his first season, they won 44 games and made the playoffs where they upset the Suns in round 1, before going down in a competitive series with the Nuggets. In 1979 however the Bucks won 38 and missed the playoffs again. The team was aided by the acquisition of a young Moncrief in the 1980 season, and improved to 49 wins, but the vision Nelson had for the team wasn’t in place until the next season when he traded for Lanier. He also bought “big man” Elmore, which was a good move to round out his new roster.

In 1981 Nelson had finally molded the roster to his liking, and produced a 60 win team playing Nellieball (as it came to be known). Nelson innovated the idea of intentionally playing mismatched, smaller teams who would be able to exploit the slower, bigger teams (with poorer outside shooting) that was so common at the time. Remember that the 3 point shot had only just been introduced, and Nelson took advantage of it (though not as much as he did later). He helped introduced the idea of a point forward, and wanted “bigs” who could pass well (to help transition), run up and down the court well (to take advantage of slower paced teams) and shoot (to suck big men out to the 3 point line, negating their size advantage and opening up the paint). All revolutionary concepts at the time, which teams struggled to respond to. Nelson’s teams actually didn’t shoot that many 3’s by and large, but they shot an awful lot of midrange ones, and sucking players out to that distance opened the whole court up. The Bucks team in 1981 was unconventional in a lot of ways. It had 7 guys getting over 25 mpg, and the highest (their star Marques Johnson) was getting only 33.4mpg. This enabled the team to stay fresh, and helped them outrun their opponents. It was also a size deprived team (intentionally so, as mentioned). Of the 7 core rotation players only 2 of them were taller than 6-7 (Lanier and Mickey Johnson). It was a novel concept, with Marques Johnson acting as a key distributor (he was 0.1 apg away from leading the team in assists at 4.6), but all 7 of the Bucks players recording great assist numbers, as ball movement flourished. The team had the 2nd best SRS in the NBA that year.

Unfortunately they got beaten in the 2nd round of the playoffs by the Erving 76ers (their only series, after a bye in the 1st round owing to an archaic seeding system), which began a debate several decades long about whether Nellieball could really work in the playoffs. The answer was probably no, and even in 1981 Nellie was forced to make big adjustments to the Bucks come playoff time, like playing Marques and Moncrief more (and basically ignoring his guys after #7 who he didn’t trust to play minutes). The other teams turned the defensive intensity up a notch in the playoffs (as expected), and ground the Nellieball Bucks down. The big scoring Bucks put up far less points per game in the playoffs, including 2 losses where they couldn’t get over the 100 mark. That said, if a GM/coach can take my small market franchise, on the verge of irrelevance, to 10 years in which he averages 51+ wins and makes the ECF’s 3 times, I won’t complain too much.

An interesting thing to note is that the team that won 60 games in 1981 bore little resemblance to the team that won 59 games just 4 years later, which touches on an important part of Don’s resume, which may be called adaptability if we’re to be charitable. Nelson was nothing if not a tinkerer, and a lot of people criticise this aspect of his management style, comparing him to trader Bob from the Jailblazer days, who just never seemed to know when to stand pat and let the team develop chemistry, and insisted on making trades for the sake of it. I think that’s a little harsh on Nellie, but at the same time he made moves that certainly suggested he liked wheeling and dealing a little too much. My favourite is the time he sold George Johnson to the Nuggets, bought him back, then traded him for a 2nd round pick all in less than 12 months (less than a year after he drafted him). I mean, who the heck goes to that much trouble over an inconsequential player like George Johnson unless they’re a little trigger happy? That said the tinkering Nellie did by and large helped the Bucks reload, whereas standing pat would have ended their run of successes much sooner.

Don Nelson- Coming up short and Reloading
Nelson acquired Alton Lister in the 1981 draft, who would go on to be an important role player for the Bucks thanks to his mid-range shot and ability to help suck out slower bigs from the paint, and he began to focus the team more around the emerging Moncrief, and less around Marques Johnson and his drug and alcohol problems (which the Bucks hid to keep his value up, and protect the team image, something that so annoyed the Clippers they discussed suing after they found out- http://articles.latimes.com/1985-03-21/ ... ug-problem). However in the playoffs the team again got a 1st round bye after a 55 win season with the 3rd best SRS in the NBA, before getting beaten again by the 76ers. Nellieball was under scrutiny again.

In the 1982 offseason Nellie drafted Paul Pressey, a player who would go on to have an important role as point forward for the mid-80’s Bucks. He also traded for Cowens contract so he could come out of his 2 year retirement to give basketball one last go. Cowens had 40 decent games as a contributor, Pressey helped off the bench, Marques bounced back from his slump the previous season (increasing his trade value) and the Bucks improved from within. Especially Moncrief, who had become the underappreciated star of the team. The team won 51 games, and again got a 1st round bye, and this time stomped home 4-0 against the Knicks in the 2nd round. Unfortunately the 76ers were again waiting for them in the Conference finals… and this time they had Moses Malone. Like everyone else that year, the Bucks got slaughtered.

Nellie resisted the urge to make big changes, and in the 83 offseason he brought in veteran Tiny Archibald, and added vet Mike Dunleavy during the season, while Pressey’s role continued to expand. The team won 50 games despite a few injuries, and had the 2nd best SRS in the NBA. During the playoffs Nelson got to show off the point forward concept some more, with Marques playing exclusively at point guard for large stretches after Tiny Archibald was injured. They won the first and second round, then lost to the super team Boston Celtics in the Conference Finals. At this point it seemed to commentators that the Bucks had gone as far as they could. The Celtics were just too good, and the Bucks were getting older. Lanier and Archibald were now 35, and although the rest of the NBA didn’t know about it Marques had serious personal problems that explained his inconsistency and slumps.

From this bleak outlook, Nelson renewed the Bucks chances with a great reloading move. Firstly he traded Marques for 3 important rotation players for the Bucks- all-star Terry Cummings, shooter Craig Ehlo and shooting guard Ricky Pierce. With these 3 players the Bucks were able to bounce back in 1985, winning 59 games and finishing with the best SRS in the NBA. Nelson would start to use Pressey as the point forward, enabling him to keep more offensive firepower on the court in the form of Ehlo/Pierce and Moncrief at the same time as Pressey. Unfortunately the retirement of Lanier left them short in the middle, and the bigger 76ers clobbered them in the 2nd round of the playoffs, helped by Moses and Barkley (who really started to step up this series).

In 1986 the Bucks again did well in the regular season, winning 57 games and posting the 2nd best SRS, but in the playoffs they ran into one of the best teams of all time- the 1986 Celtics, who swept them in the ECF’s. Not giving up, Nelson tried one last roll of the dice, turning Lister and 2 mid-range draft picks into passing big Jack Sikma, who would finally replace what the Bucks had been missing since Lanier retired. Unfortunately this was the year Moncrief’s body crapped out to injuries, and never recovered. The Bucks limped to 50 wins, but ultimately lost in 7 games to the Celtics in the 2nd round, and Nelson left in the offseason (where he took a year off, before taking pretty much the same job in Golden State, to much success and failure both). After Nelson left, and the Bucks gradually get worse, not winning 50 games again for 14 more years (which represents the only 50 win season the Bucks have had in the last 26 years years). Stats like this make you appreciate what Nellie did to innovate the game, which let him succeed in a small market with a small budget. While he was an unorthodox GM, he certainly deserves credit for being a good one during his time in Milwaukee. Without him, the Bucks probably would have moved city by now.

[jman2585]

Back-log of these things is slowly getting cleared, so I am open to requests on which GM to do next.

Not going to do Stepien or Jerry Colangelo yet. Stepien is so well known, plus he was an owner not a GM which complicates it alot. Jerry is on the "to do" list.

[jman2585]

Otis Smith

Otis Smith was a bad GM, one who should have been fired long ago, but he wasn’t “the worst” GM. He had some redeeming features that deserve mention, as well as a few (rare) strengths. What he lacked was a good conceptual understanding of basketball strategy, team building or NBA economics.

Enter Otis
Otis arrived on the scene in 2005 after Dwight had just finished his rookie year. The team had won 36 games (more than expected) and Dwight looked like the real deal. Unlike when Dan Ferry arrived in Cleveland, Otis had some assets in hand, and the team was not under pressure to “win now” since Dwight’s free agency was a long way away (he’d be hitting free agency in 2011 most likely), so Otis hand a lot of options for how he wanted to build the team. Unlike Lebron, Dwight didn’t carry the same expectations on his young shoulders, and was (as far as one could tell in the media) a humble guy, committed to working hard, putting on muscle and learning the game.

Asset wise he had a 27 year old Steve Francis who was still putting up all-star numbers. He had 32 year old Grant Hill who had actually played 67 games last season, put up good numbers, and made an all-star team. 29 year old Cuttino Mobley, who had decent value as a shooting guard at the time, was unfortunately traded for used up Doug Christie right before Otis arrived, but he had 25 year old Turkoglu who was a solid role player at the time, and he had Jameer Nelson (aged 22) who looked like a promising young player. The rest of the roster was some serviceable vets and so-so players. He also had the 11th pick in the 2005 draft.

Phase 1- ineptitude
Most of Otis early moves really showed how little he understood about either team building or just basketball in general. It’s the 2005 offseason… Dwight’s basically stuck here for 6 years, clearly you should try to build around him with young players from the draft, who will be there when Dwight is a free agent down the road. Or at least ensure there is cap space coming up, and you get players and a system which compliments him. Well, Otis did get cap space (more on that later), but otherwise he blundered almost everything.

- He hired Brian Hill to coach. Hill had not had a head coaching job in the NBA in years (and hasn’t since the Magic fired him). His first head coaching stint was with the Shaq/Penny Magic, which didn’t go at all well. He didn’t help keep Shaq, and he was fired midway through the following season after a player mutiny against him (led by Penny Hardaway). He then then had several disastrous seasons in Vancouver, before being fired once more. He was not famed for having a good system, or being especially well liked by the players. And he was being brought in to coach a team which included a player known to be troubled even then(Steve Francis). What part of this sounded like a good idea? The contract he gave him also showed very little foresight… 4 years $12 mill? What made them think they needed to pay Brian Hill, who had been without a head coaching gig for over 5 years (and not by choice). Why lock him in for that long? Stupid.
- He used the #11 pick on a guy who a) was not very good, and b) had no intention of coming to play in the NBA, or even any interest. Apparently it never once occurred to Otis to call up Vasquez or his agent and find out if he was even going to come to the NBA (and if so when). As if this wasn’t bad enough, he passed over all-stars like Danny Granger & David Lee, even solid NBA players like Jarrett Jack or Nate Robinson would have been big improvements.
- He did make one good move in the draft that year, trading for Marcin Gortat a former 2nd rounder. Unfortunately he didn’t bring him over for 2 years (and the rest of that story doesn’t end well either).
- Otis made no attempt to move Grant Hill, and while I Hill was hard to move with his injury history, the general plan to keep veterans around Dwight just stunk.
- Otis realised into his first season what should have been obvious early on- Steve Francis (who had been traded because he could not co-exist with an all-star big man, could in fact not exist with his up and coming all-star big man). Francis was traded during the season for the expiring contract of Penny, and the young Trevor Ariza, which was a great move. It gave the Magic huge cap space for 2007 to build a young core around Dwight. It was also great that they were able to make the remaining $49+ mill on Steve Francis contract the problem of Isiah Thomas for the next 3 years.
- He made the bad decision to trade Kelvin Cato and his 2007 draft pick for Darko and Arroyo. This was a really poor decision, because it showed no understand of Darko’s form to that point (never mind that he plays the same position as your franchise player). The pick got used on Stuckey, which wasn’t great, but it would have been a lot better going forward than Darko.

Overall this was a bad first season for Otis. The team won the same number of games as the previous year (treadmilling), and he had given the team no direction. He’d added very little young talent to the team aside from Ariza. But he’d gotten cap space, so the future was bright.

Phase 2- Clowningly bad
Here is where Otis moves start to really become indefensible. Firstly, he drafts JJ Reddick this offseason at #11. The very next pick he could have taken Thabo, a better and more rounded player. Plus that draft had a lot of talents Otis missed as usual- Rondo and Kyle Lowry were available in the first round, and Paul Milsap in the second. Anyway, the Magic have another treadmill season of 40 wins, and get swept in round 1 of the playoffs despite Dwight becoming an all-NBA teamer. But that’s alright. I can forgive the Magic’s poor direction, given they thought cap space could save them, but what is hard to forgive is the contract to Rashard Lewis.

He saved the cap space for that?! It wasn’t just acquiring Rashard that was bad, it was fine to get him… but why would they need to outbid themselves? Rashard had already proven in his last free agency that he was all about the money, when he kept claiming he was thinking about going home to Houston for the MLE as a bargaining tactic to make the Sonics pay him more (he settled for a mere $60 mill contract, almost half what he got from Otis). Nobody would have paid Rashard anything like this much. If you want him so bad, and Rashard did used to have talent, give him the ordinary max- for 5 years and less bonuses (like the Clippers did with Elton Brand). The Sonics especially were heading into a rebuild, they wanted no part of paying Rashard. For the amount of money they spent on Rashard, they could have signed both Vince Carter and Billups that offseason (if they wanted vets). Billups was available, coming off an all-star and MVP candidate seasons, and signed for 4 years/46 mill. And in 2007 Carter signed a 4 year/$61.8 mill contract. And this was back when Vince was 31 and coming off a 25-6-5 season with the Nets. Definitely one of the many better buys Otis could have made. It’s not like Rashard was really young either, he was turning 28 and had a history of playing better in contract years, and having a confrontational approach to ownership (former Sonics owner Shultz hated the guy). In hindsight it’s very like Rashard took steroids to bolster his performance in big years, which would explain why he was busted in the 2009 offseason, and started sucking as soon as he came back without them.

The rest of the offseason was pretty average. They brought in Foyle as a back-up C, which was sensible (but negated giving up a 1st rounder for Darko a year earlier), and traded Ariza for corn chips (stupid!). Otis did make one smart move (finally), he hired a real coach- Stan Van Gundy, who had been unfairly hounded out of Miami in impossible circumstances. He had to eat 2 years of Hill’s contract, but it was the right choice. As a result, the team finally had a good season, winning 52 games and looking very promising. Making the 2nd round of the playoffs was an excellent outcome. Unfortunately Otis’ bad moves in the past had now tied his hands. He was committed to spending a lot of money to keep together a team who didn’t seem like they could improve from within to win a title, and who were now only 3 seasons away from Dwight being a free agent. If only Otis had built the team properly, instead of rushing to get veterans (or if only he had picked the right veterans to sign) then he wouldn’t be in this predicament.

The 2008 offseason was a solid-ish one for the Magic where they mostly stood pat. They got Petrius (a good move), and drafted Courtney Lee at #22. Lee was a good find, but the trade would have looked a lot better if the next 4 players hadn’t been Koufus, Ibaka, Batum and George Hill. All better players than Lee. The 2nd round had a bunch of good players too, from Pekovic to DeAndre Jordan and Omer Asik, all guys the Magic could have gotten.

Phase 3- False hope and tied hands
The good news was the Magic made the 2009 NBA finals. The bad news was they only made it because KG got a late season injury and missed the playoffs (allowing the Celtics to lose in 7 games), and because Lebron’s teammates still stunk (something that couldn’t last). They were never a realistic shot to beat the much more talented Lakers team, and I think that was pretty obvious to more serious observers. Panic time started to set in. Otis had 2 more seasons to convince Dwight to stay, and while the team had in theory just had their best performance it was extremely qualified. I won’t say Otis was wrong for trying to shake things up, the Magic clearly were not a title team as constituted, but the way he did it was really stupid. In a sense his hands were tied by earlier mistakes he’d made (trying to compete too early, building the team around older players, paying too much for those players, etc). Having made so many mistakes, they in turn forced him to make more shortsighted decisions to try and keep the team in contention (especially when the first news the Magic got in the offseason was that Rashard was being suspended for PED’s, and promptly sucked on his return- Otis response to the scandal was classic, saying he was “not surprised”-http://www.aolnews.com/2009/08/06/magic-gm-not-shocked-by-lewis-steroid-suspension/ way to give the media a headline).

His initial panic move, trading Rafer/Battie/Lee for Carter/Ryan Anderson was actually not that bad. Rafer’s value was high, and it was a good time to move him, and in pure talent terms he probably “won” the trade. However Lee fit the team better than Carter (who was now falling off) did, and Battie was a positive influence on Dwight. Battie was an expiring in 2010, and Otis should have been trying to create cap space, not add more contracts. Indeed, that was the reason for trading the often underachieving Turkoglu for cash. To help clear future cap room.

His 2009 offseason signings were good and bad (mostly bad). He signed Matt Barnes for a 1 year deal on the cheap, which was good. But then he refused to keep him for 2 years and 9 million in the 2010 offseason. This would be sensible, except in 2009 he also signed:
- Bass in 3 years and over $12 mill
- White chocolate for a 2 year deal with his vet minimum
Then in 2010 he signs Duhon for a 4 year $16 mill deal (why?), and Q.Rich for over $10 mill drawn out over 4 years (again, why?). He gave Reddick a 3 year $20mill contract in 2010 as well, so clearly the guy wasn’t saving dollars for cap space… he just didn’t think Barnes was that good, when in fact he’d have been much better than the guys Otis signed.
His 2010 draft pick of Orton was likewise a failure.

Finally came the biggest panic move yet. After the team was predictably eliminated in the 2010 playoffs by the Celtics (despite an excellent 59 win season) Otis traded Rashard for Gilbert Arenas, who had barely played basketball in the last few years (and hadn’t been healthy since 2007). Arenas was a huge failure, who added a longer contract than Rashard’s was. Worse still, Otis was “a friend” of Arenas, which made Otis look nepotistic as well as incompetent, and cost the Magic ownership a fortune.

Otis then sent out one of his few good, young assets in Gortat and a non-trivial Euro big named Mirotic (who still hasn’t come over), along with Vince and Petrius, and brought back J.Rich, E.Clark and Turkoglu! Turkoglu sucked (especially in the 2011 playoffs) and added to the payroll (but I guess at this point Otis had got them so far over he just said F#@$ it), J.Rich wasn’t a good fit with his fairly mediocre shooting (and the Magic being a slow it down half court team who didn’t move in transition much), but in fairness his contract wasn’t any worse than Carters. The trade was a failure, and locked the Magic into salary cap doom even further. Gortat (of course) went to the Suns and ripped it up, something a lot of people had expected given how he’d looked when actually given court time. The Magic crashed and burnt in the 2011 playoffs, losing round 1 to the Hawks (while Dwight’s team mates looked horrible), and at this point reality kicked in. Dwight was not going to stay, and the team needed to move him for some compensation before his contract expired. Otis refused to acknowledge what was obvious to everyone, and instead traded for Big Baby Davis (a friend of Dwight’s) and gave him a 4 year $26 mill deal which looked naïve.

The end

What followed was an embarrassing 2012 season, for which Otis has to take his share of the blame. The public fights, the poor treatment of Stan Van Gundy, the total failure to resolve the Dwight situation, all of which led to Otis final, horrible mishandling of the whole Dwight fiasco. Threatening to trade him to a team he didn’t like, unless he signed an opt in, and amazingly being able to talk him into it no less. This was poorly done. If they had a realistic deal for Dwight, they should have made it. Dwight was clearly going to leave no matter what, the delay only contributed to the ruin of the 2012 season in which the Dwightless Magic were eliminated in the 1st round of the playoffs, further destroying Dwight’s trade value. Threatening to trade a guy if he doesn’t sign an extension is not smart, because there’s no reason to think 1 year later he’s going to be any more loyal to you, and another Dwightmare season will only hurt the team (and ticket sales) more. All hanging on to Dwight did was prevent them from better getter assets, made them too good to get a lotto pick in 2012, and left a bigger mess for Hennigan to clean up. The way the Jazz handled the Deron Williams situation was a lot smarter; once they knew he was going to leave 1 and a half years later, they moved while he had good value. The Magic kept deluding themselves Dwight would stay if they just did whatever he wanted, if they let him pick the coach and GM, brought enough of his buddies over (from Foye to Big Baby), etc, and that refusal to see hard truths killed them. They should have learnt from Shaq leaving.

Can you imagine if the Magic had gotten Lillard or Drummond by getting the Nets first rounder for Dwight? They probably could have gotten a much bigger package too given what the Nets were offering at one point, including Lopez (and given that the Nets gave up Lillard for Gerald Freaking Wallace). At the time this was rationalised by Magic fans, who claimed that the act of trading Dwight would have made the Nets too good to get a lotto pick, but what we know now is that the Magic front office knew all along how bad Dwight was hurting, and he needed to shut it down. The Nets would still unquestionably have gotten a high draft pick. Gerald Wallace after all was traded on March! Dwight shut it down soon anyway.

I mentioned some good points…
Otis was not without redeeming features. Firstly, he seemed to be good at forging relationships with players. It’s no easy feat to talk Dwight into signing an opt in for an extra year, and until the end days Otis had a good rep for getting along with players. He was a buddy of Arenas, and some of the players really liked him. He also often brought in good locker room guys who Dwight liked, from Battie to Foye, and seemed to be decent on PR to the fans. He didn’t win most trades, but he was astute enough to assemble decent talent around Dwight for most of the later years he was in Orlando, enough that they could be a contender type team. A lot of GM’s aren’t even savvy enough to do that. His clearing of cap space was well executed, even if he horribly messed up the actual signing part. Ultimately, what held him back was a lack of vision about how the team should have developed. Everything he did seemed to be a year by year response to the previous years events, when he should have come in straight away with a 3-5 year plan for how the next stage of the team’s development would happen. And if it went wrong, the owner should have fired him (I’d have fired him in 2007 after he tried to spend 119 mill on Rashard Lewis, which can’t have been the plan he pitched in 2005). Ultimately the guy came into a great situation with a blank check, and made moves with poor strategic vision which doomed the franchise. He deserves a lot of criticism for that.

[jman2585]

Donnie Nelson

Donnie Nelson is one of the hardest incumbent GM’s to rank for several reasons. Firstly he has an owner who interferes in what he does a lot. Secondly he has the notable advantage of having an owner who has for most of his tenure given him a blank cheque (except for re-signing Steve Nash for some bizarre reason). But thirdly, and most importantly, he suffers from the difficulty in deciding when his GM tenure begins at all. Donnie arrived in the Dallas front office in 1997 along with his father Don Nelson, who came in as GM/coach. Donnie’s job was to help Don Nelson out, with the hope that one day he’d be GM. The Mavs owner sold to Cuban several years later though, and where that transition began is impossible to say. His father was definitely still GM and helping with decisions through to 2005, and this creates an old dilemma of false causation. Fans of Donnie Nelson say “when something good happened, Donnie did that” and “when this bad thing happened, it was all his father/Cuban’s fault”. It’s highly unsatisfactory. Ultimately I think the only fair thing we can do is begin the timeline in 2005, when Don Nelson was fired as coach and left the Mavs (and when Donnie officially became sole GM). I think we should be mindful of what Donnie did before, but he can’t really get sole credit/blame for it, because he didn’t have full control.

Taking this perspective actually perspective does Donnie some favours. For one thing he isn’t blamed for the team playing Nellieball, which was clearly holding them back. Nor is he responsible for letting Nash go (Cuban takes the blame there), and having such unorthodox line-ups during the early 2000’s (Antoine Walker at the 5, really?). While it doesn’t give him the credit for the work he did overseas as a scout, helping to find Dirk, signing the first player from China, etc (and the first from the USSR when he was in Golden State), that’s the same for Sam Presti, who only gets assessed on his tenure as GM of OKC based on the stuff he actually did as GM in OKC, not the stuff he did for the Spurs as their top scout (where he was fantastic btw).

Someone earlier in this thread posted a summary of what they felt Donnie’s big achievements were, and I’ll post them again here, but bearing in mind that a lot of them do not fit in the chronology of Donnie as the actual GM of the Mavericks. So while we should be mindful of them, we cannot give Donnie credit for them in his capacity as GM.

Im curious why Donnie Nelson gets no mention?

Mavs won 50 games for 10+ straight, contender for most of that and the only constant was Dirk. And he was responsible for acquiring Nash/Dirk at the same time when his dad was technically the GM. He completely remade the team multiple times without the team ever drifting back to the lottery or even mediocrity. If Pop is going to get so much credit for the draft and rightfully so, Donnie probably should be credited for being the best trading GM of his era:

Tractor Traylor for Dirk/Nash(seperate deal but Dallas flipped the pick to Phoenix)
A pile of junk of which Eton Thomas was the best piece for Juwan
Juwan for Rafe/NVE
NVE for Jamison
Rafe for Walker
Walker for Henderson/Jet
Jamison for Stack/Devin/Damp(Laettner flipped to GSW)
Devin and junk for Kidd
JHO for Butler/Haywood/Stevenson
Damp for Tyson

Those are all major deals that Dallas "won".

Donnie’s tenure begins
Cuban finally made the decision to fire Donnie’s father, Don Nelson, who had tread on toes in the Dallas organisation for years. The slow start to the Mavericks 2005 season (they began the season 42-22), when contrasted to the Suns that season (who were ripping it up with Nash, who the Mavs had just foolishly let go for less than full value) was probably the final straw. It really drew a line under how poorly Nelson has used Nash’s talents. In addition, Don Nelson was clearly not using the players he’d been given on the current roster correctly, who were designed to play a slower, tougher and more defensive style of basketball, not “Nellieball as usual”. The move worked, and the Mavs finished the season 16-2 under Avery Johnson and made the 2nd round of the playoffs.

Heading into the 2005 offseason Donnie Nelson finally had the chance to shape the roster without the help or interference of his father, and playing any style he wanted. The moves he made over this period were all sensible. He added Diop and veteran wing defender Adrian Griffith, and otherwise kept the team together hoping for improvement from within, once they had a full year under Avery. Diop, who had once been a disgrace as a basketball player, turned out to be a savvy investment as he was able to improve to the point of being a credible shotblocking big off the bench, just what the Mavs needed. They won 60 games that year, and finally beat the Spurs despite Duncan going ballistic that series, almost wholly a result of their size advantage and tough D (Duncan was forced to play next to 3 swing men and a point guard that series, and the Mavs size ended up swinging it in their favour in what was an incredibly close 7 games series, one which was one stupid Manu foul away from going to the Spurs). The Mavs made it to the finals, and after going up seemed poised to finally win a ring. We all know how that ended.

Coming into the 2007 season Donnie hoped to recover from the finals fizzle. He brought in rookie Barea. He got rid of overpaid Marquis Daniels for overpaid (but better fitting) role playing big Austin Croshere, and brought in useful role playing vet wings like Buckner and Deavan George. Moving Marquis was just in time, as he succumbed to serious injuries that effectively finished him as a player, and would have made him very expensive to keep for a luxury tax laden team like the Mavs. The Mavs had an incredible 2007 regular season, winning a franchise best 67 wins, but developed a reputation as chokers after following up the 2006 finals disappointment (where they blew a 2-0 lead) with a 1st round sweep by an 8th seed (led by Cuban’s disgruntled former employee, coach Don Nelson). That one stung, and the Mavericks seemed direction wasn’t clear moving forward.

The Mavericks drop out of contention
Donnie tried to bolster the bench strength of the team coming into the 2008 season by adding vets like Eddie Jones and Trenton Hassell (in place of Buckner), but these 2 had nothing left in the tank. The 2008 Mavs were also hit by a slew of minor injuries, including to Devin Harris who Donnie Nelson resolved to trade while his value was high. Donnie certainly moved at the right time, although one wonders why he didn’t get more than old man Jason Kidd, especially given he had to include some first rounders that would have been nice to have in the future. The 2008 season was a failure however, as Kidd looked past his prime, with the Mavs winning a mere 51 games and being bundled out in the first round 4-1 by the Hornets. It seemed like the Mavs time has passed.

That offseason Donnie and Cuban made the right choice to fire Avery, as the team had started to tune him out. Avery is the sort of coach who is good in the short term, but long term the players get sick of his high pitched voice yapping in their ears. The players even came to Cuban and said he had to go. Donnie chose the best replacement possible in Rick Carlisle, a guy who was known for coaching great D, and being one of the better coaches in the NBA. In spite of injuries (Josh Howard in particular missed 30 games) the Mavs won 50 games again, and made it to the 2nd round.

Becoming contenders again
Donnie made a number of smart moves to turn the Mavs back into contenders, though greatly aided by Cuban’s willingness to spend huge amounts of money. Firstly he traded spare parts for Shawn Marion, who had worn his welcome out in Toronto (who didn’t want to pay him anymore). He turned K-Hump into gritty vet Najera, and midway through the 2010 season he managed to get rid of washed out and now cancerous Josh Howard in exchange for some guys the Wizards didn’t want to pay in Caron Butler, Stevenson and Brendan Haywood. These were smart moves that added 3 important role players to the Mavs, however in fairness they were also moves Donnie could make because Cuban was willing to spend crazy amounts of money (and lose money most years, so much so that his co-owner Ross Perot sued Cuban for irresponsible behaviour in managing the business). In the 2010 season the team won 55 games, before going down in the 1st round to the Spurs 4-2. However in the 2011 offseason the final ingredients came into play, when Donnie turned old man Dampier into Tyson Chandler. Midseason in 2011 the Mavs also picked up Peja, whose clutch shooting was vital to the 2011 Mavs title run. This represented the peak of Donnie Nelson’s success.

The decision to reload
Deciding to take a step backwards right after you’ve won a championship is a pretty unorthodox one. I don’t say Donnie was wrong, I think the 2011 Mavs were clearly placeholders until the Heat gelled, added some depth and got it together (which happened the next season), so in that sense I think Donnie got it right. I’m honestly not sure the 2011 Mavs could have even gotten to the 2012 finals ahead of the ridiculously stacked Thunder. However the way Donnie went about it was clearly flawed. He got (virtually) nothing for Tyson Chandler, who he basically insulted by offering a one year deal. Of all the guys who should have been let go, or moved, Tyson was the last of the bunch as he offered something that was hardest to replace. Once he left, it was the end of any dream the Mavs could contend. The Mavs more sensibly chose to let Barea and Stevenson leave in free agency, while Peja retired. Obviously Donnie’s plan was to save cap space for the 2012 free agency market, and that was a plan of sorts, but it forced Donnie to restock with short term contracts. Guys like Vince Carter and Delonte West who weren’t good enough to compensate for what was lost. Gambling on Odom to fill the talent void also proved a huge blunder, as Odom was mentally incapable of playing outside of LA anymore, and contributed virtually nothing to the Mavs. In retrospect Nelson really should have spent more time talking to Odom, and getting insider info on his mental state given the guy was turning 32 and had 2 years on his contract for big money. Anyway, there went the Mavs trade exception (money that would have surely been better spent on Chandler… but never mind).

The 2012 season was, unsurprisingly, a disappointment. Dirk came in out of shape and struggled to get back to form, while Odom’s situation became a huge distraction for the team. The team had the equivalent of a 44 win season, and got scrubbed in the first round, then had to sit through the 2012 free agency and see every major free agent turn them down. In retrospect, this shouldn’t have been a big surprise for Cuban or Donnie. They’d seen the exact same thing happen to San Antonio (who had arguably a much stronger position at the time), and should have learnt from that lesson (namely that it’s near impossible to build a title team through free agency, even if the Heat did it).

In the 2012 offseason the Mavs began clearing house for another run at free agency (which suggests they’ve learnt nothing from the 2012 situation). They managed to unload Odom’s contract to the Clippers for cash, which was great, and picked up some problematic players on 1 year contracts like OJ Mayo (who has looked pretty decent in the circumstances), and Eddy Curry and Derek Fisher (who didn’t). Brand, Kaman and Collison were as good as the Mavs could have hoped for on 1 year deals (which non-flawed players don’t really sign), but the Mavs have now missed the 2012 playoffs (thanks in part to Dirk’s injury and struggle to regain his form), and the question has to be asked what the next steps are. A large part of Donnie’s legacy as a GM will be decided this offseason, and how he moves the struggling Mavs forward.

Conclusion
Donnie Nelson was a good GM overall. He made sensible (but not especially insightful) trades, which made the team better. However he was usually only able to pull off these trades because he had a competitive advantage, namely his owner would spend huge amounts of money, take bad big contracts, etc, just to give the team a little bit more talent. Now that Cuban has stopped doing that Donnie’s touch doesn’t look so magical anymore. Donnie had a lot of money to spend on scouting, or on bringing over any player who might be good, and while people remember the times it worked (like Diop or Mayo) they forget all the times it failed (Zhang, Pavel, Curry, Fisher, etc). Donnie hasn’t been very good in the draft, despite the huge resources Cuban lets him put into scouting, and there haven’t been any real homeruns where you could look at one of Donnie’s moves and talk about how great it was. Even his best acquisition of Tyson Chandler wasn’t some masterstroke of insight. Chandler had just had 2 injury plagued seasons and had 1 more year at huge money (and wanted a big contract). The Mavs were able to get him for an expiring, and that gamble worked out, but it could just as easily not have worked out if Chandler’s health had continued to be the same as previous seasons. Indeed, Sam Presti, one of the best GM’s in the NBA, refused to trade for Chandler because doctors were so concerned about Chandler’s injury history. Unless Donnie is more knowledgeable about medical science than the host of NBA doctors who warned teams off, I think we can chalk that up mainly to luck. It seems from now on Cuban is going to have a budget, and spend more responsibly, so it will be interesting to see how Donnie builds a team with these new circumstances.

[jman2585]

Lance Blanks

Lance Blanks provides the model of what not to do, when you are trying to rebuild an aging team. He arrived in August of 2010, after the Suns had lost Amare and were clearly not going to be a contender anymore. In addition Steve Nash was turning 36, it should have been incredibly obvious that the team needed to rebuild. The decision to keep Nash and try to compete was really a shortsighted one, and I don’t think it’s sufficient to say “ownership wanted to win”. Blanks job is to convince ownership of the smart course of action, not make bad decisions (and almost all his decisions were bad). Hanging on to Nash so they could have 2 years of mediocrity, then trade him 2 years later, has to rank as one of the worst decisions of all time for the Suns. Let’s break down Blanks moves, and cover why he was so incompetent.

Blanks won only a single trade in his tenure as GM- the very first one he made, and he was trading with Otis Smith (an awful GM), so we shouldn’t get too excited about it. In this trade he got Gortat for Earl Clark, while managing to get rid of Turkoglu’s awful contract. Swapping J.Rich for Vince Carter was also a pretty sensible move, even if only from a ticket sales perspective. Their contracts even ran out at the same time. Gortat was a great pick up though, who was kept on a good contract.

After that, every trade or draft pick he made was terrible, and almost every signing he made was bad too. Even the signings that weren’t bad in terms of value for money were still poor, because they hindered the strategic direction of the team (or what should have been the strategic direction, namely a rebuild). A summary of the bad moves Blanks has made:
- Traded Dragic and Mirotic for Brooks (who immediately left in free agency). Gave up 2 good assets for nothing.
- Drafted Markieff Morris, a guy who looks like a career journeyman at best, passing over Kawhi, Vucevic, Shumpert, Tobias Harris, Faried, Chandler Parsons, even guys like Jimmy Butler or Dontas would have been smarter.
- Drafted Kendall Marshall, a clear bust, over guys like Henson, Harkless, heck, almost anyone would have been better. Right now Kendall Marshall is one of only 3 first rounders to have negative win shares (along with Austin Rivers and Marquis Teague… ouch).
- Traded Nash for 2 first round picks. This doesn’t look as bad as it should, because of the Lakers unexpected woes, but rest assured this was awful. If traded 2 years ago Nash would have brought back a much higher return. Not only that, think of the 2 high lotto picks from the 2011 and 2012 draft that the Suns would have also had if they hadn’t insisted of 2 treadmill seasons those years. Instead the Suns waited until 2013 to tank (though not on purpose), a year in which the draft is severely lacking in talent. Other teams like the Raptors would probably have paid more than the Lakers too.
- Paid a 3 year $18 mill contract to cancer Michael Beasley. Already looks terrible
- Paid 4 years and $30 mill to Dragic, which isn’t awful, but isn’t great either
- Tried to offer gimpy Eric Gordon a 4 year and $58+ mill contract. Overpaying, and also overpaying to try and “win now”, when you should be rebuilding.
- The Scola and Jermaine O’Neal pick ups were dumb for the same reason. Scola and JO will only help give you extra wins you don’t want. If Gortat had stayed healthy the Suns would now be picking closer to 10th because of their stubborn attempts to win this year.
- Traded useful player Robin Lopez for mega bust Wesley Johnson and a pick which has so much protection on it you won’t get it until it’s meaningless. Dumb trade.
- Although you were happy to move the productive Lopez for nothing, your GM declined to move Gortat while he value was highest (before he got hurt) because he had totally unrealistic demands on OKC (Lamb and the Raptors lotto pick, lol, as if Presti will give you both those).
Blanks actually has some competitive advantages too. Although ownership is not rich, and wants to win on a budget, they do have a famed medical staff who players respect. Cap space in the coming offseasons would have been a good way to add talent to your team if you had a bunch of lotto picks from doing a proper rebuild. Then you could be looking at the playoffs in the next few years, like the Hornets are. Instead the Suns are in a position where they’ve got virtually nothing to build around, and will be stuck in the lotto for years. All in all I’d want Blanks fired before the next draft if I was a Suns fan. He has done almost nothing right, and still shows no grasp of team direction (just commit to rebuilding already!)

[gaspar]

The thread is a joke

[jman2585]

Feel free to specify why Gaspar. I've generally had only positive feedback aside from you and Mystic.

[Revived]

Its actually a good thread. I like that you actually have a very detailed and accurate assessment of the GMs.

However, there are a few points I want to make.

Why do you have Dragic as a bad signing even though you say yourself its a good one?

Also, the Robin Lopez trade was a fantastic one. He was a RFA AND he sucked balls. I would have been fine with the Suns packaging a 2nd rd pick with Robin just to get rid of him..so getting back a first round pick no matter how protected it is was a pleasant surprise. Wesley Johnson also has actually been good since he got starter minutes. That was definitely a great trade by the Suns.

And you have too many 'what-if" scenarios. The Suns did not get Eric Gordon so you can't rule that as a bad signing. We have a great training staff and Gordon actually wanted to play for us so how do you know that wouldn't have worked out if we had signed him?

The Scola and JO pick ups were great! Scola now has positive trade value and can be a rolemodel for whichever young PF we get as Scola can groom em. He's one of the leaders of this team. Same thing with JO except for maybe the trade value part. O'Neal can help whichever young center we get within in the next 2 years. And its not like either has a bad contract.

You bash the Kendall Marshall pick but the Sun had decided on letting Nash go and needed a replacement...they did draft the best pure PG of the draft which is what they wanted. And its not like many that were picked after Marshall has exactly been shining elsewhere. I don't think the Suns thought they would have a chance at Dragic when making this pick.

And I really want to know where you got this Gortat to OKC for Lamb/TOR pick from. Provide source please?

[LarsV8]

Its actually a good thread. I like that you actually have a very detailed and accurate assessment of the GMs.

It's actually fairly stupid.

Reading through Morey's synopsis, there is a clear negative bias and blatant ignorance regarding the majority of the moves.

[b_mind]

Seriously, I don't get why people even think this thread is any good. All I see is a bunch of heavily opinionated and biased long exhausted bull spewed out. Only seem deceptively "good" because of how long winded each posts are... 'must be good, look at how long each posts are' and detailed bs there is in them

Ok, I'm done with my rant. You can continue with this useless nonsensical thread.

Good luck.